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The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Texas v. New Mexico regarding the Pecos River Compact which was created to decide on how finite water resources should be apportioned to prevent conflicts among adjacent states. Topics include the need for more detailed terms in the Compact to resolve disputes as suggested in Texas v. Mexico, a background on the Pecos River Compact, and the history of the dispute between Texas and Mexico over the river which started since the early 1990s.

The article discusses the review of the decision of several cases in United States sentencing several Mexicans guilty. It focuses on the suit filed by Mexico against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in reference to the case Leal Garcia v.Texas. It informs about the memorandum issued by the then president of United States George W. Bush for satisfying the laws and regulations of the ICJ.

In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court permitted Texas to proceed with the execution of a Mexican national who, in violation of the United States' obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, had not been given timely notice of his rights of consular notification and consultation. It did so despite its finding that the United States had an obligation under treaty law to comply with an order of the International Court of Justice that Medellin's case be granted reviezo and reconsideration. The international obligation, the Court found, was not domestically enforceable because the treaties at issue were not self-executing. The five Justices who signed the Chief Justice's majority opinion, including the Court's self-proclaimed originalists, joined an opinion that construed the Constitution's Supremacy Clause without any serious consideration of its language or the history of its drafting, ignoring evidence of the Supremacy Clause's original meaning cited by the dissenting Justices. This Article explores the meaning of originalism in the context of the Court's Medellin decision and contends that the majority's opinion, while perhaps defensible on other grounds, cannot be reconciled with any identifiable version of originalism. Rather, it is best understood as a decision reflecting the conservative majority's political commitment to favor principles of U.S. sovereignty and federalism over compliance with international obligations, even when the consequence of such a commitment is to enable state governments to undermine the foreign policy decisions of the political branches of the federal government. Ultimately, however, the Article concludes that Medellin's case never should have come before the Court. The President has a duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The Court determined that the Bush Administration did not satisfy this duty by issuing an Executive Memorandum directing states to comply with the judgment of the International Court of Justice. That being the case, the President now must comply with his Take Care Clause duties by working with Congress to make certain that federal law compels compliance with the International Court of Justice's judgment. Furthermore, this Article contends that the Medellín case is emblematic of the U.S. executive branch's broader failure to ensure that all treaties requiring domestic implementation are in fact implemented so as to avoid placing the United states in violation of its international obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present work examines the limits on ICJ's special jurisdiction as to the determination of US' breach of the Avena Judgment, as a result of the request for interpretation filed by Mexico after its national, Mr. Medellín Rojas, had been executed in the State of Texas without having his conviction duly reviewed. Not acceding to Mexico's request, the ICJ recalls that its jurisdiction on the merits of the case requires a higher degree of certainty than the one required in the preliminary phase, and concludes that the object of the request concerns a general matter, that is to say, the legal effects of the Avena Judgment on the US system, and not the scope and meaning of said judgment as provided in Article 60 of its Statute. Likewise, the constraints on its special jurisdiction hinders the ICJ from attributing international responsibility for Mr. Medellin's execution to the US, as a pronouncement on the unlawfulness of such actions applies to the enforcement of the judgment, not to its interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]