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This paper responds to a comment by T. R. Young, who sought to intervene in the exchange between the author and Marc Wardell on the role of conceptual frameworks or paradigms in the development of theory in sociology and the social sciences. Young suggested that some of the less well known assumptions of Karl Marx could serve as uniting points between the two correspondents. The dualism of the historicist conceptualization of the transition from capitalism to socialism which appears in Young's comments underestimates the empirical complexity of the political and economic problems of the period of transition. This paper disagrees with Young's final assertion that too much Marxist theory has stood in the way of radical revolution and socialist transformation.

This paper comments on the exchange between Donald McQuarie and Mark Wardell in "The Sociological Quarterly" over the role of conceptual frameworks or paradigms in the development of theory in sociology and the social sciences. It offers some friendly criticism of these two comments and suggests that some of the less well known assumptions of Karl Marx concerning the nature of theory, history and human labor may help reunite McQuarie and Wardell. Marx was concerned with the problem of human alienation. For him, history was not that which was written in textbooks, rather, what people do when they seize the moment, make revolution and gain control over their own social institutions.

This paper is a reply to the comment by T. R. Young on the exchange between Donald McQuarie and the author on the role of conceptual frameworks or paradigms in the development of theory in sociology and the social sciences. The crux of the debate may be outlined in a quotation from Henri Lefebvre which asked if dialectic materialism is both science and philosophy. The notions of method, science and praxis are the focus of this reply. For Lefebvre as for Marx, the dialectical method is a means of constructing historically grounded theory about societies; theories are the result of supplying historical correctness to the method.

This article replies to comments of David Klein on a discussion of the role of conceptual frameworks or paradigms in the development of theory in sociology and the social sciences. The three major points of the discussion are summarized, and the author claims that Klein failed to refute any of these major points. At several points Klein seems to confuse conceptual analysis with conceptual frameworks. The paper is not a blanket condemnation of conceptual frameworks or theoretical perspectives, and it does not suggest that they play no role in theoretical advances. What it suggests is that much of the work on conceptual frameworks, though couched in theoretical terms, is illusory.