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This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of (1) the relationship between regret and episodic memory, (2) the temporal structure of ‘regretful memory’, (3) the affective and evaluative dimension of regretful memory and (4) the counterfactual dimension of regretful memory. Based on Husserl’s phenomenology, I offer an analysis of regret’s complex structures of intentionality and time-consciousness. Husserl held that episodic memory requires two temporal orientations on one’s own experience: the past now that one relives and the present now in which one does the reliving. If memory generally entails two temporal perspectives, regretful memory brings in a third point of temporal reference: that now that could have been. Drawing on Hoerl and McCormack, I give an account of regret as a mnemic and counterfactual form of intentional consciousness that confronts an alternative past and attempts to negotiate between two essential yet conflicting features of its actual past: its contingency and its irreversibility. On this basis, I then draw on Bagnoli to offer a phenomenological theory of regretful memory as an emotional mode of valuing possibilities that belong to the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will describe how Brentano was able to integrate descriptive philosophy and logical analysis fruitfully by pointing out Brentano's concept of philosophy as a rigorous science. First I will clarify how Brentano attempted to turn philosophy into a rigorous descriptive science by applying scientific methods to philosophical questions. After spelling out the implications of such a descriptive understanding of philosophy, I will contrast this descriptive view of philosophy with a semantic-analytic understanding of philosophy as proposed by Frege. After having thus set the stage I will argue that (1) the current separation of philosophy into the seemingly antithetical strands of (continental) phenomenology and analytic philosophy may be seen as a consequence of how the term 'rigorous science' in 'philosophy as a rigorous science' is interpreted: Does a rigorous science grasp its object with as much exactitude as possible? Or is a science rigorous when its theories are expressed unambiguously, and their implications are drawn with precision? In the course of this investigation I will also point out (2) how Brentano's integrative use of descriptive philosophy (a precursor to phenomenology) and analysis can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to present Derrida's reading of Husserl's phenomenology in his text Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology. Its structural stages, its due themes and conclusions will be presented. The aim of this paper is to understand the problem that Derrida points out in the passage from structure to genesis in the Husserlian phenomenological method, and to observe the arguments that conclude the bad achievement of the phenomenological method. The aim is to detail this interpretation by basing it on Husserl's texts and Derrida's considerations on them. In the same way, this work is intended to serve as a basis for introductory studies to phenomenology and deconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the close similarities between Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's concept of the person as an absolute value that exercises itself in position-takings. Ethics, for the classical phenomenologists, Husserl, Scheler, and Stein, concerns the whole person, including the affective and rational dimensions, intellect and the heart, as well as volition. Persons are distinctive for their free agency, capacity to recognize norms, and ability to interact responsibly with other personal agents in the context of the communal and historical life-world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes Zahavi's view to task that every conscious experience involves a "minimal sense of self." Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls "for-meness" or "mineness." Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi's account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be committed to the view that we necessarily have a sense of ownership. However, Husserl only claims that I am self-conscious but not that I am a self that owns its consciousness. Zahavi thus misses the novelty of Husserl's position, namely that I do not need to have a sense of abiding ownership, to have experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the influence that Husserl’s drive/instinct theory has on Merleau‑Ponty’s late philosophy. Husserl’s interest in the passive realm of life develops into a study of a more profound level which even precedes the emergence of subjectivity. We analyze how it leads Merleau‑Ponty, in his philos‑ ophy of flesh, to furnish an ontological explanation regarding the problem of the relationship with others. In this regard, we investigate firstly Husserl’s theory of originary affection and its limits, before scrutinizing the notion of empathy; thereby we show how Merleau‑Ponty develops the Husserlian inten‑ tional relation into a carnal relation based on the idea that others and I belong to the same world. This will reveal that the relationship with the others always lies in the most profound level of our experience, because we share the onto‑ logical affinity, namely, the flesh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), described by Edith Stein, and phenomenon of sympathy (Mitgefühl), analysed by Max Scheler, offer complementary insights into the essence of intersubjective link and into the conditions of possibility for experiencing the Other (Fremderfahrung). Stein's and Scheler's phenomenological analyses took place in the context of Husserlian researches on intersubjectivity problems, following a critical attitude towards modern theories of sympathy and towards Lipps' psychology of empathy as well. However, Scheler's and Stein's standpoints got also together on the basis of a philosophical affinity and a critical shared position with regard to Husserl's transcendental constitution of phenomenology. According to Stein to empathize involves a particular kind of apperception that actualizes the original contents of living experiences of the alien body in a non-original way, whereas for Scheler to sympathize refers to the manner of feeling with others some shared emotions, in an original way, thanks to inner perception of the living life of the neighbour, as another condition of possibility for the Fremderfahrung. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is widespread agreement among philosophers that we refer to, think or talk about non-existent objects in much the same way as we refer to, think or talk about other objects. This paper explores the case of objects of fiction in the perspective of Husserlian philosophical phenomenology. In this perspective, everything objective is dealt with as object of some consciousness and as presenting itself in subjective modes. Within the scope of this paper, the focus of the descriptive analysis will be on showing in some detail how conscious experiences of intentionally referring to something fictive in pre-linguistic intuitive acts of imagining something are to be articulated with regard to the object of consciousness, i.e. noematically, and with regard to the intentional act, i.e. noetically. Special attention will be given to the reflective finding of some consciousness being intentionally implied and thereby modified in the very performance of an intentional act of representifying (vergegenwärtigen) something in fiction and to the question of identity and individuation of objects in fiction. It will be argued that modifications occurring in representificational consciousness, which Husserl called ‘as-if’ or ‘quasi’ modifications, provide the key for understanding the phenomenology of fictional intentionality and reference. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl's position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I show how the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions and method converge on their treatment of the historical subject. Thinkers from both traditions converge on the following thesis: that subjectivity is shaped by a historical worldview. Each tradition provides independent grounds and methodological approaches which provide accounts of how these worldviews are shaped, and thus how essentially historical subjective experience is molded. In the second part of this paper I argue that both traditions, although offering helpful ways of understanding the way history shapes subjectivity, go too far in their epistemic claims for the superiority of subjective over positivist or academic history. They propose that the historicity of subjective experience is unexpressed and therefore inexpressible in positivist or academic history. I propose that although the phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to historical subjectivity is both fruitful and valuable for understanding both history and human nature, it cannot and ought not replace academic or what I will call 'critical' history. By showing the importance of historicity, and the force of historical consciousness on our actions, philosophers of history in these traditions expose the epistemic and perhaps even ethical requirement to engage in a rigorous critical history, one which recognizes the importance of historical consciousness. Such critical history is necessary to move beyond the subjective horizon of history as experienced to understand how events shaped this historical horizon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore the issue of how our personal life is given to us in experience as a whole to be actively shaped and determined. I examine in detail Husserl's analysis of the kind of experience responsible for this achievement, which he terms Überschau and which thus far has never been addressed by scholars of phenomenology. First, I locate Überschau in the context of self-determination and highlight the difference between the unthematic pre-givenness of life in the phenomenon of self-awareness and the actual, i.e. thematic givenness of life in acts of Überschau. Second, I contextualize Husserl's discovery of Überschau in his analyses of ethical life and the possibility of a universal epoché. I argue that for Husserl the very possibility of ethical life and of phenomenology itself rest on the totalizing apprehension of one's life rendered possible by Überschau. In the third section I spell out the essential characteristics of Überschau by contrasting this peculiar kind of consciousness with reproductive forms of consciousness such as recollection and expectation, which otherwise might be easily conflated with Überschau. In section four I reply to a possible objection to the very possibility of Überschau based on the consideration of the infinitely open stream of time-consciousness. I argue that the possibility of Überschau is tightly connected with the egological nature of consciousness as understood by Husserl. The ego does not coincide with its own conscious acts and thus enjoys a special vantage point on the totality of its own life. To conclude, I advance a speculative suggestion about the phenomenological origin of Überschau in the structure of self-awareness. This opens up a variety of possible lines of research that would connect Husserl with philosophers such as Augustine or Heidegger who are more immediately associated with the issue of personal life and its unity or lack thereof. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to show that Husserl's phenomenology can be considered as a form of radical empiricism in the sense of James, since it holds--like traditional empiricism--that sensuous experience is the foundation and the source of justification of knowledge, but--in contrast wiThtraditional empiricism--it holds that there are relations, which are given in the sensuous experience just as well contents. Reality is sensuous and the structure of reality is equally sensuous. By an analysis of the concepts of the sensuous relation, of the material a priori, and of association, it is showed that Husserl--in contrast wiThtranscendentalism-- confers a normative role to the peculiarity of sensuous contents, which determines their objective connections and also the structure of the world before the intellectual activities of the subject. At the same time, it is pointed out that Husserl has never entirely gotten over the Cartesian psychologism of Brentano and of traditional empiricism, that leads him to consider only the immanent as properly present. Finally, the paper discusses Husserl's concept of the life-world, which originates from Avenarius' idea of the natural concept of the world, and his position regarding the relation between experience and science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following Husserl's speculations on how geometry originated, we suggest that spatial perception is seduced by language as a result of human attempts to capture, signify and share its concepts. And this language traps geometry and humans themselves in to the forms that have guided and regulated past practices, thereby obscuring possibilities for cultural growth and adjustments to new conditions. Some body movement exercises reveal student teachers' spatial orientations. The paper proposes that the very evolution of geometry, and the ontological status of its objects, relate to their representation in cultural forms referenced to human self-image. It is further argued that learning crucially relates to evolving mathematical or pedagogical understandings of spatial phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest the Erklären-Verstehen debate is usually interpreted as primarily epistemological. By raising the possibility that there are fundamentally different methods for fundamentally different types of science, the debate puts into play all the standard issues-that is, issues concerning scientific explanation and justification, the unity and diversity of scientific disciplines, the reality of their subject matter, the accessibility of various subject matters to research, and so on. In this paper, however, I do not focus on any of these specific issues. I start instead from the fact that the very existence of the debate itself is an issue; in fact, it poses a philosophical problem that almost everyone but the hardest line logical empiricists has come to realize cannot be resolved epistemologically. In my view, however, that it cannot be resolved ontologically, either. I think the problem is at bottom hermeneutical, and its resolution requires that we focus first, not on the objects of science or the methods of studying them, but on the character of the philosophical orientation assumed by those who would try to resolve it. In this paper, I explain why I think this is so by analyzing (1) Dilthey's contribution to the original debate, (2) Husserl's reaction to Dilthey, and (3) Heidegger's critical evaluation of both. This line of philosophical development-this movement of self-understanding from critiques of objectivism to hermeneutical phenomenology-is of course already a central feature of much work in continental philosophy of science. In my conclusion, however, I argue for the less well-established-even if apparently approved-idea that it ought to be a central feature of technoscience studies as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the use of logic to solve philosophical problems. Such use of logic goes counter to the prevailing empiricist tradition in analytic circles. Specifically, model-theoretic tools are applied to three fundamental issues in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, namely, to the issue of the existence of mathematical entities, to the dispute between first- and second-order logic and to the definition of analyticity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Derrida's interpretation of Jean Cavailles's critique of phenomenology in On Logic and the Theory of Science. Derrida's main claim is that Cavailles's arguments, especially the argument based on Godel's incompleteness theorems, need not lead to a total rejection of Husserl's phenomenology, but only its static version. Genetic phenomenology, on the other hand, not only is not undermined by Cavailles's critique, but can even serve as a philosophical framework for Cavailles's own position. I will argue that Derrida's approach to Cavailles is fruitful, facilitating the exposition of some central Cavaillesian ideas, including the notion of dialectics. Nevertheless, it is important to evaluate Derrida's own arguments against static phenomenology. I undertake such an assessment in the last section of the paper, showing that Godel's theorems do not in themselves warrant rejection of static phenomenology. I base this conclusion in part on Godel's own understanding of phenomenology as a philosophical basis for mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Steps to enhance the rigour of qualitative research are much debated in nursing research. Prolonged engagement in the field, maintaining a journal and member checks (participant feedback) can help with this. This paper examines the latter, principally as we have been intrigued by the opposing viewpoints of nurse scholars regarding this matter. A process of critically analysing our research practice, coupled with an exploration of available literature has led to some clarity on the issue, as shared here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Coactivity / Santalka is the property of Vilnius Gediminas Technical University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper points to two little-discussed interrelated features—among sociologists—about the nature of the lifeworld ( Lebenswelt): that the experience of transcendence is an essential component of human actions, and that lived experience ( Erlebnis) is founded on the non-discursivity of the lifeworld, i.e., the pre-predicative background expectancies from which the discursive arises. I examine the intellectual route of Alfred Schutz who developed his mundane lifeworld theory from appropriating Edmund Husserl’s notions of appresentation and apperception. Harold Garfinkel later extended Schutz’s concept of lifeworld to the empirical investigations of constitutive social orders. By way of conclusion, I warn against a strain of constructionism in sociology, which tends to ignore the two said features of lived experience and inaccurately conceives social realities as essentially the actor’s discursive accomplishments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part one of this paper focuses on that region in which the phenomenon of attention is the most significant today: the region of media and cultural theory. The second part refines the phenomenal description of attention by applying Husserl's concept of affection. The final part thematizes attention as a conscious turning-towards; for this purpose, the paper refers to the phenomenon of greeting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'Time and Being' Heidegger claims that the task is to 'cease all overcoming and to leave metaphysics to itself'. This paper asks what it actually means to leave metaphysics to itself, and how we are meant to understand the difference between "leaving metaphysics to itself" and "overcoming metaphysics". To understand this distinction, the paper compares Heidegger's later position with those of Husserl and Wittgenstein and with his own earlier position expressed in Being and Time. While we find different interpretations of what it means to leave metaphysics to itself, this paper shows that none of them, apart from Wittgenstein's, draw a clear distinction between leaving metaphysics to itself and overcoming metaphysics. Indeed, rather than leaving metaphysics to itself, Heidegger in 'Time and Being' comes to articulate a negative metaphysics. To avoid such a move, this paper draws on Wittgenstein to show how we can truly leave metaphysics to itself and cease all overcoming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the possibility of understanding the rudimentary elements of clinical sensitivity by investigating the works of Edmund Husserl and Emmanuel Levinas on sensibility. Husserl's theory of intentionality offers significant reflections on the role of pre-reflective and affective intuition as a condition for intentionality and reflective consciousness. These early works of Husserl, in particular his works on the constitution of phenomenological time and subjective time-consciousness, prove to be an important basis for Levinas' works on an ethics of alterity and infinite responsibility for the other person. In fact, it is difficult to understand the core of Levinasian ethics, of vulnerability as proximity, of ethical sensitivity as passivity and a suffering for the suffering of another, without understanding the influence from Husserl's work. Crucially, the paper will, on the basis of Levinasian ethics, establish an understanding of sensibility as vulnerability and receptivity that is fundamental also for understanding significant intuitions in clinical nursing. Clinical sensitivity and carefulness in nursing are shaped by the concrete and also bodily expressions of vulnerabilities in a receptivity that is pre-reflective and pre-ontological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In reworking his Logical Investigations Husserl adopts two positions that were not actually incorporated into later editions of the Investigations but do appear in other writings: (1) a new distinction between signitive and significative intentions, and (2) the claim that even naming and perceiving acts are categorially formed. This paper investigates Husserl's notion of noematic sense and the pure grammatical 'categories' intimated therein in order to shed light on these new positions. The paper argues that the development of the theories of the noema and of pure grammar allows us to recognize how even merely perceived or named things have a certain categoriality belonging to them, but that this development also requires us to distinguish between an anticipatory categoriality and an articulated categoriality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I seek to shed some light on Heidegger's conception of phenomenology, and on the relationship between Heidegger's conception and that of Husserl. In particular, I am concerned to elucidate the sense in which Heidegger's phenomenology can be seen as a species of transcendental philosophy. In the concluding section of the paper I briefly consider the significance of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology for his later philosophy, as represented by 'The Question Concerning Technology'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes how Donald Winnicott’s radical existential psychoanalytic understanding of transitional awareness and transitional relatedness intertwines both our personal psychology and our innermost experience of our own existential ontology. This article also addresses the ontological coincidences of our contemporary Existential Phenomenological understanding and Tantric Dzogchen praxis of the 8th and 9th century CE. The paper shows how 8th and 9th century CE Dzogchen Tantric understanding illuminates existentialist thinking through the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and later ontological phenomenologist such as Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty. The paper also unfolds how these two modalities of existential phenomenological psychotherapy and tantric praxis converge in the experiential process of self liberation. The work also describes how in the patriarchal spiritual world, an experience of Being that is easily accessible has become something belonging to a few «enlightened ones» in the form of a corporate product or brand. Some of the most hidden secrets of Tantra is herein presented.

The common thought that Husserl was committed to a Platonist ontology of essences, and to a mysterious epistemology that holds that we can 'intuit' these essences, has contributed substantially to his work being dismissed and marginalized in analytic philosophy. This paper aims to show that it is misguided to dismiss Husserl on these grounds. First, the author aims to explicate Husserl's views about essences and how we can know them, in ways that make clear that he is not committed to a traditional Platonism, or a mystical epistemology. Second, the author argues that Husserl's approach was an important source for Carnap in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", where Carnap tried to overcome the empiricists' qualms about referring to abstracta. Finally, the author will argue that Husserl's approach can be reconstructed in contemporary analytic terms by appeal to the idea of pleonastic transformations. By seeing both Husserl's views and their influences on later analytic work more clearly, the hope is to build bridges and make clear that the approach is of lasting value and interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl's concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation designates the unique phenomenal character of this structure as it is experientially lived through. The way experience hangs together is itself a phenomenal feature of experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the paper at hand I introduce Goethe's ontology and methodology for the study of life as an alternative to current theories. 'Life,' in its individual, social and/or pan-natural form, has been a recurring topic in the social sciences for the last two centuries and may currently experience a renaissance, if we are to believe Scott Lash. Goethe's approach is of particular interest because he formulated it as one of the first critical responses to the nascent discipline of biology. It can be characterised broadly as phenomenology with a strong dose of life philosophy. For this reason, and to draw its contours more clearly, I compare his approach to the respective thoughts in Husserl's and Simmel's work. The comparison focuses on the two central concepts phenomenon and life but also discusses broader epistemological and methodological issues, such as the relationship between observer and observed, the relationship between culture (cultural sciences) and nature (natural sciences), the nature of causality as well as preferred methods of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found inIdeas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My purpose in this paper is to determine if there is still a place for God, in Husserl's phenomenology, after the achievement of the phenomenological reduction. There are several different ways to address this issue. One can begin by asserting that there is no place in phenomenology, after bracketing the natural world of our lived experience, for any transcendence that is not, either the transcendence of the noema regarding the stream of consciousness in which it was generated or the worldly or mundane transcendence. One can also stress that the absolute consciousness that constitutes all kinds of objectivities- real or ideal -cannot tolerate at his side another absolute like the Christian God. Against these views, one can oppose the following: 1) in the intersubjective experience, the process of constitution of its specific noemata -the alter egos-goes beyond what seemed admissible in the standard intentional analysis of the process of constitution of worldly objectivities; 2) intentional consciousness shows an overall teleological structure that points beyond the simply given. In this paper, I try to explore the possibilities this opens in the core of intentional analysis to a phenomenological approach to God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that conscious thoughts are related to one another. I argue that these considerations are necessary for understanding why forms of cognitive extension may diminish our cognitive lives in different ways. This does not lead to a categorical rejection of cognitive enhancement as unethical or bad for human flourishing, but does warrant a conservative approach to the design and implementation of cognitive artifacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether or not Merleau-Ponty's version of phenomenology should be considered a form of 'transcendental' philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one, many of its features-such as its exploitation of empirical science-might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper considers whether Merleau-Ponty meets what I call the 'transcendentalist challenge' of defining and grounding claims of a distinctive transcendental kind. It begins by highlighting three features-the absolute ego, the pure phenomenal field, and the reduction-that Husserl had used to justify claims of a specifically transcendental kind within a phenomenological framework. It then examines how Merleau-Ponty modifies each of these features to focus on the lived body and a factically conditioned phenomenal field, while remaining ambivalent about the reduction. Finally, it assesses whether Merleau-Ponty's modified position can still legitimately be considered transcendental. I argue that-despite his own rhetoric-this modified position shapes the modality of Merleau-Ponty's claims in such a way that his phenomenology cannot meet the transcendentalist challenge and therefore should not be considered 'transcendental.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The aim of the present paper is to advance some considerations on the question of animism from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, we deal with the problems of the access to the phenomenon, and of its interpretation on the part of contemporary anthropology. Both problems are connected with the gap which seems to exist between so-called primitive, animistic societies, and so-called civilized, scientific cultures. Secondly, since Husserl does not devote specific analyses to this issue, we address Dorion Cairns' methodology and concrete investigations. Our major claim is that his reflections, largely inspired by Husserl's notion of sense-transfer (Sinnesübertragung), may provide a better understanding of the gap mentioned above and perhaps a way to overcome it by disclosing a genetic common root not only of animistic and modern mentalities, but also of pantheism and theism. A final section is devoted to Husserl's scattered considerations on the subject which might throw additional light on Cairns' claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I elucidate Edmund Husserl's theory of inauthentic judgments from his 1890 "On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)." It will be shown how inauthentic judgments are distinct from other signitive experiences, in such a manner that when Husserl seeks to account for them, he is forced to revise the general structure of his philosophy of meaning and in doing so, is also able to realize novel insights concerning the nature of signification. Second, these conclusions are revealed to be the foundation of Husserl's pure logical grammar, found in the 1901 "Fourth Logical Investigation." In his analysis of inauthentic judgments, Husserl already recognized, albeit in a problematic way and for entirely different reasons, many of the central tenets of the 1901 work concerning categoremata and syncategoremata, matter and form, and the isomorphism between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The processes associated with implementing a phenomenological study in the Husserlian interpretation can seem daunting to the new researcher. This is especially true if the researcher intends to implement Husserl's concepts with intentionality and reflexivity. A leading cause of difficulty lies in the tendency for Husserl to change how he described key elements of his phenomenology, particularly the epoché and the associated reductions. Although many very good manuals exist within which a new researcher will find a host of prescriptions for the execution of a phenomenological study, an essential difficulty exists for those who want a deeper understanding of the intentions of phenomenology, not only as a research method, but as a personal orientation for the scholar-practitioner. The intention of this paper is to provide perspectives useful to the new researcher beginning the process of developing a personal orientation to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Phainomena is the property of Phenomenological Society of Ljubljana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to a very specific and widespread line of interpretation, the mode of working of intentionality (hence the notions themselves of noema and noematic sense) could be understood by analogy with the linguistic paradigm set forth by Gottlob Frege in his famous essay "Über Sinn und Bedeutung." The goal of the present paper is to dismiss such an interpretation by also analyzing the manner in which Husserl relates, and thereby traces back, the constitution of the logical sphere to the so-called pre-categorial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the following paper we will seek to understand what Edmund Husserl, in his second Logical Investigation, refers to as "idealism", against the backdrop of Rudolf Hermann Lotze's interpretation of Plato's doctrine of Ideas in the third book of his Logic. This will raise not only the question of Husserl's indebtedness to Lotze with respect to the Ideenhlehre in terms of Geltung, but first and foremost that of the "Platonism" of the idealism defended in his first masterpiece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests interpreting Husserl's thesis of the "fictional destruction of the world" (gedankliche Destruktion der Welt) in the light of the eidetic method of variation. After having reconstructed Husserl's argument and shown how it relies on the methodologically regimented joint venture of free fantasy and bounded concepts, the author concludes that (1) the a priori of a world, namely its empirical (more or less rational) style, is tantamount to the a priori of a world that can be possibly experienced by some conceivable form of consciousness. (2) If consciousness is a priori bound to transcendence, such transcendence is not necessarily supposed to be the transcendence of a world, for a non-world would be enough to entertain the intentional directedness. This twofold claim allows for a novel interpretation of Husserl's principle of the asymmetry between world and consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl’s theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]