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Latin American nations have undergone dramatic transitions to democracy and open markets in recent decades. Such changes have exposed citizens to high levels of economic volatility and insecurity, while at the same time expanding the possibilities for citizens to hold governments to account and to demand compensation for such hardships. Recent research indicates that even as economic insecurity has risen and social insurance programs have been retrenched, civil society in Latin America has remained relatively quiescent, with low levels of political participation. This paper tests the hypothesis that insecurity (defined as exposure to risk and lack of adequate means to hedge that risk) has a dampening effect on citizens' propensity to engage in different forms of political life, such as attending municipal meetings and neighborhood organizations, and engaging in protest. Data from a 2009 nation-wide survey in Brazil reveal that individuals who have access to more extensive means of risk protection, all else being equal, are systematically more likely to participate actively in the more moderate and sustained forms of democratic politics, such as neighborhood associations and municipal meetings. This is not the case for protest activity, however, which is likely to entail very different calculations of risk and reward. The results of the analysis are preliminary, but indicate a sharp cleavage of insecurity that coincides with widening fault lines of political engagement in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Latin America has moved to the left during the last decade, why have the governments of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay chosen a path of moderate, gradual change, whereas their counterparts in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have proceeded with considerable economic and political radicalism? Comparative analysis and case studies of Brazil and especially Bolivia find that economic performance and party institutions do not provide a satisfactory explanation for this striking difference in political approach. Instead, natural resource rents and commodity booms (and busts) play a crucial role. The unearned windfalls produced by bonanzas inspire risk-acceptance among political leaders and common citizens, which can prompt ideological radicalism and political confrontation. By developing this argument and basing it on a novel, cognitive-psychological micro-foundation, the paper seeks to contribute to theories of the rentier state and the "resource curse." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper deals with the shortcomings of democratic political theory in Latin America. I criticize the minimialist conception of democracy defined along procedural lines i.e. elections. I contend that this conception of democracy is far too narrow and formalistic, and abstracts too much from the substantive essence of democracy which I define as liberty, equality, and happiness. My paper then is divided into two parts. In the first part, I explore liberal theory to see the concept of liberal-democracy developed from Hobbes to Mill; from there I try to demonstrate how inherent contradictions within liberal theory led to a regression in liberal-democracy, from a regime designed to secure human rights and provide happiness to the populace, to what we have today which does not provide for that. To demonstrate this empirically leads to the second part. I look to Argentina and Brazil, ostensibly democratic and wealthy yet besieged by violence and inequality. Violence is the key variable I explore, I believe it to be a manifestation of inequality, but more importantly I think it constitutes the grossest violation of the promises of liberal-democracy. Ultimately I conclude that a true democratic order must look both to its subjective essence and its objective form, I propose a dialetical relationship as the means to establish that, to raise subjectivist concerns to a matter of necessity in constituting a regime as democratic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]