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The European Social Charter has recently received increased attention due to the evolution of its monitoring mechanism and the need to address a multitude of contemporary challenges to socio-economic rights. Although the treaty’s preamble has played a crucial role in the interpretation of substantive provisions and in shaping state obligations, little attention has been paid to the way in which the preamble has defined the fundamental lines of the ‘jurisprudence’ of the Charter’s monitoring body. The European Committee of Social Rights has deduced from the Charter’s preamble several important general principles for the protection of socio-economic rights, on which it grounds its interpretation. This article analyses these principles and evaluates their effects in the relevant practice. The findings suggest that the Charter’s preamble serves different purposes and performs multiple functions in international law, thus challenging the common assumption that human rights treaty preambles are empty phrases of a merely ceremonial nature.

The Human Right to Dominate. By Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 216 pp. $24.95 paper.On Sunday, 18 October 2015, at the opening session of a conference entitled "From Hatred of the Stranger to Acceptance of the Other," President Rivlin publicly declared that it is time to admit that Israel is a sick society that needs treatment. The Human Right To Dominate helps us understand the trajectory of how Israeli society has become such a sick society today. It does this eloquently by taking us through an elaborate journey on the formation of the Zionist project and how it has sought to build order through a fabricated sense of security based on war and the control of people and landscapes. In their book, Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, uncover the very nature of the Zionist project vis-a^-vis the Palestinians and its core mechanisms of domination and subjugation. In their Introduction the authors define domination as "a broad array of relationships of subjugation characterized by the use of force and coercion." Their focus throughout this book is on a twofold dimension of this domination: "... in violent practices deployed against individuals and groups in order to dominate them"; ...as well as on "how by enacting different relationships of domination these practices are rationalized, legitimized, and made sense of by appealing to human rights" (3). Their Foucauldian inspired reflections shed light on how Israel's notion of security as a disciplinary mechanism functions as orders of social control and how war is used as a matrix for techniques of domination. In a similar fashion to Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian's 2015 book on Israel's security theology as a settler-colonial ideology, Perugini and Gordon critically investigate how Israel's security discursive practices connect to state power and ideology. They go deeper in revealing how this power permeates at so many levels of Israel's occupation of the Palestinians.This book is structured into four main chapters on The Paradox of Human Rights (HR), The Threat of Human Rights, The Human Right to Kill and The Human Right to Colonize. The first of these, "The Paradox of HR," uncovers the linkage between the establishment of the international HR regime and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Israel as reparation was espoused by President Truman as "a state where Jewish human dignity could be 'fully restored'" (33). The chapter then details how the Eichmann trial further signifies the contradictions in the evolution of the HR regime. "Israel violated international law to bring to trial a criminal of international law." Drawing upon Arendt's reflections the authors further claim how "the Nazi genocide that triggered the development of the universal vocabulary of HR was investigated in Jerusalem in a local court, where this ostensible universal discourse was translated into an ethnonational one" (34-35). They then show how from the first to the second Intifada and the subsequent military campaigns against Gaza, the HR regime has been serving to normalize the colonial relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. …

American Immunity: War Crimes and the Limits of International Law. By Patrick Hagopian. Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013. 244 pp. $27.95 paper.Patrick Hagopian, a Senior Lecturer in history and American studies at Lancaster University, has turned his prodigious talents to an enduring feature of American exceptionalism. American lawmakers after World War II piously demanded that the rest of the world follow universal human rights norms. Yet they carefully exempted American servicemen from these same standards by preventing veterans from prosecution for war crimes committed during their deployment overseas. This created a "jurisdictional gap" that the United States protected for decades, closing it only in the last years of the twentieth century to avoid the growing reach of universal jurisdiction exercised by foreign courts (e.g., p. 2). Hagopian finds this perplexing.But if you believe, as I do, that law is the handmaiden of ideology-that it serves and legitimizes prevailing belief systems within society-then there is nothing perplexing about the behavior Hagopian has worked so hard to explain.American Immunity: War Crimes and the Limits of International Law is an engaging account of the varied legal arguments by which the United States developed and maintained this double-standard. The net, however, is simply this: In its foreign face, the United States has long insisted on one rule for itself and another for everyone else, and justified the difference by making particular arguments about the law. This of course is a time-honored feature of the interaction between law and ideology in the United States-law blesses what ideology wants-and there is nothing unusual about the behavior Hagopian describes. On the contrary, it is merely another illustration of a drearily familiar principle: power implies the license to make and justify the rules.The most prominent example of this behavior in American history is the creedal attachment to equality set alongside the ideological attachment to white supremacy, which in turn produced elaborate legal justifications, from the slave codes to Jim Crow. Again, law blesses what ideology wants. Given the endurance of this behavior, the oddity is not that it recurs, but that people perennially expect it to be otherwise and express shock when they encounter it anew. Yet their reaction-a mix of astonishment and disappointment-is testament to the capacity of ideology to conceal its incoherence. And in fact, "conceal" is the wrong verb, as the incoherence is invariably hidden in plain sight. One thinks of Orwell's observations in "Notes on Nationalism," which appeared 70 years ago:All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will defend selfdetermination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsistency. …

Considerable speculation has surrounded the impact of the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions on human rights upon the Conservative Government’s proposals for repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998. This Policy Paper seeks to demystify this aspect of the debate over the future of the Human Rights Act, examining the terms of the Good Friday Agreement as an international treaty and peace agreement and explaining its interrelationship with both the Human Rights Act and the Devolution Acts. Once some of the hyperbole that surrounds the Agreement and its attendant domestic legislation is removed, it can be seen that the impact of the Agreement is in some regards more extensive than has to date been recognised, whilst in other respects the Agreement has less impact than some of the supporters of the Human Rights Act claim. Reform of arrangements so fundamental to governance in the UK should not be taken lightly, but at present the offhand treatment of the place of the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Northern Ireland settlement generates just such a danger.

On 15 December 2016 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights adopted the judgment in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy. The case was referred to the Grand Chamber by Italy following the judgment released by the Second Section of the Court on 1 September 2015. The case concerns the detention and the ensuing repatriation to Tunisia of three irregular immigrants who arrived in Italy in 2011 during the “Arab Spring”. The judgment of the Grand Chamber confirms the Chamber’s judgment in relation to some important aspects, finding a violation of Article 5, paragraphs (1)(2) and (4), and of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, and recognising no violation of Article 3 as to the conditions in which the applicants were held on the ships Vincent and Audace in the harbour of Palermo. On the contrary, the Grand Chamber distances itself from the Chamber’s assessment concerning the respect of Article 3 in relation to the conditions in which the applicants were held in the Centro di soccorso e prima accoglienza (Centre for Rescue and Initial Reception) on Lampedusa, of Article 4 Protocol No. 4 and of Article 13 ECHR taken together with Article 4 Protocol No. 4 ECHR, as the majority in the Chamber found the violation of these articles. This note analyses the differences between the two judgments, emphasising possible implications for the protection of the rights of migrants in Europe. In this context, the European Union “hotspot approach” and the Italian “Decreto Minniti” are also considered.

POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE STATE OF THE FIELD By Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor, and Yonatan Lupu* The discipline of political science has developed an active research program on the devel- opment, operation, spread, and impact of international legal norms, agreements, and institu- tions. Meanwhile, a growing number of public international lawyers have developed an interest in political science research and methods. 1 For more than two decades, scholars have been call- ing for international lawyers and political scientists to collaborate, and have suggested possible * Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and David G. Victor are Co-directors of the Laboratory on International Law and Regulation and Professors at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. Yonatan Lupu is a lawyer and a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at UCSD. We thank participants in the “mapping the field” project at the laboratory for detailed research on what political science has learned in various issue areas—including Karl Kruse, Mihaela Papa, Michael Plouffe, and Hallie Stohler. For com- ments on earlier drafts, we thank participants at the UCLA Law School faculty seminar and participants at a review meeting on December 10, 2010, at UCSD—including Kenneth Abbott, Tim Bu¨the, Peter Cowhey, Peter Goure- vitch, Stephan Haggard, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, Daniel Klerman, Barbara Koremenos, David Lake, Kat- erina Linos, Edward Mansfield, Lisa Martin, Helen Milner, Jon Pevehouse, Eric Posner, Tonya Putnam, Duncan Snidal, Alan Sykes, and Michael Tomz. Thanks also to Nicole Deitelhoff, Martha Finnemore, and Ann Towns for comments on our second draft, to Linda Wong for editorial assistance, and to Greg Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg for sharing an early draft of their related article, which appears in this same issue of the Journal. Some of these legal works that draw, in part, on political science methods and concepts look across many sub- stantive areas of law and focus on topics such as the role of law in managing economic relations, the effectiveness of law, legitimacy, and game-theoretic perspectives. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Anal- ysis of International Law, 24 Y ALE J. I NT ’ L L. 1, 3 (1999); J ACK L. G OLDSMITH & E RIC A. P OSNER , T HE L IMITS OF I NTERNATIONAL L AW (2005); Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 S TAN . L. R EV . 959 (2000) (book review); Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 V A . J. I NT ’ L L. 545 (2004); Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of Inter- national Law: An Intermediate View, in T HE R ELEVANCE OF I NTERNATIONAL L AW : E SSAYS IN H ONOR OF L EO G ROSS 133 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1968); J UTTA B RUNN E ´ E & S TEPHEN J. T OOPE , L EGIT - IMACY AND L EGALITY IN I NTERNATIONAL L AW : A N I NTERACTIONAL A CCOUNT (2010); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 H ARV . I NT ’ L L.J. 139 (1996); Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium and International Law, 96 C ORNELL L. R EV . 869 (2011). Some legal studies, drawing on political science methods and concepts, examine the functioning of legal machinery. See, e.g., John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 V A . L. R EV . 1 (1997). A large and growing body of legal literature, drawing from political science, focuses on particular issue areas, most notably human rights. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Y ALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 C OLUM . L. R EV . 1832 (2002). In addition, a large literature addresses the environment. See, e.g., Jutta Brunne´e & Stephen J. Toope, The Chang- ing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter?, 43 H ARV . I NT ’ L L.J. 105 (2002); Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AJIL 384 (1996); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Y ALE L.J. 677 (1999). Trade law is one among various other areas drawing on political science scholarship. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 D UKE L.J. This article is reproduced with permission from the January 2012 issue of the American Journal of International Law © 2012 American Society of International Law. All rights reserved

Path dependence and critical junctures refer to decisive choices and events that prompt future trajectories, which are difficult to reverse because the progression of the political or institutional consequence involves entrenched behavior, anteceding determinations, and an elevated cost of altering course. This article contends that human rights abuses that followed from the Bush Administration’s interrogation policies were the product of a path dependent process. Namely, evidence from investigations indicates that the Bush Administration chose policies, based on a primal risk-averse assumption of dire harm from terror threats, and issued an effective “call for papers” to legal advisors to have them produce opinions to make no law applicable that would restrict detention and interrogation policies. The same inner-circle of four legal advisors issued critical memoranda and the White House classified the documents under national security so that other lawyers could not critique them prior to government actions being taken. Ultimately, if one discards the premises, signified by the reality that the first terrorist attack since 9/11 occurred at the 2013 Boston Marathon, that there has been virtually no other substantial evidence of plots near perpetration or of “sleeper cells,” and that wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were unrelated to imminent and direct threats inside American borders, the initial overzealous perception of jeopardy ostensibly produced government orders that deprived human rights, undermined U.S. integrity, abused numerous innocent people in foreign countries, and violated international and domestic law. Moreover, the legal memoranda should not be perceived as an intervening variable to dilute responsibility or the chain of causation between the premise of threats and government directives that arguably cashiered international law violations, crimes, or torts.

There is broad recognition, across the political spectrum and in both 'northern' and 'southern' countries, that justice reform, and more generally the promotion of the 'rule of law', are central to development policy, particularly in conflict-affected, fragile and violent contexts. More recently an increased focus on global security and the interaction between security and development as put a renewed emphasis on such efforts. However, while legal, regulatory and 'justice' institutions are now seen as key part of the 'solution' to problems of conflict, fragility and development, this recognition is not matched by a correspondingly clear sense of what should be done, how it should be done, by whom, in what order, or how 'success' may be determined. There often tends to be a clear misunderstanding of both the nature of the problem and (thus) of the solution. In this paper, the author seek to provide some insight into these questions and sketch out a practical conception of effective justice reform in situations of conflict and fragility that may provide the basis for effective programming.

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For the poor, finance is always about much more than economics. In practical as well as philosophical terms it is a matter of basic human rights. As the dust begins to settle on the global financial crisis it is certain that all economies will suffer, but it is in the poorest, least developed states that we will likely see the most dramatic effects, simply because they have less to lose. On top of the sharp price increases in staple foods and fuel earlier this year, least developed nations are especially vulnerable to reductions in foreign direct investment in their economies, in export trade, in the levels of remittances, and in the quantities of economic aid they receive. Thoughts are now starting to move beyond the immediate concern of how to staunch the haemorrhaging global capital markets, to questions of how to repair the system for the long-term. In these discussions, considerations of how best to serve the poor must be front and centre. This essay outlines the key legal, moral, political and economic arguments why this must be so and offers some pointers as to how it might be achieved.

This article looks at the human side of protecting foreign investment in the sense that it zooms onto the role stereotypes play in the development of the relation between human rights and investment law. I demonstrate that international human rights law not only protects from discrimination based on stereotypes but also creates and reiterates stereotypes. These stereotypes may entrench differences between communities but also bear potential for new convergences. I argue that we need to focus on the humans producing the transnational legal discourse and the process of normalisation of those humans in order to destabilise stereotypes that hinder possible convergences of human rights and investment community. In short, this paper explores in what way international law's stereotypes encourage convergence or divergence in transnational legal discourse on the intersection between human rights and investment law.

The object of this book is to provide teachers and students not only with a textbook dealing with the principal topics in the field of human rights, but also with teaching suggestions, syllabuses, bibliographies, and case studies.

The United Nations (“UN”) has been the strongest supporter of Human Rights since its invention. The term “human rights” appeared seven times in the UN’s founding Charter. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) reaffirmed that human rights obligations have become an inseparable part of international law. Since that time, the UN has “diligently” worked on promoting and protecting human rights through legal instruments and on ground activities. However, the UN engages in human rights breaches when it conducts on-ground activities through peacekeeping missions. The question in this paper is: who holds the UN accountable for its human rights breaches? This short paper aims to emphasize the importance of the question and provide a preliminary discussion of the factual matrix necessary to answer the question.