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This paper traces motivational influences from the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq to patterns of Islamist terrorism in Western Europe. The paper analyses the circumstances of two successful terrorist attacks in Western Europe occurring after the invasion in March 2003. First, we survey the mass casualty attack attributed to a group of al-Qaida associated radical Islamists in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and secondly, the slaughter of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam, also by an al-Qaida inspired terrorist network. These terrorist attacks were launched in the context of intensified counter-terrorism efforts on the global scene, and the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The paper situates these acts of terrorism within the broader theory of so-called "spillover effects" from armed conflicts to international terrorism. The argument in this paper is that although there were no Iraqi insurgents involved in these two attacks, the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how cultural context influences news content by comparing American and Swedish print and broadcast news stories about the 2003 war in Iraq. Using a theoretical foundation derived from the works of Hall (1980a, 1997) and Hofstede (1979), a theme analysis was conducted of broadcast television news and print news. Results indicate that the news media in Sweden presented a very different picture of the Iraq war as compared to the news media in the U.S. was represented differently in the two countries, simply by emphasizing different aspects. In the U.S., the war was described in terms of strategy, interpreted via a perspective from inside the American troops, and explained as the United States bringing freedom to the Iraqi people. Swedish media interpreted the war from a perspective of the international community and from Iraqi civilians’ point of view. They portrayed the war in terms of suffering civilians and explained it as a failure of the international community. As hypothesized, American media had comparatively more masculine content, while Swedish media had comparatively more feminine content. Implications of this study for future research on news media portrayals of international events are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During and after the 2003 Iraq War some political analysts asserted that the American media sanitized their coverage of the conflict. Or, to put it another way, the American media was reticent to show the effects of this war, meaning the soldiers and civilians killed, maimed, or imprisoned. These comments prompt three questions. First, did the American media offer a largely clean (i.e. little to no blood or death) version of the Iraq war? Second, was the media’s coverage of the war more or less bloody than coverage of other conflicts in the past 20 years? Third, what do the findings to questions one and two tell us about the role the media can play in the politics of war? In this paper I begin the approach to these questions by comparing the war coverage images of the three major U.S. weekly newsmagazines - Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report - of five of the more significant U.S. conflicts of the past 20 years that involved casualties and prisoners: Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, Gulf War I in 1991, Somalia in 1993, and Iraq in 2003. For each of these conflicts I will compare the number and magnitude of newsmagazine images of American death, violence, and imprisonment as well as opponent and civilian death, violence, and imprisonment. Special attention will be paid to cover photos since their impact (via newstand displays) far exceeds sales numbers. The content analysis will reveal whether there is a double standard by the newsmagzines regarding images of U.S. vrs enemy dead and imprisoned and whether the newsmagazines were more willing to show graphic images of U.S. dead and imprisoned in the 1990’s than they were in the 2000’s. Finally, the paper will offer some possible explanations about what the effect of these newsmagazine images has on not only the conflicts studied, but future conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the quantitative conflict literature employs data sets that draw a large portion of their cases from 1945-1990. This historical period coincides with the U.S.-Soviet bipolar competition and security arrangements associated with that competition. A debate within the democratic peace literature has emerged between those who view the democratic peace as a general phenomenon, and those who see democracy?s effect on international conflict as largely a function of the particular circumstances of the Cold War alignment. The critics of a general relationship between democracy and war focus specifically on the role of the United States as a leader of one of the bi-polar alliance blocks The possibility that observed relationships between democracy and war could be dependent on the particular historical circumstances of the Cold War raises the question: To what extent are other empirical findings about international conflict also a function of the hegemonic influence exercised by the superpowers during period? Using ordinal logistic regression to examine the pattern of third party joining this paper re-examines the extent to which the relationship between democracy and intervention as well as the relationships between variables commonly used to explain third party interventions in the conflict literature, such as proximity, power status, democracy, trade and alliances, are a function of the intervention choices of the United States during the Cold War. The paper finds that the intervention choice of the United States is by far the most important predictor of the intervention choices of other third parties to interstate wars. And that accounting for the intervention choices of the United States ?explains? away much of the general relationships observed in earlier studies. Interestingly enough though reduced in substantive importance, a statistical the relationship between shared democracy and joining remains even after accounting for U.S. intervention choice in this period. This finding suggests that the relationship between shared democracy and third party joining is not entirely dependent upon the exercise of American leadership during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Iraq war impacted Chile,the so-called jaguar of Latin America and its strategic objectives in the world? In addressing this question, the proposed paper will focus on the differences that have arisen between the Chilean and American world views. Of special concern will be to discuss how Chile’s involvement with the United Nations -- Chile sits on the Security Council, has influenced its foreign policy. The paper will focus on the strategic considerations of Chile’s newly evolving foreign policy but will also examine the resultant impact of differences with the United States upon Chilean internal politics. It will conclude with a broader perspective on Mercosur and prospects for its future relations with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2003 war with Iraq marks the first time world public opinion has been strongly arrayed against the United States on a major issue. The world has disagreed with America on specific issues like the banning of landmines during the Clinton administration and South African sanctions due to Apartheid during the Reagan administration. But at no time were there concerted efforts involving mass demonstrations and world leaders allied against this nation. In addition, the events during March of 2003 involving the United Nations Security Council made it impossible for this country to muster even majority support for its resolution to go to war. These circumstances are even more acute when one considers that the United States enjoyed a tremendous wave of global sympathy after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 , and that many of the allies who oppose us now, like France and Germany, aided the campaign against terror in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. Further, a Pew Research poll released in 2002 indicated that the image of the U.S. had deteriorated in an extraordinary number of nations around the world in the previous two years. The primary question, then, is what went wrong? How may we trace world opinion and analyze it to answer this question, and what are the ramifications for present and future U. S. policy? How does the present American isolation from the international community affect its ability, and the ability of other nations, to promote cooperative global ventures and insure a peaceful and safe international environment. This paper studies these questions by describing the historical role of communication in the definition of communities. It then extrapolates how global communications will play a similar role in the definition of supra-national entities which will structure the relations among nations. Hypotheses are derived which test how discourse conventions in international media provide clues to the relevant entities in the post-Cold War era. These hypotheses follow primarily from a theory of global opinion processes and the emergence of an international community ; they are counterposed to Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory and the emergence of communities based upon primordial ties of ethnicity and religion . Hypotheses: Three general hypotheses guide this paper’s investigation of the model of community that will dominate the emerging international order: · Does the content of world opinion vary by civilization or global opinion theory? · Does the agenda for world opinion vary by civilization or global opinion theory? · Does the discursive construction of world opinion vary by civilization or does it follow a process of consensus or conflict according to global opinion theory? The project then uses the hypotheses for a case study of international media discourse on a particular issue-the impending conflict with Iraq. For this analysis, international newspapers from the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Iran will be analyzed. Methodology: The media analyses follow Herman and Chomsky’s assumption that newspaper discourse tends to reflect the dominant ideological and regime interests of the nation of origin . While the newspaper’s national origin does not determine its discourse, it does provide clues to how certain issues are discussed and certain terminology framed. An important example for this study involves the discourse on world opinion. Past studies have shown how use of this phrase varies with nation, region, and historical context, but that one may detect an international consensus forming when the meaning and agenda for world opinion converge across several nations’ newspapers . The paper analyzes discussion of these issues follows the pattern defined by global opinion theory or the clash of civilizations theory. It investigates whether the construction, agenda, and content follow global opinion or civilization models in the following ways: · The content of world opinion: newspaper references to world opinion are coded according to whether they represent a positive, negative, or neutral position on the issue which appears on the agenda. These results are then compared across newspapers. · The agenda for world opinion: previous research suggests that a world opinion has formed when a general consensus exists concerning: (1) the major issues on the agenda for world opinion; (2) the relative emphases these issues deserve over time; and (3) the dates, or time periods, in which these issues appear . All three of these factors are studied by comparing the dates and percentage of references among each of the international newspapers analyzed. · The construction of world opinion: previous research suggests that potential differences among national newspapers may occur in the frequency of their use of the components of world opinion in their references, and the manner in which they construct the concept of world opinion from these components. The construction of world opinion in different contexts is analyzed using factor analyses . A key question in each case is whether each of these factors tends to vary more within the civilization boundaries Huntington describes, or across these boundaries. If there is considerable variation between the two newspapers, but less between the newspapers and others in a previous study, the clash of civilizations theory is not supported. However, a more fundamental question is whether one can map a process of opinion formation and consensus that clearly isolates errant nations, as predicted by global opinion theory. Previous research has shown that these processes may be mapped by studying when the construction, agenda, and content of references to world opinion converge . The argument between these approaches is not merely academic. If the present controversies over war with Iraq have their source in primordial differences that pre-date the modern era, and the Cold War was merely an interruption in this conflict as Huntington implies, then there is little to be done to alleviate the problem. We must simply accept it as fact and endeavor to project our civilization’s values as pre-eminent in the world. If however the conflict is part of a greater struggle regarding the influence of world opinion, there are policy alternatives that can alleviate the apparent split between the United States and other countries. In either case, international communication provides clues to the predominant model of global organization, as well as potential means of solving problems of international cooperation and conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the three predominant views on the latest war on Iraq--the anti-war perspective, the pro-Bush administration perspective, and the Arab world’s unique perspective--Operation Iraqi Freedom was about securing the U.S.’ oil supply, promoting democracy, and the re-colonization of the Middle East, respectively. Above all else, this war was about preserving the existing regimes of the Middle East and Gulf region as much as possible. The U.S. had other sources to compensate for the presumed loss of Iraqi oil, and has been instrumental in keeping repressive regimes in power. Similarly, the existing system has served the U.S. well, and a redesign would have entailed too great a risk to current U.S. interests. What is at stake for the U.S. is the stability of the Gulf region, which has been increasingly disturbed by three salient factors: the emergence of politically active Islamist organizations; more frequent challenges by democratic forces; and a genuine push to re-integrate Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into the world community. This paper explains American foreign policy from an Arab world perspective, taking into account recent regional developments with clear implications on the U.S.’ behavior. This paper discusses the nature of American foreign policy as a product of the socio- and political dynamics of the Gulf region; it is presented here as a reactive policy, but not a dependent policy. The U.S. has maintained control of its standing in the Arab world while adapting to new conditions to protect its national interest. In this context, this analysis is a departure from other studies emphasizing America’s global power, imperialism, and/or oil as the driving force of its foreign policy; the Arab world/Gulf region is treated as a unit of analysis, with its own internal dynamics eliciting changes in America’s foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many American foreign policy experts have spoken out against the Bush doctrine–and against its first application, the war on Iraq. But at the same time they have overwhelmingly refrained from criticizing its assessment of the new dangers that face America today. Why have even most American critics of the Bush doctrine accepted the threat assessment upon which it rests? This is the primary puzzle addressed in this paper. The paper argues that the absence of significant debate about the nature of the threat neither reflects "obvious" world realities, nor is it a "natural" reaction to the events of September 11. Rather, the Bush doctrine’s mainstream critics have endorsed its threat assessment because in fact they had long since arrived at the very same assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since September 11, 2001 terror has been a word in the forefront of the minds of many Americans. Terror was one of the reasons given for the war in Iraq, as was a desire to "free the Iraqis" from their own source of terror, a ruthless dictator. This study examines the language used in media reports of the war in Iraq between September 12, 2006 and January 12, 2007 in all articles mentioning the war in the New York Times. Words used to describe events in Iraq are analyzed to understand how the war is conceptualized. Reasons for remaining in Iraq, and debates on why the United States went there are analyzed for word content and sources quoted, since some sources have more authority than others. Any mention of democracy, enhanced freedom, or restricted rights are also examined to present a picture of how the war in Iraq is portrayed in the New York Times. While violence is an essential part of war, it can be portrayed in numerous ways, and the framing of war can influence how citizens view it and policies related to war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various media and academic sources alleged the politicization of United States intelligence leading to the 2003 Iraq War. However, two government bodies tasked to investigate the overall intelligence prior to the Iraq War, the Senate Select Committee and the Silberman-Rob Commission, concluded that intelligence was not politicized prior to the war. These conflicting views create a puzzle. Was intelligence politicized prior to the Iraq War or was it not? This question addresses the larger issue of the nexus between the intelligence community and decision-makers in the U.S. foreign policy-making process. Recognizing the intelligence community as an important actor in foreign policy-making, this paper first examines the meaning of intelligence politicization within the existing academic literature. Building upon Alexander George's framework of trade-off dilemmas in Presidential decision-making, it places existing concepts of intelligence politicization into an adapted framework that accounts for both policy-makers and intelligence professionals. The paper then uses this framework to assess the specific case of the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, analyzing the period between the 9/11 attack and the start of the 2003 war. It most specifically scrutinizes the official reports issued by the above investigative bodies and concludes that intelligence politicization did indeed occur prior to the Iraq War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the relationship between the media and public opinion by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. Specifically, this work has two sections. First, I analyzed all the content of the two news papers' articles regarding the war from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. This work reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. Among other things, the study quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in the degree of negativity about the U.S. policies toward Iraq (The negativity was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.)The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, particularly, the end of 2003, the New York Times also becomes gradually critical of their government. In some months, the New York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.Second, this work statistically examines whether media's impact is significant in shaping public opinion. This work constructs a statistical model to test hypotheses about the media's impact on public opinion during the Iraq War. Variables in the model include: the data of content analysis of two news papers, misery index (consumer price index and jobless rate), sentiment toward their leaders (presidential supporting rating in the United States and Japanese Cabinet supporting rating in Japan, respectively) and public favorability toward other nations. The result discovers that poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi's critical assessments of the Japanese government's Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times' unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government's policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings. Finally, as a conclusion, this study ponders ramifications of media's content toward public policy process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Presidents take unilateral action because they are surrounded by political appointees who encourage a President's natural inclination to bypass Congress when it comes to war and war-making related decisions. This paper examines the President George W. Bush's unprecedented use of private military contractors in the Iraq Theater of Operations as an example of unilateral bypassing of the Congress. This bypassing is done by the Executive in order to achieve policy goals in an increasingly unpopular war. In examining the Presidency, this paper will use an institutional perspective, recognizing that Presidential power stems from politics and governing structures as well as law. In particular, this paper will focus on key institutional relationships within the Executive, which will enable a more insightful explanation of how and why the use of private military contractors on the battlefield has increased so rapidly in the last two decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the relationship between the media and public opinion by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. Specifically, this work has two sections. First, I analyzed all the content of the two news papers' articles regarding the war from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. This work reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. Among other things, the study quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in the degree of negativity about the U.S. policies toward Iraq (The negativity was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.). The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, particularly, the end of 2003, the New York Times also becomes gradually critical of their government. In some months, the New York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.Second, this work examines whether media's impact is significant in shaping public opinion. The result discovers that poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi's critical assessments of the Japanese government's Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times 'unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government's policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings. Finally, as a conclusion, this study ponders ramifications of media's content toward public policy process.This study investigates the relationship between the media and public opinion by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. Specifically, this work has two sections. First, I analyzed all the content of the two news papers' articles regarding the war from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. This work reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. Among other things, the study quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in the degree of negativity about the U.S. policies toward Iraq (The negativity was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.). The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, particularly, the end of 2003, the New York Times also becomes gradually critical of their government. In some months, the New York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.Second, this work examines whether media's impact is significant in shaping public opinion. The result discovers that poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi's critical assessments of the Japanese government's Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times 'unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government's policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper recasts the debate taking place in five major American newspapers and magazines over the meaning and the extent of ‘sacrifice’ called upon the United States by the War in Iraq in a historical perspective. It argues that the underlying tensions informing the debate can best be understood as a crisis of the "American imperial society". I argue that the United States may also qualify as an ‘empire’ before we even begin to look at its ‘foreign relations’ or its global politics . This is especially true of the place occupied by three founding minorities of the Republic: Blacks, Native Americans and Hispanics. The "imperial society model" also offers an explanation as to why race has seemed to play almost no part in the present journalistic contest over military sacrifice in the War in Iraq by alluding to the political technologies set in place in response to the crisis of the Vietnam era. Rather than suggesting that past imperial dynamics no longer adequately describe tensions in American society, this paper concludes by showing how affirmative action policies on minority sacrifice in the US army point to the persistance of imperial social relations. It also sketches out how the War in Iraq has exacerbated many of the contradictions inherent in the all-volunteer army. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the complex relationship between the United Nations and the United States under the two Bush Administrations. The key point of comparison is the role of the United Nations in each Bush’s war against Iraq. It pays particular concern both to the perceived legality of each military operation as well as the political relationship each President had with the world body. From this point the paper will expand to examine the role of the US in UN peacekeeping, in the creation of the international criminal tribunals, in environmental protection and sustainable development, and the personal relationship each President had with the Secretary-General. The most significant variables which will explain the similarities and differences between the two Bush Administrations are the a) American Exceptionalism and what Edward Luck calls American Exemptionalism; b) the relative domestic attitudes of the American public toward the UN; c) the role of the United States as global hegemon as well as the leading “norms entrepreneur”, to use the words of John Ruggie; d) the different challenges the US and the UN faced in these two periods; e) the historical development of the UN and perceptions of its proper role in world affairs, with an eye toward the intervening Clinton Administration. It will conclude with some thoughts about the future of the relationship between the United Nations and the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise in Lebanon of Hezbollah’s influence, and Iran’s growing ambition toward regional supremacy,have culminated in bringing to surfaceâ€"in a manner and intensity perhaps not seen for centuriesâ€"one of the great historical tensions underlying the Muslim world, i.e., the Shia-Sunni divide. The roots of the current antagonism between the two groups are indeed very complex, based on various historical, theological, ideological, socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors created by a 1400 year-old civilizational dynamics. As a result, the Shia-Sunni “battle” is being fought under different guises, inspired by various dynamics, and with unequal intensity across the greater Middle East. However, despite the apparent heterogeneity of causes and factors involved, as this paper will demonstrate, one of the central premises upon which the Shia-Sunni divide was historically based, and which constitutes today one of the great challenges facing the Middle East, is the divergent views that each community holds with respect to the nature and form of government. This paper will argue that in spite of the many differences that exist within the broader Shia and Sunni communities, the overall set of conflicting beliefs with respect to the form of government and state constitutes a transcending factor. Therefore, changes that have been brought about by post-9/11 events, and the ways in which they have offset the balance of power and power relations within the greater Middle East, have once more given rise to a clash of these two distinct visions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since World War II, the United States government has frequently engaged its military abroad but support from leading transatlantic alliesâ€"Britain, France, and Italyâ€"has varied. In some cases, like Vietnam, allies responded to requests from Washington by refusing to provide troops to aid in the fighting. In other cases, like Kosovo, leading allies put their troops in harm’s way, providing support for the U.S.-led fighting force. The paper posits a neoclassical realist (i.e., based in international power and security but also sensitive to domestic factors) explanation of variance in allied support. First, it argues that an ally will be more likely to support the U.S. if it perceives the target of intervention to be a threat to its own interests. Second, an ally will be more likely to support the U.S. if it highly values its alliance relationship with the U.S. and perceives its support will impact the relationship. Third, the paper argues that an ally will be more likely to support the U.S. if its domestic public opinion favors support or if electoral competition is low (e.g., because of an unpopular opposition party). The paper provides preliminary analysis of seven cases where the United States put its forces in harm’s way and asked its allies for support: Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the 2003 Iraq War. The paper evaluates the neoclassical realist explanation compared to an alternative explanation rooted in constructivist theory. The paper concludes with recommendations for American policymakers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent books and commentaries on the current Iraq war suggest that Bush's decision making reflects some of the errors found in Janis's (1982) classic groupthink model. In a previous paper, we found much evidence to suggest that Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was plagued by many of the antecedents and symptoms of the original groupthink model. We found that concurrence seeking tended to result in such errors as overestimation of the group, closed mindedness, and pressures toward uniformity. This paper evaluates the decision making process and its impact on the outcome of war. We examine what types of errors were made and how such mistakes contributed to U.S. failure to achieve its stated goals in the Iraq war. The paper uses the groupthink model as a starting point but moves beyond groupthink by incorporating some of the ideas found in the suggested revision of the model (‘t Hart 1994; ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 2004). More specifically, we highlight the impact of presidential leadership style and advisory systems on group interaction patterns (management and processing of information) and outcomes. We test both models using content analysis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will explore the numerous accounts of failure in US decision-making regarding Iraq, before and after the invasion, using cognitive as well as bureaucratic interpretations of foreign policy. It will elucidate and deepen our understanding of factors at work that impeded the US decision to invade and occupy Iraq. The paper will offer a bridge between theory and empirical research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often thought that success impedes substantial change in the ideas underpinning and the discourses legitimating foreign policy and that failure is necessary, although not sufficient, for such change. Yet, when viewed through the lens of narrative, this proposition is not borne out by the history of US foreign policy in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Korean War, made possible by the emerging Cold War, was widely seen as a failure, but it led to the consolidation of the so-called Cold War consensus, not its rejection. The debacle of Vietnam led to only the partial unraveling of that consensus, as substantial elements remained intact through the 1970s and facilitated Reagan’s rise. The Iraq fiasco does not appear to have opened up great fissures in the edifice of the War on Terror, to which the administration had bound it so tightly. The greatest changes in America’s foreign-affairs narratives have in fact come in the wake of unalloyed victory, as previous narratives came to seem less illegitimate or wrong than irrelevantâ€"such as after the Second World War and the Cold War. The proposed paper seeks to explain why policy failure has not led to wholesale narrative change, even when it might have been expected. The key lies in the rhetoric of opposition elites, to which mass audiences turn as the policy’s supporters lose credibility. Because policy failures typically reveal themselves as such only in stages, opposition elites early on have incentives to depart only from elements of the existing dominant narrative, and consequently their criticism reproduces much of that narrative. Later, once the fiasco is well established and opposition elites wish to depart from the narrative that had sustained the failure, they find themselves locked into that narrative whose core they had themselves recently reproduced, and they find the path to meaningful narrative change blocked. To substantiate these claims, the paper will explore empirically the dynamics of political opposition during America’s wars in Korea, Vietnam, and, if space permits, Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How will the US pursue the “war or terror” after the Bush administration? While changing the name of the American strategy will almost certainly be part of the new approach what will also be required is a disentangling of the various conceptions of the “war on terror” which emerged during the Bush Administration. This paper will demonstrate how the Bush Administration’ approach inflated and conflated the threats which America faced and developed competing strategies to deal with these threats.The “Counter Terrorism” strategy focused on the terrorists themselves, involved traditional counter-terrorism techniques and lead logically to war in Afghanistan. The second strategy, ‘Pre-emption and Pre-eminence’, represented a step change in Washington’s conceptualisation of the terrorist threat and how to deal with it. The third approach, the ‘Forward Strategy for the Democratisation of the Middle East’, sought to identify both the root causes of and the long term solutions to the War on Terrorism. This paper shows how and why American thinking evolved in this way and how the tensions between these different strategies have complicated America’s task of dealing with the terrorist threat. It argues that only by disaggregating these different threats and responses will it be possible to develop a coherent and workable strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key question in political psychology is how political actors update their expectations on policy outcomes and how they attribute blame, both publicly and privately, for bad outcomes. The US invasion of Iraq, now generally but not universally considered a mistake, provides an opportunity to explore this question. The paper will track the publicly stated expectations of the members of Congress who voted in the fall of 2002 in favor of authorizing the use of force in Iraq. It will focus on expectations on such issues as the likelihood of finding WMDs in Iraq, the likelihood of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the likely aftermath of the initial intervention (the prospects for peace, democracy, or civil conflict), the expected costs and duration of the conflict, and judgments on whether the 2002 vote was a mistake. Using both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the paper will assess why some members of Congress updated their public expectations more rapidly and radically than others, looking at such factors as party affiliation, margin of victory in the member's last election, prior military service, foreign policy experience, and professional training prior to entering Congress. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the question of whether and to what degree citizens are responsible collectively for the actions of their state. In contrast to current accounts of collective responsibility which focus on causality or affect as means for transmitting responsibility, the paper develops an alternative account, the "authorized state" model. This model, drawn from core intuitions of the social contract tradition, sees collective responsibility as being transmitted through the state as the agent or representative of its citizens. Having developed this model as an ideal type, the paper then assesses under what circumstances the model is most applicable, arguing that it is most relevant (1) when a collective undertakes unified, often violent or coercive action (such as in war), (2) when that action is undertaken through democratic procedures relatively free of manipulation or deception and (3) where such action does not entail the application of collective punishment. The paper finally applies the model to the U.S. war in Iraq to assess the collective responsibilty of U.S. citizens for the outcomes of that war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper diagnoses public opinion in the US and the four European countries on the three cases of use of force undertaken in the post-Cold War era - Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraqi Wars (2003). Taking a comprehensive view of the existing polling an aggregate analytical method is devised to map out and explain what generates 'support for use of force' in the US and the EU4 (UK, France, Germany and Italy). Three theories of public opinion and use of force are empirically tested. Firstly, the principal policy objectives thesis mirrors the differences in primary policy objectives of military actions. Secondly, the ends and means calculus thesis argues that public support is generated by utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits of military operations. Lastly, the interrelationship approach to leadership effect thesis originates in the indispensable role of leader in moulding public opinion and the impact of leadership popularity on diagnosis of public support for the use of force. Incorporating alternative variables into a multidimensional approach to public opinion on use of force this paper argues that the while the presence of the legitimate recognition and the absence of risks in military operation are sine qua non for Europeans to support wars which foment the coercive foreign policy restraint objective; Americans tend to evaluate wars more cost-aversively. Taken as a whole, this paper analyses 'European' participation to the US-led use of force from mass public opinion level through statistical investigation of aggregate public opinion survey data (1998-2004). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that there is an emerging consensus among realists that the U.S. should abandon its hegemonic strategy and adopt an offshore balancing strategy. Here, Iraq and the so called war terrorism (or "long war," or "global counter-insurgency," as some American officials sometimes refer to it) have been the catalysts. Increasingly, it is recognized that U.S. aims in the Persian Gulf/Middle East - and the American military presence in the region - have fueled terrorism, and caused Iran to self-defensively seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. A number of leading realists now argue that the best strategy for the U.S. is to extricate itself from Iraq, reduce its regional footprint, and adopt an offshore balancing strategy.In this paper, I make the case for offshore balancing as America's next grand strategy. In so doing, I argue that offshore balancing can be considered as a "wedge" (or wedge-like) strategy for two reasons. First, at the great power level, it can be used to break up potential alliances directed against the United States, and also to force possible future rivals of the United States to focus their security policies on each other rather than on counterbalancing the U.S. Second, in the Middle East an offshore balancing posture would help drain away much of the opposition to American policies that fosters Islamic terrorism directed at the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American foreign policy has long been viewed by scholars as an "invitation to struggle" between the executive and legislative branches. During periods of international tension the advantage in this struggle goes to the president as commander in chief, especially during times of war. Although publicly voicing dissent at such times often carries great political risks, some members of Congress see going public as the only means they have to challenge the president in his conduct of the war. Through content analysis of the New York Times for selected periods of unified government during the Vietnam and Iraq wars (1965 and 2005), this preliminary study examines who in Congress went public to try to influence the content and direction of the president's war policy. The paper finds that despite the shift in Congress from institutionalized to individualized pluralism that followed the Vietnam war, the "experts-cum-insiders" of the congressional committees most responsible for foreign policy continue to dominate the public debate on questions of war and peace. The study also finds that members of Congress who are not in the president's party have been much more likely to go public during the Iraq war than was the case during Vietnam. At the same time, the paper provides evidence of a highly organized media strategy on the part of the minority Republican leadership in 1965 to influence President Johnson's Vietnam policy. The data also show evidence of a widening partisan gap in foreign policy in Congress. Whereas in 1965, President Johnson received similar levels of support and opposition from Democrats and Republicans, in 2005, very few Democrats were willing to support President Bush, reflecting the ideological polarization of the party system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on BBC News and its changing role in the United States. Recent developments suggest that a new, powerful hybrid BBC is emerging in the United States. This paper examines a number of "faces" the BBC presents to the United States. 3 of these faces are more traditional, but the BBC has now added a fourth: as a "super-alternative" news/information source in the United States, carrying an aura of credibility that sets it apart from U.S. mainstream news media. It is the BBC's "multifaceted" nature, its reputation for honesty and integrity, and its independence from U.S. political forces, that allows it to be considered in this way. All in all, it's an attractive package for many U.S. news consumers and, potentially, a powerful combination for influencing U.S. public opinion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration's definition of political success in post-Saddam Iraq has changed almost as frequently as their rationale for the initial military invasion. Gone are the heroically optimistic predictions of peace, economic development, religious tolerance, and multi-cultural civil society in Iraq, which would then serve as the first falling domino in an irresistible cascade of democratization throughout the Middle East. Chastened by rising military, financial, and political costs, the Administration now speaks more soberly of satisfaction with a fairly stable, some-day reasonably democratic government for the New Iraq.Despite the fact that the characterization of success has been a moving target, one definition of abject political failure in Iraq has remained a constant: the fragmentation of the country into separate, possibly warring ethno-religious enclaves. The Bush Administration's emphatic warnings regarding the consequences of Iraqi balkanization have been echoed by the governments of at least eight Arab countries in the region.Notwithstanding the Administration's best efforts, however, recent events indicate that civil war and territorial partition are increasingly likely outcomes. For instance, July 2006 was the bloodiest month so far in terms of sectarian violence in Iraq. The peril of the situation was inadvertently acknowledged the following month by a leaked diplomatic note to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the note, the outgoing British ambassador to Iraq William Patey warned that civil war and a division of Iraq "is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy". Patey's warnings were echoed just hours later by two senior American military commanders in testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Iraq's former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has stated, "If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is." Given the preexisting hostilities between the ethnic and sectarian groups of Iraq, partition of the country in the event of civil war is increasingly probable.The heuristic exploration of just such a hypothetically fragmented Iraq is the subject of this paper. Specifically, it will apply traditional geopolitical methodologies of analysis to assess the political, economic, and military viability of an Iraq trisected into Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish political entities. In doing so, the paper will trace the roots of ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq and compare Iraq to two divergent models of national devolution.The paper concludes that the invasion of Iraq was ill-advised from a geopolitical perspective, that the demographic conditions within Iraq suggest that civil war and partition are likely outcomes, and that while the Kurdish and Shi'a regions would be quite viable as independent states, the Sunni rump state would face daunting political, economic, and military challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of newspaper coverage in an American newspaper and an Arabic paper revealed that the coverage of the war in Iraq was framed differently in each newspaper. The “who,” “what,” and “why” emphasized in each paper were significantly different. These differences lend credence to the idea that frames are ideologically based and that the war was seen differently in different parts of the world. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This has been a year of major distress for the American Intelligence Community (IC). Questionable intelligence about weapons of mass destruction led to questionable decisions about going to war in Iraq, which alienated large sectors of civil society and governments around the world. Of course, there are also big fans of this decision, both in the IC and elsewhere. But that is only one of the major problems that spies and intelligence analysts face. For example, there is a purge going on in the CIA as we meet today, as the fans of global intervention drive off critics there. A major "reform" bill was passed, and neutered by the Pentagon among others. This paper will focus on a largely taboo topic, the many ways by which intelligence tradecraft induces mental illness among many (not all) intelligence professionals. This leads in turn to errors of every kind. It leads to difficulty learning from past mistakes, and coping with novel problems. It also leads to very high rates of divorce, alcoholism and pain among our spies and analysts. And finally, it leads to confusing friends with enemies. Of particular importance to the field of Peace Studies is a common confusion between peace activists and "terrorists" (or in an earlier era, with communists). When fear is great and security institutions are stressed to find some bad guys, some of them literally cannot distinguish between "peace activists" and whoever the source of fear for the day is. Dissent is confused with treason. Thus did J. Edgar Hoover target civil rights activists, anti-war activists, labor activists and many others during the infamous COINTELPRO days. Some of the less stable people in our current FBI and DHS (Department of Homeland Security) are compiling lists of "potential terrorists" today that include peace activists, labor, human rights enthusiasts, environmentalists, feminists, "liberals," etc. This problem is particularly acute in the Joint Terrorism Taskforces that have been ordered to identify "potential terrorists" in every county in America. Since actual terrorists are rare and very hard to find, but peace activists and other liberal groups are relatively abundant, public and easy to find, many peace people are on such lists today. The paper that follows looks at a range of clinical mental problems that are induced or exacerbated by the practices of IC agencies (called "tradecraft" in their jargon) and how such problems make working for peace more difficult during times of war. Paradoxically and tragically, they also make solving traditional and legitimate security problems of intelligence more difficult too. In both ways protecting our people and preserving freedom become harder. Stressed out spies and CI guys (counter intelligence) make many errors, of which confusing peace people with terrorists is just one especially irritating example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that NATO can still play a useful role in providing security to its members after September 11. The alliance had been prepared for terrorist attacks politically and militarily and continues to adjust to a new security environment. As a consequence, it acted swiftly and decisively in response to September 11. In addition NATO generated two important "second image reversed" effects. First, its defense planning system coordinated and implemented common military goals and ensured interoperabililty among national forces. Second, its decisions changed the political discovered in member states. Using the example of Germany -- currently the most reluctant ally of the U.S. -- the paper shows that the discourse changed from "(self)interest" to reputation" after NATO invoked article 5. However, when important conditions are missing such as agreed contingency plans and pre-delegated authority NATO is weak and indecisive. This was the case when NATO discussed the war in Iraq and defending Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the popularity of the embedded press system as used to cover the recent war in Iraq, this paper considers methods for the evaluation of press coverage during war. Beginning with an assessment of the nature and goals of the three core constituencies of press-military relations (the press, the military, and the public), the paper identifies core outcomes relevant to evaluation of wartime coverage, and suggests methods for the measurement of each outcome. The paper concludes with a notional evaluation of the news coverage of major U.S. wars since WWII based on informal histories of these conflicts. Preliminary assessment of the press coverage of the war in Iraq suggests positive results in most outcomes relative to previous conflicts. The methods advocated here could be used to improve evaluation of coverage of future wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two terms, like no others, dominated debates leading up to the Iraq War in 2003: ?unilateralism? and ?irrelevance?. The first was used to characterize US policy toward Iraq and the second was a common theme of the Bush administration which saw UN inaction, or rather lack of support for American policy, likely to render the organization, irrelevant. The two publicized ?debates? at the Security Council, on February 14 and March 7, as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell?s February 5th multimedia presentation on the case for war against Iraq, were crucial in forming the impressions about both the US and the UN. Most of the general public, in and outside of the US, saw these as both ?defining moments? and new developments in international relations in general and with respect to the Middle East in particular. Some were quite alarmed by the course of action taken by the Bush administration which seemed determined on placing US on a collision course with much of the world community, especially erstwhile allies France and Germany. Others, mostly of a conservative bent, thought it was time for the US to standup for anti-American forces in the UN and demonstrate to leadership commensurate with its status as the lone superpower. The tragic events of September the 11th were on the mind of both camps, with the anti-Bush forces claiming that the War on Terrorism called for a multilateral approach and the pro-Bush forces arguing that the lesson of 911 is a ?preemptive? American approach, regardless of what anyone else thinks of it. For this latter camp, both American unilateralism and the rendering of the UN as irrelevant were not only welcome but twin goals of the same project. Indeed the two (unilateralism and UN irrelevance) have very much been at the heart of US strategy in the Middle East. In this paper, we want to examine US policy by focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq. We will show that US policy has, at least since 1967, been one of unmitigated hegemony, whether unilateral or multilateral, subordinating to its own the interests of the people within the region?and perhaps perpetuating the conflict process. We will show that the US has successfully maneuvered itself into the position of sole arbiter over war and peace issues in the region, as best illustrated by its monopoly over the ?peace process.? In all of this, the US has acted much as had the European powers as they sought to ?re-make the Middle East.? And, just like them, it has viewed multilateralism and unilateralism simply as interchangeable means for conquest and hegemony. We will begin with a discussion of multilateralism in the next section, and, in Section III, we will briefly discuss the European legacy, the so-called Eastern Question. The aim to lay the ground for showing continuity between European colonialism and American hegemony in the region. To show the manner in which American hegemony unfolds, we will discuss two important cases. Section IV will cover key statements of policy in the form of presidential doctrines, then we will delve into Arab-Israel ?peace process.? In Section V, we will discuss the long war against Iraq, 1991-present. In the Conclusion we will revisit the issue of hegemony and its causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the development of the American Foreign Policy from the early 80`s until the Iraq war from a structurationist point of view. The analysis is focused on the definition of the agents and their actions. Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, interpretations of it by Jabri, Emirbayer and Mische and the works of other scholars of the theory is used to explain or describe the Iraqi case along with relativist explanations. An agency-modelled description of the preceding period, the war and its aftermath is provided. A special emphasis is placed on the duality of the structure: that is the precondition and the unintended consequences of peoples’ agencies. The ongoing interaction between the agency and the structure is analysed in terms of the goal-orientedness, attachment to power, differentiation from the institutions and the projective qualities of agencies within the context of Iraq war.Paper ends with a discussion whether the outcome of the analysis is an explanation or a description of the conflict behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States currently plays a key role in shaping the European security enviroment and future agenda. But the events of 911 and the war on Iraq have raised fundamental questions about what role the United States sees for itself in Europe and in Europe’s role in the world. This paper examines developments in the Bush Doctrine and assesses the likely way forward in US policy and the impact this will have on transatlantic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frequent threat inflation has become a persistent political problem for the U.S. since World War II. A pattern has emerged: inflation begins with attacks on the intelligence community, followed by inflated threat assessments by outside experts, which serve as fodder for political propaganda campaigns. This paper examines two related episodes: First, the Team B attack on the intelligence community in the 1970’s which helped lead to overestimation of the Soviet threat in the early 1980’s. Second, attacks on the intelligence community in the 1990’s, the Rumsfeld Report of 1998, and the greatly exaggerated rogue state threat after September 11. Examination of strategies and key actors, and links to 2003 Iraq war threat inflation. Concludes that these overestimations of threat are political, not caused by insufficient information. Speculations are advanced on possible ways the U.S. democratic process could be fixed to lessen the problem--fix its "marketplace of ideas." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines American behavior since 911 through the war against Iraq through the lenses of Hedley Bull’s notion of the five mechanisms that preserve international order (The Anarchical Society: balance of power, great power management, war, international law and diplomacy. I suggest that American behavior, while often interpreted in terms of advancing its own hegemonic interests, actually reflects a broader attempt to preserve international order as scholars and decisionmakers alike know it- an order based on states and the units of the game. I suggest that the 911 events have threatened to undermine this basic order, as they gave such prominence to a non-state actor. This has been a challenge to our theories, as well as to the decision-makers who wanted to use them, becuase basic IR theories are founded on the assumption of inter-state order. For example, the main theortical structures dealing with detternece assume one is deterring rational, internationally-accountable, states. The American determination to shift the war on terror to the war against the axis of evil, reflects the attempt to shift the international game back to the familiar inter-state level, where the rules are known and solutions appear to be available. It is no wonder that the two states most strongly opposed to American policy are France and Germany, who in their own experience in Europe have indeed gone beyond the conception of an inter-state world order... I address all these issues by examinning the challenges and changes that have occured in the five order-preserving mechanisms a-la- Bull. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ankara’s failure to permit the US to launch a ground attack into northern Iraq from Turkish soil could have a substantial impact on the future evolution of Turkish-US relations. For Washington, Turkey’s strategic significance derives from its strategic location, and the denial of access to it threatens Turkey’s utility to the US. For Turkey, Washington ? and the Pentagon in particular ? has been a major supporter, not only militarily but in Europe and at the IMF too. The crisis in Turkish-US relations over Iraq raises the question of whether Turkey’s domestic politics and regional concerns can be squared with Washington’s, and whether Turkey can be regarded as a close ally in pursuit of broader strategic objectives. The future of the Kurds too remains unsettled, and could still emerge as a crisis in Turkish security policy in ways that compromise Washington’s commitments and obligations. This paper will trace the unfolding of Turkish-US relations proceeding, during, and since the war with Iraq, and consider the prospects for Turkish-US relations in their wake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the post-September 11th surge in bipartisanship mark the beginning of a new era of cooperation over foreign policy? A multivariate analysis of roll call voting in Congress on foreign policy issues over the past century suggests that the answer may be no. In this paper we show that bipartisanship’s fortunes are not only tied to international conditions, but depend on domestic electoral conditions as well. Of particular importance is public anxiety about foreign affairs and the number of party moderates in Congress. When security appears scarce, and party moderates are plentiful, as during the Cold War, bipartisanship over foreign policy is likely. But when moderate voices in Congress are in short supply, no matter how scarce security seems, bipartisanship is difficult to sustain. At a time when the center in America’s political life is weak, there is reason to wonder if the post-September 11th surge in bipartisanship will continue. The increasingly partisan debate over the war in Iraq, and whether it was really necessary, may be a harbinger of things to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]