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North of the equator It has become a truism of historical writing to conceive of Africa in the course of the nineteenth century as becoming increasingly a part of, and a product of, the expansion of Europe, which, beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had integrated ever larger areas of the world into a single economic system. In attempting an overview of the state of the continent on the eve of partition – roughly over the decade of the 1870s – a large number of questions arise from a consideration of this truism. To what extent was Africa already an adjunct of an economic system dominated by Europe? What was the relationship between Africa and this European system – was it one of an equal or an unequal exchange of commodities? To what extent was Africa dependent economically, if not yet politically? What social and ideological changes were beginning to follow from this dependency? Was Africa a fruit ripe for plucking in the 1870s, was there a certain inevitability about the forthcoming imperialist carve-up, or was partition an extraneous historical occurrence forced upon a continent which had within it other options for coping with the future? There are no answers to these questions that are at the same time simple and sensible. Certainly the answers to all such queries will differ, according to the region of Africa which is under scrutiny. Even within particular regions, the situation of individual states, societies or groups of people, their relations with each other and with the outside world (especially with the European capitalist economies) varied greatly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lines of siege, 1886–89 The outlook from the savanna Although in retrospect the flurry of European diplomacy which attended the Berlin Conference of 1884–5 seems clearly designed to prepare for the European invasion of West Africa, economic and political uncertainties in Europe and indications of stiff resistance in Africa inhibited the formation of aggressive policies. In the immediate aftermath the European siege lines were strengthened, but the scale of the impending threat to African independence was still not generally predictable. Even if in retrospect it appears that external and internal pressures were producing a general crisis of authority, its local manifestations varied greatly in nature and in intensity, and it is not easy to trace this crisis to common causes. Obviously, the impact of the European economy and European power was strongest in coastal regions. Many inland kingdoms of the savanna and Sahel still knew Europeans only as isolated and powerless travellers, and they retained the preoccupations and priorities which their historical experience suggested. Bornu, for example, though affected by fluctuations in European demand for ivory and ostrich-feathers, had more urgent problems at home; the challenge which eventually in 1893 overthrew the al-Kānamī dynasty came from Rabah al-Zubayr, a well-armed state-builder from the Nilotic Sudan, who proved capable of mobilising support among over-mighty subjects of Kukawa. 'Umar b. 'Alī, Caliph of Sokoto, 1881–91, also faced difficulties in maintaining administrative control over the empire founded by Usuman dan Fodio and in enforcing the theocratic standards which justified its existence; but these were largely inherent in the attempt to hold together territories which it took four months to traverse from east to west, once the capital of charisma accumulated by the founders had become attenuated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]