Search

The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of unfree labour in the contemporary global economy, the processes by which it is generated, and its connections with poverty and vulnerability. I challenge dominant ‘residual’ views of unfree labour as either external to global economic activity or occurring solely within small-scale, localized or non-market contexts. Instead, I contend that unfree labour needs to be understood in ‘relational’ terms as a particular form of ‘adverse incorporation’ in the global economy. This form of adverse incorporation is constituted through the circular interaction between, on the one hand, the functioning of the global productive economy and associated labour markets, and, on the other, the social relations of poverty which give rise to vulnerability and to unfree labour. I draw throughout on original empirical research conducted on ‘slave labour’ in Brazilian agriculture and child labour in the Delhi garments sector. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The biggest business story today is China, along with India and Brazil. These three emerging giants are predicted by Goldman Sachs to account for over half of global business activity by 2050. Competition and strategy as practised by these countries – and by firms and countries of the Asia-Pacific more generally – can no longer be thought of as a ‘peripheral’ feature of the world economy. Now Asia-Pacific – its firms, industries, countries – is moving to the core of the global economy, whereas strategies and competitive behaviours developed here are proving to be of much more than peripheral interest. In this paper I reflect on the technology leverage strategies developed to enter advanced industries (tiger technologies), on the accelerated internationalization achieved through complementing the global value chains created through globalization (dragon multinationals) and on the national innovative capacities developed in the region, and to what extent the practices of China, India and Brazil in developing national systems of economic learning may be said to replicate the strategies that worked so successfully in East Asia. The paper concludes that the propagation of East Asian strategies to these emerging giants promises much greater success than in countries following the precepts of the Washington Consensus.Asian Business & Management (2009) 8, 5–32. doi:10.1057/abm.2008.28 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Particularly in the North–South confrontation at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, developing countries seemed to be presenting a unified stance of resistance against the developed world. These developments were greeted with considerable surprise in the scholarly as well as policy communities, not least because many theorists of International Relations had predicted increasing homogenisation and policy convergence by developing countries around liberal solidarist norms. In this paper, we analyse the apparent revitalisation of the Third World, and evaluate the policies of developing countries at and around Cancun to assess the claims that this heralds a more activist and less accommodating period in North/South relations. We buttress this general analysis by probing further into the policies of two of the major players, namely Brazil and India. We argue that recent policy changes can be explained by learning and adaptation by developing countries within the specific institution of the World Trade Organisation. We examine this adaptation along four planes: coalitions, insider activism, negotiation strategies, and transnational coalitions. Domestic politics in both our country cases play, at best, a supportive role. We also investigate the extent to which these shifts in trade politics might be seen as broader shifts in foreign policy.*This work forms part of a project on Emerging Powers in International Regimes, funded by the Nuffield Foundation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New powers, such as China, India and Brazil, are challenging the traditional dominance of the US in the governance of the global economy. It is generally taken for granted that the rise of new powers is simply a reflection of their growing economic might. In this article, however, I challenge this assumption by drawing on the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to show that the forces driving the rise of new powers are more heterogeneous and complex than suggested by a simple economic determinism. I argue that these countries have in fact taken different paths to power: while China's rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic might, the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership of developing country coalitions, which enabled them to exercise influence above their economic weight. One important result is that Brazil and India have assumed a more aggressive and activist position in WTO negotiations than China and played a greater role in shaping the agenda of the Doha Round. Thus, although the new powers are frequently grouped together (as the ‘BRICs’, for example), this masks considerable variation in their sources of power and behaviour in global economic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The rise of new economic powers has seen increasing attention focused on the international role of the BRICS countries. Importantly, a common feature uniting the BRICS is that they are all resource-rich, and many analysts (and some BRICS governments) have argued that natural resources are one of the key factors propelling the rise of the group. This article explores the BRICS’ emerging status as ‘resource powers’, examining how resource wealth underpins their economic development and foreign policy strategies, and thus contributes to their growing influence in international affairs. It is argued that through the use of nationalistic mining and energy policies, the BRICS governments have exploited natural resources for both domestic economic and international diplomatic objectives. However, there are several challenges and emerging risks facing the BRICS’ resource strategies, which mean that resource wealth is making a positive – though inherently limited – contribution to the growing international status of the group. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The international development arena is currently subject to major changes in the geographies of power. In this article I analyse how and to what extent the (re)entry on the development scene of China, India and Brazil, together with increasing prices for primary commodities and improved access to international finance, has affected Zambia’s political leverage to set, implement and fund its own developmental policies. I argue that, while real changes in external financial flows comparable to aid from these non-traditional state actors are still small, these actors’ experience is providing Zambia with an alternative development model that combines purposive state intervention with market-based economic growth and integration into world markets. While Zambia may be taking the first steps in strengthening its ‘sovereign frontier’, the extent of this movement is still small and its development outcomes are far from assured. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

South–South cooperation is assumed to reflect a deep attitude of solidarity among nations of the global South. We point out that, although India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) present themselves as being in the vanguard of South–South cooperation, their foreign economic policies make such solidarity somewhat thin. We focus on examples in which these three states deliberately but also unintentionally create sub-optimal conditions for the development of some of their Southern neighbours. This outcome reflects the policies that emerging centres of accumulation in the South are promoting, as well as the material interests of the dominant class alliances in the aforementioned states. There is a need for close scrutiny of the foreign economic policies of dynamic developing economies, and for closer multilateral coordination among the states of the global South. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that the long-term sustainability of the trilateral partnership established in 2003 between India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) rests on a more conscious engagement with their regional partners. The construction of a strong regional leadership role for IBSA based on its members' strategic positions in South Asia, South America, and southern Africa is the proper common ground to legitimize a diplomatic partnership between the IBSA states. This is even more pressing as China is actively competing for markets and influence with the IBSA trio within their respective regions, particularly in Africa. The paradox, though, is that while Northern powers have welcomed the regional leadership role of IBSA's members, most of their neighbors are not convinced of the actual intentions of New Delhi, Brasilia, and Pretoria. As a result, leadership within IBSA is defined in global terms as a claim to lead the developing world. At the regional level, however, IBSAclaim for leadership is less clear, less acceptable, and therefore remains constrained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world economy is in a state of flux. While most OECD countries struggle to minimize the damage of the global financial crisis, a few countries maintain positive economic growth rates and are thus changing global power configurations. Among the most important emerging economies for international development are the BASIC countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China. This article analyses why these countries have rejuvenated development cooperation, what they actually do in Africa, and how they do it. It argues that the most important aspect of the rejuvenation of non-traditional donors' development cooperation with African economies is not the direct effects on these economies, be they positive or negative, but the potential gains that may accrue to African economies in terms of larger room for manoeuvre due to increased competition and the challenge to traditional donors' development hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) as political factors in international relations. Global investment banking and securities firm Goldman Sachs projected that the combined gross domestic products (GDPs) of these four economies would be greater than the Group of 7 (G7) countries by 2050. In 2006 financial information company Dow Jones introduced the BRIC 50 index. Also discussed are emerging markets and the world's population, the global GDP, and the goals of the BRICs.

The article discusses the trade-labour linkage policy of the European Union and how developing countries view this on a bilateral level. It explains that the policy focuses on social justice, human rights, and regulation, but offers an assumption that members, such as India, Brazil and South Africa, perceive it in a different manner. It also explores the discussions and reactions of members during the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meetings, in which the assumption is based on.

The author reflects on the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trilateral initiative and on the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). According to him, the three nations under IBSA initiative have a combined total population of more than 1.2 billion and gross domestic product of about US$2.3 trillion. Also, the author highlights several challenges being encountered by IOR-ARC including political openness and exclusivity.