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This article traces the institutional trajectory of the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying (OCL). It is argued that political elites' electoral prioritization, foremost demonstrated within the Lobbying Act, has undermined the OCL in its mission toward a balanced and transparent lobbying system. Politicians have demonstrated a form of regulatory opportunism in which change is filtered by electoral calculations. Gaps in the Commissioner's authority, the registration floor, and the scope of communication reporting stand out as enabling features. The article's findings suggest greater attention should be devoted to monitoring the minutiae of regulations and the gravity of electoral calculations in regulatory reform. Cet article retrace le parcours institutionnel du Commissariat au lobbying (CAL). Nous soutenons que les priorites electorales des elites politiques, mises en evidence avant tout dans la Loi sur le lobbying, ont affaibli le CAL dans sa mission d'etablir un systeme de lobbying equilibre et transparent. Les politiques ont fait preuve d'une forme d'opportunisme regulateur dans lequel le changement est filtre par des calculs electoraux. Les disparites dans l'autorite du commissaire, le plancher d'inscription et la portee des rapports de communication se distinguent comme des caracteristiques instrumentales. Les conclusions de l'article suggerent que l'on devrait accorder une plus grande attention a la surveillance des menus details des reglementations et a la gravite des calculs electoraux dans la reforme reglementaire., Introduction There is a widely shared and founded anxiety over the inequities within interest group influence in policy provision. This 'weak state' fear has raised demand among developed states for [...]