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In this paper we empirically study the relation between public debt and economic growth. We analyze how the public debt to GDP ratio at a certain point in time is cor- related with the GDP growth rate in the following period, where we consider a one-year time span, a three-year time interval and a five-years interval. Using panel data comprising seven developed countries from 1970-2012, we estimate a pooled regression model and a random effects model. We find some evidence for a significantly negative relation between debt and growth. Further, for most specifications this relationship does not seem to be characterized by non-linearities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a three-region framework to examine the effects of European currency unification on EMU and US inflation rates. It considers ways in which increased participation in the EMU might influence inflation choices in Europe and the United States. It also considers how alternative monetary policies and parameter values might influence the extent of participation in the EMU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) and United States (US) are the world’s two largest and most influential legal jurisdictions for corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The pressures of international economic competition have lead to a flurry of M & A activity in these locales in the post-Cold War period. Given the economic impact and, in many cases, political sensitivity of some M&As, it has become critical that transatlantic regulators reach similar decisions with regard to M&A approval, denial, or modification. Incongruent decisions lead to uncertainty in the marketplace, and the possible loss of global economic competitiveness and respect for regulatory processes and outcomes. In this paper, we explore the efforts made by the US and EU over the past two decades to enhance cooperation in merger policies and processes. We argue that, despite a couple of high-profile cases to the contrary, the US and EU have made great strides in reducing uncertainty in the M&A regulatory process by institutionalizing a series of formal agreements and working groups that have served to provide the foundation for a transatlantic merger environment that may serve as a model for cross-border regulatory cooperation in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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EU and US governments experience significant friction in formulating appropriate responses to the challenge of offshoring. The very first policy reactions have been viewed as ill-conceived by their rudimentary empirical foundations. Several studies on the US offshoring regulatory framework have been carried out recently. However, a comprehensive representation of the offshoring regulatory framework at European Union level seems to be lacking. Furthermore, no comparative studies have been conducted between EU and US regulatory frameworks. Given the importance of the legal dimension of offshoring, the research question of this paper is: are there divergences and/or analogies between EU and US offshoring regulatory frameworks? To answer this question, this paper dissects the economic background of the phenomenon, analyses the present EU and US offshoring regulatory frameworks, explores analogies and divergences among them and offers a synopsis of future regulatory trajectories. This paper presents an analysis that suggests EU and US regulatory approaches exhibit clear divergences regarding their scope as well as their content, mainly resulting from the almost dichotomic underlying economic perspectives. These perspectives are in turn chiefly determined by the overall reflection created by perception and media coverage. As to future regulatory trajectories, the EU will continue to strive for de-regularization of economic activity and neutralization of socio-economic collateral damage. In the case of the US, dominant factors are the public opinion and the political composition of the US Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at macroeconomic policy-making in the U.S. and the European Union (EU), using the 2008 global financial meltdown as an "experiment" in how governing institutions in the two settings address a crisis. The author notes that in both the U.S. and EU, the governing ideology for several decades has called for macroeconomic policy decisions, particularly in the area of monetary policy, to be independent of political or equity considerations. He outlines how this view was institutionalized in the U.S. and the EU. Reviewing the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, he states that the central banks and other government institutions acted differently in the two settings but that the result in terms of economic stabilization was approximately the same.

Many studies suggest that strict balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Why might public officials adhere to a rule that is practically never enforced in court? Existing literature points to a legal deterrence logic in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules in the first place. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, determines its effectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument, and we assess this model using data on U.S. states. We then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the Fiscal Compact Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the consequences of the political 'incompleteness' of the monetary union for the democratic accountability of its external monetary policy, comparing the euro area to the United States. In most countries, exchange-rate policymaking is substantially delegated to the finance ministry and central bank; oversight by other domestic actors is relatively weak. While this is true of the United States, the role of the Congress provides the possibility for 'democratic override' when policy diverges substantially from the preferences of a broad set of private sector interests. Europe's monetary union, by contrast, lacks such a mechanism; no institution can provide an effective check on the policies pursued by the core actors, the ECB and Eurogroup. A comparison of the postures of the United States and euro area toward Chinese exchange rate policy suggests that these institutional differences affect policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether the degree of interdependence between the US and the euro area has changed with EMU by analysing the effects of monetary policy and macroeconomic news on daily interest rates in the two economies. The article finds a strongly increased interdependence of money markets around EMU. Spillover effects from the US to the euro area remain stronger than in the opposite direction, but US markets have started reacting to euro area developments. In recent years certain US macroeconomic news affect euro area money markets and have become good leading indicators for the euro area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]