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Despite the widespread use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool in the absence of armed intervention and as a means to promote peace, there is notable absence of research on the effects of sanctions on the peacebuilding capacity of tourism and their relationship to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This situation is surprising given that both sanctions and tourism are promoted as a force for peace and reconciliation processes. Drawing upon international relations and political science and via semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the Iranian tourism and hospitality industry, this study investigates whether sanctions contribute to peace and create an environment suitable for tourism development. The findings indicate how the imposition, relaxation and then re-imposition of sanctions by international state actors as a means of peace have paralyzed the Iranian tourism industry through its psychological, sectoral, and societal effects and mobility restrictions. The consequences of sanctions and their sharp contrast with the SDGs are also explored. This study fills a significant gap in tourism research by examining the implications of the application of a widely used coercive geopolitical tool of statecraft in relation to the peace and tourism nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the XIXth century the relations of dependency and inter-dependency between the Iranian monarch and foreign officials became an integral part of Iranian political life. During the Iranian Constitutional Movement (1905–1911) nascent Iranian nationalism harshly condemned the Qajars as tyrants and lackeys of foreign powers. Muhammad 'Ali Shah (r.1907–1909), the first Qajar sovereign who had to share his powers with the representative assembly, was quickly discredited by his political opponents as despot and Russian puppet, an accusation that seemed to be proved when the deposed Muhammad 'Ali returned to Iran from his exile and launched a military campaign. This study represents an attempt to shed more light on the relations between Muhammad 'Ali and Russian officials, especially in the context of his return campaign of 1911. Relying mostly on unpublished Russian archival sources, this paper proposes a critical assessment of Muhammad 'Ali's link with Russia, avoiding the habitual reductionist scheme of 'patron-client' relations and putting more emphasis on the role of agency in Russian foreign policy in Iran as well as the proper intentions and ambitions of the Qajar princely elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and the reimposition of economic sanctions, Iran witnessed public unrest that threatened the survival of the regime. Throughout its history, the Iranian regime has deployed various intricate internal and external strategies that have worked separately at times, and overlapped at others, to secure the regime against threats and guarantee its survivability. It is important to discover the strategies the Iranian regime has followed to survive the stifling crises it has faced since its establishment in 1979, in order to evaluate whether it will be able to survive its chronic economic crises. While the regime has purposely supported the Palestinian cause, strengthened its relations with non-state actors, and engaged in religious discourses on an external level, it has also achieved militarization and securitization, populated unelected governmental institutions with personnel loyal to its clerical and military institutions rather than qualified persons and pursued legitimacy renewal on an internal level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ictimaiyat is the property of Ictimaiyat and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Iranian nuclear programme is a controversial issue that has had domestic, regional and international effects. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology has divided the Middle East region and international community. Turkey has been at the centre of the Iranian nuclear debate and has sought to play a 'mediating role' in this issue. This article will apply a Historical Sociological (HS) framework to analyse Turkey-Iran relations considering the Iranian Nuclear Issue. It will explore the period from 2002 until the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 and will provide an analysis of the historical, domestic and regional/international developments in the nuclear issue and how this has affected Turkish-Iranian relations. By highlighting the continuities and constraints each actor has faced, this article will demonstrate how the interaction of structure versus agency, geographical determinants and historical analysis all help provide a comprehensive understanding of the constraining and enabling factors in Turkish-Iranian relations. By applying Historical Sociology and 'Cuspness' to Turkish-Iranian relations in the Iranian Nuclear Issue, this article provides the reasons of 'how' and 'why' the relationship is complex, and how Turkey and Iran can maintain pragmatic relations yet be constrained by these factors at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different theoretical approaches can be used to analyze countries' foreign policy and regionalism. The present study intends to study and compare the policy of regionalism of Iran in the second Pahlavi era and the Islamic Republic based on the theoretical approach of James Rosenau, using the variables of decision-making personality, role, government, society and international system variables. Iran's regionalization policy during the Second Pahlavi period was in line with the structure of power in the international system. At the same time, Iran, in this period influenced by the structure of the bipolar system and the Cold War, also sought to gain supremacy and leadership in the region, as the most important person in foreign policy decisionmaking and in the personality of Mohammad Reza Shah. On this basis, we can say that the two variables of the international system and the decision-making personality were the most important variables influencing the process of foreign policy and regionalism of Iran during this period. In the Islamic Republic, with the formation of ideological elements such as the construction and nature of political power based on the velayat-e faqih and the idea of issuing a revolution, the policy of regionalism was in conflict with the structure of power in the international system and in line with ideological foundations and interests. Accordingly, the two variables of the international system and the decision-making personality were the most important variables influencing the process of foreign policy and regionalization of Iran during this period. The purpose of this paper is to use a descriptive-analytical method, a comparative study and to use the historical data to study the effect of each of these variables on the regionalization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the Strategic Culture Theory, this article analyzes Iran's evolving ballistic missile program (BMP), by focusing especially on the period of the Trump administration (January 2017-January 2021), including both Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shooting down a US surveillance drone in the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019 and Iran's attack on the US military bases following the assassination of IRGC General Qasem Soleimani, in January 2020. This work demonstrates the increasing reliance on the 'revolutionary', more offensive narrative, which has become additionally reinforced after the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani and Professor Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. This has consolidated the retaliatory aspects in Iran's foreign and security policy, while it has also marginalized moderated actors willing to engage in negotiations with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rate of construction of nuclear reactors in the world that supply energy, the geopolitical situation such as with North Korea, Iran, and the rising tensions between the world powers raise the question of whether and when a large nuclear incident xviii occur. However, after examining several references scenarios for dealing with civil nuclear events and compering them to data obtained from interviews, a careful analysis of previous events, and investigating accidents, it is clear that the current models cannot deal properly ivith those events. The current plans for coping with nuclear accidents address only partial aspects of disaster management, do not offer accurate description of unfolding events, ignore newly obtain scientific data, and ignore the human factor in decision making level. The current paper will review why Reference Scenario to nuclear incidents accepted currently in various countries around the world are not up to date and shed light on the most critical aspect in proper nuclear disaster management--rational thinking pattern. The suggested model presented at this article, ONDM, is an innovative new mechanism and a more effective preparedness mechanism for nuclear disaster, as it takes under consideration past mistakes and provides tools for leaders to make informed decisions under conditions of uncertainty Keywords: Disaster Preparedness, ONDM, Nuclear Event, Risk analysis assessment, Civil defense., 1. Introduction Nuclear disaster preparedness is an aspect that caught the attention of the world after the Fukushima disaster in 2011, when it was discovered that despite the design of [...]

Over the last few decades, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have become very active in Northeast Africa. In addition to developing bilateral relations with countries in the region, they regard the area as the gateway to connections with the rest of the continent, although they are guided by different motivations. Turkeys expansion of its interests in Africa is both a reaction to the European Union's rejection of its membership and an opportunity to expand its trade, which has been hindered by instability in the Middle East in recent years. Like Saudi Arabia, it views Northeast Africa as a place to extend its cultural influence with that region's indigenous Sunni population. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth to curtail Iran's attempts to expand its influence in the region, while Turkey has provided on-the-ground technical assistance to enhance its political and economic connections in the region. In recent years the two countries have been drawn together by Iran's involvement in Yemen, although Turkey has sought to avoid becoming involved in local political disputes. Rather, it has served in multinational peacekeeping efforts and actions to prevent piracy in the sea lanes off the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. However, since the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the latter country's relations with Iran that began in June 2017, some tension has arisen between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While Iran also wants those sea lanes to be freely open to traffic--as they were during the time of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi--it also wants to counteract Israeli involvement in Northeast Africa. Turkey has made great inroads politically and economically in Northeast Africa in recent years, while Saudi Arabia has gained the upper hand in its rivalry with Iran., INTRODUCTION Historically there have been many political, economic, and cultural connections between the core area of the Middle East (Egypt and Southwest Asia) and Northeast Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, and [...]

The Levant has constituted one of the core areas of interest for US foreign policy since the Second World War. The aim of this article is to shed light on the US policies towards the Levant, mostly during the last two American administrations, to understand how the vicissitudes of the region and of American politics made Washington's policy towards the Levant look biased, at times incompetent, and most importantly inconsistent. This article examines the changes in approach to the region as a whole from one administration to the next on issues such as the protection of Israel's sovereignty, supporting friendly regimes, fighting terrorism, and containing Iran. The hesitations and shifts in policy towards Syria are given a longer treatment as they speak both to the yet not finalized American policy towards the Levant but also to show how the US has shifted track and moved away from unseating President Assad to focus more on containing and ifpossible rolling over Iran.Keywords: Levant, Middle East, US Foreign Policy, the Syrian Uprising, Post- Islamic StateLevant bolgesi, Ikinci Dunya Savasi'ndan bu yana ABD dis politikasinin oncelikli cikar alanlarindan birini olusturmaktadir. Bu makalenin amaci, ABD'nin, bilhassa da son iki Amerikan yonetiminin, Levant'a yonelik politikalarini acikliga kavusturmayi, bolgede ve Amerikan siyasetindeki degisimlerin Washington'un Levant'a yonelik politikasinin nasil yanli, zaman zaman beceriksiz ve daha da onemlisi tutarsiz gorunmesine neden oldugunu anlamayi hedeflemektedir. Makale, bir yonetimden digerine Israil'in egemenliginin korunmasi, dostane rejimlerin desteklenmesi, terorizmle mucadele ve Iran'in kontrol altina alinmasi gibi konularda ve genel itibariyle bolgeye yonelik yaklasimdaki degisiklikleri incelemektedir. Suriye'ye yonelik politikadaki tereddutler ve degisimler daha detayli ele alinmistir. Nitekim bu konular Amerika'nin Levant'a yonelik politikasinin henuz son halini almadiginin, daha da otesinde gelismeler karsisinda ABD'nin nasil yon degistirdigini ve Esad'i yerinden etme hedefinden uzaklasarak Iran'i kontrol altina alma ve eger mumkunse boyun egdirmeye odaklandigina isaret etmektedir.Anahtar Kelimeler: Levant, Orta Dogu, ABD Dis Politikasi, Suriye Ayaklanmasi, Islamcilik Sonrasi Devlet, IntroductionThe term Levant, which derives from the Italian Levante, meaning the rising of the sun in the east, is used to refer to the eastern part of the Mediterranean that [...]

This article examines the policies of the Russian Federation in the Levant region against the backdrop of dramatic global, regional and domestic changes. Russia's strategy is analyzed through the prism of the Syrian and the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. The Syrian conflict marks Moscow's new activist policy in the region. On the one hand, it has provided for the astonishing diversification of its relations with the various Middle East actors, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Hamas, to name just a few. On the other hand, Moscow, striving for a new world order, has been faced with the fact that despite its cooperation with the US in Syria the two countries' approach to solving international problems are so distinct that even a fight against terrorism could not mend their relationship. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has always been perceived in Russia as the key factor in explaining the instability in the region. Russia's participation in the international structures dealing with the conflict resolution has been motivated primarily by a search for peace in the area. Instrumentally, Russia has always sought to keep open at least some channels of cooperation with the West, as these serve as a crucial means for decreasing international tensions.Keywords: Russia, Terrorism, Regime Change, De-escalation Zones, De-confliction.Bu makale kuresel, bolgesel ve ulusal degisimler baglaminda Rusya Federasyonu'nun Levant bolgesine yonelik politikalarini incelemektedir. Rusya'nin stratejisi Suriye ve Filistin-Israil catismalari odakli olarak analiz edilmektedir. Suriye catismasi Moskova'nin bolgede yeni ve eyleme donuk politikalarina isaret etmektedir. Bu durum, bir taraftan Rusya'nin Orta Dogu'da Turkiye, Iran, Israil, Suudi Arabistan ve Hamas benzeri farkli aktorlerle iliskilerini cesitlendirmesine neden oldu. Yeni bir dunya duzeni arayisindaki Moskova, diger taraftan, Suriye'de ABD ile yurutulen isbirligine ragmen, iki ulkenin uluslararasi sorunlara cozum bulma yaklasimlarinin birbirinden cok farkli oldugu ve terorizmle mucadele yaklasiminin dahi iliskileri iyilestirmeye yetmedigi gercegiyle yuzlesti. Filistin-Israil catismasi Rusya tarafindan her zaman bolgedeki istikrarsizligi aciklayan ana faktor olarak algilandi. Rusya'nin catisma cozumuyle ilgilenen uluslararasi kuruluslara katilimi, agirlikli olarak bolgede baris arayisi cercevesinde gerceklesti. Bu cercevede Rusya Bati'yla iliskilerinin devamliligi adina, en azindan aracsal olarak uluslararasi gerilimin azaltilmasina katki sagladigina inandigi bazi isbirligi kanallarinin acik kalmasini saglamaya calismistir.Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Terorizm, Rejim Degisikligi, Catismasizlik Bolgeleri, Catismayi Onleme., IntroductionRussia's interests in the Levant cannot be separated from its global interests and calculations. The increasingly diverged interpretation of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the role of military interference as [...]

This paper examines Iran's historical and strategic ties to the Levant and argues that its objectives can characterized as multifaceted, diversified and pragmatic in orientation. Mindful of its strategic calculations and taking advantage of regional events, Iran operates as an opportunistic and adept regional actor having increased its foothold in Lebanon and Syria by supporting its axis of resistance partners Hezbollah and Bashar al Assad in their common goals of survival, stability and anti-Israeli and American sentiments. While Tehran's strategy has, for the time being, strengthened its influence in the Levant, this paper observes that it has simultaneously resulted in the creation of anti-Iran regional alliance that could ultimately undermine Tehran's regional position. Understanding Tehran's strategic calculus in the Levant can shed light on its long-term objectives and potential outcome.Keywords: Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Bashar al Assad, Strategic Depth, Axis of Resistance.Bu makale, Iran'in Levant'la tarihi ve stratejik baglarini incelemekte ve Iran'in hedeflerinin cok yonlu, cesitlilik iceren ve pragmatik yonelimli seklinde nitelendirilebilecegini savunmaktadir. Stratejik hesaplari goz onunde bulunduran ve bolgesel gelismelerin sundugu avantajlardan faydalanan firsatci ve hunerli bir bolgesel aktor olarak Iran, direnis ekseni ortaklari olan Hizbullah ve Besar Esad'i beka, istikrar ve Israil-ABD karsiti duygulardan olusan ortak hedefleri cercevesinde desteklemis, Lubnan ve Suriye'deki nufuzunu artirmistir. Bu makale, Tahran'in stratejisinin su ana dek Iran'in Levant'taki nufuzunu artirdigini belirtmekle birlikte, es zamanli bicimde Tahran'in bolgesel konumuna nihayetinde zarar verebilecek Iran karsiti bolgesel bir ittifakin olusmasiyla sonuclandigini ileri surmektedir. Tahran'in Levant'taki stratejik hesaplarini anlamak, uzun vadeli hedefleri ve olasi sonuclarini da acikliga kavusturacaktir.Anahtar Kelimeler: Iran Islam Cumhuriyeti, Suriye, Hizbullah, Besar Esad, Stratejik Derinlik, Direnis Ekseni., IntroductionIran's increasing influence and interference in the Levant, seen through its support for Lebanese Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and Palestinian groups such as Hamas, has been both an [...]

Since the rise of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Islam has come to play a more prominent role in public and political spheres in Turkey. This paper draws on ethnographic data gathered in Istanbul and Diyarbakir between 2013 and 2015 to highlight Kurdish attitudes to Islam. Following the electoral success of the AKP amongst Kurds in the general election of 2007, Kurdish actors have sought to incorporate Islamic sensibilities into their political offering in order to appeal to Kurdish constituents. Amid the AKP's recent authoritarian turn and instrumentalization of religion, and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), many Kurds have sought to redefine their relationship with Islam to clearly demarcate distinctly Kurdish religious and political spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One of the questions which characterized the first two decades after the rise of the Qajars to the Iranian throne was the fierce rivalry between the two leading princes during the reign of Fath-ʿAli Shah, namely, ʿAbbas Mirza Nayib al-Saltanah and Muhammad-ʿAli Mirza Daulatshah. The main cause of this rivalry was the nomination of the former to the position of crown prince and regent instead of the latter, who was the elder of the two. The aim of this article is to explain the reasons for this seemingly unjust decision on the part of Fath-ʿAli, and to discuss the intensity of this princely rivalry, analyzing its repercussions on various domestic and external affairs during the first decades of Qajar rule in Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Late Imperial Russia's multifaceted presence in Persia retains many fascinating life-stories of its actors, who often exerted crucial influence on the course of the history of Russian-Iranian relations of the time. Drawing on international scholarship about the Russian-Iranian relationships at the turn of the twentieth century, but mostly on documents from Russian and Georgian archives and the diaries of his contemporaries as well as his own private notes, this article examines the activities of Seraia Shapshal (1873–1961), focusing on his embeddedness both in the Qajar court and in Late Imperial Russia's policy towards Iran during the period 1900 to 1908. The paper for the first time in Iranian studies sheds light in sufficient detail upon how Shapshal found himself in Persia and what enabled him to reach the highest levels of power at the Qajar court. In so doing, it also identifies his leading role in the June 1908 anti-constitution coup. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interview with His Excellency Ardeshir Zahedi, former ambassador of Iran to the U.S., is presented. Topics covered include his view on the current tensions, as of 2020, between Iran and the U.S., what Iranian people should do under the present circumstances and the relations of the neighboring countries with Iran. He also discussed how he sees the future of Iran and the direction it is taking.

The article presents a speech by His Excellency Ardeshir Zahedi, former Iranian minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to Great Britain and U.S., delivered during a telephone conversation in June 2020. Topics covered include Iran's relations with the U.S., the efforts of the young generation in Iran to manufacture goods needed in the country and the need for the oppression of Iran by foreign countries to be stopped. He also discusses the reasons for the revolution in Iran.

Since the coup attempt of 2016, bilateral ties between Ankara and Tehran have witnessed a significant boost. Using and refining Steven David's framework of omni-balancing, which argues that the conduct of foreign policy in Third World settings also takes stock of domestic threats to the regime, this paper explains this emerging rapprochement. The article argues that after 2016, the AKP's foreign policy became increasingly predicated on regime survival, which was also reflected in Ankara-Tehran ties. This rapprochement was strengthened by both countries' intersecting positions on the following issues (1) A mutual pro-Qatar stance in the recent Saudi Arabia-Qatar spat, (2) Mutual opposition to a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and (3) Increasingly troubled relations with the US. Through a careful analysis of Turkish and Persian sources along with official discourses, this paper will expand on these key aspects of these significantly improved bilateral relations between both countries and will conclude with discussion of its durability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign trade expansion plays an important role in economic growth and development. Since Iran's singleproduct economy is facing tight sanctions, among trading partners, Turkey benefits from special place, and political independence in international relations because of its large population, rising per capita income, high economic growth rate, geographical and cultural proximity to Iran. Many opportunities and substantial capacities have been established for expanding foreign trade between these two countries. To do this, it is necessary to determine the maximum export capacity of Iran to Turkey and whether this capacity has actually been deployed and realized or not. The next question is what the bases of Iran's export development to Turkey are, and the goods which should be focused on to develop trading. Therefore, the aim of this study was to estimate the maximum export capacity of Iran to Turkey and to determine the commodities with the highest export capacity. The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index, the Cosine Index, and the General Model of the gravity model were used to evaluate Iran's export potential and to determine commodities in which Iran has export advantage. Iran's export potential to Turkey was investigated in various years and in different commodity groups by comparing the rate of export volume of each commodity to total volume of its import by Turkey. Research findings indicated that the highest Iranian export potential value to Turkey was $9,339 million, and just 7.2% of that ($669 million) has been realized. Also, 11 commodity groups formed more than 66% of Iranian potential exports to Turkey. Among them, 'mineral products' with $2,730 million, 'plastics and natural rubber and artifacts made from them' with 1,185 million, 'common metals and artifacts made from them' with $918 million, and 'products of the chemical industry and its related industries' with $879 million were respectively the four commodity groups with the highest export potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran's coalition with the states and political organizations in the Middle East that are either Shia or act to counter the West and its regional allies is a consequence of the Islamic Republic of Iran's emotionally constructed identity. The empathy Iran has for the Shia resulting from the pain they have collectively suffered throughout history explains Iran's support for the Shia elements in Lebanon and Iraq. With the same logic, assistance Iran gives to Syria and the Palestinian organizations fighting Israel and sanctioned by the West are out of resentment against some Western powers embedded in Iran's identity shaped by a history of disrespect Iranians have seen from some Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the foreign relations between Azerbaijan and Iran. Topics include increase in contact between Azerbaijan and Iran in which several delegations have exchanged visit including top military and intelligence brass, the indications of Tehran-Baku rapprochement such as the possibility of a close military and geopolitical alliance which demonstrates declining global role of United States, and historical relationship between the nations and related territorial disputes.

Focuses on several issues concerning the decision of Iran to abandon its deal with the European Union (EU) on the suspension of its uranium enrichment program, as of November 2004. Concerns of the EU and the U.S. over the decision; Terms of the agreement, including the recognition of the right of Iran to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Information on an investigation initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the nuclear program of Iran.

This article examines the role of Iran in post-2003 Iraq and in the ongoing Syrian conflict. It also investigates and analyses Iran's political strategy in relation to both countries. The aim is to assess Iran's foreign policy and its use of proxy warfare in Iraq and Syria in order to identify Iran's strategic goals in these two countries and in the Middle East in general. It also attempts to analyse the actions and reactions of Iran's regional rivals, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The article argues that the religious affiliation of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes, and their strategic location connecting Iran to Hezbollah, are the most significant driving forces behind Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq. Also, the article argues that Iraq is a political tool used by Iran to advance its regional power ambition in order to keep the balance of power in the Middle East. To achieve this goal, Iran aims to create a parallel army in Syria and Iraq similar to its own, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Key Words: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sunni, Shia, Iran's Foreign Policy, Sectarianism, Balance of Power, Proxy war, After its creation by Britain in 1921, Iraq was ruled by the minority Arab-Sunnis who make up 20 percent of Iraq's population. The regime lasted until 2003 when the United [...]

In general, there is substantial heterogeneity in value added, gross output, and production patterns across sectors within the US economy. There is also considerable asymmetry in intermediate goods linkages; that [...]

Recent studies of diversionary theory focus on domestic determinants of conflict between interstate rivals as well as the strategic behavior of potential targets of diversion. This paper addresses both issues by analyzing the tendency of the U.S. and Iran to use their rivalry for diversionary purposes from 1990 to 2004. Throughout the study, I seek to answer the following questions: Do the U.S. and Iran use their rivalry to divert attention away from domestic political and economic problems? Second, does Iran reciprocate hostile actions from the U.S. or act more conciliatory to avoid becoming the target of diversion. My findings demonstrate that U.S. Presidents appear to be more hostile toward Iran as there is a decline in their approval ratings. The same conclusion cannot be drawn for Iran. The findings suggest that Iran neither uses hostility toward the U.S. to divert attention away from domestic problems nor behaves strategically to avoid becoming the target of a potential U.S. diversion., Introduction There has been an unresolved debate in conflict literature over the influence of domestic factors in the outbreak of conflict between states. Scholars have approached the topic, known as [...]