Search

How much is hegemony and how much is self-determination in the higher education systems in Southeast Asia? This paper argues that while the question of centre and periphery is still relevant to the analysis of international university systems, the analytical frameworks from which it has arisen may lose viability in the long term. Southeast Asian states are making use of higher education to act in ways that will contribute to the altering of their peripheral position in the global economic and political system. While changes in Southeast Asian higher education are closely tied to global markets and follow what sometimes appears to be a dependent pattern of adaptations driven by Western developed economies, the paper argues that there is also a significant amount of resistance. As Southeast Asian countries adapt in ways that help embed economic globalisation within their national landscape, the manner in which the adaptation occurs is more selective, open, and democratic than before. Moreover, while global communication with core (centre) university systems has been more open and transparent, the system is closed to direct intervention from the outside, making hegemony a less plausible explanation for the manner in which the system is reacting within the new global environment of financial interdependency.

This paper examines the impact of 'the rise of China' on the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and its implications for Japan. Japan has traditionally enjoyed a dominant position in the Bank, as it has enjoyed a dominant position in Asia. However, with the balance of power in the region tipping in China's favour, one might expect that this would be reflected in the ADB as well. This paper argues that despite the worsening Sino-Japanese relationship, the ADB has facilitated the development and maintenance of shared expectations between the two parties over the future direction of development assistance, representing an oasis of liberal institutionalism in a relationship increasingly characterised in realist terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, essentially since the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the economic integration of Northeast Asia has been marked by three overarching trends. Economic relations have become: 1) more institutionalized; 2) more "Asian;" and 3) more China-centric. These macro-trends are demonstrated and analyzed in the paper. But by way of anticipation, numerous counter-cutting facts need also to be kept in mind. In essence, recent trends, notable as they are, have by no means reversed three counter-realities: 1) economic ties are still largely driven, less by governments and formal arrangements, than by corporations in search of profits and production efficiencies; 2) despite growing economic interdependence across Northeast Asia and between that sub-region and Southeast Asia, Japan, China and South Korea remain heavily linked to global, and particularly US, markets; and 3) though China is an ever important hub in Northeast Asian trade and investment, Japan remains by far the most powerful economic player in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macro-analysis and East-West encounter are shown through consideration of objective yet subjective constructed concepts for the international system and international economy in the 21st century. Three paradigms are considered, namely the 21st century as the 'Pacific Century', as 'China's Century' and as the 'Asian Century'. Overlaps are shown between these three paradigms, as also developments in time, and gradually shift in geographical location. The 'Pacific Century', and its associated Rimspeak, was the paradigm emerging in the late 1970s, knitting together America's West Coast and the Japanese economy. By the late 1980s this was already shifting to talk of the 21st century likely to be an 'Asian Century' model, mark-1, based on the Pacific Asia dynamism shown by the 'Asian Tigers' and Japan. However, the Asian financial crash of 1997-8, and the economic downturn in Japan, meant that such an 'Asian Century' seemed premature as the 21st century arrived. Instead, it was China's economic growth that seemed most evident, and with it the concept of the 21st century as 'China's Century'. However, in turn that has already been modified during the first decade of the century by India's arrival as a rapidly growing economy. Consequently the 21st century as 'China's Century' and as 'India's Century' has been combined into talk of an 'Asian Century', mark-2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]