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Climate change and transition risks have become major issues concerning the sustainable development of human society today. And the stranded fossil energy assets generated in this context are gradually becoming an important factor affecting corporate development and the stability of financial markets. Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies in the high-carbon industry from 1998 to 2021, a two-way fixed-effects model is used to study the determinants of corporate fossil energy asset impairment. Furthermore, a "two-stage estimation approach" is used to measure the risk of stranding corporate fossil energy assets The results show that: (1) climate transition risks are a significant cause of stranded corporate fossil energy assets; (2) the stranded risk of Chinese companies' fossil energy assets has been oscillating upward over the past two decades; (3) the stranded risk has increased significantly after the "double carbon" target. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from both government and enterprise perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions has found that the effects of aid vary across different donor characteristics and delivery mechanisms. This article focuses on China's resource-related development projects, which have been considered controversial due to the relative lack of conditionality. By distinguishing between vertical and horizontal dimensions of political accountability, the study finds that China's resource-related projects are particularly detrimental to the accountability of recipient countries' horizontal (legislative and judicial) institutions. These projects are often delivered to resource-rich countries, in the form of packaging access to resources and infrastructure construction, to improve China's own energy access. Local officials may be tempted to weaken horizontal institutions so that the projects can be implemented quickly. Nevertheless, these projects have little effect on vertical accountability, as China has less intention and capacity to fundamentally restrain electoral competition in recipient countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]