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The aim of this paper was to understand in which direction policies change in periods of crisis. Do they lead to the hardening of norms or the introduction of softer rules governing public policies? Based on the study of policy change in two periods of economic governance-the 2003-2005 Stability and Growth Pact crisis, and the 2009-2013 economic governance crisis, this article explains why the policy change in the first case led to softer governance mechanisms, while during the second crisis, soft governance mechanisms were transformed into hard law. In applying the multiple streams framework to study these policy changes, we argue that the wider the window of opportunity and the more coherent the coalition of policy entrepreneurs, the higher the possibility for these actors to push in favour of legally constraining norms. Hence, it is not solely the power or capacity of one policy entrepreneur, in this case-the German government-that leads to hardening of soft law, but the coherence of the coalition the policy entrepreneur is able to build. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European crisis has many causes. Worse, the different causes are mutually reinforcing. National economies lost competitiveness within the single currency, governments and households lived beyond their means, banks and other financial firms moved capital across borders and then called it back home again in a fit of panic. Europe is suffering as a consequence. European policy-making is suffering as well. With so many ‘causes’, politicians are dividing their attention across different and at times competing remedies. Europe appears to be ‘muddling through’ rather than acting decisively as a result. This paper argues that European policymakers should focus their attention on financial causal mechanisms. Although there is some truth to claims about lost competitiveness and excessive borrowing, a close focus on financial markets promises to offer the greatest leverage over the largest number of national economies. A close focus on finance also offers a clear choice between competing policy agendas: Europe's politicians must choose either to accept a renationalization of finance or they must embrace reforms necessary to stabilize international financial market integration. Only once that choice is made, and the necessary policy agendas are put in place, should politicians again turn their focus to issues of second-order (if still significant) importance related to market structural reform, fiscal consolidation, or asset market regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an alternative interpretation of the euro crisis to the dominant sovereign debt narrative. I argue that at the core of the euro crisis is a balance of payments disequilibrium—only this time the balance of payments crisis is taking place within a common currency. The frame of reference—sovereign debt crisis or balance of payments crisis—makes a significant difference not only for determining the causes of the euro crisis but also for the adequacy of policy measures to address the crisis. The sovereign debt crisis narrative has missed the interrelated nature of the macroeconomic imbalances within the eurozone. Despite the expectation of many observers at the time of the creation of the euro that the common currency would distribute the burden of adjustment more evenly across its member countries, the reverse is actually true. Compared to the European Monetary Union's predecessor regime, the European Monetary System (EMS), deficit countries are saddled with even higher adjustment costs in the common currency than before. In particular, they no longer have the tool of a nominal exchange rate change to address balance of payments disequilibria. This situation allows surplus countries—most importantly Germany—to exercise leverage over the key bargaining issues at stake in solving the eurozone crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Virtually non-existent five years ago, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into Europe has surged spectacularly in recent years in an international context of declining FDI globally. While the stock of Chinese FDI in Europe is still minuscule, the flows show the rapidly growing interest of Chinese companies in being present in Europe, both through greenfield investment and through mergers and acquisitions. This surge of Chinese FDI occurred concomitantly to the explosion of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the general economic downturn in many countries of the European Union (EU). This paper asks whether the European crisis contributed to the surge of Chinese FDI in Europe. In particular, did this surge occur as a result of an explicit strategy formulated by governments in EU Member States in order to dig their countries out of the crisis? The main argument is that the crisis has provided Chinese investors with two types of bargains: economic bargains due to depressed prices and a greater number of assets for sale, and political bargains due to the lessened political resistance to deals that may have been objectionable in flusher times. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Arctic is becoming increasingly important in terms of energy, security and climate issues on a global scale. Following the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean, which have presented Arctic strategies in recent years, the European Union has started developing an Arctic policy. While more or less consistent guiding principles have been established via several papers and communications, these have been backed up with concrete instructions and practical action to a diverging and an overall rather low degree. As a non-coastal state, the European Union will have to rely on its membership in relevant international and regional organisations, instruments such as the Northern Dimension and cooperation with member and partner states, also in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the extent of euro area policy convergence during the third stage of EMU. The policy convergence hypothesis from international political economy posits that euro zone national economies should become more similar over time in terms of economic growth, employment and inflation outcomes as a result of using a common currency and taking the same regional monetary policy. Yet the descriptive data show little evidence of euro area policy convergence post-1999. One possible explanation for the lack of macroeconomic convergence within the euro zone is advanced (fiscal policy divergence), and the implications of policy divergence for the long-term viability of EMU are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]