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The rapid pace of improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China during the late 1970s has been well scrutinized by mass media scholars, but most of the research has focused on the press coverage emanating from the United States, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, the major nations involved in normalization. A study examined how the press of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) reported Sino-United States normalization during 1978 and 1979 through six critical events related to Sino-U.S. normalization in two leading daily newspapers of the ROK and the official party press organ of the DPRK (272 news stories were examined in all). Results showed that (1) only one story involving Sino-United States normalization appeared in the DPRK press, suggesting evidence for the "delaying hypothesis"; (2) more than a quarter of the normalization stories in the ROK press linked normalization to inter-Korean affairs; (3) there was some evidence suggesting that the ROK press reported normalization in a manner that promoted peace and understanding; and (4) normalization stories involving Korean affairs contained more "mixed" stories (with both positive and negative assertions) than those not involving Korean affairs, suggesting that when the ROK press linked this ambiguous external event to internal affairs it did so in an informative manner that weighed the positive and negative consequences of normalization on Korean affairs. (Three tables of data are included, and 83 references are appended.) (MS)

The purpose for this research paper is to investigate the reasons behind the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) initiation of democratization in Taiwan in using the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico as comparison. The KMT should be consider as one of the rare hegemonic ruling party in the world to survive democratic transitions intact, even though the nature and structures of the party have been changed tremendously through democratization. The PRI possess the same qualities. However, the reasons for initiating liberalization of the two parties were somewhat different. Ultimately, four explanatory factors (two internal, two external) emerged as the main contributors to the democratization process in Taiwan. They are: first, the development of Taiwanese identity different from that of the Chinese; second, the political demands and activism of a growing middle class due to the economic success; third, the changes in United States foreign policy towards the encouragement of democratization; and fourth and most importantly, the competition with China for support and the recognition from the international community and the need for the Taiwanese government to enhance its appeal to international supporters, particularly the United States. In addition, while the four factors mentioned above all contributed to the KMT-led democratization in Taiwan, the influence of the United State’s foreign policy in the Fast East and its support of democratic states should be considered the most significant factor contributing to the democratization in Taiwan. In sum, the hypothesis proposed by this research paper is that the accumulation and interaction of all four factors made democratization in Taiwan and the end of the KMT one-party dominance inevitable, with the external pressure from the U.S. essentially playing the most significant role in impelling the KMT elites’ decision to liberalize, adopt electoral reform and stop the persecution of the opposition. The theoretical approaches of the paper are as the following: this paper will adopt the definition of “democracy” provided by Linz and Stepan (1978) to serve as guidelines for whether there is democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. The definition from Linz states that the criteria of democracy are: “ [The] legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability” (Linz, 5). The paper will also posit that Lipset’s take on modernization theory (1959) holds valid in the case of Taiwan. The economic success in the 1970s and 1980s created a large, well-organized middle class that in turn demanded more political freedom, equality and liberalization. In addition, the paper also addresses Linz and Diamond’s (1989) claim that the genesis and maintenance of democracy is ‘greatly facilitated by values and behavioral dispositions, particularly at the elite level, of compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and restraint” (Linz, 12). The methodology use by the paper will be comparative analysis on both the KMT and the PRI’s initiation to liberalize. The paper will also provide historical analysis on the nature of the KMT and its 50-year dominance on Taiwan. Lastly, the paper analyzes voter turn-outs and the results of the 2000 presidential election, which validated the consolidation of democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. Maybe it is because of the geographic distance; Taiwan and Mexico are not often compared and studied together. Even though there are great differences between the KMT and PRI authoritarian regime, the end result of democratization and the eventual ousting of both parties from power were the same. The paper hopes to shed light on the reasons behind an elite-led liberalization by comparing two difference cases with the same end results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about U.S.-China conflict due to Taiwan is presented which was discussed at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including China's emerging global influence in the post-Cold War era and the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait conflict.

A conference paper about militarized conflict in the cross-strait relations is presented which was prepared for presentation at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular relationships and the alliance-like arrangement between Taiwan and the U.S.

This paper examines the role of economic sanctions in Taiwan's decision to reverse its nuclear weapons efforts. Sanctions have long been derided as an ineffective tool of foreign policy, particularly in "high politics" issues such as nuclear weapons programs. Contrary to the prevalent view, in this paper I demonstrate that economic sanctions led to nuclear reversal in Taiwan through the "compellence" mechanism. Drawing on the literature on coercive diplomacy, the paper concludes that Taiwan's dependence on the United States for its very survival facilitated successful US coercion to reverse its nuclear weapons program. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the United States remained interested in Taiwan’s security in the post-Cold War era? Recent critiques of the American military presence in East Asia maintain that Washington developed an imperial mindset with respect to the region during the Cold War, a perspective that sustained interest in forward deployment following the Soviet Union’s demise. As an American Cold War ally, Taiwan was naturally included in this neo-imperial project. In this paper, I offer an alternative view, focusing on two critical episodes in the history of U.S.-Taiwan relations: the Sino-American normalization negotiations in the late 1970s and the confrontation over Taiwan in the mid-1990s. Drawing upon historical materials as well as interviews with key U.S. officials from the Carter and Clinton administrations, I argue that the U.S. has refused to abandon Taiwan as a result of interests created through several decades of close interaction. Moreover, rather than sustaining U.S. hegemony in East Asia, the American relationship with Taiwan has seriously complicated Washington’s pursuit of broader strategic goals in the region. Accordingly, notwithstanding recent interest in American empire among neo-conservatives, the persistence of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan reflects the long history of close association more than neo-imperial ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the potential risk effects of alliance commitments on dispute onset and escalation. This issue is theoretically framed as a moral hazard problem from the economic literature: if one party (agent) pledges a particular commitment to another party (principal), the moral hazard for the agent arises if the principal's behavior (e.g. a reckless move) raises the risk for an agent to act on its behalf due to its contractual commitment to the principal. In international relations, alliance commitments might pose such a moral hazard risk in the context of extended deterrence. That is, how much can the protege's behavior vis-a-vis another state actually entrap its ally ("defender") into a conflict? I separate an answer to this question into two specific issues: (1) whether states with alliance commitments from others are more likely to initiate conflicts than other states without such alliance provisions; (2) given that a conflict is initiated between the protege and its opponent, whether the protege is likely to get an aid from its ally and at what escalation level. After the conceptual and theoretical discussion, the paper proceeds with a quantitative empirical analysis and draws conclusions for current U.S. policies in cases of its relations with Taiwan in East Asia, India and Pakistan in South Asia, and Israel in the Middle East. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we will examine U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. Much empirical evidence showed that the policy toward the Taiwan Strait slightly changed during Bush?s first term. After elaborating the subtle change of U.S. policy, we will attempt to interpret such change from the modified structuralism perspective. Different from neo-realist?s assumption of international anarchical status, we adopt neoliberalist?s view of international institutions existing in the international system. However, we don?t agree with the neoliberalist?s assumption that states seek their absolute interests. Instead, we accept neorealist?s survival prerequisite for states. Therefore, we identify the world as a hierarchical system and states seek their relative gains in this system. We further set the hierarchical system into two levels, the higher one and the lower one. According to Waltz?s structural theory, we claim only strong powers can have the capability to play on the higher level, while weak states are staying on the lower level of the international system. Any great power is gaming with other great powers on higher level and with weak states on lower level. Through such interactions on two levels, the great power can get interests from both. However, if the interests from the higher level are in conflict with those from the lower level, the great power, weighing its great power counterparts over the weak states, will discard the interests from the weak states. Our testing scenario centers the U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. To fit this model, the U.S. and China are two powers staying on the higher level and Taiwan stays on the lower level. Previously, the U.S. were trying to get interests from both levels and keeping the ?double track? policy. However, two events change the balance among the three players: 9/11 attack and Taiwan?s independent referendum. These events lead to a conflict of the interests from China and Taiwan and the previous ?double track? policy does not work well. Thus, in order to keep interests from the higher-level partner -- China, the U.S. chooses the strategy to sacrifice its lower-level interests from Taiwan by stopping Taiwan?s willing of independence behind the referendum. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite repeated U.S. claims that its policy toward relations across the Taiwan Strait is ?consistent? and ?clear,? in actuality its policy has long been one of ?strategic ambiguity.? It is widely recognized by scholars and policy-makers alike that the so-called Taiwan question is the most potentially explosive issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations.What is the strategic ambiguity policy all about? What role has it played in influencing the equilibrium outcomes of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades? How are the dynamics of the ?strategic triangle? consisting of the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How effective in preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait is U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity likely to be in the future? Few studies, if any, have provided theoretical answers to these questions. This paper tries to develop a game theoretic model which may provide tentative answers to these interesting, unresolved questions. Supporters of the ?strategic ambiguity? policy argue that it has successfully kept the Strait free of conflict: on the one hand, Mainland China always has to take into account the possibility that the United States might intervene if it were to attack Taiwan, and on the other hand, Taiwan always has to think twice before ?going too far? (such as declaring formal independence from the mainland). The policy, it is said, has served U.S. national security interests and has effectively accommodated changes in cross-Strait relations in past decades. There are opposing opinions, however. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have rendered one of the major imperatives for a U.S.-China rapprochement and compromises on Taiwan?the basis of the strategic ambiguity policy?obsolete. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan and the increasing military threat if faces, such as the deployment of missiles by Mainland China aimed at Taiwan, have brought new variables into the equation. Taiwan?s thriving democracy has added ideological values and moral imperatives to the U.S. commitment of defending the island. The increasing military threat from Mainland China, meanwhile, seems to have strengthened the argument for an increasing commitment to Taiwan?s defense, either in the form of more military sales or coordination between U.S. and Taiwan militaries. A continuing ambiguity in U.S. policy, so the arguments goes, will encourage PRC militancy and frustrate Taiwan?s determination to resisting aggression, and may be prone to disrupt the delicate equilibrium. Above all, it seems to compromise the U.S. moral imperative of defending democratic values.Our model shows that the policy of strategic ambiguity helps preserve the status quo and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The strategic ambiguity policy is a defensive strategy in nature, well-suited at deterring both Mainland China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies. In the long run, the strategic ambiguity policy, however, needs to be supplemented, if not replaced, by more imaginative policies in order to successfully manage the Taiwan issue. For example, the United States could be more forthright in proposals that help to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, such as proposing that Mainland China renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue in exchange for Taiwan?s pledge not to pursue independence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the administration of President George W. Bush. It puts the policy under historical perspective by examining the evolution of it. Some previous research literatures will be briefly discussed and argues that all of them cannot convincingly account for U.S. policy toward Taiwan in this time period. It proposes that there are two levels in the international system and rational actors at different levels will play different games to maximize their interests and power.

The article looks at the future of cross-strait relations after the election of fourth-generation leaders in China in 2002. It cites that China has adopted a cool dealing strategy toward Taiwan after Chen Sui-bian was elected President in 2002 and condemned the defensive referendum proposed by the president. It argues that maintaining status quo in Taiwan Strait is the key to pursue the stability and peace in the strait. It explains the factors that resulted to the conflict in Taiwan Strait and the role played by the U.S. concerning the issue.

The article examines the interaction of domestic and international factors in determining relations and policies associated with Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. It considers the possibility of direct military confrontation between the U.S. and its regional challenger, China, over Taiwan. A review of the literature on cross-Strait and the triangular relations of U.S.-China-Taiwan is presented. It considers the impact of U.S. presidential elections on the China policy since 1980.

Pressure groups have always had a significant impact on U.S. policy, both foreign and domestic. Diasporas constitute a new kind of pressure group with an exclusive focus on foreign and domestic policies that affect the home country. Famous examples include the Israeli lobby, the Armenian lobby, the Cuban Lobby, and the Taiwan lobby. Putnam's concept of the two-level game is useful for explaining the interaction between foreign policy and ethnic lobbies. The concept of social capital is useful for explaining the relative success and failures of different lobbies and getting their preferred policies accepted. Social capital includes bonding, bridging, and linkage social capital. Bonding social capital unites people within a group, bridging social capital unites different groups, and linkage social capital unites government officials with these groups. The Taiwan lobby and the Cuban lobby are analyzed using these concepts to explain their relative success in "capturing" U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba and Taiwan. The Cuba lobby employed the successful strategy of shifting policy from the executive branch to Congress, thereby making U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba more aligned with the interests of Cuban hard-liners, and more difficult to change. The Cuba lobby accomplished this by focusing on U.S. Senators and Representatives who had a large number of Cubans in their states or districts. In contrast, the Taiwan lobby focused on the executive branch, leaving U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan beholden to the prevailing U.S. policies toward China. Consequently, the Taiwan lobby has not been able to change U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the official recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1978, and the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. In contrast, the Cuba lobby has pushed the U.S. government to change its policies toward Cuba by intensifying the trade embargo, despite the fact that the rationale for the embargo no longer exists. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]