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United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) leaders have tried to manage their respective approaches to China to avoid creating problems in bilateral relations and in the U.S.-ROK alliance. U.S. policymakers have been careful not to place Seoul in the position of having to choose between Washington and Beijing. However, a U.S. military conflict with China would bring differences in U.S. and ROK interests to the fore and force South Korean leaders to make tough choices in response to U.S. requests for diplomatic, economic, and military support. This paper considers what types of diplomatic and economic support the United States might expect from the ROK in the event of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. It then examines potential U.S. requests for military support from the ROK in three scenarios: 1) a PRC joint firestrike campaign intended to inflict sufficient damage to compel Taiwan to negotiate its political status with Beijing; 2) a PRC joint blockade intended to inflict sufficient damage to Taiwan's economy to compel negotiations; and 3) a joint island landing campaign intended to seize Taiwan and bring it under PRC control. Each involves a different type of military conflict, a different projected duration, and different military demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article combines the study of Taiwan's New Southbound Policy with a case study of Taiwan–Myanmar relations from a perspective of political relations, economic cooperation, and Taiwan's (un)recognisability in Myanmar—i.e. Taiwan's soft power in Myanmar. The first part of the paper introduces the policy and compares it with the previous ones, and sheds light on Taiwan's motivation to engage with Myanmar. It considers the ongoing trade war between the United States and China, due to which investment relocation from China is expected to sharply increase. The second part of the paper provides an insight into the relationship between Taiwan and Myanmar after Myanmar's state-led political transformation from military rule and economic liberalisation since approximately 2010. It explains the main aspects and determinants of the relationship between two countries that share a neighbouring potential hegemon which they both wish to balance against. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The Biden administration has in general been operating both “strategic ambiguity” and “strategic clarity,” prompting the question: Is the United States being strategically ambiguous or strategically clear towards Taiwan? This paper believes the discussion should start with the clarification of “U.S. policy regarding Taiwan.” However, U.S. policy towards Taiwan involves the highly sensitive One–China policy. Thus, the United States will evaluate its “core interest” in relation to China when dealing with the One–China policy, as mishandling it may trigger a war between the United States and China or the rest of the world. This is the reason why the United States must devise its Taiwan policy at a macro-level and cautious manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the protection against systemic risks of the financial and stock performance of firms in receipt of 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR) awards. The data we obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) in 2016-2018, comprised of CSR-award-recipient firms (CSR firms) voted for by the Common Wealth and Global Views magazines, for a sample period running from the third quarter of 2017 to the third quarter of 2018. Our empirical results reveal that in terms of their financial performance, as compared to non-CSR-award-recipient (non-CSR) firms, CSR firms failed to demonstrate any better protection against systemic risks (such as the US-China trade war). However, the stock performance of CSR firms clearly provided better protection than that of non-CSR firms; the reason for this observation is assumed to be the higher operational costs faced by CSR firms seeking to continue to pursue their CSR goals when encountering systemic risks. Nevertheless, participation in CSR is found to have an insurance-like effect on firm value, which clearly helps to increase the confidence of investors and reduce stock volatility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This collection of 11 papers on relations between Taiwan and Latin America was presented at an international symposium held in Taiwan in October 2020. This book describes the rise of China and its rivalry with the United States through the window of Taiwan-Latin American relations. [Extracted from the article]

This paper tests the hypothesis that the links and dependency relationships between China and her special regions have changed over the past 20 years with the industrialisation of China, and the emergence of Taiwan as a source of investment and sophisticated manufactures, and Hong Kong as financial centre and supplier of services. Has this changed the size and direction of spillovers in the region, and has it curtailed or eliminated American economic leadership? We use time-varying spectral methods to decompose the links between six advanced Asian economies and the US. We find: (a) the links with the US have been weakening, while those within a bloc based on China have strengthened; (b) that this is not new – it has been happening since the 1980s, but has now been reversed by the surge in trade; (c) that Taiwan is more integrated with, and dependent on, the Chinese economy, while Hong Kong continues her separate development based on specialisation and comparative advantage; (d) that the links with the US are rather complex, with the US able to shape the cycles elsewhere through her control of monetary conditions, but the China zone able to control the size of their cycles; and (e) there appears to be no real evidence that pegged exchange rates encourage convergence; in fact the reverse may be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the geopolitical confrontation between the United States and Communist China during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-55) and the subsequent 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. It argues that the crises in the Taiwan Strait had the potential to escalate into a global confrontation, unlike the proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam. The Taiwan Strait crises went on for almost twenty years (1950s-1970s), affecting neighboring countries' political developments, and while they were mostly confined to direct military actions by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China, they had the potential to bring the world to the brink of a nuclear war. This topic is significant because, unlike the proxy wars between superpowers, the Taiwan Strait crises posed a more credible risk, thereby underscoring the volatility of international relations and strategic dynamics of the Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world's two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as 'possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic'. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as 'inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does Ma Ying-jeou pursue a China-tilting policy when US-PRC relations become more competitive after 2010? Indeed, the president's mainland policy has gone far beyond the strategic requirements to satisfy international pressures for a stable cross-strait relationship. According to neoclassical realism, domestic politics acts as 'intervening variables' through which systemic imperatives are translated into a state's foreign policy response. Based, in part, on this author's interviews in Taiwan, this paper contends that due to Taiwan's internal political divisions on the 'one China' issue, elected leaders strive for their own nation-building projects, which, in turn, generate policies that undermine Taiwan's national security. Since 2008, the KMT tries to reshape Taiwan's identity through the rehabilitation of the ROC as the legitimate 'one China'. Though Ma's rapprochement with Beijing on the basis of the '1992 consensus' has contributed to cross-strait stability, his embrace of a China-centric national identity has also placed the administration increasingly at odds with Taiwan's public which gave the KMT a resounding electoral defeat in Taiwan's local elections of November 2014. As Taipei becomes more aligned to the PRC, its security ties with America and Japan could be compromised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines U.S. policy toward Taiwan and explores several proposals for change that an American administration may wish to consider. The author suggests that, while the United States should not overhaul its current relationship with Taiwan, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite emergent trends of geo-economic integration between nation-states, the role of realist-driven geopolitical calculation appears highly enduring. This paper explores the potential contradictions between state-centric geopolitical concerns and transnational geo-economic formation through an exploration of China-US tensions over Taiwan, a territory of indeterminate geo-legal status and which China regards as its own province. I consider how the Taiwan Relations Act, a domestic public law of the US that frames US-Taiwan relations and has a major influence on East Asian geopolitics, could contradict emergent 'China region', and possibly even China-US, geo-economic integration. This is because the US-sustained arms sales to Taiwan rest on imagining and containing China as a 'threat', while geo-economic integration entails enrolling China as a strategic partner, if not an ally. Consequently, the Taiwan issue could stifle the enhancement of Sino-American relations at a historical juncture when the Chinese and American economies are more intertwined than ever. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Washington's Taiwan policy has been a controversial issue for U.S. policymakers and politicians for decades. At the core of the Taiwan issue is the question of establishing sovereignty. However, there is no "silver bullet" for resolving cross-Strait issues, especially the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. This paper first presents a chronological review of the components of the U.S. government's "one-China policy" and then examines a definitional problem found in the debate on sovereignty and its implications for Taiwan's sovereignty. A preliminary assessment will be made of the US. perception of Taiwan's sovereignty by analyzing key documents and interviews which have been conducted in Washington. This paper will then conclude with a discussion of some of the implications for the future of cross-Strait relations. Iris argued that for the United States, Taiwan's sovereignty is defined as "one policy, three sovereignties, and five perceptions." The United States is reluctant to define Taiwan's sovereignty, and as interviews conducted in Washington indicate, Taiwan's status is clearly unsettled. The United States challenges neither the Republic of China's (ROC) governance of Taiwan, nor Beijing's position on Taiwan's sovereignty. In brief the United States does not take sides on this issue, but is still bound to a certain degree by its domestic law, the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States' foremost concern is to strike a delicate balance between helping Taiwan to practice its consent, while at same time not violating its own national interests (which implies avoiding a military confrontation with China). This clearly takes precedence over getting involved in defining Taiwan's sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its relations with Taiwan and China, Washington has begun to implement separate dual strategies in order to simultaneously deter unilateral action while balancing out the rival political and military forces of each side. A simple standard strategy just is not sufficient to maintain the status quo. The way to maintain peace is for Washington to keep its role as a moderator between the two sides while preventing both from taking unilateral steps toward goals that would naturally provoke the other. US policy has to mirror the duality of the cross-strait arena by implementing dual balancing and deterrent strategies. It is also imperative that policymakers realize the complexity of the situation so as not to unwittingly provoke either side. This paper is an analysis of the emerging US strategy of deterring both sides of the Taiwan Strait from taking unilateral action while maintaining a balance of military and political forces, and gives some suggestions as to the further development of this strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021 Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait have made it back into US-Japan joint statements. Tokyo and Washington have talked (more or less) openly and on the record about what to do jointly in the worst-case scenario: a US-Chinese conflict over Taiwan. The quality and scope of Japanese contributions to US-led military operations in a Taiwan/Taiwan Strait crisis scenario depend on the circumstances and the crisis scenario. The devil would be very much in the details. However, China is very unlikely to attack or invade Taiwan (any time soon) even though Tokyo and Washington - together with other like-minded countries in the region - are preparing for various worst-case scenarios. What China calls Western containment to «suppress» China and secure US (military) hegemony in the region is in reality Tokyo and Washington jointly preparing for various worst-case scenarios in reaction to Chinese very assertive regional security policies in general and policies related to territorial claims in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After Tsai Ing-wen was elected, both Mainland China and the United States realized that the situation in the Taiwan Strait has undergone fundamental changes. In order to curb Taiwan's independence policy, the Mainland China has strengthened its coercive threats against Taiwan while the US chose to increase its strategic commitment to Taiwan and revisit the One-China policy. This article argues the current framework between China and US on Taiwan issue is collapsing. The rising of Mainland China is the root cause for this round tension, however, Tsai Ing-wen refused to accept the 92 consensus which was the trigger. This article elaborates the argument that the delicate balance in the Taiwan Strait is declining, which both China and the United Stated have increased their deterrent threats to each other while decreased their reassurances, and regional crisis is emerging. For the leaders of China and the United States, it is urgent to manage the emerging Taiwan Strait crisis and prevent the situation from going out of control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Peloponnesian War, a conflict between the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, is held to be a classic example of war between a hegemon and a rising power. Graham Allison has recently coined the term "Thucydides' Trap" to emphasize how structural forces are leading to instability in U.S.-China relations. This interpretation of history is inaccurate and reflects the influence of misleading translations. Drawing on the original Greek text of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, I argue that the concept of Thucydides' Trap does not find support even in the case that has given it its name. Thucydides' famous attribution of the war to "the growth of the power of Athens" actually refers to the expansion of the Athenian Empire rather than a shift in the distribution of capabilities. Structural arguments do offer valuable insights about potential sources of conflict in U.S.-China relations, but the causal mechanism has little to do with the analogy of Athens and Sparta. As exemplified by the flashpoint in the Strait of Taiwan, structural change has aggravated long-standing differences between the United States and the PRC. Beijing's growing economic and military power has resulted in a growing threat to Taipei, which has led the United States to affirm its commitment to Taiwan's security in ways that are inconsistent with the One-China policy. If this trend continues, it will raise the potential for a military confrontation between the great powers in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the United States and mainland China attempted to reach out to each other in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union and Taiwan had already been cooperating with each other against China. Starting in 1963, the Soviet Union and Taiwan interacted through different channels, with the culmination being the arrival of Victor Louis in Taipei. By 1971 Chiang Kai-shek decided that the Soviet Union was no longer an option as a negotiating partner. The authors, based on rare archival resources, try to restore details of the talks and interpret how they failed to accomplish a strategic partnership as the US and mainland China had done. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate 'international space'. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the 'one China' principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US strategic ambiguity versus clarity has been a centerpiece in maintaining cross-strait stability since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Dialogues and debates abound regarding the relative effectiveness of discrete US policy choices. The current thaw in cross-strait relations does not forestall decisively the resurgence in the long run of the cross-strait tensions during 2000-08, rendering the strategic ambiguity/clarity still a relevant issue. This article argues that the discussions on the issue are seriously plagued by the lack of a sufficiently rigorous and commonly shared conceptualization of strategic ambiguity/clarity, and an internal logical contradiction or an inadequate practical utility as a tool to aid policy-making. To address these problems, this article seeks to clarify and elaborate on the conceptual foundation of strategic ambiguity/clarity by differentiating between two distinct analytic levels thereof, and proposing a conceptual framework for a fuller understanding of the US policy along various dimensions. It also reappraises some major issues or problems found in the existing discussions and US practice, and suggests possible solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainstream approaches perpetuate the Taiwan–China ‘crisis’. They do so by following Cold-War concepts and prescriptions, despite the rise of new realities and new visions for cross-strait relations. We draw on Hirschman's identification of ‘loyalty’ and ‘voice’ to describe the mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations in Taiwan, mostly directed by the United States. But a third option is now emerging. It offers the possibility of a paradigmatic breakthrough or ‘exit’ based on articulations of a postcolonial subjectivity for Taiwan and its relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses China's diplomatic and military endeavors since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 in an attempt to discourage U.S. involvement in a cross-strait war. It is suggested that the Chinese government has indicated the importance it attaches to resuming control of Taiwan by constructing combat systems capable of holding U.S. naval assets at risk in Asia. It is argued that China's use of coercion and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are a matter of communication and diplomatic signaling rather than military maneuvering of strategic forces. The skillful non-use of military force and the erecting of a "contested zone" are analyzed.