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The bio-medical model of 'mental health' and 'mental illness' that relates to the relationship between wellbeing and distress informs psychopathology and dominates conceptualisation in many Western Educated Industrialised Rich Democratic (WEIRD) populations. This paper aims to critique the model, questioning the appropriateness of psychopathology as a conceptual framework when working as a Western trained clinician with populations such as in China, Japan, Asia, the Middle-East and Africa. The paper also considers the cultural appropriateness of western notions of psychopathology when working inter-culturally in relation to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, and the Review of the Implementation of the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of 'the rise of China' on the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and its implications for Japan. Japan has traditionally enjoyed a dominant position in the Bank, as it has enjoyed a dominant position in Asia. However, with the balance of power in the region tipping in China's favour, one might expect that this would be reflected in the ADB as well. This paper argues that despite the worsening Sino-Japanese relationship, the ADB has facilitated the development and maintenance of shared expectations between the two parties over the future direction of development assistance, representing an oasis of liberal institutionalism in a relationship increasingly characterised in realist terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, essentially since the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the economic integration of Northeast Asia has been marked by three overarching trends. Economic relations have become: 1) more institutionalized; 2) more "Asian;" and 3) more China-centric. These macro-trends are demonstrated and analyzed in the paper. But by way of anticipation, numerous counter-cutting facts need also to be kept in mind. In essence, recent trends, notable as they are, have by no means reversed three counter-realities: 1) economic ties are still largely driven, less by governments and formal arrangements, than by corporations in search of profits and production efficiencies; 2) despite growing economic interdependence across Northeast Asia and between that sub-region and Southeast Asia, Japan, China and South Korea remain heavily linked to global, and particularly US, markets; and 3) though China is an ever important hub in Northeast Asian trade and investment, Japan remains by far the most powerful economic player in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security cooperation between Japan and the ROK has unfolded just within Northeast Asia, rather than extending beyond the region. However, this does not mean that Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia is meaningless or impossible. In fact, such cooperation can play significant roles. First, the differences in attitude toward regional security cooperation do not come from conflicts of interest, but from differences in priorities. Since both countries depend on overseas trade in the Asia-Pacific region and energy supplies from the Middle East, the stability of sea lanes is a shared concern and cooperation in this regard will serve both countries' national interests. Second, with the "normalization" of Japan's security policy and modernization of the ROK navy and air force, both countries may have concerns about each other's strategic intentions. Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia, based on strategic consensus on the importance of sea lanes, can reduce such suspicion on both sides. Third, faced with the rising China, the coordination of both countries' policies toward China to increase the "partner" aspect will serve the interests of long-term stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Six-Party Talks play such a role now, but regional security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia will have broader effects on the Asia-Pacific region. This paper argues that there is a way forward for Japan-ROK security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the much hyped 'rise of Asia' translating into global public good? The leading Asian powers, China, India and Japan, demand a greater share of the decision-making and leadership of global institutions. Yet, they seem to have been more preoccupied with enhancing their national power and status than contributing to global governance, including the management of global challenges. This is partly explained by a realpolitik outlook and ideology, and the legacies of India's and China's historical identification with the 'Third World' bloc. Another key factor is the continuing regional legitimacy deficit of the Asian powers. This article suggests that the Asian powers should increase their participation in and contribution to regional cooperation as a stepping stone to a more meaningful contribution to global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that an important part of the future contributions Asia can make to world affairs is the strategic relationship between Japan and China. It discusses the key dynamics of the evolving order in East Asia, including regional economic integration and its spillover effects and China's peaceful and comprehensive rise. The author proposes a framework to help improve the relations between China and Japan.

After examining different theoretical expectations of how Japan might respond strategically to the rise of China, this article analyzes the evolution of Japan's policy toward China from 1972 to 2006. It argues that Japan has shifted away from the 'friendship diplomacy' paradigm to a mixed strategy that involves both positive engagement and realistic balancing to hedge against the potential threats that China may pose in the future. Japan is engaged in a vigorous domestic debate about China policy that centers around four options: cooperative engagement with a soft hedge, competitive engagement with a hard hedge, balancing and containment, and strategic accommodation. The current mixed strategy of engagement and hedging is consistent with different theoretical traditions such as offensive realism, defensive realism, and liberalism. Future developments such as Japan-China interactive effects, shifts in the military power balance, and changes in US strategy, however, could steer Japan to make choices that point in a certain theoretical direction as opposed to others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes three models that explain for the peace in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. Discussion on the notion of geographic balance of power in the region; Examination on the notion of complexity of national interests in the post-Cold War era in the region; Nuclear deterrence in asymmetric power structure; Power relations between China and Russia and Japan and the U.S.; Regional security policy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

One of the twenty-first century's great challenges will be to fill Asia's security vacuum. The US maintains a heavy military presence and an important set of bilateral security arrangements, and the region's great powers cooperate on an ad hoc basis. But there is no developed security system embraced by Asia- Pacific's leading powers. Meanwhile, the 'Asian way' of consensus-based diplomacy has suffered greatly -- in coherence and prestige -- from the financial crisis which started in 1997. What the region needs is a limited and informal concert, based on the classical principles of European concert diplomacy. Such a framework would satisfy China's quest for enhanced international status, help US efforts to 'engage' China, and address the fear of Japan and Russia being marginalised if the Sino-US relationship develops into a true 'strategic partnership'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]