261 results
Search Results
2. Specification and Analysis of Open-Ended Systems with CARMA
- Author
-
Hillston, Jane, Loreti, Michele, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Weyns, Danny, editor, and Michel, Fabien, editor
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Causation, Control, and the Evolution of Complexity
- Author
-
Pattee, Howard Hunt, Pattee, Howard Hunt, and Rączaszek-Leonardi, Joanna
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. RBN-World : A Sub-symbolic Artificial Chemistry
- Author
-
Faulconbridge, Adam, Stepney, Susan, Miller, Julian F., Caves, Leo S. D., Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Sudan, Madhu, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Goebel, Randy, editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Wahlster, Wolfgang, editor, Kampis, George, editor, Karsai, István, editor, and Szathmáry, Eörs, editor
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. Reconstruction Failures: Questioning Level Design
- Author
-
Roth, Camille, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Sudan, Madhu, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Goebel, Randy, editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Wahlster, Wolfgang, editor, and Squazzoni, Flaminio, editor
- Published
- 2009
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. Chemistry and the Completeness of Physics
- Author
-
Hendry, Robin Findlay, Symons, John, editor, Van Dalen, Dirk, editor, Davidson, Donald, editor, Kuipers, Theo A. F., editor, Suppes, Patrick, editor, Woleński, Jan, editor, Rojszczak, Artur, editor, Cachro, Jacek, editor, and Kurczewski, Gabriel, editor
- Published
- 2003
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
7. The Use of Models - Making MABS More Informative
- Author
-
Edmonds, Bruce, Goos, G., editor, Hartmanis, J., editor, van Leeuwen, J., editor, Carbonell, Jaime G., editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Moss, Scott, editor, and Davidsson, Paul, editor
- Published
- 2001
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
8. Simulating Emergence and Downward Causation in Small Groups
- Author
-
Keith Sawyer, R., Goos, G., editor, Hartmanis, J., editor, van Leeuwen, J., editor, Carbonell, Jaime G., editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Moss, Scott, editor, and Davidsson, Paul, editor
- Published
- 2001
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
9. Quantum Physics, Digital Computers, and Life from a Holistic Perspective
- Author
-
Ellis, George F. R.
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. The strong emergence of molecular structure
- Author
-
Vanessa A Seifert
- Subjects
Philosophy of science ,Downward causation ,010308 nuclear & particles physics ,05 social sciences ,Context (language use) ,Centre for Science and Philosophy ,050905 science studies ,Supervenience ,01 natural sciences ,Epistemology ,Philosophy ,History and Philosophy of Science ,Argument ,Reflexivity ,0103 physical sciences ,0509 other social sciences ,Causation ,Empirical evidence ,Paper in General Philosophy of Science ,Strong emergence ,Molecular structure - Abstract
One of the most plausible and widely discussed examples of strong emergence is molecular structure. The only detailed account of it, which has been very influential, is due to Robin Hendry and is formulated in terms of downward causation. This paper explains Hendry’s account of the strong emergence of molecular structure and argues that it is coherent only if one assumes a diachronic reflexive notion of downward causation. However, in the context of this notion of downward causation, the strong emergence of molecular structure faces three challenges that have not been met and which have so far remained unnoticed. First, the putative empirical evidence presented for the strong emergence of molecular structure equally undermines supervenience, which is one of the main tenets of strong emergence. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the assumption of determinate nuclear positions is invoked for the support of strong emergence, as the role of this assumption in Hendry’s argument can be interpreted in more than one way. Lastly, there are understandings of causation which render the postulation of a downward causal relation between a molecule’s structure and its quantum mechanical entities, untenable.
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
11. Teleonomy as a problem of self-causation.
- Author
-
Gontier, Nathalie
- Subjects
HORIZONTAL gene transfer ,SPACETIME ,GENEALOGY - Abstract
A theoretical framework is provided to explore teleonomy as a problem of self-causation, distinct from upward, downward and reticulate causation. Causality theories in biology are often formulated within hierarchy theories, where causation is conceptualized as running up or down the rungs of a ladder-like hierarchy or, more recently, as moving between multiple hierarchies. Research on the genealogy of cosmologies demonstrates that in addition to hierarchy theories, causality theories also depend upon ideas of time. This paper explores the roots and impact of both time and hierarchy thinking on causal reasoning in the evolutionary sciences. Within evolutionary biology, the Neodarwinian synthesis adheres to a linear notion of time associated with linear hierarchies that portray upward causation. Eco-evo-devo schools recognize the importance of downward causation and consequently receive resistance from the standard view because downward causation is sometimes understood as backward causation, considered impossible by adherents of a linear time model. In contrast, downward causation works with a spatial or presential time notion. Hybridization, lateral gene transfer, infective heredity, symbiosis and symbiogenesis require recognition of reticulate causation occurring in both space and time, or spacetime, between distinct and interacting ontological hierarchies. Teleonomy is distinct from these types of causation because it invokes the problem of self-causation. By asking how the focal level in a hierarchy can persist through time, self-causation raises philosophical concerns on the nature of duration, identity and individuality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
12. Understanding as explaining: how motives can become causes.
- Author
-
Fuchs, Thomas
- Abstract
The distinction of „understanding" and „explaining", formulated by Karl Jaspers in his „General Psychopathology", has had a lasting effect on psychiatry. As a result, phenomenological, hermeneutic, or psychodynamic approaches have often been accorded only descriptive or epiphenomenal status, while the actual causes of mental illness have been sought in neurobiologically or genetically based explanations. In contrast, this paper defends the explanatory role of understanding and phenomenological approaches. To this end, two levels of explanation are distinguished and shown to be equally justified in principle, namely, motivational explanation at the macro-level and physical explanation at the micro-level. The actual causal role of motivational, i.e., understandable connections is then demonstrated by means of a conception of circular causality, which includes downward causality. Finally, the explanatory role of phenomenological analyses is also shown in psychotic disorders that refuse motivational understanding, using the example of schizophrenic delusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. Enactivism Meets Mechanism: Tensions & Congruities in Cognitive Science.
- Author
-
Lee, Jonny
- Subjects
COGNITIVE science ,COGNITION - Abstract
Enactivism advances an understanding of cognition rooted in the dynamic interaction between an embodied agent and their environment, whilst new mechanism suggests that cognition is explained by uncovering the organised components underlying cognitive capacities. On the face of it, the mechanistic model's emphasis on localisable and decomposable mechanisms, often neural in nature, runs contrary to the enactivist ethos. Despite appearances, this paper argues that mechanistic explanations of cognition, being neither narrow nor reductive, and compatible with plausible iterations of ideas like emergence and downward causation, are congruent with enactivism. Attention to enactivist ideas, moreover, may serve as a heuristic for mechanistic investigations of cognition. Nevertheless, I show how enactivism and approaches that prioritise mechanistic modelling may diverge in starting assumptions about the nature of cognitive phenomena, such as where the constitutive boundaries of cognition lie. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
14. Stuart Kauffman's metaphysics of the adjacent possible: a critique.
- Author
-
van der Merwe, Ragnar
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,TELEOLOGY ,REALISM ,BIOSPHERE - Abstract
Stuart Kauffman has, in recent writings, developed a thought-provoking and influential argument for strong emergence. The outcome is his Theory of the Adjacent Possible (TAP). According to TAP, the biosphere constitutes a non-physical domain qualitatively distinct from the physical domain. The biosphere exhibits strongly emergent properties such as agency, meaning, value and creativity that cannot, in principle, be reduced to the physical. In this paper, I argue that TAP includes various (explicit or implicit) metaphysical commitments: commitments to (1) scientific realism, (2) downward causation and teleology, and (3) modal realism. If TAP is to hang together as the kind of robust philosophical thesis it evidently aspires to be, it needs an account – an account that is currently absent – of its metaphysical commitments. It is, however, unclear how such an account can be developed since various dilemmas present themselves when one explores how subscribers to TAP might do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
15. The strong emergence of molecular structure.
- Author
-
Seifert, Vanessa A.
- Abstract
One of the most plausible and widely discussed examples of strong emergence is molecular structure. The only detailed account of it, which has been very influential, is due to Robin Hendry and is formulated in terms of downward causation. This paper explains Hendry’s account of the strong emergence of molecular structure and argues that it is coherent only if one assumes a diachronic reflexive notion of downward causation. However, in the context of this notion of downward causation, the strong emergence of molecular structure faces three challenges that have not been met and which have so far remained unnoticed. First, the putative empirical evidence presented for the strong emergence of molecular structure equally undermines supervenience, which is one of the main tenets of strong emergence. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the assumption of determinate nuclear positions is invoked for the support of strong emergence, as the role of this assumption in Hendry’s argument can be interpreted in more than one way. Lastly, there are understandings of causation which render the postulation of a downward causal relation between a molecule’s structure and its quantum mechanical entities, untenable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
16. Building low level causation out of high level causation
- Author
-
Lee, Samuel
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
17. Hierarchies, Networks, and Causality: The Applied Evolutionary Epistemological Approach.
- Author
-
Gontier, Nathalie
- Subjects
SPACETIME ,EVOLUTIONARY theories ,COMPLEXITY (Philosophy) ,NATURAL history ,MACROEVOLUTION - Abstract
Applied Evolutionary Epistemology is a scientific-philosophical theory that defines evolution as the set of phenomena whereby units evolve at levels of ontological hierarchies by mechanisms and processes. This theory also provides a methodology to study evolution, namely, studying evolution involves identifying the units that evolve, the levels at which they evolve, and the mechanisms and processes whereby they evolve. Identifying units and levels of evolution in turn requires the development of ontological hierarchy theories, and examining mechanisms and processes necessitates theorizing about causality. Together, hierarchy and causality theories explain how biorealities form and diversify with time. This paper analyzes how Applied EE redefines both hierarchy and causality theories in the light of the recent explosion of network approaches to causal reasoning associated with studies on reticulate and macroevolution. Causality theories have often been framed from within a rigid, ladder-like hierarchy theory where the rungs of the ladder represent the different levels, and the elements on the rungs represent the evolving units. Causality then is either defined reductionistically as an upward movement along the strands of a singular hierarchy, or holistically as a downward movement along that same hierarchy. Upward causation theories thereby analyze causal processes in time, i.e. over the course of natural history or phylogenetically, as Darwin and the founders of the Modern Synthesis intended. Downward causation theories analyze causal processes in space, ontogenetically or ecologically, as the current eco-evo-devo schools are evidencing. This work demonstrates how macroevolution and reticulate evolution theories add to the complexity by examining reticulate causal processes in space–time, and the interactional hierarchies that such studies bring forth introduce a new form of causation that is here called reticulate causation. Reticulate causation occurs between units and levels belonging to different as well as to the same ontological hierarchies. This article concludes that beyond recognizing the existence of multiple units, levels, and mechanisms or processes of evolution, also the existence of multiple kinds of evolutionary causation as well as the existence of multiple evolutionary hierarchies needs to be acknowledged. This furthermore implies that evolution is a pluralistic process divisible into different kinds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
18. Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.
- Author
-
Yates, David
- Subjects
CONSCIOUSNESS ,SYNCHRONIC order ,MATERIALISM ,DILEMMA - Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties inherit their causal powers from their realizers. While this principle holds for functional realization, it fails on a broader notion of realization that permits the realization of complex qualitative properties such as spatial and temporal patterns. Such properties are best seen as dependent powerful qualities, which have their causal roles in virtue of being the qualities they are, and do not inherit powers from their realizers. Recent studies have identified one such property—neural synchrony—as a correlate of consciousness. If synchrony is also partially constitutive of consciousness, then phenomenal properties are both multiply realizable and causally novel. I outline a version of representationalism about consciousness on which this constitution claim holds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
19. Organisation, Emergence and Cambridge Social Ontology.
- Author
-
Slade‐Caffarel, Yannick
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,ORGANIZATION ,SOCIAL constructionism ,SOCIAL accounting - Abstract
John Searle has mistakenly claimed that emergence is the central concept in the account of social ontology defended by Tony Lawson, the central figure in the project now regularly referred to as Cambridge Social Ontology. This is not the case. Rather, if any concept can be considered central for Lawson, it is organisation. In this paper, I explain how Searle could misunderstand Lawson and, in doing so, I bring out the importance of organisation for understanding how phenomena, both social and non‐social, are constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
20. Emergence versus neoclassical reductions in economics.
- Author
-
Chorafakis, George
- Subjects
NEOCLASSICAL school of economics ,ECONOMICS ,ECONOMIC research ,RIVERS - Abstract
Many epistemic anomalies of the neoclassical research programme originate from its ontologically reductionist meta-axioms, which predicate how economic macro-systems are constituted from their micro-entities and how the latter behave – namely atomistic aggregativity, normative equilibration and global instrumental rationality. This paper explores the metaphysical foundations of the premise of emergence and argues that it can be a remedy to the ills of neoclassical reductions, and a foundational epistemic principle in a progressive systemic research programme in economics, which would bridge existing streams of 'heterodox' economic theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
21. How Downwards Causation Occurs in Digital Computers
- Author
-
Ellis, George and Drossel, Barbara
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
22. Emergence: Core ideas and issues
- Author
-
Kim, Jaegwon
- Published
- 2006
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
23. Sixteen Years Later: Making Sense of Emergence (Again).
- Author
-
Sartenaer, Olivier
- Subjects
SUPERVENIENCE (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY ,PHILOSOPHY of mind ,REDUCTIONISM ,EMERGENCE (Philosophy) - Abstract
Sixteen years after Kim's seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the emergence concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim's work that does more justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic third way between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction of supervenience and (functional) irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon-theoretical, explanatory and causal emergence-is properly identified and defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists' agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
24. Popper’s Emergentism
- Author
-
Markič, Olga, Parusniková, Zuzana, editor, and Merritt, David, editor
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
25. A simple argument for downward causation.
- Author
-
Kroedel, Thomas
- Subjects
SUPERVENIENCE (Philosophy) ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,BEGINNING ,ARGUMENT - Abstract
Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested by Lei Zhong and is shown to be superior to the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Reduction, Emergence, and Downward Causation in International Relations Theory.
- Author
-
Leon, David
- Subjects
- *
INTERNATIONAL relations , *GOVERNMENT policy , *PHILOSOPHY of science , *REDUCTIONISM , *PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
This paper aims to reinvigorate systemic theory-building in International Relations. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of science and other fields on reduction, emergence, and causal efficacy, it seeks to establish (1) that individualist or reductionist theories are premised upon an naﶥ and restrictive empiricist conception of social science, (2) that structural theories with corporate actors and unobservables as referents are neither unscientific nor mysterious, and (3) that a reformulated anti-reductionist program committed to a realist ontology and a holist epistemology is necessary for capturing that which is irreducibly emergent in world politics. . A conceptual map organized along the axes of predictability and reducibility illustrates the dependence of methodological orientations in IR on different views of the ontological status of emergent properties. Specifically, it is argued that the international system is an emergent phenomenon which occupies its own complex level of organization and is, ipso facto, neither analytically exhausted by nor ontologically reducible to its constituents. Unlike the Waltzian conception of structure, however, the one on offer here is grounded in emergence and downward causation. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2005
27. Emergence and Reduction Emergence and Reduction.
- Author
-
Le Boutillier, Shaun
- Subjects
EMERGENCE (Philosophy) ,SPATIAL orientation ,REIFICATION ,SOCIAL theory - Abstract
The question of the ontological status of social wholes has been formative to the development of key positions and debates within modern social theory. Intrinsic to this is the contested meaning of the concept of emergence and the idea that the collective whole is in some way more than the sum of its parts. This claim, in its contemporary form, gives exaggerated importance to a simple truism of re-description that concerns all wholes. In this paper I argue that a better way to test the ontological status of wholes is to ask whether their causal properties can be reduced to the qualities of their parts. If reduction is possible the ontological status of emergent wholes is diminished. A close analysis of William Wimsatt's definition, conceptualisation, and characterisation of emergent phenomena provides an understanding of the relationship between wholes and their parts and suggests, also, that the properties of collective phenomena of a social kind reduce to the activities of people. Social wholes and their parts reside in the same mode (or level) of organisation. This paper concludes by employing Jaegwon Kim's method of 'functional reduction' to demonstrate how to reduce the qualities of wholes to those of their parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. Downward Causation in Self-Organizing Systems: Problem of Self-Causation
- Author
-
Bharate, Ganesh and Sarma, A. V. Ravishankar
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
29. Causation at different levels: tracking the commitments of mechanistic explanations.
- Author
-
Fazekas, Peter and Kertész, Gergely
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,MECHANISM (Philosophy) ,AUTONOMY (Philosophy) ,VOCABULARY ,METHODOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY & science ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
This paper tracks the commitments of mechanistic explanations focusing on the relation between activities at different levels. It is pointed out that the mechanistic approach is inherently committed to identifying causal connections at higher levels with causal connections at lower levels. For the mechanistic approach to succeed a mechanism as a whole must do the very same thing what its parts organised in a particular way do. The mechanistic approach must also utilise bridge principles connecting different causal terms of different theoretical vocabularies in order to make the identities of causal connections transparent. These general commitments get confronted with two claims made by certain proponents of the mechanistic approach: William Bechtel often argues that within the mechanistic framework it is possible to balance between reducing higher levels and maintaining their autonomy at the same time, whereas, in a recent paper, Craver and Bechtel argue that the mechanistic approach is able to make downward causation intelligible. The paper concludes that the mechanistic approach imbued with identity statements is no better candidate for anchoring higher levels to lower ones while maintaining their autonomy at the same time than standard reductive accounts are, and that what mechanistic explanations are able to do at best is showing that downward causation does not exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. EMERGENCIA Y CAUSALIDAD EN BIOLOGÍA NOVEDAD ONTOLÓGICA Y NUEVAS FORMAS CAUSALES EN EL ESTUDIO DE LA VIDA COMO REALIDAD EMERGENTE.
- Author
-
MARTÍNEZ BAIGORRI, JAVIER
- Abstract
Copyright of Carthaginensia is the property of Instituto Teologico de Murcia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
- Published
- 2017
31. Epistemología seleccionista y epistemología no adaptacionista: panorama de algunos problemas en epistemología evolucionista.
- Author
-
Cadavid Ramírez, Lina Marcela
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,NATURAL selection ,ORGANISM (Philosophy) - Abstract
Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
32. The Dynamics of Group Cognition.
- Author
-
Palermos, S.
- Subjects
COGNITION ,CHARACTERISTIC functions ,COGNITIVE science ,SOCIOLOGY ,NATURALISM - Abstract
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible, distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature) is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science and sociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon of distributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examined from the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for this novel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitive scientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can deliver two distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactions between group members necessitates the postulation of the corresponding group entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the way group entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcome is a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributed cognitive systems that avoids the reductionists' threat of epiphenomenalism, while being well in line with materialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
33. Complexity and Learning: Implications for Teacher Education
- Author
-
Olssen, Mark, Peters, Michael A., editor, Cowie, Bronwen, editor, and Menter, Ian, editor
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
34. Upward and Downward Causation from a Relational-Horizontal Ontological Perspective.
- Author
-
Santos, Gil
- Abstract
Downward causation (DC) exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents' properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse (1) the traditional hierarchical- vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as (2) the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic- combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called 'emergence base'. Assuming those two perspectives with no reserves, we are condemned to confine our debate to the question of whether reified wholes can have the power to downwardly change or influence their lower-level parts, a question which seems profoundly misleading to me. I therefore propose an alternative relational ontological view, assuming a straightforward horizontal and intra- level way of representing those putative cases of cross-level causation. I finally confront two recent replies to Kim's well-known objections to DC-Craver and Bechtel (Biol Philos 22:547-563, ) and Kistler (Philos Psychol 22(5):595-609, )-, emphasizing their global positive approaches, as well as the reasons why their accounts still seem insufficient to me. I conclude arguing that both Kim's principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and its allegation of an overdetermination in cases of DC can be surpassed by the new relational ontological perspective presented here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
35. A New Foundation for the Social Sciences? Searle’s Misreading of Durkheim.
- Author
-
Bjerre, Jørn
- Subjects
SOCIAL sciences ,SOCIOLOGISTS ,PHILOSOPHY of mind ,SOCIOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY of language ,SOCIAL reality - Abstract
The aim of John Searle’s philosophy of society is to provide a foundation for the social sciences. Arguing that the study of social reality needs to be based on a philosophy of language, Searle claims that sociology has little to offer since no sociologist ever took language seriously. Attacking Durkheim head-on, Searle not only claims that Durkheim’s project differs from his own but also that Durkheim’s sociology has serious shortcomings. Opposing Searle, this paper argues that Durkheim’s account of social reality is still viable and that Searle’s attack backfires on his own theoretical project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. The nature of explanation in synergetic linguistics.
- Author
-
Zámečník, Lukáš
- Subjects
SYNERGETICS ,LINGUISTICS research ,LOGICAL positivism ,LANGUAGE research - Abstract
This investigation focuses on the nature of explanation in synergetic linguistics. After recounting the basic principles of Haken s synergetics, a physicalist stance constitutes the basis of a critique of using the stringent synergetic principle of synergetic linguistics. Jaegwon Kim has convincingly demonstrated that the strict synergetic principle impairs quantitative linguistics with downward causation. The central part of this paper demonstrates that the synergetic principle is not an appropriate principle on which to construct a valid functional explanation of quantitative linguistics. The final section analyses the concept of law in quantitative linguistics. We examine a series of laws as models and economization principles and we outline a conception of laws as various categories of conservation principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. Experiencing your brain: neurofeedback as a new bridge between neuroscience and phenomenology.
- Author
-
Bagdasaryan, Juliana and Van Quyen, Michel Le
- Subjects
NEUROSCIENCES ,PHENOMENOLOGY ,COGNITIVE neuroscience ,BRAIN physiology ,NEUROPHYSIOLOGY - Abstract
Neurophenomenology is a scientific research program aimed to combine neuroscience with phenomenology in order to study human experience. Nevertheless, despite several explicit implementations, the integration of first-person data into the experimental protocols of cognitive neuroscience still faces a number of epistemological and methodological challenges. Notably, the difficulties to simultaneously acquire phenomenological and neuroscientific data have limited its implementation into research projects. In our paper, we propose that neurofeedback paradigms, in which subjects learn to self-regulate their own neural activity, may offer a pragmatic way to integrate first-person and thirdperson descriptions. Here, information from first and third-person perspectives is braided together in the iterative causal closed loop, creating experimental situations in which they reciprocally constrain each other. In real-time, the subject is not only actively involved in the process of data acquisition, but also assisted to directly influence the neural data through conscious experience. Thus, neurofeedback may help to gain a deeper phenomenologicalphysiological understanding of downward causations whereby conscious activities have direct causal effects on neuronal patterns. We discuss possible mechanisms that could mediate such effects and indicate a number of directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. Critical Realism and the Process Account of Emergence.
- Author
-
Pratten, Stephen
- Subjects
CRITICAL realism ,TAXPAYER advocates ,HUMAN rights workers ,INTERACTION model (Communication) ,SOCIAL interaction ,EMERGENCE (Philosophy) ,CONSTRAINTS (Linguistics) - Abstract
For advocates of critical realism emergence is a central theme. Critical realists typically ground their defence of the relative disciplinary autonomy of various sciences by arguing that emergent phenomena exist in a robust non-ontologically, non-causally reductionist sense. Despite the importance they attach to it critical realists have only recently begun to elaborate on emergence at length and systematically compare their own account with those developed by others. This paper clarifies what is distinctive about the critical realist account of emergence by comparing it with an alternative. Critical realism and interactivism are shown to independently converge on the same general process (or constraint) view of emergence and develop complementary accounts of particular emergents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. Emergence and Communication in Computational Sociology.
- Author
-
Salgado, Mauricio and Gilbert, Nigel
- Subjects
SOCIOLOGY ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY ,SOCIAL reality ,CONSENSUS (Social sciences) ,THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
Computational sociology models social phenomena using the concepts of emergence and downward causation. However, the theoretical status of these concepts is ambiguous; they suppose too much ontology and are invoked by two opposed sociological interpretations of social reality: the individualistic and the holistic. This paper aims to clarify those concepts and argue in favour of their heuristic value for social simulation. It does so by proposing a link between the concept of emergence and Luhmann's theory of communication. For Luhmann, society emerges from the bottom-up as communication and he describes the process by which society limits the possible selections of individuals as downward causation. It is argued that this theory is well positioned to overcome some epistemological drawbacks in computational sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
40. Response to “Emergence in Sociology”.
- Author
-
Sawyer, R. Keith
- Subjects
INDIVIDUALISM ,REDUCTIONISM ,EMERGENCE (Philosophy) ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) - Abstract
Jens Greve has accurately summarized nonreductive individualism (NRI) and has made an important contribution to an ongoing discussion concerning individualism, reductionism, and emergentism. Greve’s primary criticism is of my account of downward causation, and he cites Kim’s critique of Fodor by analogy. I argue that my original paper already addressed Kim’s critique, by drawing on other philosophers of mind that Greve does not engage with, to make an argument for downward causation based on wild disjunction. Further, I argue that Greve does not successfully make the case that the issue of the autonomy of the mental level is distinct from the autonomy of the social level. As empirical examples of irreducible emergent group properties, I cite studies of improvisational theater dialogues, and studies of social networks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. Emergent Causation.
- Author
-
Prosser, Simon
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY ,QUANTUM entanglement ,ATOMS ,LAW - Abstract
Downward causation is commonly held to create problems for ontologically emergent properties. In this paper I describe two novel examples of ontologically emergent properties and show how they avoid two main problems of downward causation, the causal exclusion problem and the causal closure problem. One example involves an object whose colour does not logically supervene on the colours of its atomic parts. The other example is inspired by quantum entanglement cases but avoids controversies regarding quantum mechanics. These examples show that the causal exclusion problem can be avoided, in one case by showing how it is possible to interact with an object without interacting with its atomic parts. I accept that emergence cannot be reconciled with causal closure, but argue that violations of causal closure do not entail violations of the base-level laws. Only the latter would conflict with empirical science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
42. Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation.
- Author
-
Campbell, Richard and Bickhard, Mark
- Abstract
The development of a defensible and fecund notion of emergence has been dogged by a number of threshold issues neatly highlighted in a recent paper by Jaegwon Kim. We argue that physicalist assumptions confuse and vitiate the whole project. In particular, his contention that emergence entails supervenience is contradicted by his own argument that the 'microstructure' of an object belongs to the whole object, not to its constituents. And his argument against the possibility of downward causation is question-begging and makes false assumptions about causal sufficiency. We argue, on the contrary, for a rejection of the deeply entrenched assumption, shared by physicalists and Cartesians alike, that what basically exists are things (entities, substances). Our best physics tells us that there are no basic particulars, only fields in process. We need an ontology which gives priority to organization, which is inherently relational. Reflection upon the fact that all biological creatures are far-from-equilibrium systems, whose very persistence depend upon their interactions with their environment, reveals incoherence in the notion of an 'emergence base'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
43. How does downward causation exist?-A comment on Kim's elimination of downward causation.
- Author
-
Xiaoping Chen
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,REDUCTIONISM ,FUNCTIONALISM (Social sciences) ,LOGICAL positivism ,DUALISM - Abstract
The importance of downward causation lies in showing that it shows that functional properties such as mental properties are real, although they cannot be reduced to physical properties. Kim rejects nonreductive physicalism, which includes leading functionalism, by eliminating downward causation, and thereby returns to reductionism. In this paper, I make a distinction between two aspects of function-functional meaning and functional structure and argue that functional meaning cannot be reduced to the physical level whereas functional structure can. On this basis, I further distinguish between the integer of the function, which includes the functional meaning and the functional structure, and the whole of the functional realization, and also among the strong, medial, and weak supervenience relations. So-called downward causation is indeed the relationship between the whole of the functional realization and its physical realizer, which is a whole-part relation instead of a relation between levels. As a result of understanding downward causation in this way and abandoning the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, Kim's argument becomes invalid and nonreductive functionalism, justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
44. Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia.
- Author
-
Vergauwen, Roger
- Subjects
QUALIA ,SCIENCE ,CONSCIOUSNESS ,PHILOSOPHY of mind ,MIND & body ,NEUROPHYSIOLOGY ,MONISM ,DYNAMICS - Abstract
Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called 'raw feels' or the feel of 'what it is like to be') has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is possible; for them, there remains an explanatory gap. In this paper, functionalist, physicalist, epiphenomenalist, and biological models of the mind are discussed and compared. Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism is proposed as a unifying framework for a non-reductive theory of qualia and consciousness. Downward Causation, Emergence through Symmetry-breaking, and Dynamical Systems Theory are used to show how consciousness and qualia emerge from their neural substrate and can also be causally efficacious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. Can ‘Downward Causation’ Save Free Will?
- Author
-
Capes, Justin A.
- Subjects
LIBERTY ,POLITICAL science ,PERSONS ,SOCIAL sciences - Abstract
Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with assumptions implicit in his broader ontology, commit him to the implausible conclusion that determinism is incompatible with the existence of human persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. Institutions and Individuals: Interaction and Evolution.
- Author
-
Hodgson, Geoffrey M.
- Subjects
ASSOCIATIONS, institutions, etc. ,ORGANIZATIONAL structure ,SOCIAL theory ,INSTITUTIONAL economics ,EVOLUTIONARY economics ,ORGANIZATIONAL research ,SOCIAL science research - Abstract
The conceptualization of the relation between individual and structure is central to social science. After making some key definitions, this paper overviews some recent developments in the social theory of structure and agency, and makes a novel addition, based on a concept of habit derived from pragmatism and Veblenian institutional economics. Processes of habituation provide a mechanism of ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ where institutional circumstances may affect individual preferences. Finally, special characteristics of organizations are discussed, endorsing an evolutionary analytical approach that combines insights from both evolutionary economics and organization science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2007
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation.
- Author
-
Laar, Tjeerd
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY of mind ,COGNITIVE science ,METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Dynamical systems theory (DST) is gaining popularity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Recently several authors (e.g. J.A.S. Kelso, 1995; A. Juarrero, 1999; F. Varela and E. Thompson, 2001) offered a DST approach to mental causation as an alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). They claim that some dynamical systems exhibit a form of global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the DST model of mental causation. In this paper I evaluate the DST approach to mental causation. I will argue that the main problem for current DST approaches to mental causation is that they lack a clear metaphysics. I propose one metaphysical framework (Gillett, 2002a/b/c) that might deal with this deficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2006
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
48. How Causal is Downward Causation?
- Author
-
Hulswit, Menno
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY & science ,DOWNWARD mobility (Social sciences) ,SELF-organizing systems ,SELF-management (Psychology) ,COLLECTIVE behavior - Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization. In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2005
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Causal emergentism.
- Author
-
Markič, Olga
- Abstract
In this paper I describe basic features of traditional (British) emergentism and Popper’s emergentist theory of consciousness and compare them to the contemporary versions of emergentism present in connectionist approach in cognitive sciences. I argue that despite their similarities, the traditional form, as well as Popper’s theory belong to strong causal emergentism and yield radically different ontological consequences compared to the weaker, contemporary version present in cognitive science. Strong causal emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical domain and introduces genuine new mental causal powers and genuine downward causation, while weak emergentism provides new insights in understanding the mechanisms and explanation that is compatible with physicalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2004
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. Emergence in Chemistry: Chemistry as the Embodiment of Emergence
- Author
-
Luisi, Pier Luigi
- Published
- 2002
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
Discovery Service for Jio Institute Digital Library
For full access to our library's resources, please sign in.