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This paper shows that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) benefits significantly from investments in transport infrastructure such as road, railway and port, but not as much from investments in non-transport infrastructure such as real estate. However, using data collected from several sources, including secondary data on the number of infrastructure projects already invested and earmarked to be invested as well as China's direct foreign investment to Southeast Asia, this analysis shows that non-transport infrastructure constitutes a substantially higher proportion of the total infrastructure investments in Southeast Asia than transport infrastructure since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This points to a suboptimization polemic emanating from the mismatch between the injlows of the diferent types of infrastructure investments and ASEAN's need for these inputs for sustainable economic growth. Domestic disharmony, regional rivalry and political conflicts between China and ASEAN as well as other obstacles such as the debt-trap worries reduce the total investment flows to Southeast Asia, exacerbating the suboptimization problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper to examine if there is continuous macroeconomic compatibility between ASEAN-5 and China. Thus, in addition to the typical VECM test of the long run macroeconomic cointegration test, this paper examines the existence of an ongoing cointegration analysis. Design/methodology/approach – The degree of convergence during different sub-sample period of the full sample is employed, via Johansen cointegration rank tests, to examine if there is evidence of ongoing and improved cointegrating relationship among the economies. Findings – A successful ASEAN-China economic cooperation would only work if there is continuous macroeconomic interdependence between the partnership. Since a smooth transition of ACFTA will complement AFTA, the effective ASEAN-China coordination plan is essential to endorse a successful ASEAN-China coalition. Originality/value – This paper suggests a quick yet effective verification on the continuous compatibility of economies intended to have a long-term economic coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessment of the likely impact of Chinese OFDI on the ASEAN members of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) requires understanding of the evolution of Chinese policy, regulations and institutions. Utilizing recent developments in institutional theory, this paper examines the interplay between China's OFDI regulations and enterprise supportive policies. Liberalization of FDI regulations complements policies of technological catch-up and the development of regionally focused multilateral institutions. Evidence of an increasing level of Chinese OFDI since 2003, and of a larger share attracted to the BRI group, particularly the ASEAN countries, is consistent with the theorizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on data for actual and approved Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1989-2011, this paper explores the major trends in FDI in Myanmar, focusing on changes over time in the source and sector of investment. It argues that over the last decade Myanmar's inward FDI has become heavily concentrated in the extractive and power sectors, while investment in manufacturing, services and other secondary and tertiary sectors has been almost non-existent. This is mostly the result of a poor investment climate, including import and export regulations, a weak judicial system, currency controls and weak property rights. The paper shows that China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand have been the main investors in Myanmar, while Singapore, India and Western countries invested little in the 2000s. This divergence is driven partly by the differing investment patterns of the source countries, yet also reflects commercial and geopolitical realities, sanctions and concerns over energy security. The paper then examines whether and how FDI can lead to economic development in Myanmar, and, closes by discussing the importance of recent political and economic reforms for rebalancing Myanmar's FDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Xi Jinping era, China is actively implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) around the globe. Under the BRI, infrastructure development has become the main agenda for China to create connectivity. One of the infrastructure projects in the energy sector is the Nam Ou Cascade Hydropower Project. The Nam Ou River is a tributary of the Mekong River located in Laos and borders China. For Laos, this project is part of their vision to be "The battery of Southeast Asia." Therefore, this article attempts to explain that Nam Ou Hydropower has implications for China's dominance in the Mekong region. The circle hydro-hegemony is used as the conceptual framework for analyzing the phenomenon. This article also applies a qualitative method with secondary data. The article shows that the Nam Ou Cascade Hydropower Project in Laos elevates China's influence in the Mekong region. By actively pulling and pushing its neighbors into cooperation, China exercises its power as an upstream country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When ASEAN celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, it was asked if an organization founded on principles appropriate for the 1960s remains relevant today. Its critics point to the organization's recent failures to indicate that continued reliance on the "ASEAN Way" puts it on the road to irrelevance. Its defenders argue that the peace and stability that ensued since the Association's formation are testimony that the ASEAN formula works. Both conclusions are based on what commentators on either side of the debate believe ASEAN's role should be. This paper argues that an assessment should, instead, be based on what its members want it to do, expressed through policy announcements and documents like the ASEAN Charter. It should also consider the totality of its mandate from diplomacy to economics. Viewed in this way, the grouping has accomplishments to be proud of, but also some failures to regret. The 'ASEAN Way', upheld steadfastly by its member countries' leadership, has been instrumental to both its successes and failures. Overall, while ASEAN may not live up to the expectations of its critics, its achievements in some areas do suggest its continued relevance even under vastly changed circumstances, both domestic and external. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a diversification explanation in order understand the development of PTAs in Southeast Asia. I argue that an important reason why ASEAN states participate in PTAs has been to diversify existing trade ties and to reduce overdependence on a narrow range of export markets. Southeast Asian countries have formed PTAs with markets with which they had weak or unexplored economic relations, as demonstrated by three case analyses: the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP). To maximise the economic gains and the diversification effects of PTA participation, ASEAN countries have pursued a strategy of strengthening economic unity while keeping external economic linkages as diversified as possible. Although East Asia, and especially China, was an important alternative market to reduce ASEAN's dependence on trade with America, ASEAN countries have also pursued PTAs with a number of other trading partners. This paper explains how PTAs have helped ASEAN states to develop more policy autonomy in their trading environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the rise of China present a threat or an opportunity for Southeast Asia? One of the most revealing arenas in which this will be determined will be within the context of regional institution-building. For a region that is perennially associated with under-institutionalisation it is remarkable just how many initiatives have been proposed recently. Such institutions, may be important venues within which 'asymmetric regionalism' may be manifest and perhaps managed. The paper provides an assessment of this process through an analysis of China's relationship with Southeast Asia. The paper initially provides a brief theoretical introduction which explains the relationship between regional development and its possible impact on inter-state relations. Following this I provide an analysis of the political economic and strategic dynamics that are shaping and being shaped by regional initiatives. Finally, I assess how successful ASEAN's efforts have been to engage China via regional mechanisms has actually been. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its launch in late 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a significant factor in shaping China's economic and diplomatic relations with the world. China's increasing clout presents opportunities as well as challenges, especially for the developing economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which constitute major sites for investment and trade alongside the BRI routes. This special issue examines whether and to what extent China's economic ascendancy has impacted the proposed ASEAN Economic Community and the respective nations in the region. It deals with this question by grounding the analysis along three themes — institutions at a regional level, industry/sector, and particular ASEAN countries' economic relationship with China. A total of 12 articles are presented to illuminate the state of affairs at the regional level and in specific ASEAN economies. They point to the importance of managing trade and investment flows stemming from China's increasingly sophisticated national firms. This in turn hinges on forging 'rules of the game' at both the multilateral and bilateral levels, which potentially leads to mutually beneficial industrialization and long-term wealth creation. In addition to summarizing key findings of the articles in the special issue, this introductory essay examines some of the key themes confronting ASEAN in its engagement with the BRI such as institutions, global supply chains, and economic strategies. It concludes with a brief discussion on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the BRI in Southeast Asia, and on ways to enhance regional integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southeast Asia's technological achievements and economic prosperity have become the key drivers of the development of both regional and worldwide dynamics. As an organisation that represents all Southeast Asian member countries, ASEAN, as one of the region's primary actors, plays an essential role. ASEAN's attempts to fulfil its objectives include engagement with important partners outside of the area, termed "ASEAN Plus." China is one of ASEAN's key regional allies. In this scientific essay, the author wishes to comment on the potential and problems that ASEAN-China face, notably in establishing cybersecurity collaboration. Cyber security is a serious concern in Southeast Asia. The expansion of the digital economy is assisting Southeast Asia's economic progress. On the one hand, China invests in artificial intelligence and profits from open commerce in Southeast Asia. However, ASEAN lacks policies and a framework to combat cyber threats, which are akin to non-traditional threats such as drugs, human trafficking, and terrorism. In this article, the author expands on cybersecurity challenges such as the lack of cyber threat mitigation policies and the Southeast Asian region's large technology disparity. The author also examines the opportunities for ASEAN and China to expand their cybersecurity cooperation. Cooperation between ASEAN and China can focus on developing cybersecurity rules, increasing human resource capability, and transferring technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China is the most important development in East Asia in recent times. It presents major opportunities and challenges, if not threats, for ASEAN as a collective entity, and for the individual countries that compose it. Whether ASEAN can develop a collective, let alone effective response is far from clear. This paper explores and analyses the forces that are likely to determine the outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the current and future dynamics of Southeast Asia's maritime cooperation with China and India. Southeast Asian states do not only have diverse agendas when it comes to non-traditional and traditional maritime security issues, but their prioritization of these threats also vary. Those variations primarily define Southeast Asian interests for partnerships with actors such as India and China. Given China's geographical centrality, its strong economic relationship with countries in the region and the proximity of its military power, Southeast Asia states will remain far more invested in maritime security cooperation with China than India. Yet, China's territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea, and its overpowering shadow on the region, have contributed to anxiety among Southeast Asian states and their search for other security partners. The evolving threat of China's rise and polarization within the region gives New Delhi opportunities to engage. India-China rivalry is also a significant motivation for New Delhi to engage in Southeast Asia's maritime security. Two avenues for this include naval arms transfers and training for sea denial missions to claimant countries in the South China Sea, and cooperation in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia to China. With the exception of some government-linked companies, most investments from Southeast Asia have been dominated by the region's overseas Chinese businesses. In addition to cheap labour costs, large domestic market and growing economy, China has provided business opportunities to investors from Southeast Asia thanks to their geographic proximity and ethnic connections, at least during the initial investment period. However, the network effects seem to decline soon after. As the Chinese economy becomes more globalised and more competitive, the success of foreign investment in China will increasingly depend on business competency rather than ethnic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of its 40th anniversary, this article analyses how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought to deal with the problem of drug production, trafficking and consumption in Southeast Asia. Reviewing more than three decades of cooperation, it asks whether an international regime against the illicit trafficking and abuse of drugs has been established in the region under the auspices of ASEAN. In particular, the paper discusses the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) as an attempt to create a framework of multilateral cooperation. It argues however that it is still premature today to characterise existing regional consultations as a working anti-drug regime. The existing cooperative structure has remained a loose forum for information sharing despite the strong Chinese involvement that has deepened consultations since the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While outward FDI inflows have increased since 2008, the volume of Southeast Asia's exports to China has slowed down, prompting discussion about whether this will affect Southeast Asia's growth. This article empirically tests China's impact on Southeast Asia's growth using a nonlinear framework, and finds that economic linkages between Southeast Asia and China have been changing since the mid-1990s, especially during the 1997 and 2008 financial crises and the 2012 bilateral diplomatic change; that FDI is more important to economic growth than exports across Southeast Asia; and that there is no industrial technology gap between Southeast Asia and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper frames the trade relationship between China and Malaysia within the context of ASEAN and the impending RCEP. Specifically trade potentials are derived for the bilateral partnership within the two structures to identify whether China's external options under the RCEP affect her relationship with Malaysia. Potentials for trade expansion between China and Malaysia, estimated through a three-dimensional panel gravity model, are found to be marginally lower under the RCEP structure relative to ASEAN. More importantly, trade potentials appear exhausted for major products traded under both contexts. This suggests a change (decline) in the trade posture of the China-Malaysia partnership, as relative advantages are most likely to be altered under the expanded matrix of Chinese relations with RCEP members. In coping with the larger matrix structure, both nations should innovate new forms of bilateral cooperation, beyond trade, to enhance their strategic partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to Southeast Asia's geopolitical, economic, and commercial significance, world powers have focused on this region. China and India, the two neighboring nations of Southeast Asia, both with aspirations to become the dominating force in the Indo-Pacific region, have been employing all means to draw Southeast Asia into their sphere of influence. Controlling Southeast Asia would confer immense strategic gains on both nations. The goal of this study is to assess the policy of India and China toward Southeast Asia utilizing pertinent data and documents, official comments from the respective governments, and the research of Vietnamese and foreign researchers. The analysis reveals that India and China seek benefits by promoting close ties with Southeast Asia, but their methods for achieving this objective are distinct. Suppose India employs flexible diplomatic measures to develop its good relations with Southeast Asia. In that case, China has the upper hand when pursuing a diplomatic strategy that is both flexible and assertive to advance its objectives, particularly in East Sea-related problems. This provides Southeast Asia/ASEAN with difficult choices and decisions about India and China to balance their respective interests and, more significantly, to maintain ASEAN's central position in regional and international concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we have examined how Japan has supported ASEAN's economic integration through ODA and other diplomatic measures, and showed how Japan's engagements in ASEAN economic integration evolved over time. In addressing these issues, we took into account the growing influence of China's ascent in Southeast Asia, and assumed that Japan's China policy of mixed 'accommodation and balance' became explicit in Japan's ASEAN policy. The pronouncement of support for ASEAN integration, disbursement of aid to the region, forging of bilateral and regional FTAs/EPAs with ASEAN, and its recent initiatives and proactive involvement in the Mekong regional development are indicative of Japan's reactive posture on China's growing influence in the region. Japanese diplomatic initiatives in ASEAN are intended, in part, to accommodate and balance China's increasing prominence in Southeast Asia. This explains the simultaneous existence of competitive and cooperative initiatives of the two countries with ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of data on flows and stocks refutes the argument that China and Southeast Asia are engaged in a zero-sum competition for foreign investment. Although Southeast Asia appears to have lost out to Chinese-manufactured exports in global markets, this has been balanced by substantial increases in exports of components to China itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southeast Asia and Europe are key regions for the implementation of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A comparison of China's attempt to promote the BRI in both regions reveals that China acts both as a norm-setter and norm-taker. Both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the European Union which established distinct regional governance systems perceive China's growing ability to set norms in their region as a strategic threat. However, the 17+1 (formerly 16+1) cooperation format, established by China in Central and Eastern Europe as an umbrella for its bilateral relations, is embedded in the EU's governance system. In Southeast Asia, China cooperates with the individual governments on a bilateral base, but also utilizes the existing ASEAN infrastructure schemes. The article argues that China needs to be better included in the established international and regional governance mechanisms. It concludes that after mutual compromises of the participants and reforms the New Silk Road could function as a respected framework for multilateral collaboration that complements, but does not replace the existing governance structures and principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is raging speculation about the potential implications of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR)/Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the global order, spheres of influence and the positions of extra-regional powers. Much commentary is overly broad and lacks a clear and systematic method for examining OBOR/BRI’s future consequences. Focusing on the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), a major OBOR/BRI component, in the Southeast Asian context, this article shows China’s own situation and Southeast Asian international and domestic economic and political variables will hinder the complete implementation of the MSRI. Even if the MSRI is fully realized, various factors will limit the political impact of the MSRI’s economic attractions. In short, the MSRI is more likely to yield a Chinese pond than a Chinese lake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a historical institutionalist approach, this article addresses the future of Southeast Asia’s naval forces. Much analysis on this subject employs a linear Realist model in which Southeast Asia’s navies are expected to be the beneficiaries of declining internal security challenges and a deteriorating external threat environment. However, to date neither of these factors, including increasing Chinese assertiveness in the maritime domain, appear to have significantly accelerated naval force development in Southeast Asia. While there have been some capability increases in areas such as submarines, growth has mainly been in patrol boat and fast attack craft classes. Numbers of larger offshore surface combatants like frigates have fallen. This article argues that in countries where army dominance has become institutionalized, and civil control of the military is weak, governments may be unwilling or unable to reallocate funding away from armies to maritime forces. In a funding environment in which national economic growth is moderate, and spending on defence is a lower priority, naval modernization and expansion can be blocked. This article examines the cases of Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar to demonstrate how their armies became dominant and how this may have diminished the growth prospects of their navies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of 2015 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will announce the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In theory, this agreement should produce an association-wide economic integration. However, following the announcement, and for the foreseeable future, ASEAN member states will continue in significantly less than full regional economic integration. Why? Some observers believe that the AEC plans involve an "overly ambitious timeline and too many ill-thought-out initiatives." Others point to ASEAN's traditional aversion to legally binding agreements. While progress has been made in reducing or eliminating intra- ASEAN trade tariffs, substantial non-tariff barriers to trade persist. However, for most member states, the ASEAN market is relatively small while external markets, especially China, are growing rapidly. Given this outward-orientation for ASEAN trade, is the lack of an unhindered regional market really a problem? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses an extended gravity model to examine the impact of the free trade agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on their trade flows and patterns. New determinants are utilized to capture the growing importance of global production sharing and intraregional trade in parts and components in East Asia. We show that the free trade agreement leads to substantially higher and more pronounced bilateral trade flows between ASEAN and the PRC than what a conventional gravity model predicts and the increase is concentrated in ASEAN countries that have stronger industrial linkages with the PRC. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China's involvement in Asian regionalization is a main axis of its foreign policy and a part of China's multilateral strategy which aims at increasing its regional role in Asia and multilateralism in global arena. The engagement with the regional institutions such as SAARC and ASEAN on the one hand facilitate China's role as an effective player in the peripheral politics and on the other hand, maximizes PRC's strategic interest for further regional integration. The article seeks to analyze the main elements of China's engagement with two Asian regional organizations, (SAARC and ASEAN). The comparative analysis over China's behavioral policies towards SAARC and ASEAN leads to the estimation that China has the potential for leadership in Southeast Asia while in South Asia its "voice" is still inaudible. The article argues that China's engagement with SAARC compared to ASEAN is limited due to the games of balance of power in the region of South Asia deriving from the internal contradictions among the members (India-Pak relations), the low level of regionalization in South Asia as well as due to the increased role of other great and regional powers in the region of South Asia such as USA and India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as ‘hedging’. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT–NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT–PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT–PE or LT–NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam–China (HT–NE), Cambodia–China (LT–PE) and Singapore–China (HT–PE) relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a driver of economic development is no longer a secret. As a result, the competition to attract FDI is getting stiffer as any economy in the world is currently eyeing for FDI, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With the emergence of China as a new attractive location for FDI, and as part of the alternatives to further enhance the attractiveness of ASEAN, this study analyses the role of institutional quality on FDI inflows into ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses conflict in the South China Sea and its Islands, focusing on a lack of resolution of disputes over sovereignty and control involving China and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The author highlights international, regional, and bilateral strategies for resolving conflict in the South China Sea, including discussions of a lack of involvement by the United Nations (U.N.), Track-2 (nongovernmental) diplomacy efforts, and foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. It is suggested that balancing strategies involving outside countries such as the U.S. may preserve the status quo in the South China Sea region.

The article discusses conflicts over issues of sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS), focusing on the involvement of the U.S. in the region in the 21st century. The author notes that countries such as the U.S., Japan, and India have interests in the SCS and highlights both diplomatic approaches to conflict and the building of military strength in order to address conflicts through force. The SCS is highlighted as a potential threat to maritime security, and multilateral efforts to address the issue by ASEAN are noted. Other topics include China's involvement in the region; a Code of Conduct on SCS disputes; and the 45th annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) on July 9, 2012.

In his review of Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1860: Expansion and Crisis, Victor Lieberman plied the margins of Anthony Reid's (1995) portrayal of early modern Southeast Asia and objected with purpose: “critical cultural and political transformations on the mainland without close archipelagic analogy receive little or no attention” (Lieberman 1995, 799). Where connections and crossings characterize historic social formation in insular Southeast Asia, Lieberman focused on a different shore – territorial consolidation of kingdoms in mainland Southeast Asia, from over 20 in the pre-modern era to only three major empires, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam, by the end of the seventeenth century. Yet Reid's two-volume work was exquisitely timed with the theoretical pulses of globalization and their keywords of crossings – diasporas, flows, linkages, mobilities, networks, routes and travels. Closely related to the poststructural theoretical shift, these themes have guided new area studies and are likely to prevail in international scholarship for some time to come. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article uses the concepts of critical juncture and feedback effects in historical institutionalism to examine China's role in promoting a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). The first section examines the specific combination of structural factors and key intervention from Chinese policymakers that triggered the CAFTA process. The second section outlines the details of the CAFTA negotiations, analyzing the feedback effects that shaped the path and eventual outcomes of the CAFTA Agreement. Attention is given to China's initiation of a programme of ‘early harvest’ agreements that were added to the CAFTA Agreement Framework in order to help persuade the hesitant states in the region to enlist in the China-led conception of Asian regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines three sociopolitical issues in Southeast Asia that have become the focus of mass media. These are the implementation of an intergovernmental commission on human rights within the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the January 1, 2010 secluded elimination of tariffs on most goods traded among China and the other ASEAN nations, and the impact of the global economic crisis in Southeast Asia.

The unresolved maritime claims to all, or parts, of the South China Sea involve Vietnam, Malaysia. the Philippines. Brunei, Taiwan, and China, and have hindered the development of the hydrocarbon resources there. Rising oil prices and China's voracious appetite for energy have stimulated greater interest in the exploitation of the area's oil reserves. Despite the uncertainty, ASEAN countries have involved energy companies in exploration and drilling in their respective claims. Cooperation arrangements between national oil companies including Chinese have been negotiated which hold out the prospect of greater security, even in the absence of a settlement of the maritime claims. Energy cooperation may stabilize the South China Sea providing a secure operating environment for oil exploitation. In time, the way could be prepared for further steps which would involve the claimants in negotiations over a resolution of the maritime claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a comparison of the changing patterns of export share, product mix, industry structure and export growth among China and ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) as exporters of primary commodities, labour-intensive goods as well as capital-intensive manufactures to their common U.S. import market. The degree of export rivalry or competition among China and ASEAN-4 in the U.S. market is examined by using a conventional shift-share methodology. Changes in ASEAN-China's relative real exchange rate, export composition, as well as changes in their trade patterns, insofar as they might have effects on the export shares of the ASEAN-4 and China to the United States, are considered. The study points unequivocally to some rivalry effects from China on the ASEAN-4's exports to the United States. Some of the possible approaches to attaining a propitious outcome of the competition, and ways to ameliorate adverse effects of the rivalry are raised and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]