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Copyright of Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval is the property of Sociedad Espanola de Filosofia Medieval and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Warmińskie is the property of University of Warmia & Mazury in Olsztyn and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How many scientific demonstrations can a single phenomenon have? This paper argues that, according to Aristotle's theory of scientific knowledge as laid out in the Posterior Analytics, a single conclusion may be demonstrated via more than one explanatory middle term. I also argue that this model of multiple demonstration is put into practice in the biological writings. This paper thereby accomplishes two related goals: it clarifies certain relatively obscure passages of the Posterior Analytics and uses them to show how Aristotle explains biological phenomena by reference to both final and material causes in the Parts of Animals. The first part of the paper explains the account of multiple demonstration present in the Posterior Analytics and distinguishes it from another kind of plural explanation rejected by Aristotle. The second part of the paper turns to the biological explanation in the Parts of Animals and shows how Aristotle's account of multiple demonstrations works in practice. The paper thus provides evidence for the claim that the 'applied' reasoning on display in the biological works is in harmony with the framework of the logical treatises, and thus may also shed light on questions of the unity of the Aristotelian corpus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a vision for leadership in business, banking, and politics based on a recovery of virtue. It draws principally on the works of the classical philosophers Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and Plato (c. 427-347 BCE) in line with the contemporary resurgence of Aristotle associated with Alasdair MacIntyre and others. In the context of an ethical analysis of the Irish banking crisis (2008-2016), the paper will show how virtue ethics can contribute to the avoidance of a repetition of the disastrous financial crisis of 2008 in Ireland and globally. It proposes a holistic approach that integrates virtue and culture, ethics and governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adds ammunition to recent arguments for the possibility of online character friendships in the Aristotelian sense. It does so by exploring sustained and deep email correspondence or epalship as a potential venue for the creation, development and maintenance of character friendships, and by drawing an analogy with a historically famous example of penpalship: that forged between Voltaire and Catherine the Great. It is argued that epalships allow for various technological extensions in the cyberworld of today that were not available to Voltaire and Catherine; and that augmented with those extensions, there is even more reason for seeing epalships as potentially making the grade as true character friendships than traditional penpalships. However, despite being potentially categorisable as character friendships, mature epalships are vulnerable to the same problems and pitfalls as other examples of character friendships, and perhaps even more so: pitfalls that were mostly overlooked by Aristotle himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reasoning carry over to practical reasoning. I end by arguing that this version of the Guise of the Good withstands standard objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

McNabb and DeVito have recently argued that Graham Oppy's objections to the First Way are found wanting. In response, McNabb and DeVito restructured the First Way on behalf of St Thomas. More recently, Joseph Schmid and Daniel Linford argue that the restructured argument given by McNabb and DeVito is problematic, claiming that it is either valid but unmotivated or it is plainly invalid. In this paper, I argue that McNabb and DeVito's schematic glossing of the First Way is both valid and motivated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thesis of this paper is that, in De Caelo I.2, the introduction and differentiation of simple bodies is achieved entirely by differentiating simple motions. This runs counter to the traditional interpretations of De Caelo I.2, which consider how, and how completely, Aristotle uses the differentiation of simple magnitudes to differentiate simple bodies, and which assume that he introduces the notion of a simple body independently of the notion of a simple motion. But the traditional interpretations miss the point of Aristotle's argument in De Caelo I.2, which – so I argue – is to introduce the notion of simple motions, using this to introduce the notion of simple bodies, and to thereby provide an explanatory account of all possible locomotion. This is the reason why Aristotle identifies simple bodies in De Caelo I.2 with the fundamental components of the universe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The renewed engagement with Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom in management and organization studies is reflective of the wider turn towards practice sweeping across many disciplines. In this sense, it constitutes a welcome move away from the traditional rationalist, abstract, and mechanistic modes of approaching ethical decision-making. Within the current engagement, practical wisdom is generally conceptualized, interpreted or read as a form of deliberation or deliberative judgement that is also cognizant of context, situatedness, particularity, lived experience, and so on. We argue that while this way of conceptualizing practical wisdom moves closer to practice in accounting for the concrete and particular reality within which individuals enact ethics, it does not adequately account for practice in the ontological and relational sense posited in practice theories. Practical wisdom conceptualized on the deliberative dimension still retains a higher emphasis on distinct entities (individuals/institutions), reflexive agency, conscious mental states, goal-directed action, and intentionality. In other words, it puts a higher stress on individual wisdom, as opposed to practice or the relational interaction of the individual and social inhering in practice. We offer an alternative conceptualization of practical wisdom based on the dispositional mode of being in the world which is rarely deliberate, intentional, or reflective. Our conceptualization integrates Aristotle's original ethical framework, which is already embedded in a practice-based ontology, with insights from practice theories to show how practical wisdom is intuitively channelled in the dispositional mode in a given social configuration of virtues/ends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two distinct but interrelated questions concerning Aristotle's account of infinity that have been the subject of recurring debate. The first of these, what I call here the interpretative question, asks for a charitable and internally coherent interpretation of the limited pieces of text where Aristotle outlines his view of the 'potential' (and not 'actual') infinite. The second, what I call here the philosophical question, asks whether there is a way to make Aristotle's notion of the potential infinite coherent and rigorous with modern tools that can stand as a rival to the widely-accepted view of the infinite as characterized in a mathematical theory of sets. In this paper, I argue that the theoretical roles that Aristotle intends his account of the potential infinite to fulfill lead to a deep and irresoluble tension that can help explain the persistence of debates on both of these questions. I do so by turning to the places where Aristotle attempts to argue for or against the existence of particular infinite processes to show that he slides between different underlying notions of when changes are possible. Making these underlying notions clear can help us better understand the role of Aristotle's account in the history of philosophy, the possible pitfalls for a contemporary theory of the potential infinite, and what each of these debates might learn from each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Metaphysics Theta 3 Aristotle attributes to the Megarics and unknown others a notorious modal thesis: (M) something can φ only if it is φ-ing. Aristotle does not tell us what motivated (M). Almost all scholars take Aristotle's report to indicate that the Megarics defended (M) as a highly counterintuitive doctrine in modal metaphysics. But this reading faces several problems. First: what would motivate the Megarics to hold such a counterintuitive view? The existing literature tries, in various ways, to motivate (M) in a way neither trivial nor absurd. But, as we will argue, the main approaches end up attributing an unsustainable position to the Megarics. Second: most historical evidence for the Megaric lineage presents the group's philosophical practice as dialectical or negative. So why think that the claim reported in Theta 3 presents a positive, and highly controversial, metaphysical claim? This paper addresses these problems by proposing a dialectical (or negative) reading of the Megarics in Theta 3. By 'dialectical' we here mean a mode of philosophizing that neither seeks to establish the truth or falsity of certain theses, nor takes a skeptical stance. There are different reasons why a philosopher might want to take up such a mode; in the case of the Megarics we argue that they might have wanted to put pressure on Aristotle's idea of possibility and the 'test' for possibility that Aristotle mentions in several works. Reading, as we do, (M) as (part of) a paradox about possibility and actuality, we argue that the Megarics' dialectical approach here aims to highlight a shortcoming of an intuitive conception of possibility, which underpins Aristotle's idea of possibility and which features in his test for possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While in his Science of Logic, Hegel employed neither diagrams nor formulae, his reinterpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic logic in the "Subjective Logic" of Book III strongly suggests a diagrammatic dimension. Significantly, an early diagram depicting a "triangle of triangles" found among his papers after his death captures the organization of categories to be found in The Science of Logic. Features of this diagram help us understand Hegel's logical project as an attempt to retrieve features of Plato's thinking that are implicit within Aristotle's syllogistic logic. It is argued that parallels between Hegel's modification of Aristotle's syllogistic figures and Peirce's functional alignment of those syllogistic figures with his three inference forms—deduction, induction, and abduction—suggest modifications of the traditional "square of opposition" into a logical hexagon as found in recent discussions. However, Hegel had conceived of Aristotle's syllogism as a distorted version of the "syllogism" thought by Plato to bind the parts of the cosmos into a unity as described in the dialogue Timaeus. In accord with this, it is argued that seen in the light of Hegel's platonistic reconstruction of Aristotle's logic, such logical hexagons should be understood as two-dimensional projections of a logical polyhedron. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In "Practical Reason's Foundations" John Finnis expands and refines his view on the relationship between objective goods and practical reason. In this paper Finnis rejects the Humean conception which denies the possibility of practical reason, or at least presents an emaciated version of it. For Hume, desires just happen to us and there is no interaction between desires and beliefs. The Humean and neo-Humean positions, Finnis rightly tells us, have a powerful influence on how we understand practical reason, including our interpretation of Aristotle's conception of practical reason. I will call this the "bifurcation" thesis. Following Finnis's conception of practical reason and his rejection of a bifurcation between reasons and desires, and between intellectual virtues and virtues of character, I advance an Aristotelian-inspired model of deliberation and practical reason that is narrow and immersed. It recognizes the difficulty of understanding the Aristotelian analogies of practical reason as if it were both a craft and theoretical reasoning to illuminate and demonstrate the existence of practical reason. However, I also argue that this narrow or immersed model is in continuity with a deliberative-aspirational perspective that we are able to inhabit. We explain how reflection without losing immersion is possible and explain how we can move in the direction of practical reason that guides actions and makes possible the realization of objective goods in our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato's dialogues, and as described in Aristotle's logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos' method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one's own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one's set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as 'monster-barring'—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between sport and a good life presents a fruitful philosophical challenge and it has been discussed extensively within the philosophy sport literature. This paper will investigate the role of sport in a good life in the philosophical conceptions of Aristotle and Suits. Both authors paid attention to sport and its significance in the context of living well. However, their approaches differ, partly because they emerge in a different historical and cultural context. My aim is to analyse relevant texts of these two authors, presenting their major points, commonalities, and differences. The debate, to a certain extent, highlights instrumental (educational) and autotelic (intrinsic) value of sport. In order to conceptualize properly the role of sport in a good life, we need to take into account both of these aspects. The originality of this contribution can be found in presenting relevant implications of the contrasting positions of Suits and Aristotle to our thinking about modern sport. Finally, I point to the complementarity of their positions and demonstrate their impact on the broader debate concerning good sport and its role in a good life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle has traditionally been cast as the arch-enemy of all things mechanistic. Given the dichotomy long thought to exist between mechanistic and teleological schools of thought, there is a satisfying irony in discovering veins of apparently 'mechanistic' thought within the work of the definitive teleologist. Several waves of scholarship in the past century have argued, from different angles, for mechanistic interpretations of Aristotle's natural philosophy. The present generation is no exception: in the last decade, Jean De Groot, Monte Johnson, and Tiberiu Popa have variously argued that a mechanistic vein can be found in Aristotle's work, despite his undeniable teleological credentials. This paper explores the assumptions—some of them open to question—that accompany such advocacy. It will urge some terminological refinements, and turn a skeptical lens on some aspects of these projects. Nonetheless, it will stress that they open promising lines of inquiry, avoiding some of the limitations of earlier ventures into this territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (henceforth EN). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from EN I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not taken into account in previous editions of the EN—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the EN that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages.

Taking seriously the notion that diversifying our philosophical pedagogy is of both intrinsic and instrumental importance, this paper offers a defense of, and model for, a pedagogical approach aimed at making canonical philosophical texts more appealing—and more useful—for diverse students. Specifically, taking Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as a case study, this paper considers how we might make this text more engaging for students from traditionally underrepresented backgrounds. It does so by offering a five-step model, which involves: situating the text in its historical context; acknowledging and addressing problematic content in the text; drawing out novel or underexplored themes and questions from the text; bringing the text into dialogue with diverse and contemporary philosophical approaches and issues (e.g., feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, and non-Western philosophies); and applying issues, themes, and concepts from the text to contemporary matters or current events as much as possible. Specific examples are offered regarding how to achieve each of these steps when teaching the Nicomachean Ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This position paper proposes a novel approach to the ethical design of social robots. We coin the term "Virtuous Robotics" to describe Human–Robot Interaction (HRI) designed to help humans reach a higher level of moral development. Our approach contrasts with mainstream approaches to robot design inspired by the other normative theories, Consequentialism and Deontology. In the paper we theoretically justify our proposal, illustrating how the Virtuous Robotics approach allows us to discriminate between positive and negative applications of robotics systems, of which we provide examples. From an ethical perspective, our proposal is theoretically robust because it is based on the assistive role played by the robot rather than the robot's moral agency. From a designer's perspective, Virtuous Robotics is technically feasible because it transfers the cognitive burden of HRI from the robot to the user, bypassing the need for complex decision-making abilities. From the user's perspective, it is concretely advantageous, because it envisions a realistic way to make robots morally desirable in our lives, as supports for personal betterment and fulfilment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to establish new, multi-dimensional indicators of child well-being suitable to urban regions such as Attica, Greece, and adjusted to the new form of child poverty that has become apparent during its recent financial crisis. The paper mainly argues that child well-being is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and that the financial crisis produced a specific need for new scientific tools adapted to the particular features that emerged under this circumstance. Within this context, definitions of child well-being and child poverty were developed. With these definitions as foundation, a tool comprising many indicators was formulated to record child well-being; this was applied in Attica through questionnaires addressing 27 public schools and three support centers of the organization, The Smile of the Child, covering two periods: the school years between 2010 and 2018 collectively and the school year 2018–2019 individually. The total number of children in the sample was 878, belonging to three distinct school categories. The results were mapped out in seven clusters. The theoretical and methodological framework of the study was confirmed through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The results reveal that child well-being improved in the period 2018–2019 while there were evident concerns regarding unemployment and whether the education individuals receive is relevant to what kind of people they ought to be. Finally, an action plan focusing on these dimensions and some of the clusters along with an auxiliary tool for decision-making founded on fuzzy logic have been suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper problematizes current thinking about education by arguing that the question of educational purpose is not simply a socio-political question concerned with what the ends should be and why, but can also be understood as a structural question, concerned with the way we understand education's directional impetus. We suggest that it is possible to understand education as something other than a curricular instrument designed to facilitate a purpose external to itself. We challenge such an instrumental view by arguing that education is an emergent phenomenon with its own unique aesthetic qualities (like art or music); a phenomenon, moreover, that does not simply serve a purpose, but generates the purpose it serves. In this paper we lay down the groundwork for such a non-instrumental understanding of education by combining the notion of emergence with ideas from Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Aristotle's teleological notion of the 'ideal' as self-generated and the Greek notion of 'paideia.' This provides an opportunity to theorise education's directional impetus as the ongoing and open-ended coordination of three realms of human life: the symbolic, the individual and the political. Given the acute political and social dilemmas that instrumental understandings of education bring forth in multicultural, and so called 'democratic' and 'inclusive' societies, we hope that by opening the possibility to theorise education as a non-instrumental phenomenon, it may become possible to have more fruitful discussion regarding education than endless political debate about what the curricular ends of education should be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Information Sciences / Informacijos Mokslai is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper starts with reflections on Plato's critique of the poets and the preference many express for Aristotle's view of poetry. The second part of the paper takes a case study of analytic treatments of ancient philosophy, including the ancient philosopher poets, to examine the poetics of analytic philosophy, diagnosing a preference in Analytic philosophy for a clean non-poetic style of presentation, and then develops this in considering how well historians of philosophy in the Analytic tradition can accommodate the contributions of philosophers who wrote in verse. The final part of the paper reviews the current enthusiasm for decoding Empedocles' vague and poetic descriptions of the cosmic cycle into a precise scientific periodicity on the basis of the recently discovered Byzantine scholia on Aristotle. I argue that this enthusiasm speaks to a desire for definite and clear numerical values in place of poetic motifs of give and take, and that this mathematical and scientific poetic is comparable to the preferred poetic of analytic philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been little discussion of strict akrasia in contemporary literature on Stoicism ever since Brad Inwood (1985. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press) persuasively argued that Stoic psychology has no means to account for such a phenomenon. And it is true that we find no such phenomenon in Epictetus. However, Inwood's argument only applies to akrasia in the strict sense, which is when an agent knowingly acts contrary to a self-directed imperative. Stoicism can still allow for akrasia in the broad sense, which is defined by Inwood as any instance when "an agent fails to stand by a previous decision about what he will do or by some general plan or programme of action" (133). When we widen our conception of akrasia to include the broad sense it becomes apparent that this phenomenon is of significant importance to Epictetus. This is best made evident through analogy with Aristotle. This paper argues that Epictetus' ethics involves three key features which are also present in Aristotle's discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear that akrasia is certainly not absent from Epictetus. Rather a very Aristotelian understanding of why we fail to act in accordance with what we take to be in our own best interests remains at the center of his ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to present the philosophical figure of a Norwegian philosopher and writer, creator of biosophy, Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899–1990), and to investigate the origins of his notion of tragedy (tragic experience) which he introduces in his magnum opus Om det tragiske (1941). I attempt to do so by searching its roots in antique theory of tragedy introduced by Aristotle, especially on the pages of Poetics, to which Zapffe himself often refers to. A study of how Zapffe "read" and understood Aristotle's Poetics, a classical piece for the study of tragedy and tragic experience, seems essential for establishing the roots and foundations of his own vision of tragedy and its functions, finally shifting from the purely literary sphere to the biosophical level of human existence. In this paper I will focus mainly on the notion and art of mimesis, laying the basis for further detailed studies of Zapffe's biosophical analysis of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins with a vignette of Juan Carlos, an immigrant to America who works to support his family, attends classes at a community college, and cares for his ill daughter. It argues that an Aristotelian virtue ethicist could condone a safe, legal, and virtuous use of cognitive enhancements in Juan Carlos's case. The argument is that if an enhancement can lead him closer to eudaimonia (i.e., flourishing, or a good life), then it is morally permissible to use it. The paper closes by demonstrating how common objections to cognitive enhancement fail to undermine Juan Carlos's justifiable use of the technology. The particularities of his case make it morally acceptable for him to use enhancements in certain situations. The paper, thus, constructs a limited, positive case for the virtuous use of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely believed that the ancient Greeks thought that Thales was the first philosopher, and that they therefore maintained that philosophy had a Greek origin. This paper challenges these assumptions, arguing that most ancient Greek thinkers who expressed views about the history and development of philosophy rejected both positions. I argue that not even Aristotle presented Thales as the first philosopher, and that doing so would have undermined his philosophical commitments and interests. Beyond Aristotle, the view that Thales was the first philosopher is attested almost nowhere in antiquity. In the classical, Hellenistic, and post-Hellenistic periods, we witness a marked tendency to locate the beginning of philosophy in a time going back further than Thales. Remarkably, ancient Greek thinkers most often traced the origins of philosophy to earlier non-Greek peoples. Contrary to the received view, then, I argue that (1) vanishingly few Greek writers pronounced Thales the first philosopher; and (2) most Greek thinkers did not even advocate a Greek origin of philosophy. Finally, I show that the view that philosophy originated with Thales (along with its misleading attribution to the Greeks in general) has roots in problematic, and in some cases manifestly racist, eighteenth-century historiography of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hylomorphism is almost universally claimed to be a staple doctrine of Aristotle. In this paper, I discuss a wide range of texts from the dialogues of Plato that straightforwardly display hylomorphism. Both Plato and Aristotle rest their cognitive realism on their hylomorphism. The crucial difference between Aristotle's hylomorphism and Plato's is that Aristotle believes that hylomorphism supports and is supported by essentialism whereas Plato does not. Plotinus presents arguments against Aristotle's essentialism at the same time as he defends Platonic hylomorphism and his cognitive realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Synthesis (03281205) is the property of Universidad Nacional de La Plata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores how small tourism firms driven by an ethical approach to tourism narrate their organisational effectiveness. The study frames the ethical approach articulated in the first-person accounts of these firms' owner-managers using Aristotle's notion of phronesis, that is the process of identifying "good" actions consistent with living well and with an ethical telos. The research consists of a narrative approach via unstructured interviews with owner-managers of small Italian tour operators, members of the Italian Association of Responsible Tourism (AITR) and, as such, driven by an ethical approach to tourism. Data analysis combines features of structural and linguistic narrative analysis. The research findings disclose an organisational effectiveness largely rooted in a personal intuitive disposition gained by practical first-hand experience, personal knowledge, and a moral concern for the achievement of public wellbeing. Moreover, the findings challenge a business-centred approach to organisational effectiveness and question the dominant pro-growth, profit-oriented neoliberal discourses. These considerations can be used for setting the ground in tourism studies for a novel theoretical framework revolving around the ancient Aristotelian tradition of prioritising public wellbeing and happiness over capital accumulation, that further contributes to question market-driven capitalism and neoliberal globalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the striking affinities of classical Greek and Latin rhetoric with the pragmatist/interactionist analysis of the situated negotiation of reality and its profound relevance for the analysis of human group life more generally, few contemporary social scientists are aware of the exceptionally astute analyses of persuasive interchange developed by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Having considered the analyses of rhetoric developed by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and Cicero (106-43 BCE) in interactionist terms (Prus 2007a; 2010), the present paper examines Quintilian’s (35-95 CE) contributions to the study of persuasive interchange more specifically and the nature of human knowing and acting more generally. Focusing on the education and practices of orators (rhetoricians), Quintilian (a practitioner as well as a distinctively thorough instructor of the craft) provides one of the most sustained, most systematic analyses of influence work and resistance to be found in the literature. Following an overview of Quintilian’s “ethnohistorical” account of Roman oratory, this paper concludes by drawing conceptual parallels between Quintilian’s analysis of influence work and the broader, transcontextual features of symbolic interactionist scholarship (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003). This includes “generic social processes” such as: acquiring perspectives, attending to identity, being involved, doing activity, engaging in persuasive interchange, developing relationships, experiencing emotionality, attaining linguistic fluency, and participating in collective events. Offering a great many departure points for comparative analysis, as well as ethnographic examinations of the influence process, Quintilian’s analysis is particularly instructive as he addresses these and related aspects of human knowing, acting, and interchange in highly direct, articulate, and detailed ways. Acknowledging the conceptual, methodological, and analytic affinities of The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian with symbolic interactionism, an epilogue, Quintilian as an Intellectual Precursor to American Pragmatist Thought and the Interactionist Study of Human Group Life, addresses the relative lack of attention given to classical Greek and Latin scholarship by the American pragmatists and their intellectual progeny, as well as the importance of maintaining a more sustained transcontextual and transhistorical focus on the study of human knowing, acting, and interchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval is the property of Sociedad Espanola de Filosofia Medieval and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of En-Claves del Pensamiento Journal is the property of Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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The paper deals with the importance of touch in the development of human spe cies and especially in the area of visual art. The author aims to find out how the sensitivity to touch was conditioned by cultural changes in history. The paper investigates what the causes of not considering touch an important aesthetic sense were, and which visual art theoreticians and what kind of praxis of its exhibiting led to this conclusion, especially with regard to the area of painting and sculpture. The analysis of historical development of the relation between touch and visual arts starts with Ancient mythological story of Pygmalion, followed by examination of touch as the theme of artworks, exemplified especially on the Baroque and Surrealism artworks. The author also pays attention to aestheticians sup porting the idea of importance of touch in the area of art in the past (Edmund Burke, Johann Gottfried Herder). The paper ends with recent initiatives of artists to make touch an important topic of their artworks (Jan Švankmajer, Rosalyn Driscoll, Roy Nachum), as well as theoreticians (Luce Irigaray) and curators to incorporate touch into the process of experiencing artworks. The author supports the idea that touch plays a significant role not only in contacts between human beings but also in the process of aesthetic experience; however, she also points to the problems of implementing this idea into praxis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle's view on scientific inquiry as problem solving. It tackles passages where Aristotle emphasises the role that the problem-solving activity has in science, and where he describes the history of humans' problem-solving activity and the historical development of natural science as a problem-solving activity. Further, the paper examines Aristotle's practice of raising, assessing and solving problems as well as the heuristic procedures he employs to move from ignorance to scientific knowledge. Finally, it raises a question about Aristotle's view on the epistemic status of scientific definitions: does Aristotle conceive of the definitions, which are the results of scientific inquiries, as truths (known with certainty to be true, i.e. known with certainty to be principles) or rather as plausible hypotheses that may or may not be true? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is warranted concern among educationalists about child well-being where a number of school factors have created a system and a society where well-being is at stake. Within this discourse, understanding the impact of social and emotional learning and school-based well-being programs have seen educationalists return to Aristotle to understand the foundational conception of flourishing. Following this trend, we propose that before flourishing can be supported in the areas of teaching and learning, the preconditions to flourishing must be met. This paper examines the provision of structural and policy factors that form the preconditions to flourishing using the lens of Aristotle's eudaimonia, external necessities, and the obligations of the polis. This analysis found that policy intent and purpose are largely aligned with the preconditions; but the differential uptake of policy initiatives along socio-economic lines has created an education system where school capacity to provide the external necessities for student flourishing is supported by schools in an inconsistent way. This, we argue is not what Aristotle proposed for a public education, where all children have an equal chance of building capabilities to flourish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of why democracy is desirable in terms of a relational theory of democracy. The theory draws on concepts from Aristotelian, critical realist, and psychoanalytic theory. From Aristotle it takes the concepts of human flourishing and human virtues; from critical realism it takes the concepts of relational subjects and relational goods; from psychoanalysis it takes the concept of mutuality. The relational theory argues that democracy, particularly deliberative democracy, is desirable because it requires and facilitates the development of citizens with the relational capacity of mutuality. The theory is developed sequentially in the following four theses. (1) The function of government is to promote the flourishing of its citizens. (2) Human flourishing results from citizens having access to relational goods. (3) Access to relational goods requires that citizens possess the relational capacity of mutuality. (4) Deliberative democracy is desirable because it both requires and facilitates mutuality, [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper briefly discusses Aristotle in the context of the 2400 years since his birth, which in 2016 was celebrated with symposia and new books about Aristotle around the world. Then the significance of the Aristotle's "Poetics" for aesthetics and literary theory is pointed out. In the second more extensive part of the paper the idea of tragic and tragedy in Aristotle is discussed, with special reference to the interpretation of Aristotle's catharsis first published in 1948 by Michael D. Petrushevski. The reception of this interpretation during the lifetime of Petrushevski, in our country and in the world, is also pointed out, and some new currents from the end of the last and the beginning of this century in the domain of the interpretation of catharsis are actualized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Rónai - Revista de Estudos Classicos e Tradutorios is the property of Ronai - Revista de Estudos Classicos e Tradutorios and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Traditional interpretations of Aristotle's theory of perception mainly focus on uncovering the underlying mechanisms that are at stake when perceivers are affected by sensible qualities. Investigating the nature of sense perception is one of Aristotle's main worries and one that he explicitly relates to the question of its causes (e. g. Sens. 436a16–17, 436b9) and its ends (e. g. de An. 434a30 ff.). Therefore I suggest that, in order to fully explain Aristotle's view of perceptual phenomena, the possibilities, the constraints, and the goals defined by the embodied and situated engagement of perceivers with the external world must be taken into account. Accordingly, in this paper, I provide an affective reading of Aristotle's theory of perception. I shall ask what, in addition to functioning sense organs and appropriate response mechanisms, the perceiver contributes to perceptual content. Specifically, I propose to shed light on the significance of perceptual experience for the perceiver and I aim to show that, according to Aristotle, one's biological and personal qualities are perceptually relevant, meaning that they underpin perception, rather than coming into play after perception has occurred and its objects have been discerned. The paper is divided into two parts, respectively dealing with sensory affections and more complex affective phenomena. As regards the domain of primal sense perception, I will focus on smell as a representative example: since Aristotle identifies it as the least developed of human sensory faculties, it will serve as a revealing illustration of how sense perception is informed and qualified by what, drawing on contemporary philosophical terminology, I will call 'perceptual interests', viz. the affective sense of what is at stake in the living being's interaction with the environment. I will then proceed to consider the way more complex affective phenomena underpin perception by examining the case of emotions and that of virtues of character. By showing how perception is affectively inflected and how emotion is rooted in perception's bodily nature, I aim to sketch out the general lines along which I believe that the Aristotelian theory of perception should be approached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to identify several interpretive problems posed by the final part of DA II.11 (423b27–424 a10), where Aristotle intertwines the thesis that a sense is like a 'mean' and an explanation for the existence of a 'blind spot' related to the sense of touch, adding the further contention that we are capable of discriminating because the mean 'becomes the other opposite' in relation to the perceptible property being perceived. To solve those problems, the paper explores a novel interpretation of Aristotle's claims, arguing that they describe a homeostatic physiological reaction by which the sensory apparatus responds to perceptible stimuli. According to the proposed interpretation, such homeostatic reaction constitutes a necessary condition for perceiving what Aristotle refers to as 'proper' perceptible features, which include properties like 'hot' and 'cold' as well as colors and sounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's argument against Timaeus' view of intellection as an endless circular motion can be divided into two main sections: a categorial one, which rests upon the impossibility of intertwining material and immaterial ingredients into a single (albeit twofold) substance; and a geometrical one, which highlights those features of circular magnitudes which render them unsuitable for performing intellectual tasks. This paper focuses on the first set of reasons that Aristotle puts forward, by stressing the productive philosophical outcome of this otherwise perplexing doxographical survey. It is argued that Aristotle's own notions of 'contact' and 'unmoved mover' are greatly indebted to his critical scrutiny of Timaeus' cosmogony. Further, the paper holds that the version of 'causal synonymy' that Aristotle discovers in Timaeus' εἰκὼς μûθος leads him to recast this principle, in order to avoid unwelcome 'physiological' consequences. In this way, Aristotle's literal reading of Timaeus' εἰκὼς μûθος emerges as a plausible interpretive stance [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]