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The article presents the paper "China's Political Party System," published by China's State Council Information Office in 2007. The document examines the political party system adopted by China, focusing on the role that multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party plays in China's social and political life. The author looks at China's basic political system as well as manifestations of socialist democracy. A brief introduction to the democratic parties of China is also presented.

Due to increasing demand and scarce financial resources for healthcare, health system efficiency has become a major topic in political and scientific debates. While previous studies investigating determinants of health system efficiency focused primarily on economic and social influence factors, the role of the political regime has been neglected. In addition, there is a lack of formal theoretical work on this specific topic, which ensures transparency and logical consistency of arguments and implications. Using a public choice approach, this paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationships between health system efficiency and political institutions. We develop a simple principal-agent model describing the behavior of a government with respect to investments in population health under different political regimes. The main implication of the theoretical model is that governments under more democratic regimes put more effort in reducing embezzlement of health expenditure than non-democratic regimes. Accordingly, democratic countries are predicted to have more efficient health systems than non-democratic countries. We test this hypothesis based on a broad dataset including 158 countries over the period 1995-2015. The empirical results clearly support the implications of the theoretical model and withstand several robustness checks, including the use of alternative indicators for population health and democracy and estimations accounting for endogeneity. The empirical results also indicate that the effect of democracy on health system efficiency is more pronounced in countries with higher income levels. From a policy perspective, we discuss the implications of our findings in the context of health development assistance., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Democratic legitimacy is essential for democratic stability, as democracies rely on citizen support to survive. However, perceived legitimacy gaps can also be an important catalyst for change and potential democratic renewal, begging the question when challenges to legitimacy become problematic for democratic survival. Easton distinguished between citizen support for political authorities and the political system, and argued that if support for political authorities declined, such declining support could either be resolved by the current political authorities changing course, or by citizens electing new political authorities at the next elections. However, if dissatisfaction with political authorities would not be resolved, lacking support had the potential to eventually "spill-over" and undermine support for the political system as a whole. In most empirical research on legitimacy, the assumption is that such "spill-over" is visible only if declining levels of political trust and satisfaction with democracy start to undermine support for democracy as a political system. In this paper, we argue that "spillover" can also manifest in a different way: through the politicization of political support. When politics is no longer (only) about substantive policy decisions, but rather (increasingly) about the system itself, agreement on the rules of the game, or even on democracy as "the only game in town", is no longer self-evident. In this paper we further develop our theoretical argument about the connection between legitimacy and politicisation, and argue that European democracies appear to experience growing politicization of political support, in terms of the association of political support with citizens' substantive issue positions and voting behaviour. The paper demonstrates empirical evidence of such politicization of political support in 17 European democracies with European Social Survey data from 2002-2022. The paper concludes by reflecting on the implications of the politicization of political support for democratic stability and renewal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, democracy has been facing increasing challenges. How has comparative regime research responded? Focusing on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, this paper argues that the perception of serious threats to democracy in general and liberal norms in particular has given rise to a convergence around the liberal conception of democracy, reversing a previous turn towards recognising its conceptual contestability. In tracing V-Dem's discursive turn from the contestation to the decontestation of democracy, the paper reconstructs two mechanisms that concern the ways in which academic research relates to the outside world and that have jointly pushed V-Dem scholars towards embracing unequivocally liberal conceptions of regime type and regime change. As a response to the crisis of democracy, this gradual abandonment of a pluralist conceptualisation of democracy is understandable but also deeply problematic as it contributes to downplaying the inherent limitations of liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should refugees govern refugee camps? This paper argues that they should. It draws on normative political thought in consulting the all-subjected principle and an instrumental defense of democratic rule. The former holds that all those subjected to rule in a political unit should have a say in such rule. Through analyzing the conditions that pertain in refugee camps, the paper demonstrates that the all-subjected principle applies there, too. Refugee camps have developed as near distinct entities from their host states. They have formed their own economic, legal and even political systems within which refugees are subjected to political rule. The paper then demonstrates that democratic rule should be preferred over any other decision-making procedure. No amount of experts can replace the institutions that would lead to the accountability of decision-makers and to the incorporation of refugees as situated and epistemically diverse knowers of the problems they face and the solutions that would work best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates reasons to participate in non-deterministic elections, where the outcomes incorporate elements of chance beyond mere tie-breaking. The background context situates this inquiry within democratic theory, specifically non-deterministic voting systems, which promise to re-evaluate fairness and power distribution among voting blocs. This study aims to explore the normative implications of such electoral systems and their impact on our moral duty to vote. We analyze instrumental reasons for voting, including prudential and act-consequentialist arguments, alongside non-instrumental reasons, assessing their validity in the context of non-deterministic systems. The results indicate that non-deterministic elections could strengthen the case for voting based on prudential and act-consequentialist grounds due to their proportional nature and the increased influence of each vote. We conclude that, while non-deterministic elections strengthen our duty to vote overall, they do not strengthen it for all the arguments in the literature. This paper contributes to the discourse on electoral systems by critically evaluating the moral obligation to vote in non-deterministic elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary conflicts of sovereignty in Europe have gone beyond the clash between national and supranational sovereignty. Sovereignty conflicts are increasingly occurring within member states. This paper develops a conceptual framework that distinguishes between foundational, institutional and territorial conflicts of sovereignty, elaborating on this taxonomy with reference to the historical evolution of the concept of sovereignty in Europe. It provides an account of why we have seen a proliferation in conflicts of sovereignty within European states. This is due in part to the notion of "shared" sovereignty. Central to European integration, this notion has introduced considerable institutional indeterminacy into the political systems of member states, leading to many of the institutional conflicts of sovereignty we see in Europe today. The struggle of national party systems to institutionalize societal conflict via partisan competition is another contributory factor. This has displaced conflict onto the terrain of how popular rule is institutionalized within the national state. In developing this framework, the paper provides a method for distinguishing between political conflicts tout court and those touching specifically upon sovereignty. Moreover, the framework helps us distinguish between those conflicts of sovereignty most destabilizing for a polity and those which are less so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethics committees are usually expected to reach and frame their decisions by consensus. In a post-totalitarian society the conception of consensus might somewhat differ from the one present in societies with a long-term, uninterrupted tradition of democratic development. In 1990s, post totalitarian societies of Central and East Europe have been walking difficult paths from the situation, when matters of public interest had been decided almost solely within the structures of a totalitarian power (usually a 'communist' party and by the party dominated governmental or municipal structures) and the political decisions implemented by more or less coercive exercise of that power (while requiring the broadest community attainment--'imposed consensus'); toward societies deciding their fate and matters of public interest via institutions of a modern, pluralistic, parliamentary democracy (subscribing implicitly or even explicitly to consensus, perceived mostly as 'overlapping' or 'procedural'). The paper gives an analysis of evolution of the notion of consensus in the post-totalitarian Slovakia as seen within the frame of the first decade of establishment and work of ethics committees in the institutions of biomedical research and health care. Examples of present challenges for ethics committees' consensual decision making are outlined.

This paper argues for the importance of the political context of a society for bioethics. In particular, I argue that in a liberal constitutional society, such as the one we find ourselves in, no particular moral perspective is granted a privileged position. Rather, individuals are allowed to live their lives according to values they adopt for themselves, and the rights granted to protect this ability "trump" social consensus, and place boundaries on the social application of personal moral beliefs and values.

Democracy is a political system that has some universal appeal, and, this seems to invest it with some kind of legitimacy over other systems of government. But this in no way suggests that it is homogenously conceived or practiced across the world—particularly in Western and African countries. Yet there is some supposition that some cultures have (almost) perfected their practice of democracy while others are learning its rudiments. This tends to arouse the philosopher's interest in the conceptual and practical bases for the supposition. In African philosophy, the notion of consensus has often been touted as a kernel and mēnsūra for evidence of democracy in traditional African thought. This paper examines the propriety of this move, taking into account the specific positions of the Ghanaian philosophers, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye. It explores the political dynamics of contemporary Africa and brings out the challenges and prospects for the sort of democracy that is being practiced—or, at least, is said to be practiced—in Africa. It is often debated in African political thought whether consensus or majoritarian rule (characterized by such activities as voting and multipartism) defines democracy, but the paper argues that neither of them really brings about democracy. It then highlights the humanistic end of democracy. Using the Ghanaian experience especially, the paper proposes ways of improving the understanding and practice of democracy in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On balance, Africa generally has made some progress in good governance under liberal, multiparty democracy in the past two or three decades. But there are well‐noted, wide‐ranging dysfunctions in governance, which inhibit human development and fulfilment. Several papers have been published, which propose various solutions to the dysfunctions. Among them are proposals for types of all‐inclusive democratic politics. I examine a couple of these proposals and conclude that they generate formidable feasibility challenges, even for the types of democracy they advocate. This paper focuses on Ghana, but with a thrust intended to have import for the sustainability of democracy across Africa. The argument is basically that the operating democratic constitutions in Africa provide a normatively desirable liberal, multiparty democracy, which promises a reasonably good life for all without exception; but practice has resulted in enduring, multiple deprivations and low standards of living for millions of citizens. The reason for the undesirably wide gap between the ideal and the practice is not because multiparty democracy is inconsistent with African traditions or is otherwise not good for Africans, as some scholars claim, but because of those who tend to run it—their general incompetence, including or marked by their intellectual and ethical inability to rise above partisan limitations and failure to leverage the efficiencies of the free market system. The proposed solution for Ghana, intended to eliminate or significantly mitigate the dysfunctions just mentioned and to sustain the multiparty democracy, is to redesign the National Development Planning Commission (NPDC), a constitutional organ which serves the partisan executive, into a robust, non‐partisan, independent institution, anchored on the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances, to enable it to do at least the following two things: (a) to produce, with representation from key stakeholders, including political parties, technocratically objective, competent, efficient and accountable rolling and all‐inclusive National Development Plans (NDPs) in place of vote‐inspired and partisan manifestoes, with budgets approved by parliament; and (b) to monitor, evaluate and report on the governing party's implementation of the NDPs to parliament. Democracy will become sustainable as the general quality of lives grows steadily under the continuous implementation of all‐inclusive NDPs, which are to be crafted to efficiently and sustainably deliver public goods and services that serve district, regional and the common needs and interests of all Ghanaians rather than the interests of the few and powerful or, at best, of majorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The objective of this paper is to better understand the evolution and institutional roots of Hong Kong's growing economic inequality and political cleavages. By combining multiple sources of data (household surveys, fiscal data, wealth rankings, national accounts) and methodological innovations, two main findings are obtained. First, he evidence suggests a very large rise in income and wealth inequality in Hong Kong over the last four decades. Second, based on the latest opinion poll data, business elites, who carry disproportionate weight in Hong Kong's Legislative Council, are found to be more likely to vote for the pro-establishment camp (presumably to ensure that policies are passed that protect their political and economic interests). This paper argues that the unique alliance of government and business elites in a partially democratic political system is the plausible institutional root of Hong Kong's rising inequality and political cleavages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Muntaqa: New Perspectives on Arab Studies is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

That parties fulfil their pre‐election pledges once they are in government is a fundamental idea of many democracy models. This paper addresses the question of whether the government/opposition status of their party affects how much citizens want governments to fulfil their promises. We hypothesize that interest‐driven, rational voters are more likely to prefer their own party to keep its promises and investigate whether this rationale is impacted by public opinion and expert views. The analysis is based on a survey experiment conducted in Australia and Austria. It finds that voters broadly adhere to the democratic principle of expecting pledge fulfilment but, at the same time, some take a rational approach to government promises. The opinions of the public and experts mitigate but do not change this effect. Another key finding is the significant difference in the preference for promise keeping versus promise breaking between government and opposition voters in the Austrian case, the country with the more heterogeneous and polarized political system. This paper contributes to the literature on voters' attitudes on democracy and pledge fulfilment by showing that voters are normatively driven but a significant number of voters deviate and instead follow the rational voter logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Estudios de la Administración Local y Autonómica is the property of Instituto Nacional de Administracion Publica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In an era marked by global concerns about democratic erosion, this study delves into the nuanced landscape of individual-level perceptions of democracy. This paper uncovers intriguing insights that challenge conventional wisdom by examining a robust dataset from the World Values Survey comprising over 90,000 responses across 60+ countries. Surprisingly, people's perception of democracy and satisfaction with the political system exhibit minimal correlation with systematic measures of liberal democracy. Instead, indicators like sentiments regarding the 'army taking over during government incompetence' and 'participation in unofficial strikes' emerge as robust predictors of democratic evaluation. Moreover, this analysis unveils a notable connection between individual economic satisfaction and perceptions of democratic governance and political system performance. These relationships illuminate the dynamics shaping democratic assessment at the individual level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarly curiosity about political friendship (the relationship of mutual care among political fellows) is increasing as liberal democracies around the world face radical polarization. Yet one worry persists: can political friendship really exist in contemporary democracies? The objective of this paper is to answer this question in the affirmative. To this end, I investigate whether members of modern polities have reasons to form friendly bonds with one another. The paper has four parts. The first establishes a fundamental desideratum that any consideration must satisfy to count as a reason for political fellows to partake in political friendship. The second evaluates and rejects a line of argument that presents bonds of mutual identification and belonging among political fellows as reasons for political friendship. The third evaluates and rejects a line of argument due to Paul Ludwig that presents the shared utility of political community as a reason for political fellows to engage in friendly practices with one another. Finally, I introduce my own novel argument—the "argument from membership"—for why political fellows have a reason to care for one another. I argue that membership in a functioning political community is indispensably valuable for any individual in virtue of playing a constitutive role in the individual's attainment of their final ends. I hold that, as constituent parts of the same political community, political fellows have a reason to value one another and, accordingly, to care for one another's well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To globally manage COVID-19, governments instituted national emergencies, prohibited large social gatherings, and introduced travel bans and lockdowns. However necessary from a health perspective, these responses allowed politicians in some contexts to threaten the stability of democratic institutions and human rights. Some leaders met with approval from a public rallying around the flag -- when citizens put their trust in government to manage a crisis. Yet power grabs also provoked resistance in a number of countries. This study examines a mix of regime types -- consolidated democratic, semi-consolidated democratic, illiberal democratic and authoritarian -- which include: the US (liberal democracy under threat), Poland (liberal, semi-consolidated democracy), Hungary (illiberal) and China (authoritarian) in a snapshot from the pandemic's outbreak through September 2020. Relying on a theoretical framework that examines the use of emergency powers in the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis where a rally effect enabled some leaders to abuse power, this paper argues that significant popular resistance arose against leaders' power abuses but was hindered initially due to a rally effect. However, rallies were largely temporary, or held only for certain issues. Elements of civil society in the US, Poland and Hungary ultimately slowed political leaders' power grabs. In China, the threat of the pandemic empowered the government to effectively shut down open civic resistance, most visibly in Hong Kong. This paper demonstrates that in authoritarian contexts, the use of emergency powers may have more severe implications compared to democratic or semi-democratic contexts. This research contributes to strategies of democracy promotion in crises by pointing to the need to support civil society, which in many -- but not all -- cases can subvert overreach by political leaders' power grabs in crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does the architecture style of a parliament's legislative assembly reveal about a state's relationship to authoritarianism and colonialism? Physical design is traditionally seen as an objective or neutral component of the legislative process, divorced from political desires and strategic engineering. However, this paper argues that legislative architecture is acutely informed by two factors: a country's regime type in the year of construction and its colonial legacy. First, this paper proposes that different regime types desire distinct attributes in physical spaces. The needs of a regime type (either for debate or conformity) encourage the construction of legislative halls featuring architectural enablers of their desired attributes; thus, regime type in the year of construction may predict or inform the construction of legislative typologies. Secondly, it considers how colonial legacies, in particular British colonialism, influence the selection of architecture typology. It determines that certain legislature styles are inherited as a byproduct of British colonialism due to the symbolism bestowed on former British institutions. Finally, given the high financial cost associated with legislative construction and the legitimacy bestowed upon legislative spaces, this paper proposes that legislatures become "sticky" or resistant to change after their initial construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Rechtsextremismusforschung is the property of Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Euro Latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político (RELASP) is the property of Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Politica y Relaciones Internacionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper aims to investigate whether a country's youth cohort size and quality of democracy, independently and jointly predict young people's propensity to support democracy as a political system. We use pooled data from World Values Survey Waves 5–7, comprising 81 country-waves with 25,125 observations from 39 established and new democracies, in multilevel binary logistic regression analyses. The paper finds evidence that firstly, against conventional expectations, a large youth cohort exerts a positive influence on young people's support for democracy as a political system. Secondly, the effect of youth cohort size depends on the quality of democracy of countries: young people growing as part of the youth cohorts in established democracies show stronger propensities to support democracy than their peers in new democracies. This has implications for both theory and empirical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Singapore represent different types of political regimes and provide a fascinating contrast concerning their performance with regard to the global conflict between liberal democracies and autocracies. This paper examines briefly their common historical backgrounds and provides a detailed analysis of common 'Asian' cultural features and popular support for democracy on the micro-level. It then systematically assesses their performance concerning liberal democracy and quality, governance scores, and socio-economic development. Finally, the reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic are documented showing again specific regime characteristics. We use most recent V-Dem, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, World Values Surveys and similar data. The conclusions point to possible international consequences and the crucial position of Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Faced with contradictory outcomes in empirical studies on the relation between democracy and income inequality, this paper attempts to provide empirical relations between democracy and income inequality. In particular, the authors seek to find if any curvilinear relation exists as in the Kuznets hypothesis. Design/methodology/approach: Given elusiveness in empirical relations, the authors will consider several specifications using different estimation methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS), panel data estimation and performing statistical tests to determine the best specification for the relation between income inequality and democracy. Once the authors choose the specification, then the authors will apply this specification to the different groups of data to find any meaningful implications. Findings: Using the unbalanced panel of 136 countries spanning from 1980 to 2018, the authors found an inverse U-shaped relation, called a political Kuznets curve – income inequality increases first and then decreases later as more democracy is achieved. By quantifying the curve, the authors find that the direct impact of democracy on income inequality is small and that the incremental impact of democracy on income inequality is smaller in a semi-democracy while relatively larger in a full democracy and autocracy. Originality/value: From the study's findings, the following policy implications can be considered. First, any change in income inequality caused by democratization should not be concerning as the impact of democracy on income inequality is measured to be very small. Second, the largest factor reducing income inequality is real GDP per capita. Third, the authors find that an impact of government expenditure on income inequality is also inversely U-shaped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2011, Egypt saw one of the largest protest movements in its modern history: the 25th of January revolution. One of its major demands was the call for democracy and end of dictatorship after 30 years of Mubarak's rule. After ousting Mubarak, the Egyptian public sphere witnessed an openness. Even with increasing levels of oppression and violence, there were open spaces for freedom of association, expression, and demonstration, etc. Yet, in 2013 and with the intense protests against the elected Muslim Brotherhood (MB) president, the military interfered and ousted the elected president. In light of these events, Egypt witnessed a backlash against democracy under the pretext of fighting 'terrorism'. Since then, Egypt has been seeing manifestations of this relapse on almost all levels, in terms of legislations, decrees, practices that closed the public space to any protesting voices, with higher levels of oppression and violence against the opposition and not only the so-called 'terrorists'. In this context, this paper proposes to dissect the Egyptian stumbling road to democratisation since 2011. It examines internal factors as well as the role of regional and international actors in orchestrating developments in Egypt. The paper proposes that the process of democratisation in Egypt has faced multiple drawbacks, not only related to regime type (military rule) but also with respect to social movements, the involvement of regional actors, etc.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why don't democracies fight each other? Since discovering this empirical regularity, scholars have assumed that the answer must lie with regime type (i.e. democracy). Our paper provides and tests an alternative explanation: the territorial explanation of war, which stresses grievances and argues that territorial issues incentivize states to resort to war more often than disagreements over other, non-territorial issues. We show that democracies do not generally have territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) or the territorial claims that would produce territorial MIDs. Democracies are peaceful because they lack the most dangerous grievances in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1990, multilateral organizations have invested in the idea that multiparty political systems are an essential part of building durable peace, and that former insurgents must be converted to political actors. To what extent does this foster longer term democracy and stability? In this paper, we focus on the role of electoral inclusion for post-rebel parties in the creation of stable party systems as one feature that supports both democratization and durable peace. We find that political integration of former insurgents in electoral politics not only serves the short-term purpose of bringing such groups "inside the tent" and smoothing the transition from war to peace. It also lays a foundation for the creation of stable party systems. We test our propositions with an original dataset and offer explanatory analysis of small set of parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While studying political systems nowadays, science usually considers the characteristics of the democratic systems and the systems that transit from non-democratic to democratic. The overall impression is that very little attention is paid to studying the characteristics and the types of non-democratic systems. Such neglect of the characteristics and types of non-democratic systems contributes to the general public ignoring the danger of the rise of such systems. The rise of non-democratic systems in the last two decades in the world is evident and therefore it is important that the basic characteristics and types of non-democratic regimes are clearly elaborated. In that direction, this paper aims to define non-democratic systems, make a clear distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, and elaborate on the different types of authoritarian regimes. The paper also analyzes the rise of hybrid regimes and their difference from classic authoritarian regimes. Through such an elaboration of the non-democratic systems, the paper concludes that the non-democratic systems possess characteristics and values that are not compatible with the rule of law and the protection of human freedoms and rights, and therefore their progress represents a global threat and danger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag on free votes from 1953 to 2013, I examine the effect of length of previous party membership and the age of joining the party on indicators of party cohesion. Examining free votes allows for credibly controlling alternative explanations of unified voting behavior. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion on the findings' implications in light of recent developments in parties' candidate recruitment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tunisia was for a long-time seen as a successful country on its way towards democracy, thanks to its robust civil society. Still, while civil society is seen as important actor for democratization processes in Tunisia, little is known about how organizations frame democracy, and how they combine the concept with their own organizational framing? Using data from interviews and media analysis from 2015 and 2016, the paper uses the example of the three civil society organizations UGTT, LTDH and ATFD and assesses their definitions of democracy. Different sub-dimensions of democracy are analysed and combined with social movement theories of framing. This allows for the assessment of organizational definitions and for the identification of differences between actors. This procedure helps explain how organizations act in the Tunisian political system depending on what is valued in their framing. The three organizations regularly connect the demand for democracy with their issue-specific claims. Participative as well as legal elements are highlighted while especially elections are less prominent. The referral to rights as outlined in the constitution is an essential referral across organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies suggest that the democratic system constructs a permissive environment for ethnic autonomy. This argument does not, however, fit in the case of Nepal in which the Constitution has institutionalized the democratic system and rejected the Madheshi autonomy. Nepal's constitutional position makes it imperative to examine the limits of the democratic system to address ethnic ambitions. In response, this paper has examined the following question: How did the democratic political system affect the Madheshi demand for autonomy and self-determination? It identifies that the democratic system socialized the mainstream parties to consider that democracy supports individual rights and provides all citizens with equal opportunities. In contrast, self-determination gives additional privileges to some communities over others and hurts the citizens' rights to equal treatment from the state. Due to this perception, the mainstream parties characterized self-determination as an undemocratic right and used numeric strength to refuse the Madheshi autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At first glance, Fichte and Nietzsche might strike us as intellectual contraries. This impression is reinforced by Nietzsche's disparaging remarks about Fichte. The dearth of critical literature comparing the two thinkers also could easily lead us to believe that they are, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant to one another. In this paper, however, I argue that their theories of subjectivity are in many respects remarkably similar and worthy of comparison. But I further explain how, despite this convergence, their normative philosophies end up so conspicuously at odds with one another. After examining the resemblance between their denials of the substantial self, I respectively analyse Fichte's and Nietzsche's positive accounts of subjectivity, self-cultivation, and the political preconditions of self-cultivation. I locate the conceptual juncture at which their practical outlooks begin to part ways in their divergent drive psychologies and in their distinct conceptions of conscience. These apparently minor theoretical differences generate a large-scale disagreement regarding the political systems they believe best enable self-cultivation, with Fichte favouring a democratic regime, while Nietzsche opts for a markedly more aristocratic one. I close by sketching a possible way out of this dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the name of health security, individual freedoms were constrained in an unprecedented way in many countries, democratic or authoritarian, all over the world during the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the constraints have not been consistent across countries, which motivates this paper to examine the relevance of value preferences towards freedom or security in the society for COVID-19 policies. Based on data for 40 democratic and authoritarian countries, the analyses show that the variation in the stringency of COVID-19 policies can be explained by value preferences of the population only in autocracies. In democracies, however, we do not find such a relationship. Governments in democratic political systems, we argue, are responsive to their constitutions and face prosecution by the judiciary if they violate the law or provisions of the constitution, limiting their capacity to implement strong COVID-19 policies. Nevertheless, their COVID-19 policies restricted citizens' freedoms and liberties, which means that these policies were rather not responsive to citizens' preferences for freedom, democratic rights and liberties. By highlighting how autocracies respond to their citizens' value preferences for security, this paper contributes to a better understanding of how autocracies might gain legitimacy in times of crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to spell out the Commission's present position on the following set of questions: according to which normative criteria can European integration, European governance and the Commission's own roles in the two processes be considered legitimate? Taking the 2001 White Paper on Governance as a reference point, it is argued that the Commission is trapped between two sets of claims to legitimacy: one set of claims coming from the Monnet tradition of thought, where the stress is on unity, efficiency, responsibility and impartiality; and a second set of claims coming from the post-Maastricht critique of the Union, which highlight diversity, clarity and democracy. The result has been that the European Commission entered the recent constitutional debate with a set of proposals that did not do much to strengthen its own position in the Union, or to contribute innovative ideas to the debate, which was meant to deal with the great challenges that lie ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since democracy is the only political system that considers the views of the general populace, most states have switched over to democratic political systems over time. The right to vote allows citizens to directly or indirectly elect the representatives of their choice in democracies; Good governance is a term that is only applied to this one system, a transparent, participatory, and accountable government. The phrase "good governance" refers to a system of government that upholds the rights of its citizens, gives them equal access to opportunities, considers the views of the general public, and makes its policies clear to the general populace and refrains from engaging in dishonest practices. It is referred to as a government that values participation, accountability, and transparency and ensures that all citizens are treated equally under the law. As time goes on, laws are made to increase government accountability and transparency; for this reason, the right to information is included in the constitutions of the vast majority of states. Through the exercise of this right, the public will have access to information about public matters, enabling them to monitor the government. As a result, corruption will be reduced and a more accountable system of government will be established; in addition, it will make corruption and the abuse of power more difficult. The constitution of 1973 was amended in April of 2010 to include 19-A Article regarding the RTI in order to design a more explicit, participatory, and accountable structure. Pakistan is a democratic country with a separate chapter on fundamental rights and this research paper aims to examine how Pakistan's RTI can put up good governance. This study looks at the regulatory structures of Pakistan's right-to-information laws and asks if the intended goals of openness and good governance have been met? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Athenian ostracism has long captured democratic imaginations because it seems to present clear evidence of a people (demos) routinely asserting collective power over tyrannical elites. In recent times, ostracism has been particularly alluring to militant democrats, who see the institution as an ancient precursor to modern militant democratic mechanisms such as social media bans, impeachment measures, and lustration procedures, which serve to protect democratic constitutions from anti-democratic threats. Such a way of conceptualizing ostracism ultimately stems from Aristotle's "rule of proportion," or the removal of "outstanding" individuals in a polity who threaten to disturb the achievement of communal eudaimonia (Aris. Pol. 1284a). However, this way of interpreting the institution only presents a truncated view, one which is overly centered on the ultimate expulsion of an individual from the polity, rather than on its broader contextual telos—the transformation of the ostracized individual and of the community. To move past this simplified view, this paper considers all elements of ostracism with equal force, and argues that ostracism offered a shared opportunity and shared space for all members of the polis—citizens, non-citizens, and elite members alike—to reform the character of the subject individual and to instill and reaffirm democratic values in the community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tolerance has long been identified as a crucial feature of liberal democracies. Although the limits of tolerance are debated, the extent to which citizens are open and willing to accommodate others who are different from them is often regarded as a sign of a healthy and well‐functioning liberal democracy. The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate the state of political tolerance in Europe today. The main questions we ask are: What explains the different levels of tolerance across individuals in various countries? Which groups in society are the most likely targets of intolerance? We understand political tolerance as the willingness to allow the free articulation of interests and ideas in the political system of groups one opposes. Previous research emphasizes education, civic activism and threat perceptions as important determinants of tolerance. We redirect the debate to a set of novel correlates of tolerance. We argue that conspiratorial thinking and cosmopolitanism are critical factors that explain levels of tolerance among Europeans. The analysis employs original survey data collected as part of a mass survey conducted in 2017 in 10 European Union member states: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Our descriptive analysis shows that far‐right groups (i.e., fascists and neo‐Nazis) and Muslims are the most disliked groups in Europe. When it comes to the level of tolerance towards these groups, we find that more than half of the respondents in each country are willing to deny their most disliked group parliamentary representation. Moreover, we find that even after controlling for traditional determinants of tolerance, conspiratorial thinking and cosmopolitanism emerge as the most important predictors of political tolerance. Our analysis suggests that the recent rapid spread of various conspiracy theories related to the COVID‐19 pandemic is likely to have far‐reaching implications for tolerance as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political parties are widely recognised as indispensable actors in democratic systems. One way to illustrate the actions and role of political parties is to explicate various party functions that may be carried out in a political system. The aim of this paper is to explore the relationships between the organisation of party education and five specific party functions in Sweden. The empirical material consists of interviews with party officials from all eight parties that were represented in the national parliament during 2018–2022 as well as a mapping of educational content, structure, and activities from various parties. This material has been analysed in relation to five concrete party functions and a theoretical approach that highlights interactions and relationships occurring on different levels in apolitical system. The results demonstrate that there are different relationships between party education and party functions which may generate implications that are important both for the agency of a party but also to the broader political landscape. It is also possible to discern one specific function related to the provision of party education, namely an affirmation function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the years 1945 – 1948. The Slovak historiography calls this era the “people’s democracy”. A people´s government and democracy itself were supposed to be the cornerstones of post-war Czechoslovakia. The word “democracy” had not only been used very often in public by the organiser of the Slovak people’s uprising (Slovenské národné povstanie), but it was a keyword in all important political documents. Those intellectuals who were part of the revolution were fighting for a functioning democratic system, plurality, free elections, a pluralistic party system and a government that was approved by parliament. These ideals first materialized in the foundation of the Slovenská národna rada (National Councilof the Slovak Republic) and the founding of the Demokratická strana (Democratic Party in Czechoslovakia) in Banská Bystrica. Andrej Cvinček, a canon from Nitra (Slovakia), was an active player in this process. Cvinček was not only a politician with a Christian background, he was a politician who stood up against secular tendencies within the state and was a proponent of conservative political opinions. Cvinček was a forceful advocate of the Christian weltanschauung and the axioms, principles, and interests of his church and religious bodies and organizations. This paper wants to analyze his view on and perception of democracy in post-war Czechoslovakia. Cvinček was hinting at the extreme divergence of what communists described to be a people’s democracy and the very communist reality: this was a warning of what to expect from the immanent rise of totality. Simultaneously, we need to raise the question of whether changes in the political system and society had an impact on the convictions and the career of a politician that was fighting for church interests and Christian principles. This paper is based on materials kept in archives, press articles of his time, and memoirs of his contemporaries. The aim of this paper is, to a lesser extent, to portray his political career, but the focus is being laid on the creation of a typology of how he perceived and understood democracy and how democratic ideas were implemented in the given years 1944 – 1948. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of examining the constitutionality in countries whose political system has elements of consociational democracy. The consociational model was traced back to the late 60s of the 20th century in the works of the American political scientist of Dutch origin, Arend Lijphart. From the mid-90s of the XX century, this model has become an extremely popular constitutional engineering within the International Community itself, which was involved in the process of post-conflict international state-building, leading to the creation of new constitutional arrangements such as the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 1995, but also the Republic of North Macedonia (RNM) following the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). Therefore, the interest of this paper is to examine the position, jurisdiction, and institutional structure of judicial review bodies in these two countries of consociational democracy in Southeast Europe, by comparing Bosnia and Herzegovina's experience with that of the Republic of North Macedonia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examined the trine cord nature of social protest, constructive criticism and unionism to governance in Nigeria as stated in Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and People's right and other international laws. As a qualitative research it relied heavily on secondary source of information such as newspapers, journals and published works which are content analyze to befit the work. The paper adopted the system theory as a frame work of analysis because of its emphasis on input, output, feedback mechanism and stability of the status quo. After verification it is safe to mention that the formative life cycle of Nigeria as a country began from social protest, criticism and domestic allied group. This underscores the pivotal place of these trine cords in the independence of Nigeria as well as its political attainment. However, it is of no news that several military and democratic regimes in Nigeria have not come to terms with any act of obvious opposition due to their ever-corrosive reactions. Thus, the work made series of recommendations such as follows: Government should consciously accept the place of pluralism in a democratic system of government, the business of government should be run with openness instead of opacity. More so, government as an institution should appreciate the place of dynamism as nothing is constant and so they should be open to criticism and accept the need for a change when necessary. Wilder consultation through bottom up approach should be a consistent order so as to continuously reflect the wishes of the people. In order words the public choice approach to policy formulation should never be negated. This will reduce the level of social glamour in a political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy has promoted political and socio-economic development far more effectively than any other political system across many countries and centuries of history. In Nigeria, it has been characterized with political corruption, ethnic politics, politicking of core government policies and programmes and politics of godfatherism. Since the return of democratic rule in 1999 to date, the country witnessed a heightened tempo in the politics of godfatherism, which has not only retards the process of democratic consolidation but also undermines effective state governance and restricts rather than broadens democratic representation. Godfatherism is one of the greatest glitches facing the Nigerian political system. This paper therefore, attempts a reflection on the nature, causes and effect of godfatherism on Nigeria’s nascent democracy. We anchored our investigation on some basic propositions arising from the elite theory and argue that politics of godfatherism negates peaceful coexistence, law and order and poses a threat to the Nigeria’s nascent democracy. This paper which is theoretical in nature draws its argument basically from secondary data which include journal articles, textbooks and internet sources. Requisite conclusion and recommendations were provided in the light of the theoretical findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]