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In contemporary world politics, Taiwan is, for different reasons, a subject of great contention. The constant conflict it faces with Beijing over the claim to fully integrate it into its sovereignty, in the conception of a single China, limits its expectations as a possible independent state. Given this, and in a long-standing dispute, the groups in power, both in Beijing and in Taipei, confront each other precisely because of these visions, which is the object of constant encounters and disagreements. Thus, and intending to firmly maintain international recognition through a low-profile strategy, Taiwan has maintained formal ties with different states in different regions of the world, including Latin America and the Caribbean. This has allowed the use of its official links in some countries in the area, which are exposed to pressure from the government of the People’s Republic of China, which appears as a counterweight to Taipei’s efforts. With this background, the purpose of this paper is to describe that the presence of Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean depends on the ability of its political leaders to materialize initiatives whose impact is not of great importance in the dynamics of regional politics and economics. This will allow you to avoid situations that jeopardize the achievements achieved so far and allow you to continue with this status quo created over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the recent incursion by China (meaning both Beijing and Taipei) into the Caribbean and Pacific. The general contours of Chinese trade and investment are discussed to provide a background context for a more specific exploration of Chinese aid, especially to small islands across the two regions. A review of recent literature primarily from Western sources reveals that the main strategic use of aid by Beijing (People's Republic of China - PRC) has been to support the demands of its growing economy but secondarily to isolate Taiwan (Republic of China - ROC) diplomatically. This conclusion, illustrated with several case vignettes, is based on the focus of Chinese aid on those islands retaining diplomatic links with Taipei as well as on the political manoeuvreing this Cross-Strait rivalry has spawned. The paper further suggests that the types of projects Beijing and Taipei have funded, like those of their Western counterparts before them (Australia, Japan, United States), yield limited long-term island development gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]