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This paper explores how Japan employed language education to justify Japanese imperial surveillance practices by examining the depiction of policemen and military police officers in Japanese language textbooks used by Korean primary students during the colonial period under Japanese rule. The analysis of the Japanese language textbooks used during this period uncovered the colonial educational goals and ideologies presented to Korean students, the ideal colonial citizens desired by the ruling system, and colonial aims furthered. This study investigates the ideologies presented in the textbooks using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Visual Image Analysis (VIA) by analyzing eight textbooks that were used in Japan and Korea. Both images and texts relating to Japanese government officials in the textbooks for Koreans from the colonial era are analyzed. The study reveals that the textbooks positioned Korean students to accept and integrate Japanese ideologies and attempted to indoctrinate Koreans into believing that the Japanese government officials were kind and cooperative, while also maximizing their authority over the colonized in their portrayal. The portrayal of government officials in the textbooks further reinforced this by showing the colonized having to display good behavior to authority figures, while not conveying any negative images of the government officials.

Escalation of great power rivalry resulting from China's rise and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted Japan to align its foreign and security policies more closely. This paper analyzes how ODA policy, which the Japanese government regards as a crucial diplomatic instrument, has been modified in the face of these changes. The most significant transformation is the securitization of ODA, or the deployment of ODA to advance Japan's national security interests. This trend is evident in the emergence of a new type of ODA that aims to contribute to Japan's security interests by strengthening the deterrence capabilities of developing countries involved in territorial disputes with China. Notably, Japan is justifying this new ODA trend in the name of upholding the universal value of the international rule of law. In other words, Japan is shifting the focus of assistance away from domestic issues of democracy and human rights in each recipient country toward the rule of law in international relations. This is a manifestation of Japan's effort to strike a careful balance between upholding universal values and avoiding the risk of offending incumbent governments in recipient countries with questionable domestic governance records. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the shadow of China's rise involving relative US hegemonic decline, Japan is considered to have played supplementary and complementary roles to buttress the international status quo and to have been engaged in a geoeconomic competition with China. Yet, in October 2018, Japan and China announced an about-face on their respective bilateral policy lines from competition to cooperation. This change begs the question of if the two in fact followed a competitive game at the grand-strategic levels. The study will cast a doubt about the assumed link of the two countries' declared policy lines and actual policy actions and argue for the case of a propaganda rivalry. This study will examine Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" against China's "Belt and Road Initiative" Strategy, with focus on their status within the respective national strategy systems, financial resources and funds, and project feasibility/viability. Then the study will identify some crucial factors of the two countries' setbacks and analyze their transitory reconciliation. This paper is intended to exemplify a realist approach to systematic and critical examination of "strategy", a most abused term, that often misguides foreign and security policy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been much debate about the motivations and ramifications of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's desire for Japan to play a more proactive role in strategic affairs in Southeast Asia. The paper argues that the desire to do so stems from a broadening of Japan's interests in East Asia from one of merely defending Japanese administration and control over what Tokyo calls the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea to concern about the future of the maritime and strategic order in East Asia more generally vis-à-vis China's rise. In this context, the Abe administration views the limiting of Chinese assertive actions in Southeast Asia as critical to Tokyo's own national interests -- a direction in Japanese policy that is widely welcomed by most countries in Southeast Asia due to the their concerns about Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. The paper then goes on to examine the still considerable legal, domestic and economic constraints when it comes to Japan playing a broader strategic role in Southeast Asia. In doing so, it argues that the greatest areas of impact Japan might have will be through using its weight in multilateral forums to balance Chinese influence, and as an exporter of military technology and hardware to Southeast Asian countries who are similarly concerned about Chinese behavior in the region and disruption to the post-World War Two East Asian order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To many observers Japanese decision-making is an enigma that defies conventional analysis. Neither the traditional rational actor model of decision-making, nor alternative pluralist models proposed for the analysis of Western democracies fit the Japanese case. As a result Japanese security policy decision-making is described as ‘reactive’ or even non-existent. Likewise, the anomaly of Japanese decision-making is ultimately predicted to be resolved through a process of ‘normalization’ whereby Japanese policy formation evolves into a form that does fit these models. However, this paper contends that the fact that Japan’s security decision-making does not fit commonly-used models is due rather to the limitations of those models. Japan’s security policy, like that of all states, is gradually evolving, but this does not mean that it is about to become just like the West. This paper addresses how a conjuncture of external factors and internal factors has stimulated important changes in Japanese security policy-making which are frequently missed or misinterpreted by observers. In order to understand Japanese security policy-making, and to chart its future course, a refined cybernetic approach is introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Second World War, Japan began paying war reparations and instituted a strategy of international positioning - based on international cooperation activities - that aimed to ensure the supply of natural resources to its production and trade. Economic security became the target of Japanese cooperation. Japan soon became a major donor, whose strategy has been permeated by its interests. Taking a critical perspective, this paper analyses the evolution of the Japanese cooperation strategy, in particular the changes promoted by the prime minister, Shinzo Abe. Its starting point is a review of the stages of Japanese cooperation (emphasising the outside interference the country has had to respond to), the underpinning of which has shifted from the principle of economic security via the principle of human security to its present greater focus on strategic security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “national systems of innovation” (NSI) framework for analyzing innovative performance and policy has been an important and influential area of scholarship for nearly 20 years, since the first articulation of the concept in Freeman (Technology policy and economic performance: lessons from Japan, 1987). Surprisingly, however, the large literature on national systems of innovation has devoted little attention to the role of defense-related R&D investment and innovation. This paper surveys the role of national defense within national innovation systems, focusing in particular on the United States during and after the Cold War, including a brief description of post-9/11 trends in defense-related and national security investments in R&D. I also summarize some of the abundant literature on the role of defense-related R&D and procurement within specific sectors of U.S. industry, including aircraft, machine tools, and information technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vacuum circuit breakers (VCBs) have been developed and widely applied in Japan to meet the requirements of increasing energy consumption and also in national security of various areas. As a result, for example, a 168 kV two break porcelain type and a 100 kA one break VCB have already appeared in the Japanese market and they are currently being exported to world-wide markets. VCBs interrupt currents in vacuum, and this means they do not exhaust dissolved gases which are sometimes harmful to the human body or cause effects on the environment. Therefore, by its nature, the recycling of materials and safety to the human body have been realized, and also no global warming effects would be expected. Energy is extremely essential and important in human daily life, and many types of circuit breakers play important roles in electrical power transmission and distribution systems to maintain the systems reliability and safety by switching the systems under several conditions. Since vacuum circuit breakers possess a lot of advantages such as high current interrupting capabilities, small size, and Low cost, they will be used much more in the future, and at this moment, we believe it is very worthy to discuss and consider thoroughly future trends of VCBs. In this paper, the results of the developments in Japan will be reviewed, the reflection of the results will be stated, and the subjects of engineering in the 21st century will be discussed. These will include recycling, safeguards to the human body and the fireless nature of VCBs; and it will be demonstrated that the developmental works of VCBs are being wonderfully explored in Japan now and in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu, or Senkaku, Islands in the East China Sea has flamed up between China and Japan. This conflict deserves further attention because of its potential of being the spark to unleash a Sino-Japanese firefight. However, this was not the first time the two Northeast Asian great power rivals have at least verbally fought over who is the rightful owner to the resource-rich archipelago and surrounding waters. The controversy can be traced from post-World War II, over the 1970s and 1990s, to today. The entire process of this largely verbal fistfight can be best understood through the Copenhagen School's securitization and de-securitization concepts. Japan, being in the role of the administrator, naturally more often desecuritized the issue in the past than did China, while China mostly strategically securitized the dispute. For the current round of escalation over the dispute, interestingly, Japan acted as initial securitizing actor. This paper aims to contextualize the instances in which the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has been either securitized or desecuritized by either party. The analysis adds nuances to securitization theory, especially concerning the role of societal uprisings in securitizing a dispute such as the one at hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Change has been the dominant theme in Japan for the last decade, and none is more profound than the transformation in Japan's security policy. The seemingly immovable Yoshida doctrine is crumbling under the Koizumi administration's efforts to beef up the nation's security in response to the North Korean threat. Within the last few years, Japan saw the first post-1945 overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces and the launching of its first spy satellite. To many, this represents a revolutionary change in Japanese security posture, but in reality they are the culmination of a long-drawn evolutionary process that begun since the end of the Cold War. This paper argues that the current security renaissance is a sign of the emerging Koizumi Doctrine grand strategy, in which Japan aims to eradicate the "economic giant, political pygmy" moniker by expanding its global influence through limited global security cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a critical perspective on the Bush Doctrine's impact on the Asian, especially Southeast Asian, security order. It proceeds in four parts. The first examines the problematic nature of the Bush Doctrine, such as its deliberate conflation of preemptive and preventive war and its expansive scope as a "grand strategy of transformation." This is followed by an analysis of the responses of Southeast Asian states to the doctrine. The third part looks at the "imitation" effects of the Bush Doctrine in Asia-Pacific, where it may be reshaping, national security strategies of some states such as Australia and Japan. The last part of the paper evaluates how the Bush Doctrine, with its underlying, basis in U.S. power dominance in a unipolar global setting, affects the Asian security architecture, particularly the balance between bilateral and multilateral security approaches to regional order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks on the objective of Shinzo Abe, prime minister of Japan, for the protection of Japanese people and revision of National Defense Program Guidelines in Japan which includes advancement of defense diplomacy, procurement of defense equipment, and expansion of security cooperation network. It focuses on the capabilities, motives and consequences of Japan's Self-Defense Policy. The bilateral relations between China and Japan are also discussed.

This article offers an alternative perspective of Japan's international human security diplomacy concerning the underlying motivations that has caused Japan to pursue its international human security diplomacy in such proactive and aggressive manner. So far Japan's involvement in the international human security initiatives had only been examined separately in the literature, with not much attention been given towards it linkage with Japan's relentless efforts and restraints throughout the decades towards becoming a normal state. This article argues that when Japan's involvement in international human security is studied together with its underlying ambition of becoming a normal state, the approach can no longer be solely understood as Japan's effort to compensate the imbalances between its reactive international political posture and its significant status as the world's third-biggest economy. Instead, this involvement should be examined from the perspective of Japan's own national security requirements. Most importantly, it should be examined alongside Japan's effort to strategically participate, contribute, and gain greater autonomy in the international political sphere under its envisioned status as a normal country. From this perspective, the motivation behind Japan's persistence and aggressive pursuit of its international human security diplomacy becomes clearer under Prime Minister Abe's "proactive contribution to peace". It implies a shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state' that sees Japan playing a more active role in responding to the structural changes of the international security environment. In particular, it corresponds with Japan's effort under the Abe administration to inculcate worldwide awareness that becoming a "normal state" is a prerequisite for Japan to collaborate with the international community and contribute effectively towards sustainable world peace and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Asia the rise of both China and India is becoming a reality. Their growth is of an unprecedented scale. While the US continues to be the only superpower, it needs the help of like-minded countries to deal with international challenges. Beyond 2030, the G3-the US, China and India as the pillars of a tri-polar world-may become a reality. In order to cope with changes of this magnitude, increased cooperation between the US, Europe and democracies in Asia is essential. To be successful in adopting this new strategic landscape, it is necessary to strengthen the ties between Europe and democracies in Asia. In this regard, rule-making is the key area for success. Japan is contributing to these efforts by applying a comprehensive engagement policy towards China while strengthening its alliance with the US. Establishing strategic ties with India is also important. Japan and Europe can do much to help achieve stability. After all, Japan needs a strong and engaging Europe, just as Europe needs a strong and active Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Second World War, Japan was occupied by the United States, regaining its sovereignty in 1952 with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty. During the Cold War, Japan maintained a low military profile, refraining from developing strong military forces and from deploying them overseas. Its security relations with East Asian countries were not very tense. However, Japan's security policy has undergone significant transformation after the Cold War. This change was prompted by the weakening of the left in Japanese domestic politics, North Korea's missile and nuclear development programmes, and the rise of China's power. Instead of making active efforts at improving its relations with its neighbouring states, Japan has taken a realist policy of strengthening its own military capability, enhancing its alliance, and building new security ties with states that have similar security concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty-first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we explore why oil import patterns differ between states with a view to understanding the relationship between agent-based explanations such as strategy and structural explanations-for example, geography We compare degree of diversification between China and Japan in an effort to explore the relationship between agency and structure in the formation of energy security policy The China-Japan comparison is contextualized with reference to the baseline case of the United States, a well-diversified importer. We employ the Shannon-Wiener index of diversity to assess the extent of oil import diversification, and temporal changes in diversification for China, Japan, and the United States. A key finding is that China's statist approach has allowed it to diversify its sources of imported oil more quickly than Japan's hybrid approach. In fact, since becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China's sources of imported oil have diversified quite rapidly Japan's overreliance on the Middle East for much of its imported oil has been endemic since 1973. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the important and enormously complicated issue of US-Japan Ballistic Missile Defence1 (BMD) cooperation. A context for analysis is developed through the consideration of China's views of the causes and consequences of the highly controversial December 2003 Koizumi Cabinet decision to commit Japan to the US-led missile defence programme. An analytical trajectory is drawn between that decision and the emerging shapers of China's strategic thinking on the process of political, legislative and force-structure reform, which is underway in Japan's security policy. It begins by discussing the rationalisation used by Tokyo and Washington to justify BMD cooperation, and how it is linked at the various different levels of China's policymaking to 'new' threats that have emerged over the last seven years. This connection highlights the pressing need to distinguish between the following questions: what are missile defences (in an operational context), and what are they being used for? It concludes by arguing that the Koizumi and subsequent administration's enthusiasm for US-Japan BMD cooperation is, to many Chinese, tantamount to a long-term Japanese commitment to the materialisation of a new regional security order - one that is capable of forcing Japan to take on a larger security role and severely curtailing China's strategic reach to the outside world. This, for now, makes the very idea of missile defences one of the biggest impediments to more open, trusting and cooperative relations between China and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of economic issues, in a comprehensive multilateral and bilateral context, has been receiving increased attention in writings about the Korean Peninsula lately. This article adds to this debate by analysing Japan's relations with North Korea from an economic diplomacy perspective. The concept of 'negative economic diplomacy' is introduced to understand actions of the Japanese government, which had tried economic engagement in various ways until the early 1990s, but hardened its stance thereafter. Tokyo seems to have come to the conclusion that North Korean rulers are more willing to preserve the status quo than some wish to believe and, consequently, started to use the North Korean threat to justify Japan's controversial military enhancement in a context of uncertainty about the United States' commitment and an increasingly stronger China. is strategy was practised through a negative approach to economic diplomacy of withholding economic benefits-in policy fields ranging from the abductees and normalisation of diplomatic relations, to trade relations, sanctions and the six-way process. Japan's policy was most outspoken from late 2002 until at least mid-2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 1990s, Japan has sent increasing numbers of its military forces overseas. It has also assumed a more active military role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Neither conventional constructivist nor realist approaches in international relations theory can adequately explain these changes or, more generally, changes in Japan's security policy since the end of World War II. Instead, Japan's postwar security policy has been driven by the country's powerful antimilitarism, which reflects the following normative and realist factors: pacifism, antitraditionalism, and fear of entrapment. An understanding of the influence of these three factors makes it possible to explain both Japan's past reluctance to play a military role overseas and its increasing activism over the last decade. Four case studies--the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the anti-Vietnam War period, increases in U.S.-Japan military cooperation during detente, and actions taken during the administration of Junichiro Koizumi to enhance Japan's security profile--illustrate the role of antimilitarism in Japan's security policy. Only through a theoretical approach based on analytical eclecticism--a research strategy that considers factors from different paradigms--can scholars explain specific puzzles in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many Chinese and Japanese authorities believe Taiwan is essential to their respective states' national security due to the island's geographic centrality and beneficial proximity to nearby and distant sea lanes. Of further importance is Taiwan's immediacy to territorial and resource disputes between China and Japan. This article focuses on the security concerns and strategies of both states and applies realism, its tenets of defensive and offensive realism, and neoliberalism in order to better comprehend those concerns and strategies and also provide probable solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the divergent approaches pursued by Japan and South Korea in their attempts to resolve an issue that is related to a fundamental responsibility of sovereign states: the protection of citizens. The case considered here is North Korea's abduction of Japanese and South Korean nationals. In Japan, the abduction issue has taken center stage in the country's North Korea policy, whereas in South Korea, recent administrations have downplayed the issue—despite the fact that nearly 500 South Korean citizens remain detained in North Korea, compared to fewer than 20 known Japanese abductions. The authors find that the key to understanding the divergent responses lies in the politicization of specific, ostensibly apolitical demands for the state to fulfill its duty to protect citizens. In particular, the proximity of the abductions issue to key nationalist themes, which politicians in each country use to mobilize support, prevents the matter from being addressed in a neutral way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With East Asian international relations in flux since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security role is critical in influencing the region's future. In this article, the author examines Japanese opinion leaders' attitudes toward relations with Asian countries, the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and Japan's culpability for the Fifteen-Year War of 1931-45. The four major contemporary security strands in Japan—pacifism, mercantilism, normalism, and nationalism—are analyzed. The author argues that normalism continues to rise in the post-Cold War era as the rightist conservatives (normalists) gradually gain predominance over the moderate conservatives (mercantilists). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia occupies a uniquely strong position in Japan's evolving security partnerships. The two countries' bilateral alliances with the United States, their common desire for U.S. commitment to and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, their common desire to foster regional multilateral security institutions for the purpose of disciplining China through inclusion, and their limited but significant capabilities to respond to security problems beyond the region have caused the two countries to nurture enhanced ties. Although this bilateral partnership has been more closely associated with trilateral cooperation including the United States between 2005 and 2008 (rather than with regional multilateralism), the expanding scope of Australia-Japan cooperation mostly encompasses nontraditional security areas, such as law enforcement, counterterrorism, and humanitarian relief operations. This approach seeks a middle ground between exclusive U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateralism and all-inclusive regional multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neorealists argue that Japan's response to the rise of China has been to draw closer to the United States in order to balance Chinese power. In practice, the Koizumi and Abe administrations differed in their responses to the growth of Chinese power in East Asia. While Prime Minister Koizumi sought to consolidate the US-Japan alliance, Prime Minister Abe adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. Although buttressing the US-Japan alliance, this strategy aimed to balance China by building a containment coalition with other Asia-Pacific states. Japan's signing of a security declaration with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Abe's strategy, and marked a subtle shift in Japanese security policy from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. Although congruent with US strategic interests, this move supported Prime Minister Abe's ambition to exercise more autonomous influence over the regional security order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the problem of the research expeditions to foreign lands during the period of national seclusion in Japan. Each historical period has its specific geographical perspective. The geographical thinking in Tokugawa Japan was influenced by a policy of self-isolation. In the Tokugawa period, Japan was more interested in protecting the boundaries than expanding its geographical horizons. There were, nevertheless, several expeditionary ventures launched by the government. This article presents the background of research expeditions dispatched by the shogunate and then moves to a discussion of the mechanism of these official expeditions and motivation behind them, as well as the nature of the political statements implied by the explorations and their results. The Japanese expeditions to the Pacific islands and northern region were mostly limited to scientific observation, mapping, and geographical survey, and the reasons for expeditionary ventures were security concerns rather than territorial expansion or the pursuit of economic interests. Although the links between the geographical exploration of the Tokugawa period and colonialism were weak, the expeditions had a considerable degree of political effect on the state policy of modern Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Japanese security policy. Although antimilitarist norms are widespread in Japan, they have not constrained Japanese security policy. They have not prevented it from building one of the most powerful military forces in the world, with potent offensive and defensive capabilities. And, as Japan's leaders have said repeatedly, if Japan felt threatened, these norms would not even prevent Japan from building nuclear weapons. Since World War II, Japan has followed a highly restrained foreign policy, but this restraint is explained by a strategy of buck-passing rather than by antimilitarist norms.

The article examines militarization in contemporary Japan, as most saliently manifest in increases in military spending and the buildup of military might, by focusing on the erosion of anti-militaristic principles. This includes the broader interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which now permits certain 'offensive weaponry' and 'collective defense' type arrangements; the weakening of the 'three non-nuclear principles', which are not effective against port calls by US vessels laden with Tomahawk missiles and other nuclear-capable weapons; the relaxation of the ban on the export of defense-related technology, which from 1983 onwards makes an exception of exports to the United States; and the scrapping of the '1% ceiling' on military expenditures in the 1987 budget, which put an end to an important barrier to increases in military spending. The erosion of these principles has been facilitated by external factors -- American pressure, the Soviet military buildup in the region, and the decline in Asian criticism of Japan's military presence -- as well as by internal factors -- a greater acceptance of the Self Defense Forces and the US-Japan Security Treaty on the part of the opposition parties as well as the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]