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Design is the act of bringing the intelligible to the senses. Not simply a work of pure reason finding science or methodology through knowledge, or a work of practical reason sensing genius or taste by empirical evidence, or even faith, design is a cause often mistaken for an outcome. It is a totality of which only a part is sensuous, as an esthetic object, or as a structure of soundness, while other parts elude the senses into apprehension through form fitting idea. Attributes of relevance in the artifact emanate from within the constituents of design: form and content, relative to one another rather than to the need for art, often external thereto, being social, political, economic, etc. In this regard, the significance of a work of design is an internal affair found in the accordance of form to content. I say accordance to allow for the possibility of a range in suitability, where one idea is more suited to being recited in a poem than embodied in a sculpture. This is while harmony is a state of absolute accordance, similar in content to elegance in form where nothing could be added or omitted without some loss of significance. Ultimately, judgment of the work of art –as a design—is a question of making responding to conception and not the servitude of the artifact to the external need that had called for the act of making in the first place. Design is collected –as would be rainwater— at the core of existence, nourishing, invigorating the spirit with turgidity, and springing out into full visibility and splendor when the natural thrust of expression overwhelms the forces of containment.

This paper proposes a roughly Aristotelian account of powers ontology. In doing so, the paper uses the distinction found in Aristotle between four analogous senses of potency to explain causation and the existence-essence distinction in substances. On this basis, the paper offers some justification in support of the claims that powers and dispositions are the truth-makers of categorical properties and that categorical properties are ontologically dependent upon powers and dispositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the conception of philosophy and ethics in Seneca's Letters, as well as in his other writings, which it sets in the broader context of ancient and modern thought. The introduction outlines the Socratic and Stoic foundations of Seneca's ethics. The next section focuses on the interpretation of passages from the Letters that remind us that the task of philosophy is to teach human to live an active life. The paper points out that, according to Seneca, philosophy resembles art more than knowledge, and Seneca adapts his language and the examples he uses to this effect. In the next section, the paper returns to delineating the relationship between theoretical and practical thought. The specificity of Seneca's position becomes visible in the background of Aristotle's problematization of this relationship. The last section asks how we should approach Seneca's conception of ethics and philosophy. The analyses outlined above show that Seneca's Letters fully express an approach to philosophy as an art of living, an approach that modern authors such as Nietzsche and Foucault consider determinative for the whole of ancient philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to present a theoretical approach to studying argumentative study, also known as modern rhetoric; the paper follows a limpid path, moving between the various definitions of argumentation using the descriptive-analytical method. Firstly, it differentiates the two types of argumentation: the logical and the linguistic. Then, it deals with the most well-known contextual definitions of argumentation in both Arabic and Western argumentative studies. Aristotle was the first to refer to the types of argumentation. Hence, the paper shows his endeavors in this respect. The article advances Arabic language and teaching by providing theoretical foundations, pedagogical insights, cross-cultural understanding, historical context, methodological applications, relevance to modern scholarship, and validating Arabic rhetorical traditions. This study aims to give a brief and easy idea of Aristotle's efforts in the field of argumentation, especially the logical arguments and the subjective moral arguments, and the functions of these moral arguments of benefit, influence, and enjoyment, whether they relate to the orator (Aetos), the audience (Pathos), or the speech itself (Logos). Then, the research concluded with examples of these self-created arguments. The study results showed a comprehensive concept of the arguments in Arab and Western thoughts. Moreover, the researchers proved that Aristotle's topics and thoughts were one of the most significant sources of nourishment for the modern argumentative lesson; Arabic rhetoric did not lag behind the Western lesson in its care for argumentations and its methods of analysis, and they demonstrated the applicability of the mentioned concepts in the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to gain a better understanding of contemporary political realism, as well as of the theories of two classical political philosophers, this paper argues that the methodological roots of a contextualist model of realism can be found, among others, in the writings of Aristotle and Machiavelli. It is argued that the methodological assumptions of contextualist political realism can be formulated through two main notions: 1) the experiential basis – analysis of politics through reliance on experience from political practice; and 2) contextualism – avoiding universal claims as much as possible, i.e., making claims about politics always within a socio-historical context. Using those lenses, the paper points out the methodological elements of Aristotle’s and Machiavelli’s political theories that are in line with this version of political realism, claiming both of them could be perceived as forerunners to a certain degree. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to gain a better understanding of contemporary political realism, as well as of the theories of two classical political philosophers, this paper argues that the methodological roots of a contextualist model of realism can be found, among others, in the writings of Aristotle and Machiavelli. It is argued that the methodological assumptions of contextualist political realism can be formulated through two main notions: 1) the experiential basis – analysis of politics through reliance on experience from political practice; and 2) contextualism – avoiding universal claims as much as possible, i.e., making claims about politics always within a socio-historical context. Using those lenses, the paper points out the methodological elements of Aristotle’s and Machiavelli’s political theories that are in line with this version of political realism, claiming both of them could be perceived as forerunners to a certain degree. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we introduce the subject of the special issue Trends in Argumentation Logic. Here we mainly describe two approaches to argumentation logic with explicating monotonic and nonmonotonic, or defeasible, reasoning and explain the role of artificial intelligence in applying argumentation logic. Then we give a short overview of the papers contributed to the special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper extends well-established arguments for the liberal potential of vocational education by advocating for the necessity of craft learning in a liberal education curriculum. The case for the necessity of craft learning in liberal education is established in two parts, the first looking toward Aristotle and the second toward Heidegger. First, ideas from Aristotle are employed to articulate a vision of liberal education as that which supports the performance of our characteristic human activity. The paper then splits with Aristotle to suggest that such activity is not defined by rational contemplation, but rather by the circumspective engagement with materials through which our being-in-the-world becomes apparent to us. If, as Heidegger suggests, these practical engagements demonstrate our most fundamental mode of encountering the world and one another, then any liberal education focused on the fulfillment of our potential for understanding must include some craft learning by necessity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces Prior's unpublished paper Aristotle on Logical Squares, which is deposited in the Bodleian Library and which discusses Greniewski's definition of the $$\Box $$ operator, which Greniewski introduced in his paper Próba ' odmłodzenia' kwadratu logicznego. It is a unique attempt to formalize the square of opposition. Bendiek's review, which is an important intermediary between Greniewski's and Prior's paper, is also mentioned here. Greniewski's main motivation was to rejuvenate the traditional square of opposition in order to make a square of opposition more precise. He did not investigate the history of the square of opposition. Prior's approach differs a great deal from Greniewski's one because he bases his analyses of Greniewski's operator on Aristotle's definitions of squares of oppositions. There are some queries, which arise due to the different aims of Greniewski and Prior and their different approach might have caused Prior's effort to the approximation of Greniewski's operator to Aristotle's definitions of the squares of opposition was unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine Aristotle's cosmological proof of God's existence, Avicenna's metaphysical proof, and Thomas Aquinas's five-way proof. By comparing these proofs, I argue that philosophers and theologians take different approaches to proving God's existence not only because they follow different epistemological principles but, more fundamentally, because they construct different metaphysical frameworks in which God as the Supreme Being plays different roles and is thus clarified differently. The proof of God's existence is also of theological significance. This paper makes an original contribution by showing that, despite Avicenna's harsh criticism, Aquinas returns to Aristotelian cosmological proof. Moreover, Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle by identifying God not only as the First Mover but also as the Creator. The theme of God's existence bridges philosophy and theology, and it also clearly reflects the interplay and mutual influence of Greek philosophy, Arabic Aristotelianism, and Latin Scholastics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to evaluate Marx's conception of alienated labour from the point of view of Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of practice. I will argue that Marx's conception of alienation in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (and elsewhere) is too abstract, and therefore needs to be revised to reflect the reality of the 21st century. It presupposes that, in capitalism, all salaried and waged labour is alienated (a claim recently reiterated by Amy Wendling in her otherwise outstanding Karl Marx on Technology and Alienation). Clearly, this is not the case. The key characteristics of alienation as spelled out by Marx may not be present in a great variety of contemporary jobs dominated by services, especially if they are (or can be seen as) MacIntyrean practices (for example, practicing medicine in a public hospital or working as an engineer in a private company). Drawing on some of the most notable literature on the forms of alienation and reification, I will aim to theorise the conception of meaningful non-alienated labour. Given that practices, as meaningful non-alienated activities, are small islands of human excellence and resistance against the economic pressures of institutional profit maximisation and the self-valorisation of capital, I will conclude the paper by considering the political importance of this conception of labour for anti-capitalist struggles in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Applied ethicists' interest in narratives and narratives ethics has grown steadily. Some thinkers position narratives as supplements to ethics, while others see narratives as new form of ethics comparable to virtue or deontological ethics. In this paper, I analyze some of the main ethical claims being made on behalf of business and literary narratives from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that, while narratives can significantly contribute to the development of our character, to a better grasp of virtues and vices, and to a clarification of a virtue ethics framework, this contribution is highly nuanced. In particular, Aristotelian virtue ethics enable us to sensibly and helpfully distinguish the ethical value of narratives within business ethics from narrative business ethics per se. This paper has three parts. Part One offers a provisional definition of narrative and sketches some of the large claims that literary critics, philosophers, theologians, and others have made for narratives' relevance to and value for ethics. In Part Two, using narratives drawn from business and literature, I take up each of these claims in turn and examine whether the claim makes sense and is compelling from an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. Part Three gathers together the threads of the arguments in Part Two to specify the modest, but nonetheless significant, legitimate roles narratives might play within Aristotle's virtue ethics. I also point to some limitations inherent in an Aristotelian critique of narrative ethics and suggest some questions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of tyche (τύχη), a Greek term that can be alternatively translated as luck, fortune, or fate. The paper disentangles various threads of argument in the primary sources to argue for a realist understanding of what we moderns call "luck." In short, it contends that Aristotle's account of these issues is mostly correct and merits close attention when canvassing recent philosophical debates about luckology. Aristotle argues that science pertains to the general rule; it is not about the particular. Particular events have contingent content that exceeds the scope of science. Even if we could predict all future events with ultimate accuracy, we would still be left wondering why good or bad things happen to specific people. Although luck is not a scientific category, it has an existential reality that leaves momentous events open to metaphysical and even religious interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as a virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. This view is sometimes assumed to require a commitment to an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On that view, practical wisdom would require philosophical insight and an implausibly well worked out set of weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim to show that particularists can and should take on much of what was thought to belong to the Grand End view. I argue for a conception of practical wisdom as a virtue of extended action that accounts for overarching ends without the need to appeal to an unrealistic, intellectualized blueprint for life. Further, on the view advocated here, as in Aristotle, practical wisdom is a virtue of substantial rationality and a different capacity from instrumental rationality in that it requires reflection on what constitutes a good human life. This is not high-minded philosophical reflection and is, in fact, something rather mundane that draws on the same rational capacities we deploy to assess the goodness of actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between potentiality and possibility in Aristotle's modal teleology is sometimes conflated by the implicative conjunction that potentiality implies possibility and possibility implies potentiality. In his unpublished doctoral dissertation Richard Rorty warns that trying to pin down Aristotle's definition of potentiality often leads to treating the term as a "mere façon de parler." Consonant with Rorty, this paper observes that the definition of possibility in Aristotle's works is not without its own share of semantic snags. Subsequently, I abide by Rorty's caveat not only to resist the lure of expressive convenience some commentators have taken in describing potentiality, but also to elucidate possibility's two-fold field of modal application. Consequently, this paper aims to present a nuanced account of how notions of potentiality and possibility are presented in Aristotle's treatises for the sake of demonstrating that both sides of the potentiality/possibility conjunction do not mutually imply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Cultural Studies / Roczniki Kulturoznawcze is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Institute of Cultural Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is often assumed that in the collapse of the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature that results from the rise of mechanical philosophies in the early modern period, the collapse falls on the side of art. That is, all of the diversity among natures that was explained previously as differences among substantial forms came to be seen simply as differences in arrangements of matter according to laws instituted by the "divine artificer", God. This paper argues that, for René Descartes, the collapse occurs on both sides. Natures are artefacts of God, and human artefacts, under some conditions, can be classified as natures or, at least, continuous within nature. Drawing on developments across both horticulture and engineering in the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as Descartes' mechanical philosophy, this paper explores challenges to the Aristotelian nature/art distinction. The question then is what, in the advent of this collapse, are human artificers doing when they construct artefacts? Are they replicating God's powers by creating new natures, or are they doing something else, and if so, what might that be? It is argued that we should view human invention for Descartes not as creating new natures so much as discovering them. These findings have consequences for how we interpret Descartes' use of the term "nature" in relation to automata and other artefacts produced by human hands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bo Burnham's Inside, promoted as a musical comedy special by its platform Netflix, released in June 2021 to almost unquestioning praise, and has now won 3 Emmys. The work is an evocative retrospective of Burnham's fictionalized experience during the Covid-19 quarantine. Written, performed, filmed, and edited by Burnham himself, the piece reflects his career as a musical comedy performance artist, and also provides an intimate look into his struggles with mental health, internet culture, and artistic ego. Of particular appeal in this piece is the complex pairing of comedy with pathos. Its songs have become ironic backgrounds to TikTok videos and popular sea shanty renditions. Critics remark: 'What he's describing is the near-universal feeling of despair in 2020. And that feels good' (Herman 2021); 'A tricky work that for all its boundary-crossing remains in the end a comedy in the spirit of neurotic, self-loathing stand-up' (Zinoman 2021); 'A claustrophobic masterclass in comedy and introspection, Inside is a beautifully bleak, hilariously hopeful special' (Rotten Tomatoes). It is this complexity which I seek to investigate. I assert that Bo Burnham's Inside achieves its poignancy not through its comedic stylings, but through its implementation of a traditional Aristotelian tragic structure. This paper will discuss the ways in which Burnham follows the tragic structure and the monomyth while engaging with, and subverting, benign violation theory to provide a postmodern catharsis in its audience that feels like comedy, but ultimately provides a shared expression of, and outlet for, the audience's grief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores Galen's notion of the chreia of bodily parts and activities, and the method of its discovery against the Aristotelian background. It argues that the chreia of an object π (a bodily part or activity) is a connection between the activity ε for the sake of which π has come into existence, and the attributes of π without which ε would cease to exist or would not be as good. The discovery of chreia , then, is an explanation of this connection. Aristotle does not use the word ' chreia ' in this sense, but in Parts of Animals he employs a partly overlapping notion which he calls ' ergon '. Finally, the paper points out that Galen's chreia is equivalent to the middle term of teleological demonstrations, as outlined in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II 11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Physics 2.4–6, Aristotle offers an account of things that happen "by luck" (ἀπὸ τύχης) and "spontaneously" (ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου). Many of these things are what we might think of as "lucky breaks": cases where things go well for us, even though we don't expect them to. In Physics 2.5, Aristotle illustrates this idea with the case of a man who goes to the market for some reason unrelated to collecting a debt he is owed (197a17–8). While he is there, this man just so happens to run into his debtor and get his money back—which is what he "wanted" all along (196a4). This case has a number of features that have proved puzzling. Most notably, Aristotle seems to think that while "it happened accidentally to him to come and to do this for the sake of getting the money", nevertheless the man "did not come for the sake of this"—though he "would have" (196b34–6). What must such a proceeding be like to be described in these ways? Physics 2.4–6 makes several important moves towards answering this question. One of them—among the earliest and seemingly a foundational one—is the claim that "for the sake of something are as many things as could be done by thought and by nature" (196b21–2). The aim of this paper is to identify the role that this claim plays in Aristotle's account of spontaneous proceedings. It defends two main claims. First, Aristotle's suggestion that spontaneous proceedings could be done by nature and by thought is the product of a more general strategy. His approach is to sketch an intuitive pattern of explanation for proceedings that happen for the sake of something in the ordinary—non-spontaneous—way, and then to try to extend that model to the case of things that do so spontaneously, preserving as much of it as possible. Applying this strategy reveals that whereas nature and thought in fact function as efficient causes of ordinary proceedings that are for the sake of something, this cannot be the case in spontaneous ones. Instead, nature and thought could function as their causes. Second, I argue that Aristotle's implementation of this strategy is rooted in his account of causation and especially Physics 2.3's list of "modes" (τρόποι) of causes. When he claims that spontaneous proceedings "could" be done by nature and by thought, he is saying that nature (in natural cases) and thought (in practical ones) are their efficient causes in capacity. In the practical case, spontaneous proceedings are caused by agents who have certain capacities, connected with their desires and abilities. In the right circumstances, these agents would actively exercise those capacities in acting for the sake of a given end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Phainomena is the property of Phenomenological Society of Ljubljana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is a neo-Platonic theory of moral education better than a neo-Aristotelian one, because the former offers a dialogue method that teachers can use in universities to induce epiphanies in students, in order to jump-start the moral development of those with a rather vicious character? In this paper, this claim, put forward by Jonas and Nakazawa in their book A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, is evaluated. Admittedly, the Nicomachean Ethics, which came to us in the form of a collection of edited lecture notes, gives the impression that Aristotle was not interested in dialogue. But by looking at the dialogical form of the Ethics and by consulting some of his ideas on logic, I show that Aristotle's oeuvre does include valuable ideas about how teachers may conduct dialogues with their students. These dialogues may not yield epiphanies and will not convert vicious adults, but they are suitable for reaching most students and can appeal to their emotions and practical wisdom. While Jonas and Nakazawa argue that Plato and Aristotle only agree on the centrality of habituation, imitation, and role-modelling in their accounts of moral education, I conclude that dialogue should be added to that list. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many, striving to attain first place in an athletic competition is explicable. Less explicable is striving to attain first place in a virtue (aretē) competition. Yet this latter dynamic appears in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. There is 4.3's magnanimity, the crown of the virtues, which seemingly manifests itself in outdoing one's peers in virtue. Such one-upmanship also seems operant with 9.8's praiseworthy self-lover, who seeks to get as much of the fine (to kalon) as possible for herself. Contrary to many interpreters, this paper argues that praiseworthy self-love and magnanimity involve one-upmanship. The relevant exemplars are not simply striving to be the best that they can be in respect to virtue (in virtuous activity), but to be better than others. The paper argues that Aristotle's axiology, which sets activity (energeia) above state (hexis) and potentiality (dunamis), engenders one-upmanship. For only the level of activity substantially differentiates individuals, settling for inferiority is obviously objectionable, and equal achievement for Aristotle is not static but involves matching and surpassing the achievements of others. The paper concludes that modern discomfort with these dynamics is due to an axiology Nietzsche attributes to Christianity, one that bases human value fundamentally on non-differentiating potentiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that virtue ethics is unfortunately committed to a developmentally detrimental form of moral evaluation in its traditional iterations. That is, first, because both action guidance and moral development are central to virtue ethic and, second, because virtue ethics permits or requires character appraisal in moral education and child-rearing through praise and blame. However, studies from developmental and clinical psychology show that praise or blame involving character appraisal can be detrimental to children and, especially, to women and girls. While not all empirical studies point in this direction, the data are sufficiently murky to warrant an objection to virtue ethics along the lines of a situationism. Using a feminist and care-oriented critique, I argue this could pose a problem for virtue ethics. However, I argue that the criterion of moral evaluation can and must be distinguished from successful moral education of children to avoid this problem. By focusing on behavior instead of character, moral agents can avoid the harm virtue ethics may cause. Finally, I respond to an objection that doing so makes virtue ethics esoteric or self-effacing and argue that it fares no worse than other moral theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows how Ménestrier's theorizing on emblems developed from his practice as devisor of decorative schemes and festivals, as indeed did that of fellow Jesuits. It explains his concern for developing a theoretical framework (whereas fellow Jesuits usually published collections of emblems with little theory) in terms of the influence exerted by his Jesuit training in Aristotelian philosophy and Thomist theology and the example set by the (ex-)Jesuit theorist Emanuele Tesauro. It puts Ménestrier's theory and practice of emblems within the context of his more general concern for "erudite," or symbolic, images and how he conceived such images, in general, operate on humans. In conclusion, I suggest how this understanding of such images' potential within the context of Catholic renewal affects how Ménestrier understands the purpose and creation of emblems. This article is part of the special issue of the Journal of Jesuit Studies on Jesuit emblems and emblematic edited by Walter S. Melion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's use of the term 'eironeia' in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) appears to be inconsistent: first, he attributes the attitude termed 'eironeia' to the great-souled man (megalopsychos), who is defined by his virtuousness, then he classifies 'eironeia' as one of the two vices which are central to his account of the virtue of truthfulness. Modern attempts to explain and to solve the "riddle of the great-souled eiron" have not been satisfying. This paper argues that the riddle results from Aristotle trying to reconcile aristocratic values with democratic reality. In the process, some insight will be gained on the concept of the megalopsychos in general, on Aristotle's notion of the virtue of truthfulness and on his depiction of Socrates. Finally, it is argued that Aristotle's use of the notion of 'eironeia' in the NE bears some resemblance to the use of the notion of 'irony' in modern political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Evaluation Paradigms present evaluators with differing approaches to evaluating a program’s merit, worth, and value. Grounded in varying ontologies (i.e., notions of reality) and epistemologies (i.e., ways of knowing), these paradigms advance differing views of what counts as knowledge. The privileging of Western-centric knowledge (i.e., empiricism) over traditional and revealed (i.e., spiritual) knowledge, places the reigning evaluation paradigms at odds with Indigenous paradigms and presents numerous risks to individuals, communities, and ecosystems. This paper invites readers to step into the ethical space (Ermine, 2007) between epistemologies to interrogate Western knowledge assumptions and identify common philosophical ground between Indigenous and Western ways of knowing. Through an examination of Aristotelian and Cartesian thought and a review of transdisciplinary support for an interactive epistemology which embraces empirical, traditional, and revealed knowledge, I argue that embracing the Knowledge Trinity concept advances the decolonization of evaluator heart and mind and provides a new epistemological foundation upon which to construct a Decolonizing Paradigm. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to encourage the decolonizing of Western-trained evaluators’— Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike—heart and mind by arguing for embrace and integration of empirical, traditional, and revealed knowledge in evaluation theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]