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In his explanation of human action Alfred Schutz resorts mainly to Max Weber's notion of subjective meaning and Husserl's notion of type. For him subjective meaning seems more important to understand human action than the fact that social actors internalize normative values. Accordingly, validity has mainly to do with projects of action, with fulfilled (or unfulfilled) expectations and to the stock of knowledge available, along with the actor's system of relevances. This raises two characteristic Schutzian problems: 1) the relation between the subjective meaning of an action and the objective criteria (namely, the juridical and the ethical ones) according to which any action can be evaluated; 2) the relation between an actor and his fellow human beings that arguably share the same system of relevances and act in the same normative framework. In this paper, I intend to offer an analysis of these issues, resorting mainly to Schutz's 1934 book Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt, and in some unpublished manuscripts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-sector social collaborations are increasingly recognised as valuable inter-organizational arrangements that seek to combine the commercial capabilities of private sector companies with the deep knowledge of social and environmental issues enrooted in social sector organizations. In this paper we empirically examine the configurations of conditions that lead to lasting cross-sector social collaboration. Situating our enquiry in Schütz's theory of life-worlds and the reciprocity literature, we employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to analyse data gathered from 60 partners in 30 cross-sector social collaborations. We find two distinct types of configurational pathways leading to lasting cross-sector social collaboration which we label reciprocal economic exchange based on direct reciprocity, and reciprocal social exchange based on generalised reciprocity. The pathways vary in terms of the delivery of expected and unexpected resources and benefits. We introduce the concept of double relationality to explain the interdependence of structure and action in lasting cross sector social collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Schutz is, without a doubt, one of the phenomenologists that contributed the most to the reflection on how to apply insights from phenomenological philosophy to the, empirical and theoretical, human and social sciences. However, his work tends to be neglected by many of the current advocates of phenomenology within these disciplines. In the present paper, I intend to remedy this situation. In order to do so, I will systematically revisit his mundane and social-scientifically oriented account of phenomenology, which, as I shall show, emerges from a theoretical confrontation with the Husserlian distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is initially striking about Alfred Schutz's phenomenological account of the musical experience, which encompasses both the performance and reception of music, is his apparent dismissal of the corporeal and spatial aspects of that experience. The paper argues that this is largely a product of his wider understanding of temporality wherein the mind and time are privileged over the body and space, respectively. While acknowledging that Schutz's explicit or stated view is that the body and space are relatively insignificant to his account, the paper reveals how they actually feature significantly in the latter, but in ways that remain largely implicit. First, the analysis demonstrates that the mental and temporal aspects of Schutz's phenomenology of the musical experience cannot be considered independently of their interrelations with the equally important, albeit under-examined, corporeal, and spatial aspects. Concepts from Nietzsche's early aesthetics are recruited to fulfil this task. Second, the analysis challenges Schutz's dismissal of space in his theory of music perception. Lastly, it reveals the crucial, yet implicit, role of the body and space in his key examination of the intersubjective phenomenon he terms 'making music together'. By presenting the above arguments, the paper aims to draw out the implicit dimensions of Schutz's phenomenology of music and thereby enrich his influential account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces phenomenology‐based ethnography as a novel ethnographic approach for research in management studies and organizational analysis and describes three methods that have been developed from this approach: life‐world analytical ethnography, focused ethnography and go‐along ethnography. Phenomenology‐based ethnography has emerged from developments in sociology that draw on 'social phenomenology' developed by Alfred Schütz. These developments involve the use of phenomenology‐based ethnographic methods that shift the focus of research onto participants' subjective experiences of the field further than has been required by other ethnographic approaches. This paper uses a set of dimensions that allow a comparison of these phenomenology‐based methods' aims, techniques of data collection and analysis, and required effort. These three methods are then compared with current ethnographic methods used in organizational research and management studies. The paper concludes with a discussion that explores and addresses the critique of how phenomenology‐based ethnography conceives the relationship between the researcher and the research subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Review of Sociology is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The problem of the other was one of the central problems for the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. He investigated the other as the alter ego intensively in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which he introduced the conceptions of "analogical apperception'' and "pairing'' as fundamental forms of "passive synthesis.'' Although it is no doubt Husserl who investigated the other most seriously and intensively, there is an aporia in his theory of the other. If the other is an object of ego's intentional consciousness, the other turns out to be no more than a modification of the ego. In the face of such an aporia, some phenomenologists embarked upon inquiry into the other. This paper focuses primarily on Alfred Schutz's discussion of the "other'' in general and about the "stranger'' in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is the contention of this paper that the majority of scholars deal with a simplified notion of Schutz's understanding of social science. Specifically they tend to view Schutz's understanding of social science as containing only three postulates: logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and adequacy. However, such considerations tend to focus primarily upon 'Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action' (1953) and only engage with Schutz's other essays in a tertiary manner. This paper argues that only by giving due attention to Schutz's other work does it become clear what his full understanding social science is. A full picture must necessarily take into account the postulate of relevance or disinterestedness, postulate of clarity, and postulate of compatibility or tested observation. This paper will clarify the relationship of all these postulates which will necessarily require a number of amendments in order to achieve the greatest clarity possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents and discusses the correlations between John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy and Alfred Schutz's phenomenological philosophy -- both as contributions to building up a communicational paradigm useful as an epistemological grounding and a methodological framework for Communication Sciences. We discuss the possible knowledge present in the relationship between communication and philosophy starting from the seminal notions of communication for Schutz and Dewey. These authors' ideas relate to each other in the lifeworld or the natural environment, in the everyday life and in action. The conclusion of this paper demonstrates the application of philosophical notions to communication studies, to the perception of technology and to techniques related to technology, moving beyond a reductive and incomplete instrumental perception. Technology and techinique are all the intelligent means by both man's and natural environment's energy are directed and used to fulfill the human needs; and these are not limited to a few exterior forms nor comparatively mechanical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents critical views of the works of sociologist Alfred Schutz by sociologists Helmut R. Wagner, Jonathan B. Imber and David M. Rasmussen. In Schutz's theory, " value neutrality" means the non-assimilation of the fundamental anxiety and the exclusion of the experiences of music, business, friendship. Wagner traces what Schutz refers to in several places of his work as the fundamental anxiety biographically to Schutz's experience in the first World War. In his analysis of Schutz's" The Well-Informed Citizen," Imber suggests that ways of reading this paper are to see in it what the subtitle says," An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge," that is, a sketch of Schutz's conception of the sociology of knowledge. Rasmussen's "Explorations of the Lebenswelt: Reflections on Schutz and Habermas," criticizes Schutz's use and development of phenomenology, his construction of the social world on the basis of face-to-face relations, and his exclusively methodological critique of Weber.

Purpose -- The purpose of this paper is to examine how the boundaries of rhetoric have excluded important theoretical and practical subjects and how these subjects are recuperated and extended since the twentieth century. Its purpose is to foster the awareness on emerging new trends of rhetoric. Design/methodology/approach -- The methodology is based on an interpretation of the history of rhetoric and on the construction of a conceptual framework of the rhetoric of judgment, which is introduced in this paper. Findings -- On the subject of the extension of rhetoric from public speeches to any kinds of persuasive situations, the paper emphasizes some stimulating relationships between the theory of communication and rhetoric. On the exclusion and recuperation of the subject of rhetorical arguments, it presents the changing relationships between rhetoric and dialectics and emphasizes the role of rhetoric in scientific research. On the introduction of rhetoric of judgment and meanings it creates a conceptual framework based on a re-examination of the concept of judgment and the phenomenological foundations of the interpretative methods of social sciences by Alfred Schutz, relating them to symbolic interactionism and theories of the self. Originality/value -- The study on the changing boundaries of rhetoric and the introduction of the rhetoric of judgment offers a new view on the present theoretical and practical development of rhetoric, which opens new subjects of research and new fields of applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Schütz is often credited with providing sociology with a firm ground derived from phenomenology of science and justifying it as a science operating within natural attitude. Although his project of social science draws extensively on Edmund Husserl's theory of attitudes, it would be incorrect to assume that Schütz shares with the founder of phenomenology his conception of science. This paper compares Husserl's and Schütz's views on the structure and meaning of science and traces the roots of their radical divergence. Whereas Husserl increasingly emphasises the importance of phenomenological reduction for the genuine human science, Schütz eventually rejects reduction and restricts the social science to a specific system of relevancies within the reality of the lifeworld. This paper presents the argument that Schütz's conception eliminates the possibility of a phenomenological justification of social science, as it implies that there are no rationally justifiable grounds to pursue science. In this way, Schütz's views substantially differ from the phenomenological theory of science and become open to the phenomenological critique of naivety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the concept of the idealization of the interchangeability of phases of life as an enhancement, or rather as a further development of Alfred Schutz's general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives. It claims that the according figure of thought is a constitutive part of acts of understanding in everyday life where, in order to understand each other, individuals of different age-groups have to overcome the difference of perspectives that are attached to their particular ages. This is accomplished by a specific assumption that is also applied in the case of intrasubjective, autobiographical understanding. By discussing its sociological significance as well as its philosophical background, this paper introduces the idealization of the interchangeability of phases of life as a fundamental and universal figure of understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on Husserl's phenomenology and Bergson's philosophy of consciousness, Alfred Schutz, from an analysis of the consciousness behind individual actions, started theory building based on Weber's social scientific conceptual system according to its key concept of "meaning" and further developed his own structure of social world by the method of the Ideal Type. In this work, the issue of otherness has raised a series of sociological questions, especially the question of intersubjectivity. Within the tradition of social thoughts, via Schutz' beginning effort to answer the essential methodological question in modern sociology through the meaningful lifeworld that is based on the we-relations, the probability of intersubjectivity is not only a key question as to how sociology is possible; it is also a question of how society is possible. In this paper, with the discussion of Schutz's work placed within the history of methodological thinking, the author argues that Schutz's work on sociological methodology provides us with a new possibility to understand the lifeworld of modern individual, and further, a way to reflect upon current sociological research in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the complexities involved in young people's attempts to move away from criminal activity. This paper draws on qualitative data from a study that aimed to identify how young people negotiate transitions away from offending. The paper argues that an analysis of the subtle shifts in young people's perceptions and interpretations of their situation sheds light on the complex nature of desisting from crime. To do so, the paper focuses on the role of relevance in order to explore how these subtle shifts in thinking enable young people to reinterpret their lives and move towards desistance. By way of undertaking this analysis, this paper draws on Alfred Schutz's phenomenological approach to the nature of relevance to explore how young people shift between their known world of 'doing crime' and an unknown world of being 'straight and legitimate'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as "the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions" that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories of collective intentionality, because what happens is not planned in advance but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. The second and no less decisive reason is that jazz musicians act together in a very distinctive way, which casts into clear relief the interplay between togetherness and agonism, individual freedom and group commitment, which is contained in every human interaction. In other words, in free jazz we find what Hannah Arendt calls the "paradoxical" or "twofold" character of "human plurality." Starting with the analysis of two paradigmatic case studies—Charles Mingus's Folk Forms No. 1 and Ornette Coleman's Free Jazz: A Collective Improvisation—my main concern in this paper is to provide a phenomenological account of the individual-yet-plural intentionality that emerges and runs through the improvisatory process in the free jazz case. After having made the negative point that this phenomenon represents a challenge to the analytical theories of collective intentionality, I shall argue that it can be accounted for from a phenomenological perspective. My basic thesis is that the overall cohesiveness of the improvisatory process must be regarded as a meaningful realization of an overall feeling, shared and shaped together by musicians over time—and not as the execution of an advanced plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the differences in the spatial-temporal co-location of human individuals, Alfred Schutz divided the contemporaneous lifeworld into two major realms: the realm of consociates made up of individuals sharing a community of space and a community of time, and the realm of contemporaries made up of individuals sharing neither a community of space nor a community of time. Extending Schutz's phenomenological analysis to cyberspace, this paper delineates an emergent third realm – the realm of consociated contemporaries, in which individuals share a community of time without sharing a community of space. A central argument of this paper is that the emergence of this social domain in cyberspace reconfigures the structure of the lifeworld by creating a new spatial-temporal condition of human contact, which gives rise to a new mode of human interaction and a new form of human relationship. The revolution of electronic communication is therefore a revolution of the ways in which human individuals come to construct we-relationships with one another in shared meaning contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present new aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity and improve the understanding on how research can be developed in very restricted environments, such as the context of an organization managed using the methods of Project Management. And more generally, it introduces the rhetoric of judgment as a fundamental aspect involved in the development and specification of projects. Design/methodology/approach – The theoretical approach is based on the phenomenological theory of human intentional action developed by Alfred Schutz, in which the notion of mental project is more flexible than that of project management. In it the concepts of subaction and repeated action are considered a combination of similar actions already performed. The Kantian notion of judgment is introduced to outline self-persuasion as a fundamental source of creativity. Findings – The introduction of an extended notion of project and routine involving judgment expands the rational, generic and technical notion of project management. And the rhetorical aspect of judgment, at the individual level, establishes the possibility to deliver unexpected outcomes that are considered creative. Originality/value – The proposed notions of project and routines mediated through the rhetoric of judgment present theoretical and practical progress in the subject of managing projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to highlight different interpretations of the fundamental characteristics of the natural attitude, as formulated by Berger and Luckmann, and Alfred Schutz respectively. The first part of the paper explores the notion of taken for-granted in the everyday life-world in The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann and The Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil by Berger. The two essays show the presence of a articulated vision based on the same theoretical matrix. The second part of the paper analyses the essential characteristics of the natural attitude in the work of Husserl and Schutz. Although Berger and Luckmann are commonly viewed as being Schutzian scholars, their work actually presents significant differences, not only with respect to Husserl, but also to Schutz himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the relations between Schutzian theory and hermeneutics. After presenting the connections between hermeneutic thought and Schutz’s work from a historical point of view, it will argue that despite its significant differences from hermeneutic theory, Schutzian theory can be utilized as a kind of proto-hermeneutics. By now, the heterogeneous movement of the interpretive social sciences has reached an established position, but with their growing reliance on the impulses coming from philosophical hermeneutics, the latent problem comes to the foreground: the former demand for an action-theoretical grounding has faded away. Currently, action theory itself is no more dominated by the work of interpretively minded authors, but by the theories of rational choice. This results in a false opposition between the explanatory models, which base their arguments on historical, cultural, and linguistic factors, and those, which focus on the plane of the decisions of individuals. Bypassing the objectivism present in both the rational choice approach and hermeneutics, Schutz’s pragmatic theory of the life-world, originating from both interpretive and pragmatic intellectual influences, may be useful to overcome this opposition, and can serve as a proto-hermeneutical point of departure: that is, as a theory which cannot alone take over the duty of hermeneutics, but which can complement hermeneutics on a fundamental level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a summary of all of the papers within the issue. The author ties together a common theme among the articles: ideas about "the other." Practical as well as theoretical aspects of "the other" are presented. The author mentions the philosophies of several philosophers including Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, Emile Durkheim, Emmanuel Levinas, Erving Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel. Also mentioned is the development of ideas of the self in respect images of "the other."

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl's position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses ethnomethodology's program in relation to the phenomenological life-world analysis of Alfred Schutz. A recent publication of Garfinkel's early writings sheds new light on how he made use of phenomenological reflections in order to create a new sociological approach. Garfinkel used Schutz's life-world analysis as a source of inspiration, called for 'misreading' in the sense of an alternate reading and developed a new, empirical approach to the analysis of social order which he called 'ethnomethodology'. Ethnomethodologists usually acknowledge the historical importance of Schutz but emphasize that Garfinkel succeeded to overcome the limitations of phenomenological analyses and moved beyond. This view has spread above all in the Anglosaxon countries. In German sociology, Schutz's life-world analysis still has a much stronger standing than ethnomethodology and is interpreted as a systematic whole. Following Luckmann, it is discussed as a protosociological foundation of the methodology of social sciences or, following Srubar, as a philosophical anthropology with two poles: a subjective and a social, pragmatic pole. Both versions claim to analyze the meaningful constitution of the social world, to serve as a foundation of sociological methodology and to provide guidelines for an 'adequate' sociology. While Garfinkel used phenomenological concepts for sociological analysis, Luckmann clearly distinguishes the two: you either do phenomenology (protosociology) or you do sociology (a theoretically guided, empirical sociology of knowledge). This paper describes the present-day debate in German sociology and compares ethnomethodology's program with these interpretations of Schutz's life-world analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Alfred Schutz’s insights on types and typification. Beginning with a brief overview of the history and meaning of typification in interpretive sociology, the paper further addresses both the ubiquity and the necessity of typification in social life and scientific method. Schutz’s contribution itself is lacking in empirical application and grounding, but examples are provided of ongoing empirical research which advances the understanding of types and typification. As is suggested by illustrations from scholarship in the social studies of social science, studies of social identity associated with membership categorization analysis, and constructionist social problems theory, typification can be found to be central to social research whether it is taken up as a largely unacknowledged resource or whether it is addressed by different names. The overview and illustrations suggest the continuing, widespread, and indeed foundational relevance of Schutz’s insights into types and typification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper points to two little-discussed interrelated features—among sociologists—about the nature of the lifeworld ( Lebenswelt): that the experience of transcendence is an essential component of human actions, and that lived experience ( Erlebnis) is founded on the non-discursivity of the lifeworld, i.e., the pre-predicative background expectancies from which the discursive arises. I examine the intellectual route of Alfred Schutz who developed his mundane lifeworld theory from appropriating Edmund Husserl’s notions of appresentation and apperception. Harold Garfinkel later extended Schutz’s concept of lifeworld to the empirical investigations of constitutive social orders. By way of conclusion, I warn against a strain of constructionism in sociology, which tends to ignore the two said features of lived experience and inaccurately conceives social realities as essentially the actor’s discursive accomplishments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can a phenomenology of culture be at the same time a philosophy of culture? In other words, can a descriptive exploration of acts and objects of culture serve at the same time as a critical reflection on those acts and objects? Or does cultural critique imply a separate and additional task, that of a normative examination of the explored cultural phenomena? What would be the founding values of such an examination? How would it be established? Furthermore, what would be the importance of recognizing the distinct nature of this task compared to the exploratory-descriptive one? How would the two tasks relate to one another? Finally, is a full-fledged philosophy of culture, i.e. a critical exploration of cultural phenomena, needed? And if yes, why? These are the questions addressed by this paper. Answers are sought in a close examination of the work of Ernst Cassirer which involved both a phenomenology of cultural forms as well as an attempt at their normative-critical evaluation. And yet his work was criticized by many for its lack of an ethical dimension, a critique endorsed by another phenomenologist of culture, Alfred Schutz, whose work itself was accused for being non-critical. Beginning with a presentation of these two phenomenologies of culture this paper examines closely the charges directed against Cassirer's comprehensive philosophy of culture, namely, its idealism and its a-moralism. Through this examination the paper aims to shed light on a number of issues pertaining to the questions formulated above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the years, a number of interpreters with an interest in economics have given some attention the work of Alfred Schutz. As intimated in this literature, the orientation of his delimited thought on economics stemmed from contacts with the Austrian school during his Vienna years. Probably because of this connection, there exists among these interpreters an inclination uncritically to align Schutz with the Austrians' thought. What will be argued in this paper is that in adopting such an uncritical position, each of these readings fails adequately to situate Schutz's critique of economic analyses within the framework of his own social theory. It will become apparent that his treatment of economics turned out to be a mixture of defence and critique, and that his interpretation of the subject and the intellectual status he ascribed to it were considerably more ambivalent and ambiguous than has been noticed. In particular, Schutz expressed significant reservations about the highly circumscribed and artificial depictions of the world of human action that some economists espoused, especially within the confines of marginalist theory. When arraigned against the phenomenology of the life-world that he had developed, and against the "postulates" around which he had constructed his social theory, much of extant economics did not meet the requirements of a properly grounded social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the structure of the 'we relation' drawing on Alfred Schütz's theoretical framework. It argues for a flexibilization of the initial framework in order to capture not only the tension, but also the variations in the relation between the lived experience of the other in lived duration and the reflection upon the other, through which meaning is constructed. In order to do so, it revisits Schütz's claims about immersion into togetherness as part of the experience of copresence and it bridges them with the apparently opposite Sartrian view of the other as either objectifying or being objectified. This leads to certain shifts in the distinction between consociates and contemporaries and sheds light upon the ways in which the process of constructing the other as meaningful is not an added layer, but a co-constitutive element in the vivid experience of copresence and of absence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German phenomenologist Alfred Schutz had a Japanese fellow scholar, Tomoo Otaka, to whom he expressed his deep gratitude in his book, "Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt." Though several Japanese philosophers had known German phenomenologists in the 1920-30s, it is very few who referred to Schutz's thought extensively in Japanese social scientists' circle of that time except for Otaka. This paper deals with a brief bibliographical history of the reception of Schutz's phenomenology in Japan in the period after the end of World War II. In the postwar period, theoretical sociology in Japan was increasingly influenced by American sociology, which took the place of German sociology of knowledge or German formal sociology which had been central in the prewar times. Many sociologists of the young generation supported the structural-functionalism of T. Parsons and his theory of the social system was most prominent in the 1960s. Then, spear-headed by students, a political, counter-cultural movement against the established authorities in universities and the academic circles had developed. Radical questions were directed toward the academies.

The article focuses on the field research as asymmetrical relation. In this paper, sociology is viewed as an undertaking concerned with the rational and systematic study of social life in all its manifestations. This is a statement of methodological principle, that is, it pertains to the reasoning and the procedures of sociologists. It should be read neither as an ontological statement, asserting that social conduct is rational, nor as the claim that sociology is a science in the traditional sense. Within the framework of the subjective approach to sociology, the first of the three conditions is met, basically, by the methodological device of the ideal type as introduced by Max Weber and developed by Alfred Schutz. This formulation of the preconditions of research in the vein of a sociology of understanding has brought into the open an usually hidden and ignored characteristic of the subjective sociological approach: the subjectivity involved is not merely that of motives and objectives, and knowledge of pertinent conditions and the command of interactional skills on the part of the observed actors; it is as much the subjectivity of the researcher.

Starting with the discussion on free-will and action, this paper discusses how Alfred Schutz approaches these issues for the comprehension of life-world. After a brief overview on how contemporary philosophers as Ernst Tugendhat and Ulrich Pothast face these problem, it is argued that for Schutz action plays a central role in his conception of life-world. The article goes further and advocates for the importance of exploring individual biographies as a way to provide an accurate understanding of actions. By the end of this text, it is suggested that the biographical narrative approach, as proposed by Fritz Schütze, as well as by Gabriele Rosenthal, is an important contribution to the Schutz' perspective of the life-world and to adequately explore the most different social phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a case study, this paper contributes to answer the call to inquiries set by John Dewey in the conclusion of his Theory of Valuation. To move on to ethnography, some requirements explained by Alfred Schutz have also been followed: the study of choices, transactions, and evaluations must be confronted with real situations in real temporality, not with puppets set in motion by social scientists. The present case study is based upon a thorough ethnography of evaluation in a Spanish Moroccan community milieu, conducted in Andalusia and Morocco from 2007 to 2010. The observation discipline, which leads to an original kind of ethnographic data, has been called ethno-accounting ( ethnocomptabilité) by the author, as the point is to take into account what people do actually take into account, instead of claiming to assess things and situations directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper combines Alfred Shultz and Herbert Simon's theories of action in order to understand the grey area between dynamic and completely unstructured decision making better. As a result I have put together a specific scheme of how choice elements are represented from an agent's personal experience, so as to create a bridge between the phenomenological and cognitive-procedural approaches of decision making. I first look at the key points of their original models relating Alfred Schutz's 'provinces of meaning' and Herbert Simon's 'satisficing' mechanism. I then consider the particular concept of intentionality and reasoning by analogy for different choice settings. Finally I have suggested a perspective based on creative behaviour and sense-making for ill-structured conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on interviews with advertisers in three Turkish advertising agencies, this paper analyses the knowledge production practices of these agencies in order to understand how tacit knowledge has become the main source of differentiation for survival in the advertising sector. Relying on Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of common sense and Alfred Schutz’s social theory of knowledge, I argue that the production of implicit or tacit knowledge – non-verbal, or otherwise unarticulated and intuitive forms of knowledge – is understood not merely as a business strategy and a battleground within and between agencies, but as a socially constructed form of power, working through discursive practices in advertising business. Thus, tacit knowledge, as a practical strategy, is employed for the purposes of improvisation and invention within the structured social order of the advertising field. In advertising, explicit or codified knowledge depends upon and privileges tacit knowledge in knowledge production processes, which are profoundly based on strategies of typification, human capital, common sense and everyday experience. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents information on scholarly exchanges between Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz, two sociologists. Parsons and Schutz met for the first time at Harvard in April, 1940, where Parsons, had invited him to read a paper entitled "Rationality and the Structure of the Social World" at a seminar on rationality. These two men, despite a great deal of similarity in their approaches to key problems in the social sciences, tended to talk past each other and never reached a basis for a meeting of minds. The importance of subjective categories in the analysis of social action is at the center of the exchanges between Parsons and Schutz. At the time these exchanges took place, Schutz was a refugee intellectual, as yet without any foothold in the American academic World; white Parsons, having already produced a considerable body of work and was solidly ensconced at Harvard University and had already helped train a number of brilliant younger sociologists.

The present paper gives an introduction to Schutz's hereafter first published ["Fragment on the Phenomenology of Rhythm"]. After the editorial remarks the connections to the first part (first published in 1976) are developed along the lines of a nonconceptual substructure of meaning, the problem of passive synthesis, the phenomenological concept of the ideal object, the problem of the unit, and finally the connection of body, mind, and space. The paper closes with a commented summarization of Schutz's fragment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper discusses the concept of imposed relevance as developed by Alfred Schutz. The discussion acts on the assumption that within his writings there are two different usages of the concept: a phenomenological one and a sociological one. The argument states that both usages may not be confused--a failure which might be induced by the fact that Schutz himself never dwelled on their correlation. This being said, this paper presents some basic considerations which try to utilize phenomenological reflections for sociological analyses, keeping in mind that the difference between them may not be blurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the relation between Harold Garfinkel and Alfred Schutz. Reference will be made to their correspondence as well as to some of Garfinkel's writing. Garfinkel, who was a graduate student at Harvard at the time, first met Schutz at the recommendation of Aron Gurwitsch. Their meeting led to further exchanges including papers that Garfinkel sent to Schutz. When his book, titled Studies in Ethnomethodology, appeared in 1967 he specifically cited Schutz as one to whom he was "heavily ... indebted" in his work. In later writings he no longer made such citations and moved away from his earlier position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The work of Alfred Schutz was an important early influence on Harold Garfinkel and therefore on the development of ethnomethodology. In this article, I try to clarify what Garfinkel drew from Schutz, as well as what he did not take from him, specifically as regards the task of social inquiry. This is done by focusing in detail on one of Schutz's key articles: 'Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences'. The aim is thereby to illuminate the relationship between Schutz's views on the character of social science and Garfinkel's radical proposal for a re-specified focus of investigation. This is further pursued by examining an important debate about the link between Schutz and ethnomethodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is the clarification of some key concepts of the methodology of biographical narratives. Despite of the fact that this methodology is widely used, its theoretical underpinnings not yet appear to have been systematically compiled. Accordingly, the objectives of this paper are as follows: [i] develop the method of narrative interview and the method of analysis of biographical narratives created by Fritz Schütze; [ii] clarify some of the theoretical points that this author assumes (as the task of sociology and its object of study) through the concepts of self, society and language; and [iii] explore the influences of the theoretical framework of the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz and compare both authors. Its conclusion is the statement that the phenomenological sociology cannot be considered the only theoretical framework that underlies Schütze's methodology, which points out to new questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos de Contabilidad is the property of Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Estudios Sociales is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An essay is presented regarding Alfred Schutz's contributions to social sciences. It presents an overview of the works of Schutz which include description of multiple realities, theoretical framework for understanding common-sense, and social reality. It also discusses the significance of "relevance" as a theme in his works.

This paper lays the groundwork for developing a thorough-going phenomenological description of different phenomena of violence such as physical, psychic and structural violence. The overall aim is to provide subject-centered approaches to violence within the social sciences and the humanities with an integrative theoretical framework. To do so, I will draw primarily on the phenomenological accounts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz, and thereby present guiding clues for a phenomenologically grounded theory of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - The paper seeks to understand the formation of mutual knowledge in the online world using the phenomenological framework that Alfred Schutz and his associates constructed for the examination of the lifeworld. Design/methodology/approach - This study consists of three parts: reviewing Schutz's theory of the constitution of intersubjectivity in the lifeworld; extending Schutz's analysis to the acquisition of mutual knowledge in the online world; and applying the extended version of Schutz's theory to the booming biogosphere on the internet. Findings - Schutz divided the contemporaneous lifeworld into two realms - consociates and mere contemporaries. Schutz maintained that people came to know one another based on shared life experiences through "growing older together" in the realm of consociates and based on objectified schemes of interpretation through "ideal typification" in the realm of mere contemporaries. This article extends Schutz's analysis to human interaction on the internet, showing that in the emergent online world people become mutually familiar based on the biographic narratives they recount to one another through self-disclosure. Mutual knowledge obtained online also contributes to the total stock of knowledge people come to accumulate in an increasingly distanciated lifeworld. Originality/value - This article argues that the spread of the internet has changed the structure of the lifeworld Schutz depicted, and such changes have produced ways of getting to know others that were previously impossible. In light of those changes, this article seeks to update Schutz's theory of mutual knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has two purposes. First, it aims to reconstruct Schutz's concept of "Wirbeziehung" , by focusing on the concept of objectification or typification, which sociology has not yet sufficiently considered. Thereby, it also will show that the subject-object scheme, which traditional theories of sociology tacitly attribute to the actor as an object, is a one-sided perspective. In doing so, Martin Buber's concept of "Ich und Du" will function as an informative guide to inquiring especially into the concept of objectification. Second, this paper has the purpose of presenting two ideas included in the argument of the sphere of the We. One is the insight of Vergesellschaftung. It unfolds the correlation of the formation of the personality with the constitution of the world. Another is the basis of the philosophical foundation of social sciences. Sociology formulates experimental theses, seeing the self-evident as a given assumption. However, such sciences of fact can not thematization vorprädikative phase which occupies a central position in the world of daily life, and thus can not help excluding it from consideration. Eventually, this paper will confirm that the essential structures of the life-world that have been found on an intentional analysis of consciousness can not only unfold "the possibilities of human beings constructing worlds" —which sciences of fact, in principle, cannot approach—but also play a part in "the frame of reference ensuring adequateness" between common-sense constructs and scientific constructs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of this paper is to explore basic proposals of thinkers Herbert Spiegelberg and Alfred Schutz, and to shed light on their mutual relationship and their impact on phenomenology and theoretical sociology, an impact that can only become greater in the future. This brief presentation of Spiegelberg's and Schutz's basic concepts indicates that Schutz's theoretical sociology was not distant from involvement in discussion of fundamental phenomenological issues, and that Spiegelberg, who was certainly not just an editor of a thick phenomenology reader, but rather a full-fledged thinker and a serious reinterpreter of the phenomenological heritage, was inspired by Schutz's sociological use of phenomenology. There fore, it is worthwhile to examine the relationship between their theories and to learn more about what was really at stake in their philosophizing. The article presents typifications and relevance structures of Alfred Schutz's analysis of provisional, socially acquired knowledge.