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In the wake of the horrific terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, there is growing pressure for the enactment of a new anti-terrorism law. In 2004, the Congress Government repealed the Prevention of Terrorism Act ("POTA"), due to widespread criticism that the act's draconian preventive provisions had been badly manipulated and abused by state and local elites against the lower classes or religious minorities.This paper examines the failures of the POTA regime in order to understand how future anti-terrorism regimes can be made more effective and less subject to abuse. I start by analyzing the role of the Indian judiciary in the implementation of past anti-terror laws such as the National Security Act (the A.K. Roy case (1982), the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (the Kartar Singh case (1994), and POTA (2003). In each case, the Court has upheld deeply flawed laws on the grounds that anti-terror legislation lies within the realm of "extraordinary law." In this paper, I revisit these decisions and argue that the Court in the future should adopt a more assertive and proactive role in scrutinizing future anti-terror legislation, in order to ensure that future regimes are effective and not abused by state elites. Indian leaders must learn from the mistakes of POTA in designing a new law that centralizes power and control over anti-terrorism policy, and provides for strong judicial review and oversight of its implementation. I conclude by contrasting Indian case law with U.S. Supreme Court and federal court decisions in this area. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often imagine that countries with nuclear energy programs are nuclear weapons states waiting to happen. Yet there are multiple ways that states can enhance their nuclear security, even when they possess the requisite technology for a weapons program. They may undertake diplomatic efforts to reduce the level of threat, they may seek shelter under an ally's nuclear umbrella, and they may adopt unilateral military measures, up to and including the development of a nuclear arsenal. Over the past five decades, India has engaged in all three of these approaches. Since India's pursuit of nuclear weapons is already well-documented, this article focuses on its efforts to elicit nuclear restraint from other states through diplomacy and to seek the protection of nuclear-armed allies. Drawing on archival documents and interviews in New Delhi and Mumbai, it documents how Indian leaders eventually became disillusioned with these two alternatives to nuclear armament. In doing so, it depicts India's emergence as a nuclear power not simply as a response to regional threats, but also as the result of dissatisfaction with alternative paths to nuclear security. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of this finding for possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in nuclear energy in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]