Search

People who have no experience with programming can create informal programs to rearrange the order of cars in trains. To find out whether they rely on kinematic mental simulations, the current studies examined participants’ eye movements in two experiments in which participants performed various moves and rearrangements on a railway consisting of a main track running from left to right and a siding entered from and exited to the left track. In Experiment 1, they had to imagine different sorts of single moves of cars on the railway. The sequences of their fixations resembled iconic gestures: they tended to look at the starting location of the imagined move, and then at its final location. In Experiment 2, the task was to create descriptions of how to solve four sorts of rearrangements that differ in their Kolmogorov complexity. It predicted the time to find the correct solution and the relative number and duration of fixations recorded during the description of each move for rearrangements of different complexity. Participants were more likely to fixate on the symbols on the cars than anything else, and they fixated longer when the rearrangement was more difficult. They also tended to fixate regions of the tracks where a car’s movement began or ended, as if they were imagining a car moving along the tracks. The results suggest that humans rely on a kinematic mental simulation when creating informal algorithms.

Seeing a person preparing to perform an action and later remembering having seen subsequent phases of the action, but not previous phases. This is what a theory on the role of the motor system in the creation and recovery of memories predicts can happen. We investigate memory for action after viewing an image representing an actor acting on a series of everyday objects. The participants in one experiment viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects (e.g., blowing the nose), and 15 minutes later they were asked to complete a recognition task. At recognition, participants viewed photos representing temporally distant moments, backward or forward in time compared to the original, along with the same photos seen at encoding. Results showed that participants tended to accept forward photos more than backward photos. In a pilot study, we explored the role of the temporal distance between encoding and recognition. Results showed that when 3 days elapsed between the encoding and recognition phases, participants did not tend to accept forward photos more than backward photos.

An assertion about a fact can in principle be tested in observations. That is impossible for assertions about what is permissible or obligatory, i.e., deontic assertions based on moral principles, conventions, rules, or laws. Many modal logics concern these matters. But an integrated theory of emotions and reasoning predicts that emotional reactions and strength of belief should be correlated for deontic assertions, but not for factual assertions. You can be convinced that it is wrong to take paperclips from the office, and that it is right for society to provide health care for everyone, and your emotional response to these two assertions is likely to correlate with the strength of your beliefs in them. In contrast, you can be convinced both that fresh snow is white and that fossil fuels are making the world hotter, but have an emotional reaction to only the second of these assertions. Grounds for factual assertions are empirical findings. But assessments of deontic assertions depend in part on the emotions that they elicit. Previous studies have corroborated this prediction for moral claims, matters of convention, prudential rules, and personal recommendations. We report two experiments that yield the same interaction for legal pronouncements from the Italian Civil Code compared with parallel factual assertions. People like propositions they believe, and they believe propositions they like. We discuss several remaining unknowns including the potential role of emotions in reasoning about legal and other deontic propositions.

Recursive loops in informal algorithms are difficult to formulate, even for na ̈ıve adults (Khemlani et al., 2013).Children can formulate algorithms that do not require loops (Bucciarelli et al., 2016), and anecdotal evidence suggests thatthey can understand loops. As there were no previous studies, we examined how they made deductions of the consequencesof loops, and how they abduced loops in creating informal algorithms in everyday language. We therefore tested fifth-gradechildren’s ability carry out both these tasks in algorithms that rearrange the order of cars on a toy railway track with onesiding. Experiment 1 showed that they could deduce rearrangements from algorithms containing loops, and Experiment 2showed that they could formulate at least some algorithms that contained loops. These abilities are the likely precursors to thecomprehension of recursion and to computer programming.

The deep comprehension of a text is tantamount to the construction of an articulated mental model of that text. The number of correct recollections is an index of a learner's mental model of a text. We assume that another index of comprehension is the timing of the gestures produced during text recall; gestures are simultaneous with speech when the learner has built an articulated mental model of the text, whereas they anticipate the speech when the learner has built a less articulated mental model. The results of four experiments confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions for both children and adults. Provided that the recollections are correct, the timing of gestures can differ and can be considered a further measure of the quality of the mental model, beyond the number of correct recollections.

The main assumption underlying the present investigation is that action observation elicits a mandatory mental simulation representing the action forward in time. In Experiment 1, participants observed pairs of photos portraying the initial and the final still frames of an action video; then they observed a photo depicting the very same action but either forward or backward in time. Their task was to tell whether the action in the photo portrayed something happened before or after the action seen at encoding. In this explicit task, the evaluation was faster for forward photos than for backward photos. Crucially, the effect was replicated when instructions asked only to evaluate at test whether the photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from two still frames, Experiment 2), and when at encoding, they were presented a single still frame and evaluated at test whether a photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from single still frame; Experiment 3). Overall, the results speak in favour of a mandatory mechanism through which our brain simulates the action also in tasks that do not explicitly require action simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study concerned the role of gestures that accompany discourse in deep learning processes. We assumed that co-speech gestures favor the construction of a complete mental representation of the discourse content, and we tested the predictions that a discourse accompanied by gestures, as compared with a discourse not accompanied by gestures, should result in better recollection of conceptual information, a greater number of discourse-based inferences drawn from the information explicitly stated in the discourse, and poorer recognition of verbatim of the discourse. The results of three experiments confirmed these predictions. (Contains 6 tables and 3 notes.)

The aim of the present study is to compare the pragmatic ability of right- and left-hemisphere-damaged patients excluding the possible interference of linguistic deficits. To this aim, we study extralinguistic communication, that is communication performed only through gestures. The Cognitive Pragmatics Theory provides the theoretical framework: it predicts a gradient of difficulty in the comprehension of different pragmatic phenomena, that should be valid independently of the use of language or gestures as communicative means. An experiment involving 10 healthy individuals, 10 right- and 9 left-hemisphere-damaged patients, shows that pragmatic performance is better preserved in left-hemisphere-damaged (LHD) patients than in right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) patients.

Deontic assertions concern what one ought to do, may do, and ought not to do. This paper proposes a theory of their meanings and of how these meanings are represented in mental models. The meanings of deontic assertions refer to sets of permissible and impermissible states. An experiment corroborated the ability of individuals to list these states. The most salient were those corresponding to the mental models of the assertions. When individuals reason, they rely on mental models, which do not make all states explicit. The theory predicts the most frequent conclusions drawn from deontic premises. It also predicts the occurrence of illusory inferences from assertions of permission, i.e., inferences that seem highly plausible but that are in fact invalid. Assertions of prohibitions, according to the theory, should reduce the illusions. Further experiments corroborated these predictions.