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Governmental intervention is essential to combat environmental pollution, a phenomenon classically explained as market failure, while market-based environmental policy instruments have provided cost-effective alternatives. By examining five pilot air pollution (sulfur dioxide) and water pollution (chemical oxygen demand) trading schemes in China through a market-based theoretical framework and extensive empirical analysis, this research analyzes where a state-market boundary is defined, whether the market is performing effectively, and, critically, what leads to underperformance. Constrained by policy design, policy conflicts, and excessive state intervention, the market has not played an effective and ‘decisive’ role, resulting in low market thickness for participants and transactions, market congestion on prices, and inadequate market safety for genuine emissions trading. Better emissions trading for conventional pollutants and CO2 requires better market-oriented rules, improved policy coordinat...

Frequent adjustments of environmental regulations usually cause business and investment risks, resulting in significant challenges for policy effectiveness. This paper examines how regulatory uncertainty affects decision making through an empirical study of the ‘Pay for Permit’ policy in the Tai Lake Basin in China. The results show that firms’ willingness to decrease pollution is positively influenced by their perceived attitudes, social pressure, and perceived behavioural control. In addition, perceived regulatory uncertainty has significant impacts on social pressure and attitudes toward pollution control. Firms that perceive less regulatory uncertainty are more inclined to adopt antipollution strategies under the Pay for Permit policy. To reduce regulatory uncertainty, China’s policy makers should maintain a consistent level of environmental regulations, set clear and reliable long-term policy targets, and strengthen policy enforcement. Keywords: regulatory uncertainty, corporate environmental strategies, Pay for Permit, theory of planned behaviour