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A conference paper about U.S.-China conflict due to Taiwan is presented which was discussed at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including China's emerging global influence in the post-Cold War era and the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait conflict.

A conference paper about militarized conflict in the cross-strait relations is presented which was prepared for presentation at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular relationships and the alliance-like arrangement between Taiwan and the U.S.

This paper attempts to understand how and why China has been portrayed as the primary military threat in Taiwanese security discourse through an examination of offence-defence theory. It is based on the premise that those events or factors that one identifies as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. The paper first introduces the protracted debate among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the 'Pan-Blue' opposition parties and US officials and analysts over the 2004 Special Defence Budget controversy. In defence of its arms procurement program, the Chen Shui-bian administration resorted to a particular mode of interpreting danger, that is, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China's favour and thus it is imperative to correct the imbalance through fielding the weapons systems provided by Washington. The paper then explores the underlying assumption of that pervasive interpretation in the official articulation of Chinese military threat in Taiwan and the United States, which holds that offensive advantages make war more likelyâ??a principal hypothesis of offence-defence theory. Rather than questioning the methodological ambiguities about how to define and measure the 'offence-defence balance', the paper argues that it is precisely these ambiguities that make China's threat image in Taiwan possible. The special budget case is indicative as to how Taiwan's defence policy is better understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of a peace-loving Taiwanese identity contrary to the belligerent Chinese than as an instrument to build and maintain a capable defence posture against potential attacks from the mainland. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the various impacts of contemporary globalization on national security, with special reference to the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China and its security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper adheres to a sectoral approach to the study of globalization-security interconnections and adopts a broadly based definition of security pertaining to the case study in question that encompasses economic, technological and defense security. The analysis of the subject matter is grounded in evidence collected in more than 140 interviews with chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data. On sectoral migration, the paper argues that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the development of the indigenous Chinese chip industry. It has been discovered that some Taiwanese non-state chip actors have violated government regulations in the process of spearheading the migration, and some have even forged business ties with their PRC counterparts associated with the PLA. As for the ensuing security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved, although long-term strategic repercussions are paramount. The depth and scope of the continuous sectoral migration in years to come will determine the level of economic security risks faced by the US and Taiwan. Long-term technological and defense security repercussions need to take into account two important elements at play: technological change in the sector (increasing commercial-to-military spin-on and dual-use nature of the chip technology), and the PRC dual-track (economic and defense) grand strategy behind its resolve to upgrade its indigenous chip capability. Four pertinent aspects are analyzed: (a) concerns over the PRC chip industrial base, its contribution to the PLA modernization and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour; (b) technology-related misgivings over the trustworthy supplies of chips for the US and Taiwanese military end uses, as well as the shrinking "chip gap"; (c) fear of denial of chip supply due to foreign dependency; (d) dubious implementation of export control policies at the unilateral and the multilateral level that exacerbate some of the above security repercussions. The concluding section elucidates how the case study helps to show the impact of globalization on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. To sum up, the study offers a fresh look at the complex security repercussions of the globalization of a strategic industry that occurs in a politically sensitive region in world politics today. It not only helps us disentangle an important policy issue, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the globalization-security interconnections in international relations today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study that attempts to understand American military posture in East Asia within the context of a U.S.-Japan-China-South Korea-Taiwan pyramid, where the U.S. plays the role of benign leader at the apex. It explores some military arrangements contemplated by the U.S. It examines five official documents made to the public since the inauguration of U.S. President George W. Bush including the "Quadrennial Defense Review Report."

The article looks at the future of cross-strait relations after the election of fourth-generation leaders in China in 2002. It cites that China has adopted a cool dealing strategy toward Taiwan after Chen Sui-bian was elected President in 2002 and condemned the defensive referendum proposed by the president. It argues that maintaining status quo in Taiwan Strait is the key to pursue the stability and peace in the strait. It explains the factors that resulted to the conflict in Taiwan Strait and the role played by the U.S. concerning the issue.

The article examines the interaction of domestic and international factors in determining relations and policies associated with Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. It considers the possibility of direct military confrontation between the U.S. and its regional challenger, China, over Taiwan. A review of the literature on cross-Strait and the triangular relations of U.S.-China-Taiwan is presented. It considers the impact of U.S. presidential elections on the China policy since 1980.

The article offers a game theoretic view of the Taiwan issue. It is stated that the U.S. strategic ambiguity policy may or may not deter a conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan. It may or may not deter from pursuing bolder measures to gain independence from China. As such, it is an effective policy in deterring both China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies.

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. In addition, the interaction among mainland China, US, and Taiwan is increasing as they are becoming more active in regional multilateral institutions. This situation raises the puzzle that whether institutions, economic interdependence can facilitate peace and stability among China, Taiwan and the United States. If the answer is yes, what are these causal mechanisms? Liberal theories of international relations emphasize the role of international institutions on fostering cooperation by reducing obstacles. such as uncertainty and transaction costs.. that stand in the way of mutually beneficial agreements between states. In addition, they also hold that interdependence decreases the incentives for conflict and war because states become reluctant to disrupt or jeopardize the welfare benefits of open economic exchange. This paper unifies these theoretical insights to explore the role of economic interdependence, institutions on the stability and cooperation between mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite repeated U.S. claims that its policy toward relations across the Taiwan Strait is ?consistent? and ?clear,? in actuality its policy has long been one of ?strategic ambiguity.? It is widely recognized by scholars and policy-makers alike that the so-called Taiwan question is the most potentially explosive issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations.What is the strategic ambiguity policy all about? What role has it played in influencing the equilibrium outcomes of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades? How are the dynamics of the ?strategic triangle? consisting of the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How effective in preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait is U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity likely to be in the future? Few studies, if any, have provided theoretical answers to these questions. This paper tries to develop a game theoretic model which may provide tentative answers to these interesting, unresolved questions. Supporters of the ?strategic ambiguity? policy argue that it has successfully kept the Strait free of conflict: on the one hand, Mainland China always has to take into account the possibility that the United States might intervene if it were to attack Taiwan, and on the other hand, Taiwan always has to think twice before ?going too far? (such as declaring formal independence from the mainland). The policy, it is said, has served U.S. national security interests and has effectively accommodated changes in cross-Strait relations in past decades. There are opposing opinions, however. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have rendered one of the major imperatives for a U.S.-China rapprochement and compromises on Taiwan?the basis of the strategic ambiguity policy?obsolete. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan and the increasing military threat if faces, such as the deployment of missiles by Mainland China aimed at Taiwan, have brought new variables into the equation. Taiwan?s thriving democracy has added ideological values and moral imperatives to the U.S. commitment of defending the island. The increasing military threat from Mainland China, meanwhile, seems to have strengthened the argument for an increasing commitment to Taiwan?s defense, either in the form of more military sales or coordination between U.S. and Taiwan militaries. A continuing ambiguity in U.S. policy, so the arguments goes, will encourage PRC militancy and frustrate Taiwan?s determination to resisting aggression, and may be prone to disrupt the delicate equilibrium. Above all, it seems to compromise the U.S. moral imperative of defending democratic values.Our model shows that the policy of strategic ambiguity helps preserve the status quo and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The strategic ambiguity policy is a defensive strategy in nature, well-suited at deterring both Mainland China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies. In the long run, the strategic ambiguity policy, however, needs to be supplemented, if not replaced, by more imaginative policies in order to successfully manage the Taiwan issue. For example, the United States could be more forthright in proposals that help to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, such as proposing that Mainland China renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue in exchange for Taiwan?s pledge not to pursue independence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intellectual property is becoming one of the most valuable and powerful assets in the increasingly privatized global economy. Globalization, technological advances, the Internet and e-commerce have made intellectual property (IP) infringements an escalating and pervasive issue in both developed countries such as the US and developing countries/regions such as Taiwan and mainland China. However, due to local interests, agency priorities, different levels of economic development and different enforcement structures, the US, Taiwan and mainland China enforce the similar IP laws on the books very differently in action. First, this paper intends to portrait a general picture of IPR enforcement mechanisms in the US, Taiwan and mainland China, and to estimate the proportions of IPR infringements handled by three major enforcement systems: the criminal judicial system, the civil judicial system and the administrative system. Then it focuses the attention on criminal judicial systems specifically. It analyzes the different roles criminal courts play in handling IPR infringements in the three regions. The different roles of criminal courts include: to facilitate governmental policies, to enforce the criminal law, to protect the fairness of the system, to punish or to deter serious infringers, and to bring compensation to victims. The study implicates that apart from conventional jurisprudential wisdom, criminal courts could serve vastly different functions in handling economic crimes in countries/regions with different political regimes, legal structures and cultures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]