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Global health security is an increasingly complex regime. The failures of global governance and norms of cooperation during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the re-entrenchment to nationalist policy-making have created impetus for new governance arrangements, institutions and policy development. These changes include amendments to the International health regulations (IHR), development of a pandemic convention or accord, convening of the High-Level Meeting on Pandemic Preparedness and Response, establishment of the Pandemic Fund, and development of the medical countermeasures platform, among others. These various developments claim to be in synergy with each other, but understanding of regime complexes and forum shifting from international relations reveal the power dyna mics which underlie these processes. I use these concepts to demonstrate how states are transferring negotiations from one institutional location to another in search of more favourable outcomes, or are creating strategic uncertainty within negotiations to avoid future accountability. I further highlight three risks posed by these developments: (i) an increasingly complex landscape for global health security; (ii) erosion of the World Health Organization's authority in global health security; and (iii) dominance of high-income state positions within these negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combating threats of infectious diseases has been increasingly framed as a global shared responsibility for a multi-actor framework of states, international organisations and nongovernmental actors. However, the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) has shown that this governance framework has not been able to limit the spread of this virus, despite the normative and legislative changes to global disease control. By unbundling the concept of responsibility, this article will assess how global shared responsibility may have failed because accountability does not fall on any one state or stakeholder, highlighting an inherent weakness in the global disease governance regime. The paper concludes that a move towards multiple responsibilities may prove a more effective mechanism for ensuring global health security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]