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Copyright of Memoria y Civilizacion is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, S.A. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Human Review is the property of Eagora Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronēsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self‐controlled and akratic agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of University of Sharjah Journal for Humanities & Social Sciences is the property of University of Sharjah - Scientific Publishing Unit and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines D. von Hildebrand's view of the heart, as well as The Heart, published in 1965. It shows how the heart, without any pompous and sentimental vision, is the center of an intense affective activity, as important as the intellectual, for the lived knowledge of the values and goods that structure reality. It starts from the mystery of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the noblest sign of human nature, to reach the tender affectivity, which implies knowing how to grasp the objective situation, and understand if there are authentic reasons for a particular behavior. To reach it, it is necessary to cross the Sacred Heart of Jesus where there is knowledge and wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Kantiana is the property of Sociedade Kant Brasileira and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper presents an excursus in the challenging philosophical topic of passion, with a special emphasis on the contribution made by the philosopher Michel Meyer. Firstly, the article focuses on the relevance of the concept of passion as a way of approaching philosophy. In this vein, relevant axes of this theme are outlined in the context done by the Western philosophy. Secondly, the article points out some important alignments of the classic dichotomy passion -- reason, one of the great leitmotifs of the explanation of passions. Thirdly, given the originality of the approach developed by Michel Meyer, the passions are examined within the sophisticated problematological framework, who succeeded to put in a new perspective an old philosophical term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the anthropology, ethics, and politics of Helvetius, focusing on the theme of power and the passions that gravitate around it, and highlighting the transition from a position that could be broadly defined as "anarchic" (all powers are bad) to one that realistically takes power for granted as an insurmountable horizon (and which leads to the future-laden idea of a "democratic despotism"). By analyzing these themes, it questions the common interpretation of Helvetius's thought as a compact block ("Le système d'Helvétius"), emphasizing the way in which the theoretical reworkings presented in De l'homme must be understood in light of the internal tensions of De l'esprit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the first half of Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza presents his directions for mitigating the passions through reason. He touts his account of the power of reason over the passions as ground-breaking and unique, while positioning himself squarely within the traditional debate of akrasia, or weakness of will. Spinoza claims he is the first to identify the affects through their characteristic effects, and demonstrate the way these effects can be countered by the mind's activity. It follows that Spinoza's claim for originality can be explained in (at least) two ways: first, passions themselves have been misunderstood, and second, previous philosophers have misunderstood the relationship between reason and the passions. In the first part of this paper, I place Spinoza's discussion of the passions and reason's power over them in a historical context. Next, I present Spinoza's definition of the affects, and his directions for 'destroying' the passions. In the third section I point to the differences between my interpretation and that of recent commentators. Finally, I discuss the way in which Spinoza's directions for mitigating the passions serve as the psychological basis for his moral theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Descartes' theory of the passions has important connections to his view that nonhuman animals are automata. In this paper, I show how critics of animal automatism exploited these connections. I interpret a criticism of animal automatism developed by Gabriel Daniel (1649–1728). Daniel argues that animal automatism commits Descartes to an implausible account of the phenomenology of conflicts between passion and reason. If animal bodies act by mere automatic mechanism, then when a human being resists their animal impulses they should experience a conflict between the disposition of their body and their rational soul. However, our experience of conflicts between passion and reason instead suggests that these conflicts are internal to the soul. Daniel's objection to Cartesian animal automatism was later criticized by David Renaud Boullier (1699–1759), but Boullier himself raises an objection to Cartesian animal automatism that develops insights from Daniel. I argue that Boullier succeeds in raising a powerful objection to Cartesian animal automatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By turning his focus to individuals – the profile of billionaires as the people they are – Peter Hägel offers in his book Billionaires in World Politics an interesting move towards agency, showing that their power, even if situated in a complex economic structure, also consists in bending, changing, or setting the rules of how the game is played. After having followed the move of the pendulum from structure to agency with Hägel, in this paper I suggest that moving back to structural analyses could again provide new insights. I argue that in order to have a more complete picture of the billionaires-and-politics puzzle, it is required to not only look at agency as a kind of reflexive phenomenon, but also to provide a more historically informed genealogy of the conditions under which billionaires' passions have been shaped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Descartes, the passion of generosity—defined as legitimate self-esteem— appears to be egocentric, the result of agents' contemplation of their nature. Yet Cartesian generosity is also intended to serve as the foundation for other-regarding passions, attitudes, and dispositions. This paper examines this tension as it is addressed in the writings of an early Cartesian feminist, Mary Astell. We uncover the social dimension of generosity in Descartes's Passions of the Soul and demonstrate how Astell extends the Cartesian concept in her Serious Proposal. We argue that while there is an internal relationship between Cartesian generosity and good will toward others, Astell's work recognizes that generosity can only be fully actualized under equitable social conditions. We thus provide a deeper analysis of the role that this master passion plays in Descartes's ethical thought as well as a greater appreciation of the impact of Cartesian ethics on early modern feminism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]