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Robert McCauley and Ernest Thomas Lawson, Philosophical Foundations of the Cognitive Science of Religion

Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beliefs, it is altogether less certain that the same can be said for other classes of beliefs, such as moral or religious beliefs. This issue takes centre stage in debates concerning evolutionary debunking arguments against religious beliefs, where the rationality of beliefs is often dependent upon their production by an evolved faculty that is sensitive to truth. In this article, we consider whether evolution selected for true religious beliefs. We begin by highlighting the relevance of this question for broader philosophy of religion, then present a dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments for and against the proposition that true religious beliefs generate pragmatic success and hence can be selected for by evolution.

In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.

Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility.

This chapter discusses evolution of religion in terms of cultural evolution. We argue that there are good reasons to study religion in terms of cultural evolution. Basic concepts and theories within cultural evolution studies are discussed such as memetics, sociobiology or dual inheritance theory. This chapter also discusses the concept of religion as cultural niche, and the distinction between content biases and context biases.

This chapter shows how cultural processes can account for the emergence of religious components. We argue that cultural processes can shape the operations of cognitive mechanisms so that they easily and automatically produce religious components.

This chapter offers arguments for adaptationist explanation of religion. We argue that cognitive explanations are mainly proximate explanations that do not explain the long-term evolutionary context of religious components. Only adaptationist theories offer an ultimate explanation of evolution of religion.

This chapter presents the basic concepts of evolutionary biology that are applied in adaptationist theories of religion. We discuss concepts like the unit of selection, or individual selection versus group selection. This chapter also discusses the puzzling explanatory challenge of the evolution of cooperation.

After having discussed biological adaptationist and cultural adaptationist approaches, we lastly discuss sexual selection theory of religion. This chapter introduces the main concepts and theories in sexual selection. Then, possible applications to the evolution of religion are offered. While there are good reasons to explain at least some of religious components in terms of mating strategies, not all religious features evolved under direct sexual selection pressure.

This chapter presents some of the main theories and assumptions of cognitive science of religion (CSR). The main CSR theories and concepts discussed here include the concept of religion as by-product, the naturalness of religion, HADD, MCI hypothesis, theory of mind, and promiscuous teleology. Critical remarks on CSR refer to marginalized impact of social and cultural factors. We also discuss some objections to the notion of intuitiveness.

This chapter discusses adaptationist theories of religion which consider religious components such as beliefs and/or behaviors as adaptations. Such adaptationist theories of religion include Broad Supernatural Punishment Theory, Big God Theory, costly signaling theories of religion, the concept of religious coping and its positive impact on human health, and the idea that religious rituals foster cohesion. Such theories draw on two important distinctions: group versus individual selection of religion, and the concept of religion as old versus new adaptation.

This chapter explores the concept of naturalness of religion. Religious components may be regarded as natural in the sense of being intuitive and cognitively effortless. Such theories and concepts are critically evaluated.

Recently, Del Ratzsch proposed a new version of the design argument. He argues that belief in a designer is often formed non-inferentially, much like perceptual beliefs, rather than formed by explicit reasoning. Ratzsch traces his argument back to Thomas Reid (1710-1796) who argues that beliefs formed in this way are also justified. In this paper, I investigate whether design beliefs that are formed in this way can be regarded as knowledge. For this purpose, I look closer to recent scientific study of how design beliefs are formed. I argue that the science strongly suggest that people easily form false beliefs. As a result, design beliefs can only constitute knowledge if subjects have additional reasons or evidence for design.

I discuss and criticize an argument for the conclusion that belief in spirits is unreliably formed and hence unjustified. The argument is based on three scientific explanations for spirit-beliefs; hyperactive agency detection device, infrasound, and magnetic stimulation of the temporal lobe. I argue that the argument fails because the explanations are of too limited scope

Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theories a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be made better by insights from John Dewey. I picked Dewey because he offered important insights in cognition long before there was cognitive science and because his ideas are influential in the recent enactivist movement. The relevance of Dewey’s thought for CSR will be discussed under three headers: embodiedness, embeddedness and anti-modularity. I focus on these points because embodiedness and embeddedness are important features of Dewey’s view on cognition and because his ideas are useful for criticizing modularity. I will first give a brief overview of the most influential theories in CSR. Then I will discuss how existing theories in CSR can be improved on the first two points and criticized on the third.

I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted. The arguments draw on scientific evidence from Cognitive Science of Religion. They differ considerably as to why the evidence points to unreliability. Two arguments conclude to unreliability because religious belief is shaped by evolutionary pressures; another argument states that the mechanism responsible for religious belief produces many false god-beliefs; a similar argument claims that the mechanism produces incompatible god-beliefs; and a final argument states that the mechanism is offtrack. I argue that the arguments fail to make the case for unreliability or that the unreliability can be overcome.