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The article presents the author's reply to commentaries on her article "The Turn to Affect: A Critique." It explains that the objective of paper is to show that the theorists in her study share erroneous assumptions about the relation among the affect system, intention and cognition. It also explains that her criticisms on the incoherencies of affect theory are no intended to undervalue art and aesthetic experience.

Abstract The standard problem with many slippery slope arguments is that they fail to provide us with the necessary evidence to warrant our believing that the significantly morally worse circumstances they predict will in fact come about. As such these arguments have widely been criticised as scare-mongering. Consequentialists have traditionally been at the forefront of such criticisms, demanding that we get serious about guiding our prescriptions for right action by a comprehensive appreciation of the empirical facts. This is not surprising, since consequentialism has traditionally been committed to the idea that right action be driven by empirical realities, and this hard-headed approach has been an especially notable feature of Australian consequentialism. But this apparent empirical hard-headedness is very selective. While consequentialists have understood their moral outlook and commitments as guided by a partnership with empirical science most explicitly in their replies to the arguments of their detractors some consequentialists have been remarkably complacent about providing empirical support for their own prescriptions. Our key example here is the consequentialist claim that our current practises of partiality in fact maximise the good, impartially conceived. This claim has invariably been made without compelling support for the large empirical claims upon which it rests, and so, like the speculative empirical hand-waving of weak slippery slope arguments, it seems similarly to be undermined. While these arguments have presented us with wishful thinking rather than scare-mongering, we argue in this paper that their complacency in meeting the relevant empirical justificatory burden remains much the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Aquinas holds that the existence of God is self-evident in itself (because God's essence is his existence) but not to us (since we do not know the divine essence). Giles of Rome agrees with the first part of Thomas's claim, but he parts company with Aquinas by maintaining that God's existence is self-evident to the wise. Since the wise can know that God is his existence, they cannot think of him as not existing. This paper reexamines Thomas's teaching in the light of Giles criticisms. By examining closely what is involved in the claim that God's essence is his existence, and how one's knowledge of this claim is related to the knowledge that God exists, it argues that Thomas's position has the resources to withstand Giles's objections.

This paper presents an examination of some of the ways in which social criticism can be developed on the basis of the analysis of everyday life in modern societies. An attempt is made to combine the results of phenomenological (Schutz), ethnomethodological (Garfinkel), and dialectical (Kosik) approaches to the everyday world as the world-taken-for-granted, with the study, founded on semiological theory, of social images and the ideological elements implicit in them. At the centre of the discussion lies the mechanism of thematization by which the subjects assign predicates to persons, objects and events in a given social context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a paper explaining the speech delivered by Lysias titled "Oration XII, Against Eratosthenes" in terms of Burkeian notions of identification and redemption. The author mentions that the speech shows features which have proved resistant to traditional methods of Lysianic criticism. The speech is also cited as least controversial among his speeches with respect to authorship due to Lysias's personal prosecution of Eratosthenes for the murder of his brother Polemarchus.

This article responds to the diversity of approaches in the five papers presented at the Matthew Section of the Society of Biblical Literature, held in Boston (Massachusetts), 21-25 November 2008. This response focuses on an overarching question: what does it mean to read Matthew in a global context? It considers two key areas. The first is location and voice/language and the second, the hermeneutics and methodologies employed and how these enabled John Y.H. Yieh (Virginia Theological Seminary), Andries van Aarde (University of Pretoria), Dorothy Jean Weaver (Eastern Mennonite Seminary), Laura Anderson (Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley) and Lidija Novakovic (Baylor University, Waco) to read Matthew within a global context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]