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This paper examines US public opinion after the drastic changes in US–China relations during the Trump presidency. I argue that the perceived China threat influences Americans' evaluation of the China–Taiwan tension. Based on the US dataset of the 2018 Survey on Global Attitudes and Trends by the Pew Research Center, Americans tend to perceive the China–Taiwan tension as a serious problem for the USA when Americans identify China as a major threat and its military strength as a concern. As US public opinion shapes the US foreign policy on China, the findings shed light on the public support for the ongoing US–China conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up until the end of Cold War mainstream theories in the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies have overlooked the transformation in relations between actors but instead concentrated on either the constant state of conflict between units or radical changes from war to peace. Acknowledging major changes in their subject matters due to the changing conditions with the end of Cold War, both disciplines had to rethink their theoretical assumptions and renew their toolboxes. Accordingly, the constructivist turn in International Relations and the introduction of Transformational Approach to conflict in Peace Studies have brought the two disciplines closer. Similar to the Constructivist theory of International Relations that emphasizes changes rather than law-like regularities in international politics, the Conflict Transformation Approach in Peace Studies focuses on perennial transformation processes in conflicts. This paper through bringing together insights from the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies, analyses the cross-strait conflict between the People's Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan) within a constructivist framework, and from a transformational perspective by applying Hugh Miall's five-point model of conflict transformation (context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, and personal/elite transformation). Miall's five-point model is utilized in this paper to show that, despite serious crisis occurred in more than 70 years history of People's Republic of China-Republic of China conflict, the relationship of the parties has undergone a set of transformations on the way to reconciliation. Although the conflict, with serious disagreements on crucial issues, is far from being settled, the ongoing transformation creates room for negotiations and further reconciliation on issues that were previously regarded as non-negotiable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How international economic ties affect domestic politics is a research question that has interested many scholars. In this paper, I try to address this question by conducting a qualitative case study of the effect of China-Taiwan economic ties on the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election. Specifically, I examine how China-Taiwan economic ties (1) shaped the political debate in the aforementioned election; (2) influenced the Taiwanese people's opinions about the debate; and (3) affected the outcome of the election. By focusing on the political conflict in Taiwan over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), an FTA-like economic agreement China and Taiwan signed in June 2010, I argue that (1) the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election involved a political competition between the pro-openness coalition (which was, politically, anti-Taiwan's independence and, economically, pro-ECFA) and the anti-openness coalition (which was pro-Taiwan's independence and had a cautious attitude toward the ECFA); (2) the Taiwanese general public was gradually convinced that the benefits of the ECFA outweighed the costs; and (3) the pro-openness coalition eventually won the election with the support from the majority of the Taiwanese people, which to a great extent was a result of China's, as well as the pro-openness coalition's, successful effort to persuade the Taiwanese people that the ECFA was incompatible with Taiwan's independence promoted by the antiopenness coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute has caused tensions among China, Japan, and Taiwan for decades. Although the Taiwanese government keeps a low profile on the dispute, the issue has flared up online discussion among Taiwan's netizens. Many consider Taiwanese people more pro-Japan than other countries in East Asia, as elder generation living on the island shares nostalgia toward Japan, and as its younger generation charmed by Japanese manga and anime, let alone Taiwan being the top donor to Japan's 311 earthquake. In this vein, Taiwanese people should accommodate well with Japan. However, Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute may tell another story. The act of Japanese government to nationalize Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012 has provoked anger among its neighbor countries. Are Taiwanese people in favor of Japan's stance on Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute due to the attachment for Japan or the other way round? This paper applies text mining technique and sentiment analysis to the digital data of Taiwan's largest bulletin board system station-PTT-established by college students and extracts postings concerning Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute in the past 4 years (2009~2012). By this bottom-up approach, we aim to examine Taiwan's netizens' emotion toward the two hegemonies-i.e., Japan and China-and to see whether the strong attachment to Japan has any impact on netizens' opinions on the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the diverse approaches of EU members' integration with the EU through modelling, and assesses the applicability of each model to Taiwan-China relations. Building upon two variables: 'the association with national identity and reorientation or not', and 'being the leading or founding member or not' four EU members' integrative models stand out. The German model is proved to be the most integrationist, followed by the Finnish and the French models. The UK model appears to be the least committed. Due to sovereignty controversies, the visionary German and French models are not applicable to Taiwan-China integrations and the prospects are for the pragmatic Finnish model at best, and the UK model at worst. These modelling outcomes can then explain why the growing economic integration between the two sides has not produced spillover effects into the political arena. This paper therefore argues that it would be in China's interest to make Taiwan an equal leading player in Taiwan-China integrations, and to transform its 'one-China policy' from the current political and sovereignty contents to a cultural and value-laden concept. Among the theories being examined, (neo)realist-constructivism demonstrates more applicability than two mainstream integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the quality of international relations between countries affect regional economics? The question of how much economic change can be attributed to the trajectories of international politics is difficult to answer, because different factors over time can influence economic development. This research uses synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods to evaluate the impact of the normalisation of cross-strait relations in 2008 on regional economic growth in Jiangsu province. Based on data from the Regional and China Year Books from 1990 to 2015, Jiangsu province, a region with prominently close economic ties with Taiwan, witnessed a CNY 20,726.52 (around GBP 2328.35) increase in per capita GDP from 2008 to 2015, compared with the counterfactual in the absence of normalised cross-strait relations. There was an annual increase of approximately CNY 2961 Yuan (around GBP 333). This research has important implications for acknowledging the relationship between the quality of political relations and their economic impact on confrontational countries and regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The Biden administration is attempting to transform traditional US–Taiwan relations into a multilateralism‐based "US + alliance–Taiwan" interactional model, which can be conceptualized as alliance coordination. This article unpacks the logic of Biden's strategic thinking in the US Taiwan policy. Adopting an asymmetric alliance perspective, it argues that US allies' reactions to Biden's foreign policy and their ideological attitude toward China have interacted with the US placement of the Taiwan question on the agenda in the alliance system to produce different degrees of alliance coordination, which can be measured by the new typology constituted by seven approaches: all‐fields approach, pure high politics approach, high politics driven approach, half‐measures, low politics driven approach, pure low politics approach, and strategic inaction. Three cases, including the different reactions of Japan, European countries, and South Korea, are analyzed to demonstrate how the alliance coordination operates in realpolitik. Additionally, the assessment of this article reveals that Biden's alliance coordination would place growing strategic pressure on mainland China and introduces greater volatility into cross‐strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-Strait relations play an important role in defining Taiwan's politics. At the same time, Taiwan politics has become the most important factor shaping cross-Strait relations. There have been wild fluctuations in the cross-Strait relations since the 1990's. Each of Taiwan's political successions in the past has brought about monumental changes in the relationship, thus it is likely that power turnover in Taipei in 2016 will have a deep impact on how Taiwan and mainland China interact with each other. The crux of the matter is the "1992 Consensus," or whether Taiwan is willing to adhere to the "one China" principle, however it is interpreted. The Blue camp (Kuomintang and its offshoots) is willing to accept this bottom line, but not the Green camp. There is a much wider discrepancy between the ideal position of Taiwan in cross-Strait/international relations and the ideal position of the Democratic Progressive Party in domestic politics than between the two ideal positions for the Kuomintang. Such wide discrepancy for the DPP may bring about contradictory pressures on the newly inaugurated Tsai Ing-wen government, resulting in fluctuations in its China policy and great disturbance in cross- Strait relations, repeating the experience in 2000-2008. The four components of the Chen Scenario summarized from the rule of the last DPP president Chen Shui-bian are investigated: committed and flexible leadership, economic malaise, Beijing's position, and U.S. factor, and the likelihood of repetition of the Chen Scenario under President Tsai is gauged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While China's relations with Arab states have been studied by many, Taiwan's relations with them have hardly been investigated. This study takes Saudi Arabia as a case study and examines the development of Taiwanese-Saudi relations in the period between 1949 and 2013, comparing them to Chinese-Saudi relations. The Taiwanese-Saudi formal diplomatic relationship lasted for over four decades until 1990 and was longer than any other Taiwanese-Arab formal relationship. Even after Saudi Arabia's normalization with China, Taiwan has maintained substantial economic, social, and cultural relations with Saudi Arabia on an informal basis, which have shown signs of reinvigoration in recent years. This long Taiwanese-Saudi "honeymoon" was previously seen from the Cold War perspective. Nevertheless, the anti-Communism factor alone is not sufficient for explaining the course of the development of Taiwanese/Chinese-Saudi relations. This article adds three factors to the analysis - (1) Islam; (2) energy; and (3) development - and revisits those two bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Taiwan's foreign relations with Japan and China. It is stated that Taiwan has been a sensitive issue in Sino-Japanese relations; and recognizing the relative importance of China and Japan to Taiwan is very useful in understanding their triangular relations. It is mentioned that China's policy toward Taiwan is an uncertain factor that restrain's Taiwan's diplomacy; and China and Japan have good relations and Beijing, China, and Taiwan may have friendly relations with both the nations. The article also discusses the implications of national identity for foreign relations; and Taiwan's democracy and cultural experiences under Japanese colonization.

The warming cross-Taiwan Strait relationship has allowed China greater opportunities to influence Taiwan's media. Three interrelated strategies--greater economic control over media outlets, pressure exerted on media owners, and the purchase of influential advertisements--have led to growing concerns about the erosion of press freedoms in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan-China relations have experienced a remarkable détente since KMT candidate and cross-strait moderate Ma Ying-Jiu was elected president on Formosa in 2008. Yet despite the rapprochement and its concomitant reduction of military tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the island's security position vis-à-vis China has been in steady decline since the early 2000s. Ma's expectation that closer economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing will result in greater international space for Taiwan have so far not yet been realised. On the contrary, deeper connections with the mainland seem to but accelerate the growth of Taiwan's security vulnerability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the relation between China and Taiwan, as well as South and North Korea. It examines the success of China and Taiwan in functionalist cooperation and exchange despite its failure to shift economic cooperation into political cooperation through a neo-functionalist political package deal. It also explores aspects that influence the regression of the economic cooperation and human exchanges between North and South Korea. It notes the move of China and Taiwan in utilizing functionalism to augment economic cooperation without touching the issue of sovereignty. Furthermore, it cites integration patterns of divided countries basing on inter-Korean and cross-Strait relations, and discusses their implications on regional integration theories.

Chen Shui-bian achieved an international reputation for his promotion of Taiwan independence. Whilst that reputation may have been well earned, the analyses on which this conclusion is based are frequently flawed in two ways. First, by using an undifferentiated notion of independence, they tend to conflate sovereignty with less threatening expressions of Taiwanese identity and pro-democracy discourse. Second, by failing to take into account the impact of immediate strategic context, analysts ignore a fundamental element of democratic political communication. In our empirical analysis of more than 2,000 of Chen's speeches, we seek to avoid both flaws by unpacking the concept of independence and taking into account Chen's strategic relationship with his primary audiences. Our findings challenge popular portrayals of Chen, but more importantly they have strong implications for policy makers and students of political rhetoric with regard to current and future ROC presidents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the increasing political roles of Taiwanese business people, called taishang, in the relations between Taiwan and China under the policy of Hu Jintao, president of the People's Republic of China. This article explains why the efforts of China to use Taiwanese business people to gain political leverage over Taiwan will most likely not work. The 2008 election of new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou signaled a new effort to promote increased interaction and economic integration with China, hoping that it would lead to eventual peace between the two governments.

Since Chinese president Hu Jintao took office in March 2003, Beijing has gradually developed a new approach to the Taiwan issue. The new strategy appears to be “speak softly and carry a big stick” toward proponents of Taiwanese independence and relying on Washington to rein in the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party on the one hand, and, on the other hand, actively seeking reconciliation with the anti-independence Chinese Nationalist Party by offering economic benefits to Taiwan and making limited concessions on some difficult bilateral issues—including the sovereignty issue—to promote better economic and social relations and to undercut support for Taiwanese independence. Although the new approach has contributed to the current reconciliation, there is no change in Beijing's fundamental principles, and the current rapprochement is largely limited to the area of economic cooperation. The long-term impact of the rapid economic integration should not be underestimated. Taiwan may also become socially and culturally integrated with the People's Republic of China, and the foundation will be laid for eventual reunification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elections for a new parliament and president in Taiwan last year have led to a relaxation in the relationship with China that had become increasingly tense under the previous administration in Taipei. Having come to power on a platform of economic revival, the newly elected president, Ma Ying-jeou, now has to win over a wary public to support his policy of deeper engagement with China. This is becoming increasingly difficult as the economic downturn on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has made it hard to deliver the expected material benefits and the island slides into a severe recession. Meanwhile, Ma faces a growing dilemma as he waits for Beijing to deliver concessions on allowing the island more international space. If this is not forthcoming, domestic politics could force him back towards the more assertive foreign policy developed by his predecessors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the long-term implications of the January 2007 launching of China's first successful antisatellite missile into space on China-U.S.-Taiwan relations. While the launch caused alarm across the Taiwan Strait, views in the United States were mixed as to whether the launch was the beginning of the militarization of space or a bid to force the United States to sign a treaty to avoid a costly arms race. The article examines these views in the context of historical tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]