Search

In its basic thesis, this paper presents medical intelligence (MEDINT) as a specific platform of intelligence work, its historical development, and transfer from the military to the civilian intelligence sector, as well as its transformations from the Cold War period to the present day. It also points out the key features of the application of traditional intelligence methods for the purpose of MEDINT. By setting MEDINT in the context of the current Covid-19 pandemic, we aim to show how the intelligence community contributed to the effective health crisis response by applying certain intelligence tools: epidemiological surveillance, gathering relevant intelligence, targeted counterintelligence and epidemiological contact tracing. The aim of this paper is to anticipate the consequences of the Covid-19 crisis on the future of the global security environment, and to point out new perspectives. It is undeniable that the Covid-19 crisis has imposed the need for medical intelligence to adapt to the new security reality. This process implies not only further development of specific resources (in accordance with MEDINT criteria), but also external connection with professional and academic communities, as well as continuous monitoring of activities that carry a certain risk to public health (dual use research). Eventually, it is especially important for the intelligence sector to build different models of international cooperation that can be crucial in the effective response to global health security threats, such as a pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted limitations in the current public health data infrastructure, and the need for a comprehensive, real-time, centralized, user-friendly data management system suitable for both disease surveillance and outbreak management. To address these issues, the Canadian Forces Health Services Group developed the webbased Canadian Armed Forces Surveillance and Outbreak Management System (CAF SOMS). This paper details the development of the CAF SOMS, provides formative evaluation results and includes a discussion of the lessons learned and intent to use the CAF SOMS in future to enhance the CAF's disease surveillance and outbreak management capability beyond COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to learn the challenges encountered by public health emergency preparedness systems, both in terms of problems encountered and adaptations during and after the first wave, as well as successful responses to them. Results: This work draws on published literature, interviews with countries and institutional documents as part of a European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control project that aims to identify the implications for preparedness measurement derived from COVID-19 pandemic experience in order to advance future preparedness efforts in European Union member states. The analysis focused on testing and surveillance themes and five countries were considered, namely Italy, Germany, Finland, Spain and Croatia. Our analysis shown that a country's ability to conduct testing at scale was critical, especially early in the pandemic, and the inability to scale up testing operations created critical issues for public health operations such as contact tracing. Countries were required to develop new strategies, approaches, and policies under pressure and to review and revise them as the pandemic evolved, also considering that public health systems operate at the national, regional, and local level with respect to testing, contact tracing, and surveillance, and involve both government agencies as well as private organizations. Therefore, communication among multiple public and private entities at all levels and coordination of the testing and surveillance activities was critical. Conclusion: With regard to testing and surveillance, three capabilities that were essential to the COVID-19 response in the first phase, and presumably in other public health emergencies: the ability to scale-up testing, contact tracing, surveillance efforts; flexibility to develop new strategies, approaches, and policies under pressure and to review and revise them as the pandemic evolved; and the ability to coordinate and communicate in complex public health systems that operate at the national, regional, and local level with respect and involve multiple government agencies as well as private organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the important role of professionals in designing and communicating effective policies. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the level of trust in the COVID-19 national public health policy among public health professionals in Israel and its correlates during the first wave of the pandemic. Methods: A purposive sampling of public health professionals in Israel, through professional and academic public health networks (N = 112). The survey was distributed online during May 2020. Level of trust was measured by the mean of 18 related statements using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 means not at all and 5 means to a very high extent, and grouped as low and high trust by median (2.75). Results: A moderate level of trust in policy was found among professionals (Mean: 2.84, 95% Cl: [2.70, 2.98]). The level of trust among public health physicians was somewhat lower than among researchers and other health professionals (Mean: 2.66 vs. 2.81 and 2.96, respectively, p = 0.286), with a higher proportion expressing low trust (70% vs. 51% and 38%, respectively, p < 0.05). Participants with a low compared to high level of trust in policy were less supportive of the use of Israel Security Agency tools for contact tracing (Mean = 2.21 vs. 3.17, p < 0.01), and reported lower levels of trust in the Ministry of Health (Mean = 2.52 vs. 3.91, p < 0.01). A strong positive correlation was found between the level of trust in policy and the level of trust in the Ministry of Health (rs = 0.782, p < 0.01). Most professionals (77%) rated their involvement in decision making as low or not at all, and they reported a lower level of trust in policy than those with high involvement (Mean = 2.76 vs. 3.12, p < 0.05). Regarding trust in the ability of agencies to deal with the COVID-19 crisis, respondents reported high levels of trust in the Association of Public Health Physicians (80%) and in hospitals (79%), but very low levels of trust in the Minister of Health (5%). Conclusions: This study shows that Israeli public health professionals exhibited moderate levels of trust in COVID-19 national public health policy and varied levels of trust in government agencies during the first wave of COVID-19. The level of trust in policy was lower among most of the participants who were not involved in decision making. The level of trust found is worrisome and should be monitored, because it may harm cooperation, professional response, and public trust. Professionals' trust in policy-making during early stages of emergencies is important, and preemptive measures should be considered, such as involving professionals in the decision-making process, maintaining transparency of the process, and basing policy on scientific and epidemiological evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the role of primary care in China's response to COVID-19. A retrospective, reflective approach was taken using data available to one of the authors who led the national community response to COVID-19, first in Wuhan and then multiple cities in ten provinces/municipalities across the country. At the peak of the pandemic, primary care providers shoulder various public health responsibilities and work in close partnerships with other key stakeholders in the local communities. Primary care providers keep playing a 'sentinel'/surveillance role in identifying re-emerging cases after the elimination of community transmissions of COVID-19. Critically, however, the pandemic once again highlights some key limitations of the primary care sector, including the lack of gatekeeping, limited capacity and weak integration between medical care and public health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various mitigation measures have been implemented to fight the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, including widely adopted social distancing and mandated face covering. However, assessing the effectiveness of those intervention practices hinges on the understanding of virus transmission, which remains uncertain. Here we show that airborne transmission is highly virulent and represents the dominant route to spread the disease. By analyzing the trend and mitigation measures in Wuhan, China, Italy, and New York City, from January 23 to May 9, 2020, we illustrate that the impacts of mitigation measures are discernable from the trends of the pandemic. Our analysis reveals that the difference with and without mandated face covering represents the determinant in shaping the pandemic trends in the three epicenters. This protective measure alone significantly reduced the number of infections, that is, by over 78,000 in Italy from April 6 to May 9 and over 66,000 in New York City from April 17 to May 9. Other mitigation measures, such as social distancing implemented in the United States, are insufficient by themselves in protecting the public. We conclude that wearing of face masks in public corresponds to the most effective means to prevent interhuman transmission, and this inexpensive practice, in conjunction with simultaneous social distancing, quarantine, and contact tracing, represents the most likely fighting opportunity to stop the COVID-19 pandemic. Our work also highlights the fact that sound science is essential in decision-making for the current and future public health pandemics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]