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Este ensayo presenta una revisión crítica de la llamada teoría “decisionista” de Carl Schmitt tal como fuera expuesta en sus principales trabajos políticos durante el periodo de Weimar. El autor argumenta que el decisionismo de Schmitt no es, como frecuentemente se ha afirmado, una simple variante del voluntarismo ético asociado a filosofías morales existencialistas y positivistas. Decisionismo es en cambio una particular doctrina política que sostiene que el Estado es la fuente absoluta de toda decisión legal y moral en la vida política. Desde esta perspectiva, el autor demuestra que el decisionismo de Schmitt es una doctrina puramente negativa, fundada en la negación simétrica de todos y cada uno de los valores políticos del liberalismo., This essay is a critique of the so called "decisionist" theory by Carl Schmitt, first expounded on his main political works during the Weimar period. The author explains that Schmitt's idea of "decisionism" is not, as it has often been pondered a simple variant of ethical voluntarism associated with both existentialist and positivist moral philosophies. "Decisionism" is a particular political doctrine based on the claim that the state is the absolute source of legal and moral decisions in political life. From this perspective, the author demonstrates that Schmitt's "decisionism" is a purely negative doctrine, based on the symmetrical negation of all the political values of liberalism.

Inter-institutional cooperation between the congress and the presidency may be the best way to promote good governance in a regime of separation of powers. In order to evaluate the performance of different political institutions, especially the different frameworks associated with ‘presidentialism’ and ‘parliamentarism’, we adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce the highest satisfaction or social utility. From this perspective, proportional representation in congress can be very appropriate since it tends to establish a close correspondence between the median party's and the median voter's preferences. Likewise, cooperation – rather than conflict or mutual checks – between the median party in congress and the presidency for both legislative decisions and cabinet formation can favour socially efficient outcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidential regimes in Latin America shows that ‘parliamentarization’ of presidentialism is gaining acceptance, although intermediate formulae may be more conflictual than a global, more coherent institutional reform.

This essay is a critique of the so called “decisionist” theory by Carl Schmitt, first expounded on his main political works during the Weimar period. The author explains that Schmitt's idea of “decisionism” is not, as it has often been pondered a simple variant of ethical voluntarism associated with both existentialist and positivist moral philosophies. “Decisionism” is a particular political doctrine based on the claim that the state is the absolute source of legal and moral decisions in political life. From this perspective, the author demonstrates that Schmitt’s “decisionism" is a purely negative doctrine, based on the symmetrical negation of all the political values of liberalism., Este ensayo presenta una revisión crítica de la llamada teoría “decisionista” de Carl Schmitt tal como fuera expuesta en sus principales trabajos políticos durante el periodo de Weimar. El autor argumenta que el decisionismo de Schmitt no es, como frecuentemente se ha afirmado, una simple variante del voluntarismo ético asociado a filosofías morales existencialistas y positivistas. Decisionismo es en cambio una particular doctrina política que sostiene que el Estado es la fuente absoluta de toda decisión legal y moral en la vida política. Desde esta perspectiva, el autor demuestra que el decisionismo de Schmitt es una doctrina puramente negativa, fundada en la negación simétrica de todos y cada uno de los valores políticos del liberalismo.