Search

Abstract: When our eyes track objects that are moving in a richly structured environment, the retinal image of the stationary visual scene inevitably moves over the retina in a direction opposite to the eye movement. Such self-motion-induced global retinal slip usually provides an ideal stimulus for the optokinetic reflex. This reflex operates to compensate for global image flow. However, during smooth pursuit eye movements it must be shut down so that the reflex does not counteract the voluntary pursuit of moving targets. Here, we asked if retinal information is sufficient for this cancellation of the optokinetic reflex during smooth pursuit eye movements. In a series of experiments, we show that neither the eye movement-induced retinal image motion per se nor the relative motion between the pursuit target and the background are sufficient for suppression of optokinesis. We, therefore, conclude that extra-retinal information about smooth pursuit eye movements is required for the cancellation of the optokinetic reflex. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: When interacting with the world, we need to distinguish whether sensory information results from external events or from our own actions. The nervous system most likely draws this distinction by comparing the actual sensory input with an internal prediction about the sensory consequences of one’s actions. However, interacting with the world also requires an evaluation of the outcomes of self-action, e.g. in terms of their affective valence. Here we show that subjects’ perceived pointing direction does not only depend on predictive and sensory signals related to the performed action itself, but also on the affective valence of the action outcome: subjects perceived their movements as directed towards positive and away from negative outcomes. Our findings suggest that the non-conceptual perception of the sensory consequences of self-action builds on both sensorimotor information related directly to self-action and a post hoc evaluation of the affective action outcome. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Recent work has demonstrated that the sense of agency is not only determined by efference-copy-based internal predictions and internal comparator mechanisms, but by a large variety of different internal and external cues. The study by Moore and colleagues [Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Conscious and Cognition] aimed to provide further evidence for this view by demonstrating that external agency cues might outweigh or even substitute efferent signals to install a basic registration of self-agency. Although the study contains some critical points that, so we argue, are central to a proper interpretation of the data, it hints at a new perspective on agency: optimal cue integration seems to be the key to a robust sense of agency. We here argue that this framework could allow integrating the findings of Moore and colleagues and other recent agency studies into a comprehensive picture of the sense of agency and its pathological disruptions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The experience of being the initiator of one's own actions seems to be infallible at first glance. Misattributions of agency of one's actions in certain neurological or psychiatric patients reveal, however, that the central mechanisms underlying this experience can go astray. In particular, delusions of influence in schizophrenia might result from deficits in an inferential mechanism that allows distinguishing whether or not a sensory event has been self-produced. This distinction is made by comparing the actual sensory information with the consequences of one's action as predicted on the basis of internal action-related signals such as efference copies. If this internal prediction matches the actual sensory event, an action is registered as self-caused; in case of a mismatch, the difference is interpreted as externally produced. We tested the hypothesis that delusions of influence are based on deficits in this comparator mechanism. In particular, we tested whether patients’ impairments in action attribution tasks are caused by imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of self-action. Schizophrenia patients and matched controls performed pointing movements in a virtual-reality setup in which the visual consequences of movements could be rotated with respect to the actual movement. Experiment 1 revealed higher thresholds for detecting experimental feedback rotations in the patient group. The size of these thresholds correlated positively with patients’ delusions of influence. Experiment 2 required subjects to estimate their direction of pointing visually in the presence of constantly rotated visual feedback. When compared to controls, patients’ estimates were significantly better adapted to the feedback rotation and exhibited an increased variability. In interleaved trials without visual feedback, i.e. when pointing estimates relied solely on internal action-related signals, this variability was likewise increased and correlated with both delusions of influence and the size of patients’ detection thresholds as assessed in the first experiment. These findings support the notion that delusions of influence are based on imprecise internal predictions about the sensory consequences of one's actions. Moreover, we suggest that such imprecise predictions prompt patients to rely more strongly on (and thus adapt to) external agency cues, in this case vision. Such context-dependent weighted integration of imprecise internal predictions and alternative agency cues might thus reflect the common basis for the various misattributions of agency in schizophrenia patients. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]