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In the increasingly volatile global political order, national economic structures and international relations, integrated as they are, are showing concerning signs of strain. Taiwan, whose world-leading semiconductor industry is indispensable in Global Supply Chains and whose economic prosperity and security are critical to a stable global economic system, has received much research interest since the late 1980s. Against the background of a slowing Taiwanese economy, starting in the 2000s, this paper seeks to investigate the causes of Taiwan's challenges and the linkages to the global economy vis-à-vis China. Based on previous research from different social science disciplines, this paper shows that Taiwan's economic performance has been undermined by the declining effectiveness of its industrial policy and the general state intervention in the country, which is in turn caused by deep socio-political divisions on issues of national identity and Taiwan-China relations. The paper reveals the dilemma, which results from this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addresses "Asia's paradox," where deepening economic interdependence has not led to sustained political harmony in East Asia. It argues that domestic splits, non-violent conflicts between antagonized social groups with significant political and economic power, can disrupt the pacifying effect of economic dependence. Using an in-depth case study of Taiwan's relations with the People's Republic of China from the late 1980s to the late 2000s, this paper underscores the limitations of economic constraints on political relations across the Taiwan Strait, suggesting that despite economic interdependence, individuals' political preferences may be swayed when identity agendas emerge at the center of politics. This research predicts that Beijing's recent utilization of economic coercion for political purposes is likely to prove counterproductive, as it can provoke nationalist sentiments among the target country's population and neutralize China's economic leverages. For the same reason, the U.S.-ROK alliance won't be hindered by South Korea's economic ties with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special section includes four papers to examine the ups and downs of the relationship between Taiwan and China. While both sides of the Taiwan Strait have different political systems, these studies show that domestic politics play a central role in explaining the oscillation of the cross-Strait relationship. The findings provide evidence of the interaction between domestic and external factors. Leaders in Beijing and Taipei therefore need to take heed of the internal forces of both sides of the Taiwan Strait in addressing their contentious relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the recent features of China's economic coercion against Taiwan by offering an up‐to‐date and in‐depth analysis of China's targeted sanctions on Taishang in Tsai Ing‐wen's first term. The paper elaborates on China's specific reasons and means for imposing informal targeted sanctions, as well as their newly observed features in comparison with the past. Heavy dependence on the Chinese economy by certain enterprises of the island has made them vulnerable to sanction targeting. Compared to the past, nationalist boycotts by Chinese consumers and online activities have had a greater influence as part of China's informal targeted sanctions. Beijing's demands for supporting the "one China" policy and the "1992 Consensus" have also become more obvious. These findings suggest that the impetus for developing the cross‐Strait economic exchanges has become more susceptible to the effects of non‐economic factors. Although Beijing's sanctions on Taishang have not yet changed Taipei's policy, they cannot be said to be ineffective. Through the tactics, Beijing definitely sends clear signals of what it wants as it advances their strategy on cross‐Strait relations to the outside world. The case studies on Taiwan provide important implications for other economies as a barometer of China's increasing economic sanction practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party won the 2016 election in Taiwan, Beijing's Taiwan policies have witnessed some strategic and tactical adjustments. This article attempts to clarify the underlying changes and continuity in Beijing's Taiwan policy by addressing three vital questions. First, for Beijing, what is the prominent concern for its Taiwan policy making? Second, what is the top priority for its 'great rejuvenation' ambition? And third, what is Beijing's guideline for dealing with Taipei's reluctance to accept reunification? This paper argues that, firstly, how to prevent Taiwan's de facto independence from perpetuating has become the primary challenge for Beijing, given Taiwan's inclination to indefinitely maintain de facto independence. Second, Beijing still prioritizes the achievement of comprehensive modernization before the fulfillment of reunification within its overarching 'national rejuvenation' timetable. Third, discouraged by Taiwan's anti-China dynamics, Beijing has switched its guideline for promoting unification from 'placing hope on the Taiwanese' to 'placing more hope on the mainland itself'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between mainland China and Taiwan in 2010, Taiwan's future status in the field of Asian regional integration remains unclear. While Taiwan remains outside the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China's rise and continued expansion in regional integration put increasing pressure on Taiwan to confront its political differences with China. This paper discusses the interconnection between regional integration and cross-Strait relations and seeks to address the implications such linkage entails. The authors note the exploitation of a two-pronged strategy by Beijing to pressure Taibei into confronting the political problem between China and Taiwan. In addition, the authors assess Taiwan's performance in terms of its progress in the establishment of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) from 2008 to 2016 under the Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) administration and identify the hurdles and prospects for Taiwan's future integration efforts. This paper concludes with a brief consideration of Taiwan's New Southward Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relations between China and Taiwan (cross-Strait relations) have been a thorny issue for all parties concerned. These relations are one of the flashpoints in the world, which may trigger a serious military conflict. They involve not only China and Taiwan but also the United States. The purpose of this paper is to account for the trajectory of this triangular relationship with the help of opinion surveys in Taiwan. It is shown that when the Kuomintang (KMT) gains the governing power in Taiwan, Taiwan is the median voter in the cross-Strait relations game at the international level while as a non-traditional KMT or the Democratic Progressive Party is in power, it is the US that turns out to be the median voter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine and reactions to it have affected, and mostly worsened, already-formidable and growing challenges for US policy toward China-Taiwan conflict situations. These challenges include deterring a more powerful and assertive China in a more complex set of scenarios (including gray zone conflicts), assuring China that behavior that conforms to US preferences will mean more cooperative US behavior, and managing the abandonment / entrapment dynamic in US relations with Taiwan. The implication of the Ukraine war for the US and cross-Strait issues is mixed, complicated, and stillevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mobility across the Taiwan Strait has intensified since the border was opened in 1987. The cross-border social, cultural and economic exchanges, however, have remained closely embedded in the nationalistic logic specific to cross-Strait relations. Employing a state-centered approach and building on a comparative analysis of the interaction between Beijing and two groups of cross-Strait migrants (mainland spouses in Taiwan, and Taiwanese investors in China), this paper examines the various ways in which a state may still exert influence over migrant communities in a context of increased mobility and exchanges. This paper argues that the nation-state may still shape migrants’ experiences, particularly when sending and receiving governments have unresolved disputes. Under these conditions, state actors may use migrant communities to achieve their nationalistic goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although cross-strait relations have been the most stable in the last eight years under the pro-mainland KMT government, the pro-independence DPP scored a major victory in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections. This paper examines ways identity changes in Taiwan have influenced how Taiwanese view and deal with cross-strait relations and reactions from the mainland after the January elections. Using constructivism as the theoretical framework and survey data, we argue that Taiwan's continued democratization has created a different social and political experience. This experience has solidified over time and created a unique Taiwanese identity. As time passes, the KMT, which has a stronger historical and social lineage with the mainland, is being weakened by Taiwan's changing experience and identity. Nevertheless, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are not only essential for people on both sides of the strait, they are essential for the region and the world. Both the new DPP government and the mainland government must rethink their strategies and policies in order to construct a new framework to ensure continued peace and stability in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an exploratory research that seeks to investigate how ideology predicts Taiwanese perceptions of cross-strait relations, including attitudes toward Taiwan independence, perceptions of mainland China and Chinese people, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and Chinese democracy. We took an inductive approach to left-right differences in Taiwan to offer a more systematic empirical understanding of ideology beyond the West. To do so, we conducted a nationally representative survey among adult Taiwan citizens (N = 1,350). Findings revealed that those who identified with the Left (vs. Right) tended to demonstrate more negative perceptions of cross-strait relations. Specifically, the political left is more negative about the outlook of Chinese democracy while favoring Taiwan independence, than the political right. Furthermore, the political left perceives both mainland China and the Chinese people more negatively than the political right. These findings underscore the role of ideology for a full comprehension of cross-strait relations, as they indicated a fundamental difference between the political left vs. right in terms of perceptions of cross-strait relations. The present research extends existing political psychology literature on ideology and international relations, particularly in the East Asian context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have demonstrated that interest indicators demonstrate a significant correlation between interstate conflict and states' interests. By investigating cross-Strait relations, this paper suggests that the deepening of both political and economic interests boosts the political will to implement peaceful talks in the China-Taiwan dyad. However, domestic opposition and contested politics in Taiwan slowed cooperation between Beijing and Taipei during Ma Ying-jeou's second term as president. Since international and domestic politics affect each other, it may be useful to employ Robert Putnam's two-level game theory to investigate the interactions between the power and preferences of major actors at the domestic level. The author uses the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the South China Sea issue to illustrate the importance of the aggregation of interests between Beijing and Taipei, and argues that the maintenance of status quo on the South China Sea issue may provide a stabilizing factor in cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How international economic ties affect domestic politics is a research question that has interested many scholars. In this paper, I try to address this question by conducting a qualitative case study of the effect of China-Taiwan economic ties on the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election. Specifically, I examine how China-Taiwan economic ties (1) shaped the political debate in the aforementioned election; (2) influenced the Taiwanese people's opinions about the debate; and (3) affected the outcome of the election. By focusing on the political conflict in Taiwan over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), an FTA-like economic agreement China and Taiwan signed in June 2010, I argue that (1) the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election involved a political competition between the pro-openness coalition (which was, politically, anti-Taiwan's independence and, economically, pro-ECFA) and the anti-openness coalition (which was pro-Taiwan's independence and had a cautious attitude toward the ECFA); (2) the Taiwanese general public was gradually convinced that the benefits of the ECFA outweighed the costs; and (3) the pro-openness coalition eventually won the election with the support from the majority of the Taiwanese people, which to a great extent was a result of China's, as well as the pro-openness coalition's, successful effort to persuade the Taiwanese people that the ECFA was incompatible with Taiwan's independence promoted by the antiopenness coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the progress in US-Taiwan relations during an era of cross-Strait rapprochement. In order to place the issue in the proper historical context, the paper begins with a brief overview of bilateral relations during the administration of President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008). The study next discusses improvements in Taipei's relations with Beijing and shows how Washington supports the cross-Strait rapprochement. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite arguments to the contrary, it is clear that US-Taiwan relations have moved forward in parallel with improvements in Taiwan-Chinese mainland relations since 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the complex issue of the triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and the United States. Due to its importance to both China and the United States, Taiwan has burdened the relationship between the two powers as long and as fierce as any. China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory and has been unwilling to reject the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. Under these conditions, Taiwan has chosen to balance China by aligning itself with the United States in order to avoid submission or destruction. Although the U.S. supports a 'one-China' policy, it is strongly opposed to any move that could change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force. While both Beijing and Washington often emphasize positive engagement and dialogue, divergent interests of China and the United States over Taiwan, along with their contest for domination in East Asia, have remained a focal point of contention that could send the two powers on a collision course [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional integration theory can explain past and present processes of cross-strait integration and disintegration. Historical institutionalism can analyse how the path dependence of the 'One China policy' shapes cross-strait relations until today and how fundamental changes can occur through critical junctures. Neofunctionalism can well explain the dynamics of economic integration through spillovers and spillbacks driven by transnational actors since the 1980s. Liberal intergovernmentalism can shed light on the bargaining processes and their outcomes during the negotiation of various cross-strait agreements under the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Postfunctionalism offers the best explanation for the central role that identity has played in cross-strait relations, in particular since 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The island of Taiwan has successfully managed 60 years of fast-paced economic growth. Taiwan is a demonstrably resilient player in the global economy, while also maintaining high levels of income equality. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding whether the factors that have enabled and sustained the Taiwanese development project thus far will be an adequate means of managing the contemporary challenges facing the island. Taiwan may be becoming increasingly vulnerable to global economic conditions, and the island's future seems also to be increasingly tied to developments in the Chinese mainland. This paper examines the prospects for a continuing Taiwanese growth paradigm from both a cultural and an economic perspective and finds reason for optimism. This optimism is contingent on the strength of international export markets and prudent management of cross-Strait relations with the Chinese mainland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, many people have called for a more active role for the EU in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. While acknowledging its immense power and influence, this paper argues that the EU's role will remain limited for three structural reasons. Despite the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's sui generis system will continue to constrain its policy towards cross-strait relations. With 27 countries of varying interests, power and perspectives, it is difficult to expect the EU to change its current policies, which consist of the 'one-China' notion and the principle of a peaceful solution. Second, the regional structure along the strait is so complex that the EU can hardly come up with new initiatives. Given the fact that China is more important than Taiwan, the EU can hardly make its policy more favourable to Taiwan. However, supporting Chinese unification, especially in a non-peaceful way, will run counter to the EU's interests and principles. Even if it is willing to play a more active role, the EU lacks power to do so. Finally, the global structure will limit the EU's freedom of action. The EU does not live in a care-free environment, and nearby stability tops its security agenda. In its dealing with global issues, the EU may benefit from Chinese cooperation. Although the EU has close relations with the US, the American factor can hardly be expected to cause major changes in the EU's policy towards cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei's post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei's restriction on trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan's economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems of the security externalities or promoting the island's economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the quality of international relations between countries affect regional economics? The question of how much economic change can be attributed to the trajectories of international politics is difficult to answer, because different factors over time can influence economic development. This research uses synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods to evaluate the impact of the normalisation of cross-strait relations in 2008 on regional economic growth in Jiangsu province. Based on data from the Regional and China Year Books from 1990 to 2015, Jiangsu province, a region with prominently close economic ties with Taiwan, witnessed a CNY 20,726.52 (around GBP 2328.35) increase in per capita GDP from 2008 to 2015, compared with the counterfactual in the absence of normalised cross-strait relations. There was an annual increase of approximately CNY 2961 Yuan (around GBP 333). This research has important implications for acknowledging the relationship between the quality of political relations and their economic impact on confrontational countries and regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the characteristics and institutions of the Xi Jinping regime's policy-making on Taiwan affairs and compares them to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the policy-making processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made. First, the operation of the People Republic of China's (PRC) policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the leader's personality and domestic political situation at the time. Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC's policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations and internal politics in Taiwan at the time. Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC's policy toward Taiwan has increased, and the role of the local Taiwan affairs policy-making system has been polarized under Xi Jinping's rule. Considering these trends, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping's authority over the CCP's policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for "promoting reunification" limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao's policies toward Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Biden administration is attempting to transform traditional US–Taiwan relations into a multilateralism‐based "US + alliance–Taiwan" interactional model, which can be conceptualized as alliance coordination. This article unpacks the logic of Biden's strategic thinking in the US Taiwan policy. Adopting an asymmetric alliance perspective, it argues that US allies' reactions to Biden's foreign policy and their ideological attitude toward China have interacted with the US placement of the Taiwan question on the agenda in the alliance system to produce different degrees of alliance coordination, which can be measured by the new typology constituted by seven approaches: all‐fields approach, pure high politics approach, high politics driven approach, half‐measures, low politics driven approach, pure low politics approach, and strategic inaction. Three cases, including the different reactions of Japan, European countries, and South Korea, are analyzed to demonstrate how the alliance coordination operates in realpolitik. Additionally, the assessment of this article reveals that Biden's alliance coordination would place growing strategic pressure on mainland China and introduces greater volatility into cross‐strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing nature of China's policy toward Taiwan. Many of the sharpest debates in Taiwan, the United States, and elsewhere have been over whether recent modifications in policy represent a genuine overhaul in Beijing's approach to Taipei. To simplify, some argue that meaningful change is already happening and that such developments warrant careful study and attention. However, skeptics conclude that change is not happening. As Chen Shui-bian observed during an interview with the author, the new strategy is nothing more than a tactic to "deceive our people and foreign countries." After analyzing various indicators, this study shows how theories and/or conceptual frameworks often employed in the fields of international relations and comparative politics help analysts from the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and elsewhere unravel some parts of the complicated puzzle that constitutes Beijing's policy to- ward Taipei. In conclusion, however, the author suggests that it is probable that officials in Taipei will require more facts--not theories--before they agree that there is a genuine "paradigm shift" in Beijing's approach to the thorny Taiwan dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an institutional account of how President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has sent important messages across the Taiwan Strait. Under Taiwan's constitutional system, the parliament can neither hold the president accountable for what he says nor sack the premier appointed by the president, while a president who lacks legislative support also finds it hard to put his policy goals into practice. These problems give President Chen the excuse to set up extra-constitutional channels to deliver pro-independence messages, some of which go against his official pledges. Here, a collection of Chen's important remarks directed across the Taiwan Strait are analyzed, and a consistent pattern is revealed of when and where he is likely to say what. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the association between political competition (elections in Taiwan and political successions in China) and cross-Strait conflicts. We find that the Taiwan president has been more assertive toward mainland China during the election period or in his second term, than during the inter-electoral period or in the first term. The general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reacts to Taiwan's provocations more harshly when he was in a period of power transition than when he had consolidated power. The two phenomena rest on the same assumption: when a political leader is domestically challenged, he cannot appear weak in external behaviors; when the leader is secure in his position, he can afford to make external concessions. We test the assumption against the empirical evidence from the cross-Strait relations of 1989–2012 and find the most serious conflicts occurred during Taiwan's electoral period and when the CCP general secretary was in power transition. The study advances our understanding of how conflicts occur in cross-Strait relations and may lead to possible ways of their prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 elections in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It not only won the presidency but also an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan. It is now in full control of the government. An intriguing question is how the DPP government under President Tsai Ing-wen will deal with China which has warned Taiwan time and again that it would attack Taiwan if the latter declares de jure independence. The current study investigates the possible move that may be considered by the Tsai Ing-wen government, that will not irritate its own constituents on the island, and at the same time will not escalate the tension across the Taiwan Strait. Whether Tsai's policy is tenable given the domestic and international constraints remains to be seen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas 'optimists' argue that military conflict in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly unlikely, 'pessimists' warn that conflict remains a real option. The landslide victory for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of President Tsai Ing-wen in the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections adds fire to the debate. The DPP win makes a peaceful unification on China's terms an ever-distant prospect. Since the election, Beijing's strategy has rested on pressuring Taipei into accepting the '1992 consensus' as the precondition for constructive relations. However, this article argues that strategies of 'coercion' are a double-edged sword for China: its very success in deterring Taiwan from declaring formal independence has backfired as far as compelling the island from accepting unification on its terms. While pessimism about a new period of cross-Strait tensions is premature, the Taiwan Strait remains a volatile regional flash point in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses national identity in Taiwan as of September 2012, focusing on an analysis of the nation's identity politics and democratization process which reportedly began in 1987. The institution of general political elections in Taiwan is addressed, along with an examination of the cross-Strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. The cultural origins of China are assessed, as well as the evolution of socio-political developments in both Taiwan and China. Former Chinese President Lee Teng-hui is also mentioned.

The article focuses on the relation between China and Taiwan, as well as South and North Korea. It examines the success of China and Taiwan in functionalist cooperation and exchange despite its failure to shift economic cooperation into political cooperation through a neo-functionalist political package deal. It also explores aspects that influence the regression of the economic cooperation and human exchanges between North and South Korea. It notes the move of China and Taiwan in utilizing functionalism to augment economic cooperation without touching the issue of sovereignty. Furthermore, it cites integration patterns of divided countries basing on inter-Korean and cross-Strait relations, and discusses their implications on regional integration theories.

China's Taiwan policy has been one of coupling intimidation (the "stick" approach) with coercion (the "carrot" approach), a policy mix which, in the near term, is not likely to change, as is evidenced by the passage of the "Anti-Secession Law" in March, 2005. However, under Hu Jintao, the focus has been on pragmatism. The warm atmosphere that presently reigns in the Taiwan Strait area is unprecedented. Further talks are expected before the two cross-Strait leaders are slated to step down, simultaneously, in 2012. An era of reconciliation and negotiations has dawned. For the first time there is consensus regarding norms of interaction between the two sides. Cross-Strait relations have stabilized after years of tumult. More open, stable and predictable cross-Strait relations are in the interests of both sides. Difficulties surely lie ahead, but they will be dealt with in a different manner than what has been witnessed in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]