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Based on data for actual and approved Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1989-2011, this paper explores the major trends in FDI in Myanmar, focusing on changes over time in the source and sector of investment. It argues that over the last decade Myanmar's inward FDI has become heavily concentrated in the extractive and power sectors, while investment in manufacturing, services and other secondary and tertiary sectors has been almost non-existent. This is mostly the result of a poor investment climate, including import and export regulations, a weak judicial system, currency controls and weak property rights. The paper shows that China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand have been the main investors in Myanmar, while Singapore, India and Western countries invested little in the 2000s. This divergence is driven partly by the differing investment patterns of the source countries, yet also reflects commercial and geopolitical realities, sanctions and concerns over energy security. The paper then examines whether and how FDI can lead to economic development in Myanmar, and, closes by discussing the importance of recent political and economic reforms for rebalancing Myanmar's FDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is raging speculation about the potential implications of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR)/Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the global order, spheres of influence and the positions of extra-regional powers. Much commentary is overly broad and lacks a clear and systematic method for examining OBOR/BRI’s future consequences. Focusing on the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), a major OBOR/BRI component, in the Southeast Asian context, this article shows China’s own situation and Southeast Asian international and domestic economic and political variables will hinder the complete implementation of the MSRI. Even if the MSRI is fully realized, various factors will limit the political impact of the MSRI’s economic attractions. In short, the MSRI is more likely to yield a Chinese pond than a Chinese lake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses an extended gravity model to examine the impact of the free trade agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on their trade flows and patterns. New determinants are utilized to capture the growing importance of global production sharing and intraregional trade in parts and components in East Asia. We show that the free trade agreement leads to substantially higher and more pronounced bilateral trade flows between ASEAN and the PRC than what a conventional gravity model predicts and the increase is concentrated in ASEAN countries that have stronger industrial linkages with the PRC. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as ‘hedging’. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT–NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT–PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT–PE or LT–NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam–China (HT–NE), Cambodia–China (LT–PE) and Singapore–China (HT–PE) relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]