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This article investigates changes within national budget by examining actors’ behavioral predilections and the institutional constraints under which they operate. The article presents three theoretical propositions about the influence of attention and institutions on all magnitudes of programmatic budget changes ranging from large cuts to massive expansions. Using quantile regression, the author is able to uncover which distinct processes bear on cuts, stasis, and expansion across spending categories within a budget. An examination of budgetary data from Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States from 1964 to 1999 leads to the conclusion that attention shifts lead to contractions and expansions of budgetary items, whereas preference-based explanations have marginal support. In addition, institutional costs involved in budgetary politics amplify budgetary shifts. The author closes the article by discussing the implications of the findings for partisan theories of government and institutional theories. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Governments in democratic systems are expected to respond to the issue preferences of citizens. Yet we have a limited understanding of the factors that cause levels of responsiveness to vary across time and between countries. In this article, the authors suggest that political contestation is the primary mechanism driving policy responsiveness and that this, in turn, is mediated by political institutions and government popularity. To test this proposition, the authors analyze the responsiveness of executive policy promises (speeches) and policy actions (public expenditure) in Britain, Denmark, and the United States in the period from 1970 to 2005. These time-series analyses show that higher levels of political contestation are associated with more responsive executives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I identify whether budgets in Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are punctuated and investigate the variation in budget punctuations over time. Building on stochastic process methods, I find that budgets in all four cases exhibit mostly incremental changes punctuated by extreme shifts. In order to explain variation in budget punctuations over time, I rely on two models: partisan control of government and partisan distance of the assembly. The two models are tested using national budgetary data across all government functions for the four countries from the mid-1960s to 1989. I find that greater distance in strength and ideology among parties leads to increases in the degree of punctuations in the German and the British cases, whereas there is some evidence for the partisan control model in the American cases. In the Danish cases, partisan distance reduces the degree of budget punctuations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests whether the government's budget is intertemporally balanced in a number of EC countries by applying a method first developed to detect speculative bubbles in financial markets. The test aims to establish whether the government can engage in bubble finance, and is based on a comparison between two sets of estimates. The first is obtained directly by regressing the stock of outstanding debt on a distributed lag of the primary surplus The second is obtained indirectly from a pair of equations, one relating the current debt stock to next period's primary surplus and debt stock, the other specifying an AR process for the primary surplus. In the presence of a bubble, only the first set of estimates is inconsistent, and hence the two sets differ It is found that the null of no bubble can be rejected in the cases of Italy, Germany, Denmark and Greece implying that the government is not intertemporally solvent in these countries The other EC member states appear to be on a sustainable path. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]