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This paper engages Adam Smith's reflections concerning the moral and economic dimensions of business–society relations in the context of the Multinational Corporation (MNC). The paper argues that Smith formulates a pronounced moral criticism of prevailing corporate business practices, which emphasize profit while de facto undermining the moral underpinnings and social cohesion of commercial society. Rather than simply promoting selfish profit maximization by individuals, businesses, and society at large, Smith's work reveals a deeply entangled analysis of the complex interplay between material interests, moral aspects of human behavior, and Smith's overall goal of broad socioeconomic welfare. The balancing of moral and material motivations requires the social embeddedness of economic exchange within normative community frameworks. In this context, the sociopsychological process of moral approbation via Smith's impartial spectator mechanism has the potential to temper humans' tendency for excessive (material) self-love. Smith's scrutiny of internationally active corporations problematizes a range of institutional and governance issues and their implications for the moral bonds between individuals, MNCs, and global society. Most importantly, Smith worries about the potentially negative impact of increasingly anonymous and emotionally distant economic relationships between market participants on their ability to reckon with the moral consequences of their actions. Building on Smith's entangled perspective, the paper proposes a normatively grounded framework to critically contend with contemporary efforts to redefine corporate citizenship in the global economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is everything good in political economy incorporated into modern graduate education in economics? With the transition of the art of political economy into the science of economics, there was a significant narrowing of graduate education curriculum. The prevailing technique in economics, a neoclassical framework focusing on formal empirics, gradually compressed artistic components of economics, including philosophical underpinnings, democratic justifiability, theoretical intuition, comparative institutional analysis, and political economy. Courses on the history of economic thought, which historically played a role in introducing graduate students to the complexities of the art of political economy, are now only offered as an elective. This paper argues, however, that there are still insights to be gleaned from studying the classics of political economy in graduate education. We highlight the tradeoff between theoretical cumulativeness and knowledge, arguing that significant insights from historical works of political economy are often absent in contemporary technical expositions of economics. We explore examples of useful knowledge in political economy that was lost in the transition away from the art of political economy. To remain an operationally valid social science, economists should reintroduce the artistic elements of political economy into the graduate training of economists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on economist Adam Smith's theory of banking and its gradual evolution over a period of time. According to the author, it is generally recognized that Smith regarded real money as consisting of gold and silver coins, the value of which was determined by its cost of production. Paper money was a useful device that could be substituted for a part of the nation's stock of gold and silver, which latter could then be exchanged abroad for real capital goods, thus increasing the nation's productive capacity. The "channel of circulation" being of fixed capacity, any issue of paper money creates an excess supply that will then be exported. Since paper money is not accepted abroad, any excess money balances that result from the issue of paper money will lead to the export of an equal quantity of gold and silver. The paper money that stays at home in the place of the exported specie can fulfill its function only if the value of notes remains equal to that of coin. That equality can be maintained only if paper money can be exchanged immediately and unconditionally for coin.

Smith asks whether patriotism and cosmopolitanism spring from the same source. If they do, we face two anomalies. First, we should expect a British subject to love France more than Great Britain because France has a larger population than Great Britain. Second, we should expect a British subject to love France more than a far-away country such as China given that the British subject is more familiar with the French than with the Chinese people. Both expectations are factually untrue. This led Smith to reject the patriotism-cosmopolitanism continuum thesis. The love of country must spring from a source that is unrelated to the love of humankind. Nonetheless, neither kind of love can be reduced to substantive utility that informs the economist's utility function and the social welfare function. Substantive utility appears as self-interest and other-interest (altruism). The altruist preference varies in intensity, depending on familiarity: people are ready to help more familiar people than less familiar ones. What complicates the discussion is that Smith uses the same term "familiarity" to discuss varying degrees of love: people tend to love more familiar people than less familiar ones. This paper sheds light on Smith's confusing concept "universal benevolence"—which is best understood as the love of humankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Cultura Económica is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since acquiring money is not, and is not intended to be, directly in the social interest, the economic principles suitable for capitalism must, in the long run, resolve the possible institutional conflicts between acquiring money for the business enterprise and producing real output for the benefit of society-at-large. Mainstream economic theory since Adam Smith has suppressed this structural quarrel by presuming the capitalist monetary economy operates as if it were a barter economy. Ironically, money as an institution of capitalism is presumed neutral with respect to both employment and output, but President Lincoln never believed this, and in the Mercantilist tradition of Hamilton-Adams-Clay- Carey ("The American System"), his Greenbacks institutionally effectuated the National Capitalism of the(se) United States. At issue had been whether to concentrate capital (North) or disperse it westward (South), whether to create a national bank to finance internal growth (North) or whether to oppose the system of finance-capital and paper credit (South). Throughout the Civil War, the North's non-neutral view of money versus the South's (orthodox commodityexchange) neutral view of money proved critical to this embattled national decision of societal production (North) versus State's rights. Ultimately, the North's instituting the monetary-economic insights of the National Capitalist via Abraham Lincoln proved decisive [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes briefly the changing ideas on the role of money and banks from William Petty to Thomas Tooke, including the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. It analyzes the role of ideas in shaping the evolution of central bank regulation. Particular importance is given to the Bank of England's inconvertibility period, from 1797 to 1821, and the ensuing debate in shaping Robert Peel's Bank Act of 1844, which is often seen as the birth of modern central banking. The importance of the Say's Law, and the inexistence of an alternative theory of the determination of output, is shown to play an essential role in the policy prescriptions of the so-called Bullionist authors, who won the debates that shaped central banking practices in the nineteenth century. The paper concludes with a brief analysis of what is a central bank according to the dominant (marginalist) mainstream of the profession, and what an alternative conception based on what may be termed classical-Keynesian political economy would be.JEL Classification: B10, N20, E58 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Special Issue comes from the Development Studies Association (DSA) 30th Anniversary conference in 2008. The theme was ‘Development's Invisible Hands’, focusing on the forces likely to influence global change and re-shape development agendas over the next 30 years. The first section comprises brief invited thinkpieces mainly from DSA past presidents. Interestingly, while some focus on Adam Smith's original ‘invisible hand’ analogy and others discuss a range of non-market issues, several invoke Karl Polanyi on the limitations of market society. The second and third sections consist, respectively, of ‘synthesis’ papers on parallel panel themes and papers developed from the best panel presentations. The papers demonstrate the range of issues raised by questioning the future of development and development studies—while the limitations of future gazing are pointed up by the unexpected challenge to current development models presented since the conference by the global financial crisis. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose There has been controversy about whether Adam Smith is an economic egalitarian because he expresses at least four distinct views on equality, in two of which, he approves of inequality, and in the other two, he claims otherwise. The purpose of this paper is to isolate and consider these four views carefully to understand Smith’s complete position on equality.Design/methodology/approach The paper examines Smith’s apparently contradictory views on equality as his evolving response to Hume and Rousseau’s critiques of inequality.Findings Hume and Rousseau criticize any income inequality that is disproportionate to industry between the rich and poor. Smith’s response to their critiques evolves over time. In his initial response in early writings, he defends inequality in a civilized society by comparing it with a poor primitive society. However, in his later response in The Wealth of Nations, he eventually accepts Hume and Rousseau’s critiques of inequality. According to Smith, an equal and opulent society will evolve. A primitive society is equal but poor. In contrast, an existing civilized society is opulent but unequal. In each society, equality and opulence are incompatible. However, Smith believes that a future civilized society will fully achieve both equality and opulence.Originality/value The paper analyses both historically and theoretically the comprehensive structure of Smith’s egalitarian views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2023 marks the tercentenary of the birth of Adam Smith. A towering figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, his writings helped to establish the discipline we now refer to as Political Economy. Indeed, many of his ideas remain the foundation of economic theories still in use today. It is this ongoing relevance, and the lessons we can take from Smith's methods, that binds the papers in this Special Issue together. The Special Issue draws upon excellent contributions from renowned scholars covering a wide array of Smith's contributions to economics and political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Obnovljeni zivot is the property of University of Zagreb, Society of Jesus and Faculty of Philosophy & Religious Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The concept of the Anthropocene reflects a particular meaning of the "human" as it exists in society, and a specific understanding of freedom, which only became possible at the close of the twentieth century. Whereas Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, Rousseau, and Adam Smith attempted to grasp the potential for humanity to be changed through society in a self-conscious process of attaining freedom, the "Age of Man" today appears entirely disconnected from human agency. Indeed, the Anthropocene is associated not with the flourishing of life but with the sixth mass extinction. Drawing insight from classical and contemporary critical theory, this paper seeks to explicate the emancipatory potential within the concept of the Anthropocene, and the ways in which this potential is blocked by material circumstances that masquerade as "freedom." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most Adam Smith scholars hold that Smith endorsed public provision of education to offset deleterious consequences arising from the division of labor. Smith's putative endorsement of publicly funded education is taken by some scholars as evidence that he tends more toward progressive than classical liberalism, or that this is a departure from, perhaps an inconsistency with, Smith's otherwise strong presumption against government intervention in markets. This paper argues that these interpretations are flawed because Smith ultimately does not advocate public provision of education. He raises the idea and explores its potential benefits, but he ultimately does not endorse it. Smith also provides reason to be skeptical of public provision of education, which suggests that his final position may have inclined against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is probably the first written paper using the concept of `the national innovation system' and it analyses how technological infrastructure differs between countries and how such differences are reflected in international competitiveness. It makes a critical review of new (in the 1980s) developments in the theory of international trade and confronts them with recent empirical results. It shows how competitiveness cannot be explained by wage rates/prices/currency rates. Technological leadership gives absolute rather than comparative advantage and technological leadership will reflect institutions supporting coupling, creating, clustering comprehending and coping in connection with technology. The analysis is rooted in historical context through references to Friedrich List and his criticism of Adam Smith and laissez-faire. Special emphasis is put on List's concept of mental capital. Finally, the analytical arguments are illustrated by the catching-up and forging ahead of first Germany and later Japan. The paper concludes that disequilibria in international trade will be persistent and that for laggard economy the free trade doctrine may be unduly restrictive. Another conclusion is that public investment in technological infrastructure and intellectual capital is crucial for successful economic development. It is pointed out that there is a need to couple education, science, trade and industry policy in order to build competitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is going to have a brief idea on the application of Behavioral Economics into the welfare of the masses through policy formulations. Behavioral Economics adds a paradigm shifting revolution in the field of Economics with more insights from psychology, neuroscience and microeconomic theory. It has been often argued that traditional economics with their models of “rational decision making” fail to take into considerations that how people make important choices. The notion in this branch of Economics is more like old wine in a new bottle. The cognizance from Behavioral Economics is now being able to make a vigorous influence on policy making through nudging. The evolution of Behavioral Economics is not a latter day postulation rather its existence can be tracked down in the times of Adam Smith and had a continuation through the time of Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s.The paper would also like to have a pilot study on the relevance of this branch of Economics in the other sections as well along with its future prospects. It also identifies the analysis of emergence of Behavioral Economics in the new era. This proceeding would like to initiate the notion The paper is going to have a brief idea on the application of Behavioral Economics into the welfare of the masses through policy formulations. Behavioral Economics adds a paradigm shifting revolution in the field of Economics with more insights from psychology, neuroscience and microeconomic theory. It has been often argued that traditional economics with their models of “rational decision making” fail to take into considerations that how people make important choices. The notion in this branch of Economics is more like old wine in a new bottle. The cognizance from Behavioral Economics is now being able to make a vigorous influence on policy making through nudging. The evolution of Behavioral Economics is not a latter day postulation rather its existence can be tracked down in the times of Adam Smith and had a continuation through the time of Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s.The paper would also like to have a pilot study on the relevance of this branch of Economics in the other sections as well along with its future prospects. It also identifies the analysis of emergence of Behavioral Economics in the new era. This proceeding would like to initiate the notion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Polish Journal of Economics / Gospodarka Narodowa is the property of SGH Warsaw School of Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is devoted to the debate on economic development in Russia after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and focuses on the contribution of Yuli Zhukovsky, a self-taught economist. Based on his interpretation of western ideas, he saw material conditions as the crucial factor of economic development and suggested a set of measures that would ensure the improvement of the country's productivity. Zhukovsky's eclectic views differed from the ideas of the radical intelligentsia and the liberals, thus making his contribution unique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines to which extent Confucius and Adam Smith can be read as virtueethicists. The goal of this paper is to show that, despite all differences, the concept of the "self" performs similarly in Smith and Master Kong. Although Confucius condemns the sole pursuit of self-interests, he still accepts that it is the interested self that cultivates itself and behaves according to the rites. Adam Smith highlights the value of virtues as an orientation for the individuals on how to develop their self-interest without harming others, ideally strengthening society. This paper shows that moral self-cultivation is important to both. In questions of philosophical anthropology and ethics, Master Kong and Adam Smith share many convictions. There are however two specific differences between them: First, each developed a social philosophy against a different social, political, and institutional background. Second, while ritual propriety and political leadership are important for Confucius, in Adam Smith, they are addenda. Nothing differentiates the leader from the "gentleman". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although 'relative poverty' is a phrase of immediate recognition, wide circulation and an ever increasing acceptance in the last half century, the concept itself remains surprisingly undertheorised. This paper wishes to try and remedy this discursive deficiency by proposing an ontological elucidation of the nature of our needs. The author re-visits the dispute between Amartya Sen and Peter Townsend — a duel of crossed wires (if not sabres), which can be seen as representative of the various theoretical takes on the nature of relative poverty. While the dispute itself ended with an unfortunate misunderstanding between the two scholars, whose different disciplinary affiliations have done nothing but replicate the rift, the author nonetheless foregrounds the commonality between the two thinkers - their respective identification with Adam Smith. By exploring points of differences and convergence with Adam Smith's own ontology of needs, which the author reconstructed elsewhere, the paper hopes to offer insights into the ontology of 'relative poverty' as well as to suggest that taking this ontology seriously would lead us inevitably to a re-examination of 'economic methodology'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study investigated public authority regulations and the invisible hands of Adam Smith in a free market economy during the emergency a paradoxical relationship but the focus is to determine the place of public authority regulation of prices of goods during pandemic. It generated primary data by administering sets of questionnaires to selected firms and the data was analyzed using the Chi-square analysis. The two hypotheses formulated for the study was tested at a 5% level of significance. Results revealed that there were no price variations in pharmaceutical products and bakery companies' products during the first wave of covid'19 pandemic in Nigeria. The findings show that because the restriction of movement did not affect essential commodities, and international borders were open for pharmaceutical goods and other essential products. Though discovery from the skeletal interviews conducted, showed an increase in demand for bakery products but no corresponding rise in prices. This movement restriction was affected by the firm order and directives of the government as carried out by COVID-19 task force. It is suggested that government should regulate the prices of commodities during emergencies to curtail artificial inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the teachings and admonitions regarding wisdom found in the sixth edition of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) . Following a mindpath marked by the seminal contributions of Glenn Morrow (1923), Donald Winch (1978), and Laurence Dickey (1986), the paper offers an interpretation of the higher moral standard (superior prudence) introduced by Smith in the last edition of TMS, as his response to the socio-economic and cultural changes that took place in Great Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. Between the fi rst and last editions of TMS the taste for luxury and conspicuous consumption became widespread and contagious both geographically and across ranks. Prudence and other-approbation, suffi cient gatekeepers of moral conduct and character in the previous editions of TMS, became progressively less effective in keeping society away from moral deception and in regulating reputation and the distinction of ranks. The paper examines the introduction of superior prudence in the last edition of TMS as Smith's vision of a dialectical process between external and internal approbation that is capable of transforming individual dependence on social praise into a dialogue between materialistic and moral concerns, which would lead to a progressively wiser, although confl ictual, existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the eighteenth-century Scottish and British cultural context, idleness was a central issue for religion, literature, art, and philosophy. This paper analyzes the reflections of David Hume and Adam Smith on idleness and commercial society. Hume advanced his most provocative view on the subject in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), where idleness is represented as the endowment made by the "very sparing hand" of the "author of nature" to humanity. My argument is that Smith's view on idleness that was advanced in the Wealth of Nations (1776) is connected to Hume's Dialogues, as Smith's invisible hand defeats idleness through a combination of self-interest, the propensity to exchange, and the division of labor. The broader aim of this study is to add to the philosophical relationship between the Scottish philosophers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between relative and positive profit was put forward by Sir James Steuart in the shortest chapter of his book An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy (1767). This distinction has been scarcely noticed in the literature to follow except for some comments made by Marx especially in the initial chapter of his Theories of Surplus Value. The purpose of this paper is to investigate, in an attempt to keep words apart from concepts, whether and to what extent Steuart's distinction, which is never mentioned in Smith's Wealth of Nations (in spite of his familiarity with Steuart's work), is an essential part of Adam Smith's system of thought. The point of departure for tracing this distinction is, first, Smith's elementary example of dwelling-houses and profitable buildings; and, then, his more advanced discussion (to be developed by later scholars and in particular by Marx) between the process of circulation (from one individual to another) and the process of production (and reproduction) of national wealth in the light of the two points of view, that of an individual and that of the whole society, on which Smith's theory of capital is based. This point of departure is used in the paper to trace Steuart's distinction between relative and positive profit behind the different terminology adopted in the classical literature that followed suit with particular regard to the wage-profit inverse relationship, the competition-of-capitals doctrine and the distinction between value and wealth. Steuart's own distinction is thus used in the paper to support Ricardo's conception of the "neat produce" as put forward in his Essay on Profits; as well as to differentiate Ricardo's theory of rent (as a transfer of existing wealth between different parties rather than as a creation of new wealth) not only from Malthus's theory (in which the two concepts of rent are mixed up) but also from Smith's (who used the word rent to convey the former concept in Book I and the latter concept in Book II of the Wealth of Nations). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even the most zealous interpreters of Adam Smith as an advocate of free markets and commercial progress have long acknowledged his support for public education. Yet the comparatively little scholarship on Smith's educational theory never fully articulates his defense of public education, often framing it as a corrective to economic and moral problems generated by the market while ignoring its political importance. We argue here that Smith saw public education as much more than anesthesia to treat the wounds inflicted by the market. For Smith, compulsory public education not only promotes distributive justice, develops moral judgment, and cultivates good citizenship—it is vital for securing all three. A compulsory education affords citizens the opportunity to sympathize with others and be objects of sympathy while teaching them how to be skeptical of the rhetorical efforts of others. As such, this paper argues that Smith's major works offer a potent defense of public education as a precondition for political judgment rather than a mere program "needed to offset the social costs of the division of labor." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconstructs Carl Menger's theory of economic development centered around the growth of knowledge. Menger made knowledge central to the economic process, long before this was done more widely in economics. His work draws attention to two different types of knowledge, shared cognitive and institutional frameworks which help create coherent and integrated markets on the one hand, and, on the other hand, private--increasingly specialized and differentiated--knowledge used in the production of heterogenous (capital) goods. We situate Menger's work on economic development in the evolutionary endogenous growth tradition going back to Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith, and later developed by Alfred Marshall, Allyn Young, Ludwig Lachmann, and others. We use these insights to suggest that one of the crucial questions of economic organization is (1) the complementarity between the two types of knowledge we identify here, and (2) the extent to which knowledge is a part of shared social infrastructures rather than being organized privately within firms and other organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adam Smith recognized that slavery, despite its economic disadvantages, was the rule rather than the exception in the eighteenth-century commercial society. How did he explain the massive employment of enslaved Africans in the American and Caribbean colonies? Several scholars have been highlighting that Smith attributed the persistence of slavery to an almost natural inclination of humanity toward tyranny and dominion. However, the mere reference to the love of domination is not enough to fully answer the question above. This paper addresses another feature of Adam Smith's account of Atlantic slavery: the relation between the love of domination and the mercantile policies regulating colonial trade. We conclude that Smith saw the extraordinary profitability arising from such policies as an enabling condition to the massive employment of slave labor in the sugar and tobacco colonies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This paper explores the Newtonian roots of Adam Smith's thinking as a contribution to explaining the structural dynamics of the economic system. • Smith proposes an explanation of "social physics", where the intentionality of actors is the main distinction from Newton's natural dynamics. • In Smith's account, the sources of structural economic dynamics lie in the actors' capacity to organise production within the market. • This conceptual framework highlights a possible avenue along which to investigate Pasinetti's separation theorem. • The literature on industrial policy has moved in the last twenty years towards Pasinetti's insights, to which explicitly reference should be made. This paper explores the Newtonian roots of Adam Smith's thinking in the structural dynamics of the production system and of social organization at large. Newton's Principia Mathematica inspired a philosophical movement in Scotland that looked for principles that could explain the dynamics of social and economic bodies with the same scientific rigour. In Smith's account, the sources of structural economic dynamics lie in the actors' capacity to organise production within that domain of interaction of competing forces that he defines as the market. Against this background, Smith analyses the role of the institutional setup. This conceptual framework is central to the theory of structural dynamics in classical political economy. It highlights a possible avenue along which to investigate Pasinetti's distinction between the 'natural' (production-based) and the 'institutional' levels of analysis (Pasinetti's separation theorem) by exploring the dynamic interdependence of technological and institutional drives in the emerging new industrial revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In papers on the history of thought, writers often lump Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek together. Both Smith and Hayek are classical liberal, free-market economists. Each emphasized the spontaneous order that develops without any person planning the order. They also discuss the benefits of such spontaneous orders. Yet, as with any two great thinkers, Smith and Hayek had important differences. This paper adds to the literature by clarifying one such difference. Smith believes that on some margins, particularly education, ends that are not achieved through the spontaneous order should be promoted by governmental action. Hayek is skeptical of the ability and benefit of picking particular ends to promote through government intervention. For Hayek, the beneficial attribute of a spontaneous order is its general application [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to resolve a seeming paradox in Adam Smith's study of history with regard to inference to the best explanation. In the Wealth of Nations Smith argued the priority of "natural progress" over the model of historical progress as evidenced by many contemporary historians. These two competing exercises in philosophical history raise the previously unexplored question of what are critical tests to justify which model is the best, with Smith's wide use of scientific realist standards such as seeking for underlying general causality, generality in explanatory and predictive power, and appeal to the arts of persuasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there limits to what it is morally okay to imagine? More particularly, is imaginatively inhabiting morally suspect perspectives something that is off-limits for truly virtuous people? In this paper, I investigate the surprisingly fraught relation between virtue and a familiar form of imaginative perspective taking I call empathy. I draw out a puzzle about the relation between empathy and virtuousness. First, I present an argument to the effect that empathy with vicious attitudes is not, in fact, something that the fully virtuous person can indulge in. At least one prominent way of thinking about the psychology of the virtuous person excludes the possibility that the virtuous could emotionally apprehend the world in a less than virtuous way, and empathizing with vicious outlooks does seem to run afoul of that restriction. Then, I develop an argument that runs in the contrary direction: virtue in fact requires empathy with vicious outlooks, at least in some situations. There is reason to think that a crucial part of being virtuous is ministering effectively to others' needs, and there is also reason to think that other people may need to be empathized with, even if their emotional outlooks are at least minorly vicious. Finally, I outline two different solutions to this puzzle. Both solutions hold some promise, but they also bring new challenges in their train. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We ambitiously reexamine Smith's moral theory in relation to Hume's. We regard Smith's developments as glorious and important. We also see them as quite fully agreeable to Hume, as enhancement, not departure. But Smith represents matters otherwise! Why would Smith overstate disagreement with his best friend? One aspect of Smith's enhancement, an aspect he makes very conspicuous, is that between moral approval and beneficialness ('utility' in Smith) there is another phase, namely, the moral judge's sense of propriety. With that phase now finding formulation, Smith, if only implicitly, generates a spiral of beneficialness and propriety, a spiral shown in Figure 7 in the present paper. We consider Figure 7, illustrating the spiral, to be the most important arrival point in the present paper; it highlights the non-foundationalism of Smith's ethics. But to arrive at the spiral, we must engage in extensive exegesis. In Part IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith presents a foil against which he develops his own theory, a foil supposedly representing Hume. According to the foil, moral approval derives from 'utility.' But, in multiple ways, the foil is misleading. We provide an interpretation of Hume, notably his four-factor account of moral approval, before examining Smith's representation of Hume. One twist is that Smith used the words utility and useful differently than Hume did – Smith quietly stretched them to include species of agreeableness, thereby obscuring the importance of agreeableness in Hume's theory. Another, more significant problem is that Smith allows the impression that in Hume moral approval derives quite determinately from beneficialness. In fact Hume conveys the interpretive and sentimental spaciousness of the operations that generate moral approval; here, Hume even speaks repeatedly of 'proper sentiments', thus almost using the term propriety himself. But the propriety phase in Smith opens up to a key facet of Smith's development on Hume: He poeticizes a locus of sympathy not emphasized in Hume – namely, that between the moral judge and her own man within the breast; that locus enters the theory in addition to the sympathies emphasized in Hume, not in lieu of them. We distinguish lateral sympathy, which is important in Hume's thought, and vertical sympathy, which is especially characteristic of Smith's more inner-directed and allegorical thought. Smith embraces Hume's lateral sympathy and enhances moral theory by adding formulations ('the man within the breast', 'the impartial spectator') that elaborate vertical sympathy. Next, we come to something of a twist in the whole matter: We show that – as Smith well knew all along! – propriety is a species of agreeableness! Smith's propriety phase represents another dimension within which such agreeableness lives: Smith's vertical dimension thus gives rise to a spiral representing the diachronic development of the judge herself. It is a spiral of beneficialness and propriety: Each propriety phase in the next loop of the spiral engenders a species of agreeableness now as a part of beneficialness. Smith's developments on Hume, then, involve the following three facets: (1) formulation of the propriety phase; (2) the poetic elaboration of vertical sympathy; (3) the diachronic spiral of propriety and beneficialness. The three facets come together, especially in Ed. 6 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The whole development goes beyond Hume, but, really, is agreeable to Hume – though Smith himself portrays his developments as disagreeing with features of Hume's moral theory. We speculate that Smith was more or less aware of all that that we say, including the absense of any really substantive disagreement. Why, in that case, would Smith have proceeded as he did? We address that question at the end of the piece. Our speculations suggest a method in the madness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it look like when an organization tentatively steps away from an exclusively rules-based regime and begins to attend to both rules and principles? What insights and guidance can ethicists and ethical theory offer? This paper is a case study of an organization that has initiated such a transition. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has begun a turn toward the promotion of ethical principles and best practices by adding a "conceptual framework" to its existing Code of Professional Conduct (Code). This conceptual framework calls upon its members to intentionally increase their awareness of significant threats to their compliance with its rules of conduct and to establish safeguards to offset or eliminate those threats. To this end, each member is required to regard every questionable situation, circumstance, transaction or relationship by attempting to view it through the eyes of an imagined reasonable third party. This paper examines this protocol theoretically and practically. First, we frame this analysis within the principles and ethical concepts that inform the professional ethics of accountants. Second, we critique the AICPA's long-standing rules-based approach to its Code. Third, we examine the new conceptual framework with a view toward its potential for the promotion of a more principles-based approach to the professional ethics of the accounting profession. Fourth, we give attention to the notion of the "reasonable and informed third party," which has been embedded in the new conceptual framework, and consider how two schools of thought—Adam Smith's modernist "impartial spectator" concept and Emmanuel Lévinas' postmodern phenomenology in regard to "the Other"—may offer theoretical support and clarity for this epistemic exercise. Finally, we point out several ways in which the AICPA's commitment to its new conceptual framework could be strengthened and enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper was written as thanks for compliments offered at award proceedings at the 2010 IIFET. It deals with the past and future of fishery economics. A short historical account (or "pedigree") shows that while fisheries have been mentioned by historians of old economies, their writings chiefly covered only the fish trade. This was also true of early economists, such as Petty and Adam Smith. It was marine biologists who were to show the way. Around the time of the Great War , the first bits of genuine fishery economic analysis appeared. These, however , were generally disregarded until Scott Gordon' s 1954 article caused what Thomas Kuhn calls a "revolution." My own paper appeared a year later . There followed what looked like decades of comparative calmness in ocean economics. The advent of individual catch quotas has now widened and deepened the interest in fishery problems and those "paradigms" related to them, such as those appropriate to fishery self-government. The new problems and possibilities have drawn in lively and creative participants. They work in the front ranks of applied economics, and the author is proud to have been honoured by them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a commercial society, said Adam Smith, "every man becomes in some measure a merchant," If Smith is right, what does that mean for the character of the society? This paper addresses the character forming effects of the market--and, specifically its impact on the "virtues," There is a long tradition of viewing commerce as subversive of the virtues. In this view, the market is held to have legitimated the pursuit of narrow self-interest at the expense of social and civic obligations and moral restraints. But, as Albert Hirschman has shown, many Enlightenment moralists saw commercial society as a moralizing force. Which view is right? This paper examines how many of the character traits that we commonly call virtues are rewarded--and so presumably reinforced and diffused--by the market. In this way, the market (as it were by a hidden hand) strengthens its own foundations and reproduces a moral culture that is functional to its own needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has three main aims. First, to make good on recent suggestions that Adam Smith offers a genealogy of the origins of religious belief. This is done by offering a systematic reconstruction of his account of religion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, demonstrating that Smith there offers a naturalised account of religious belief, whilst studiously avoiding committing himself to the truth of any such belief. Second, I seek to bring out that Smith was ultimately less interested in the truth of religious beliefs than in evaluating and understanding the place of religion in healthy ethical living. Third, I put Smith's account into contrast with the more famous treatment offered by Nietzsche (as well as Bernard Williams's later, Nietzschean, reflections), and suggest that Smith offers us the more plausible picture of both religion and morality, a finding of both historical and contemporary philosophical import. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adopts the view promoted by early modern philosopher Adam Smith that exercises of the sympathetic imagination play an important role in supporting human sociability and ethical behaviour. It argues that such exercises have potential to significantly change the way in which privileged racial identities relate to marginalised and devalued racial identities. First, the paper draws on Sally Haslanger’s reflections upon her lived experience of transracial parenting to illustrate how sympathetic identification with the experiences of a differently racialized individual can transform the way in which we relate to entire racial groups. Haslanger’s account demonstrates the potential for exercises of the sympathetic imagination to disrupt the way in which we experience our own embodiment, and to generate a form of knowledge that implicates our sense of self and will to act. Second, the paper discusses some limitations of appealing to sympathy as a social resource in less intimate contexts. This discussion throws light on the importance of exercising a critically reflective mode of sympathy to overcome racial bias, in addition to the importance of institutional design and grassroots initiatives in facilitating sympathetic identification across racial lines. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It has long been recognised that Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) advances a 'system of natural liberty' in seeking to account for the 'nature and causes of the wealth of nations.' This is not however a theme that is explored or explained in the early sections of the book; in fact, not until Book IV, Ch. ix does Smith give his most expansive account of what he might mean by this term. This paper examines this chapter in detail to determine the limits of his critique in that chapter of the 'agricultural system' (of Physiocracy), and why it might be that Smith is so parsimonious in offering a clear account of his central idea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper examines some critical accounts of emotional life shaped by neoliberalism. A range of literature concerned with neoliberalism and emotional experience in educational contexts is reviewed. I argue that neoliberal ‘reforms’ in public institutions create an ever-increasing demand for emotional performance. Neoliberals often refer to Adam Smith'sThe wealth of nations(WN) but this paper focuses on Smith's equally significantThe theory of moral sentiments.In this work Smith connects competitive social relationships with varieties of challenging emotional experience. I argue that theorists in the present, seeking to understand neoliberal ‘reforms’ in public institutions, should focus on not justWNbut both of Smith's major works together. This paper offers new insights into the nature of neoliberalism, extending and developing the field of historically informed critical work highlighted in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction to the journal is presented in which the authors discuss reports presented at the 22nd Annual European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET) conference including reflections on the future of the history of economic thought, circular flow analysis in mid-18th century and contributions of Scottish economist Adam Smith.

Catholic Social Teaching (CST) takes a rather cautious view toward the value of the ideas of Adam Smith, due to his emphasis on negative political and economic liberty. Detractors of Smith within CST point to what they consider to be deficiencies within his works: an impoverished moral anthropology, a lack of concern for the common good, and markets untethered to human needs. Defenders of Smith within CST tend to emphasize the material benefits that derive from Smithian institutions, such as economic growth, improvements in standards of living, and the new opportunities that arise from cultures focused on innovation. This paper argues that Smith’s ideas have real value for CST. However, this value primarily lies in his moral psychology. While not denying the dangers of business activity for our moral lives, Smith also helps us to understand the possibility of the moral corruption of those who wield political power, thus providing an indirect defense of political and economic liberty that coheres with important Christian ethical notions found in CST. This is the case even though CST does not consistently recognize concerns surrounding the dangers of wielding political power—and thus Smith’s arguments offer real challenges to CST as well. This paper further suggests that these basic insights are relevant regardless of one’s favored institutional arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economics was a part of social and political thoughts in general for most of history. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith saw economics as a subset of jurisprudence. However, the seeds of economic analysis were planted long before; in ancient India, societies exercised economic theories and principles during the 3rd century BCE. This paper investigates the economic leadership in ancient India between the 3rd century BCE and the 3rd century C.E. During that era, a philosopher, economist, jurist, and royal advisor named Chanakya authored the ancient Indian political treatise the Arthshastra. He has discussed many economic theories like economic growth, tax, and mixed economy in his book. He is considered the pioneer of political economics in India, and his work is believed to as an essential precursor to classical economics. This paper evaluates the theories of Chanakya by a comparative analysis of political and economic union between the modern-day the European Union and the Mauryan Empire of ancient times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]