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This paper explores the relationships of subjects in the context of data and data technologies, and advances an original theoretical framework called Informatic Personhood to better conceptual subjects and their relationships. Because of the enormous structural change that data has contributed to, subjects are sometimes distant and backgrounded in studies of data, despite data having significant impacts on their lives. Data-mediated relationships mean an increased scale to a relationship, with individuals able to connect to much broader contexts of data, but also have these structures reach down to their subjective context through data. Informatic Personhood seeks to capture the dynamics of data present in everyday life, addressing this distance and better conceptualising the scale of data-mediated relationships. This framework has two parts. The first – The Informatic Context – explores salient structural developments around data and conceptualises this as being defined by the presence of 'data interfaces' (that connect individuals to digital contexts), 'data circulation' (trends in the movement and storage of data), and 'data abstraction' (data manipulation practices). The second part concerns the Informatic Person, and the embodied, affective, and sensemaking relationships of individuals occurring across and through the Informatic Context. This framework better addresses the scale of data-mediated relationships, and places subjects firmly in the foreground of how data is understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Just as there isn't a generally accepted meaning of the term law, there still isn't a completely clear and defined meaning of the term autonomous law. There is a big interest for the autonomous law in practice and theory, sociology and law anthropology. Five main meanings are attributed to this term: autonomous law as a theoretic notion, a subsystem of law, source of law, law of work and autonomous identity law. When it comes to autonomous law as a theoretic notion it is closely linked with the idea of legal pluralism. This paper follows the development of the understanding of legal pluralism from Duguit, Ehrlich, Petrazycki, Gurvitch, through, Evan, Llewellyn, Hobel, to Vanderlinden and Jean-Guy Belley. The paper ends with 'a new legal pluralism' which has a tendency to become the only right school (legal orthodoxy). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Part I of this two part paper we tried to elicit the ‘essence’ of the notion of interactional expertise by looking at its origins. In Part II we will look at the notion of contributory expertise. The exercise has been triggered by recent discussion of these concepts in this journal by Plaisance and Kennedy and by Goddiksen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]