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Since the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns that counter-terrorism laws and practices are directly and indirectly causing human rights violations have mounted. Much of the international focus has been on the United States. This paper highlights, however, that it is a debate with a truly global dimension. The author examines particular concerns that Canadian law enforcement and security agencies may have been complicit in the imprisonment and torture abroad of Canadian citizens who were of interest in the context of national security investigations. The cases are situated in the wider debate about torture that has emerged worldwide in recent years, and argues that any move to create exceptions to the absolute prohibition of torture, enshrined in numerous international treaties, would lead to both injustice and insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece provides a detailed case study of the evolution of counter-terrorism within a specific domestic security agency of a liberal-democratic state in the context of the Cold War. It does so by examining the creation of a counter-terrorism unit within Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and how it responded to international terrorism. This occurred in between major terrorist attacks in Canada in 1970 and 1985 and included a growing focus on counter-terrorism even as counter-subversion remained a top priority within a still dominant Cold War domestic security framework. Ultimately, the article, based on thousands of pages of previously secret documents, argues that the Security Service could conceive of in a broader strategic sense the threat of terrorism but found it more challenging, for a variety of reasons, including the dominance of the Cold War and the difficulties around infiltrating ethnic communities, to collect intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines whether Islamic terrorism has seen a marked increase in Canada since the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks in New York City. It discusses the effect of the September 2001 terrorism to the Canadians and policymakers moving forward. The author argues that an analysis of terrorist incidents in Canada after the September 11 incident reveals a disturbing trend and also provides a clear indication of several areas which need to be investigated and addressed to mitigate this threat moving forward. It offers an overview of the six high profile terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Legal systems should not always assume the legitimacy of state demands for secrecy and accommodate them with procedural innovations. This is especially so in Canada, which has made problematic policy choices to stress secrecy even in counterterrorism investigations where secret intelligence often has evidential value. A fairer and more efficient transition from secret intelligence to public evidence could be achieved if Canadian criminal trial judges, like those in other democracies, could make and revise non-disclosure or public interest immunity orders to protect secrets. The government of Canada has not justified adopting the procedural innovation of closed material procedures that would allow it to defend itself in national security civil litigation on the basis of secret evidence not seen by plaintiffs claiming to have been abused, but only by special advocates. There is a danger that even justified procedural innovation such as the use of special advocates will create new baselines that can be used to support additional innovations that may undermine the legitimacy of the legal system and discount the value of procedural regularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Captain Javed Latif, a Muslim Canadian pilot from Pakistan, was denied pilot refresher training by Bombardier Aerospace Training Center in Canada based on information received from US national security officials. Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif 's ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Latif had been racially profiled. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary seeks to excavate Captain Latif 's fuller story largely through a reading of silences. It critically analyzes the Court's claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THE COLLAPSE OF the notable twin towers of New York's World Trade Center in 2001 influenced Canada in a larger number of courses than the loss of two dozen Canadians among the unfortunate passings on that day. Instantly, American fingers indicated as far as anyone knows remiss northern outskirt security that had encouraged terrorist activity in the United States. In spite of the fact that this creation was in the long run recognized all things considered, the harm was finished. The characterized circumstance was genuine in its outcomes. In a bitingly humorous move, Canadian authorities exceeded themselves in showing security cautiousness with the outcome that few pure Canadian natives were whisked away by American constrains in remarkable version, to endure torment in Syria and Egypt and to have their lives shredded by the encounters. The best known of these is Syrian-conceived Maher Arar, an Ottawa architect (see O'Connor 2006). In every circumstance, the misusing of individual data relating to the casualties was vital to their wrongful detainment. In spite of the fact that security and observation are verifiably fundamental to this circumstance, with some striking special cases (Calhoun 2002) sociological examination did not figure unequivocally in endeavors to comprehend it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the developments in the Canadian intelligence community after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. It notes that the country's intelligence community gained substantial new resources and revised mandate, as well as the modification of institutional structures to focus on new threats and improve coordination, after the terrorist attacks. It states that the mobilization of resources to prevent a direct attack on Canadian citizens or Canadian infrastructure became the immediate priority of the government. The country's Department of National Defense was also increased to meet new military commitments and expanded its intelligence gathering.

The article focuses on the military responses and capabilities of the national security policy in Canada after the September 11, 2011 terror attacks in New York. It notes that Canada's federal government has tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focusing on security issues. The author suggests that the Canadian military is reasonably prepared for a military response to the eventuality of a terrorist incident or an act in the country.

This article explores the recent UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism. Contrasts can be readily drawn. Essentially the UK is engaged in both internal/domestic and external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism. Therefore, it has adopted a wide-ranging 'broad risk management' approach. Meanwhile the US is engaged mostly in external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism, conceived of as counter-insurgency in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has adopted a narrower 'risk prevention' approach. The Canadians, confronting a smaller threat, are less embroiled in 'firefighting' activities, enabling them to adopt more of a 'risk pre-emption' approach involving some social engineering. Arguably, the Canadian model outlined in this article can offer some instructive lessons for both the US and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that there are five major challenges currently facing Western intelligence communities. First - ensuring skills retention for intelligence officers and analysts, while developing knowledgeable managers and customers, all in an increasingly-complex security environment. Second - instituting and inculcating knowledge and expertise in these staff - while addressing an opponent in al-Qaeda which demonstrates increasingly sophisticated use of IT, new media, etc. Third - drawing-in outside expertise from the research and business communities, as is done currently in the US and Canada but in only a very limited manner in the UK. Fourth - overcoming institutional rigidity in dividing the foreign and domestic - alongside rigid sharing and co-operation relationships. Fifth - creating truly collaborative environments that offer genuine socio-cultural incentives to collaboration rather than mere 'IT solutions'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]