Search

Evaluates the various factors that influence the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Details on international factors; Factors originating in mainland China; Factors arising from developments within Taiwan.

Examines issues surrounding the national unity and territorial integrity of Taiwan. Significance of national reunification of China and Taiwan; Discussion on the civil war started by the Kuomintang; Position of the Chinese government regarding the settlement of the Taiwan question.

The PRC-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry has not spared the South Pacific islands, a region only rarely mentioned within a Western strategy for Asia. This paper argues that the PRC and Taiwan have, since the 1970s, become players in their own right in Oceania, raising new variables in an uneventful area. Beijing and Taipei have made energetic efforts out of all proportion to draw such tiny islands to either camp. The elusive reasons are dissected herein. Wary of Western hegemony, the region's leaders have turned to Asia for offers of trade and aid, and have played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. This paper seeks to: explain Beijing's and Taipei's goals in lands that yield seemingly negligible gains; show how such activism has impacted Oceania; determine the region's perceptions and reactions; portray the relative position of all players; and point out future problems. The study is divided into contentious points crystallized over time: Cold War decolonization and the Chinese/Taiwanese arrival; aid, trade, and investment; fishing disputes; the role of China's navy; the region's nuclear-free zone; UN and South Pacific Forum dialogues; and the region's social economic, environmental ethnic, and security concerns. The study concludes that the supremacy of Chinese and Taiwanese global commercial considerations aims to demand a specific institutional-geopolitical alignment in Oceania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the puzzling phenomenon that authoritarian governments are perceived to be more responsive than democratic governments. By comparing China and Taiwan by both large-N statistical analyses and in-depth case studies, we show that the answer lies in the differences between democratic and authoritarian institutions. First, failing to elect one’s preferred candidate in democracies predisposes voters to critical assessment of government responsiveness. There is no such predisposition in authoritarian countries where elections are nonexistent or nominal. Second, elections incentivize democratic leaders to over-respond to certain groups. There is no such mechanism in authoritarian countries. Third, the solid and clear legitimacy established by electoral victories shield democratic leaders from particularistic demands made through unconventional channels. Without such legitimacy, authoritarian leaders are compelled to cement legitimacy by increasing responsiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In “Diversionary Dragons, or ‘Talking Tough in Taipei’” (Journal of East Asian Studies 9, 3: 369-398), Yitan Li, Patrick James, and A. Cooper Drury presented a newly created data set to show that Chen Shui-bian used independence rhetoric and confrontation with the mainland as a diversionary tactic in the face of domestic political difficulties. In the present exchange, Jonathan Sullivan challenges the authors’ understanding of how the Democratic Progressive Party used the Taiwan independence issue-and the authors’ interpretation of independence- and raises questions about the coding of press coverage as a means of identifying underlying preferences. The authors respond, concluding that the future use of such diversionary tactics is by no means foreclosed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Taiwan, as well as the US, have failed to adapt new practices in response to the paradigmatic changes in the sources and nature of the China­Taiwan conflict. Reflecting the tremendous political and social changes in Taiwan, China, and the world that have occurred during the past 10–15 years, the most prominent source of the China­Taiwan conflict has shifted from power to identity. This article discusses the change of social identity in Taiwan and the re-emergence of nativistic nationalism in the PRC identity. The authors suggest that policymakers on all three sides could begin to re-think the Taiwan issue by taking advantage of the ideas and methods pioneered by experts in the rapidly growing field of conflict analysis and resolution. In this article, the authors apply concepts related to identity used by practitioners in the field of conflict resolution to look at the deeper cultural issues of identity and suggest some more appropriate methods for intervention and resolution of this deeply rooted conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]