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In this paper I analyse whether the right to legal capacity, established in Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, allows for criminal responsibility to be assigned to persons with mental disabilities. I argue that, understanding legal capacity as a legal ability to act within the law, persons with disabilities can not only exercise rights but also assume obligations and responsibilities, including criminal ones. I argue that legal capacity could affect imputability as the attribution of culpability, helping to eliminate the defense based on insanity as an exoneration from criminal responsibility, commonly applied to persons with disabilities. However, this exercise recognizes limitations: legal capacity does not ensure that all persons are criminally responsible, as an impartial formulation of imputability is compatible with the right to legal capacity. These restrictions open the possibility to explore other ways of assigning responsibility to those who do not have the capacity to be culpable, such as responsibility without blame proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Filicide is the act of a parent killing their own offspring. Previous studies indicate that there are both commonalities and distinctions between filicides committed by mothers and fathers. The main objective of this study was to compare maternal and paternal filicide with a major focus on clinical and sociodemographic features of perpetrators, incident details, and victims. Filicide cases were examined at the bedded unit of the Expertise Department of Observation of the Council of Forensic Medicine that were referred by the Turkish Ministry of Justice. A total of 51 perpetrators and 57 victims were analyzed from June 2014 to December 2023. The perpetrators were daily face‐to‐face interviewed by psychiatry and forensic medicine physicians. There were significant differences in sociodemographic characteristics and psychiatric conditions between maternal and paternal cases. Female perpetrators tended to be younger, unemployed, mostly targeted younger victims and used asphyxiation to kill, whereas males tended to target older victims and utilized firearms. The most common primary cause of filicide in maternal cases was "unwanted pregnancy," whereas "spousal revenge" and "anger or impulsivity" were predominant in paternal filicides. All perpetrators who were not criminally responsible were mothers, mostly diagnosed with psychotic depression. Unwanted pregnancy, psychotic depression, and postpartum psychosis should be assessed when evaluating risk for mothers, especially for infanticide. The desire for revenge on a spouse, often seen with personality disorders, impulsivity and anger, access to firearms should be screened for risk of paternal filicide, particularly in older victims. Early recognition of these factors can help in implementing prevention strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pathological dissociation is relatively common in the United States and may be associated with violent or criminal behavior. Dissociative Disorders, especially Dissociative Identity Disorder, are considered controversial diagnoses by some in the psychiatric and legal professions. Individuals who offend during dissociative states may not be criminally responsible if they meet the legal standard for insanity, however, insanity pleas based on dissociative symptoms are rare. This review examined Federal appellate case law for potential legal barriers to the insanity defense for dissociative conditions and any restrictions imposed on related expert evidence. Few rulings directly addressed these questions but there do not appear to be any unique barriers for dissociation‐related insanity pleas. Some cases provided valuable insights regarding the admission of expert evidence, effective expert testimony, and the role of defense counsel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is insanity defined similarly in civil and criminal contexts? Is the type of insanity that leads to the exemption from criminal responsibility the same (in nature and severity) as the insanity that grants a wife the right to annul a marriage or that leads to the invalidation of transactions? In common literature of Imāmī jurisprudence and Iranian law, insanity has a single meaning in all rulings and regulations. In this approach, insanity is absolutely between being and not being; that is, a fason is either insane and therefore subject to all specific rulings; or not insane, in which case none of the specific rulings are applied to him/her. The present study primarily aims at highlighting the necessity for setting aside absolutism regarding the issue of insanity, and to consider the concept of insanity as a relative and comparative concept in all its dimensions. It is possible that the insane fason is only devoid of awareness in committing certain types of crimes, and yet faforms the rest of his actions willingly and fully consciously. Similarly, fasonal transactions made by someone suffering from the most severe types of mental illness can be entirely valid and effective. The authors primarily aim at clarifying a theory titled "Comparative Approach to the Concept of Insanity", and then providing possible foundations for it within Imāmī jurisprudence. Finally, the authors have explored the following four topics: "relative application of responsibility", "the multiplicity of defenses related to insanity", "the distinction between family law, criminal law, and contract law", and "distinction between the identification criteria for insanity". These are discussed as the four-fold implications of accepting the comparative approach. In the end, the study concludes with recommendations for further studies in research and judicial practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insanity's status as an all-or-nothing excuse results in the disproportionate punishment of individuals whose mental disorders significantly impaired, but did not obliterate, their capacities for criminal responsibility. Prohibiting the trier of fact from considering impairment that does not meet the narrow definition of insanity contradicts commonly held intuitions about mental abnormality and gradations of responsibility. It results in systemic over-punishment, juror frustration, and, at times, arbitrary verdicts as triers of fact attempt to better apportion liability to blameworthiness. This Article proposes a generic partial excuse: Diminished Responsibility from Mental Disability. This excuse could be asserted as an affirmative defense at the option of the defendant and would be expressed as a fourth verdict in addition to the traditional forms of guilty, not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity. The partial excuse would recognize that the capabilities necessary for criminal responsibility exist along a spectrum. It would respond to the widespread belief that mental dysfunction, even when not rising to the level of insanity, may be so destructive of rationality that it merits a reduction in liability. The resulting verdicts would render our justice system more capable of accurately expressing community condemnation, increasing its legitimacy. Evidence suggests that jurors would thoughtfully apply a partial responsibility verdict and that having that option would lead jurors to experience greater confidence and satisfaction than in the current all-or-nothing system. Outside the United States, numerous countries recognize partial responsibility for mental impairments, demonstrating the feasibility and benefits of the partial excuse. Because a diminished responsibility verdict would mitigate a defendant's sentence, its operation over time should reduce the mass incarceration and unjustified suffering of those with mental disabilities. The verdict could also connect defendants with treatment necessary for their clinical stability and well-being, as it has done in other countries. Over the decades, several prominent scholars have offered proposals for partial excuses for diminished responsibility. None gained legislative traction. This Article's proposal differs from prior proposals in four key respects. First, it limits its purview to rationality and volitional impairment from mental disabilities, a traditionally recognized form of diminished blameworthiness. Second, to be workable and attractive to states, this proposal recommends that states draw definitions of partial responsibility from existing statutory frameworks, namely contemporary insanity and Guilty But Mentally Ill standards. The latter, present in about a dozen states, permits juries to find a defendant guilty while highlighting the defendant's mental illness; however, these verdicts carry no necessary sentencing or treatment consequences. Deriving a partial responsibility standard from existing statutes should carry greater local legitimacy than wholly new language. Third, in light of the realities of mental disorders and its lived experience, this proposal does not advocate for withholding mitigation from defendants who contributed to their impairment through failure to comply with medical directives. Finally, the proposal draws upon foreign partial responsibility statutes to glean possible sentencing and treatment consequences that could accompany the verdict and respond to any public safety threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extraneous neuroscience information improves ratings of scientific explanations, and affects mock juror decisions in many studies, but others have yielded little to no effect. To establish the magnitude of this effect, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis using 60 experiments from 28 publications. We found a mild but highly significant effect, with substantial heterogeneity. Planned subgroup analyses revealed that within-subjects studies, where people can compare the same material with and without neuroscience, and those using text, have stronger effects than between-subjects designs, and studies using brain image stimuli. We serendipitously found that effect sizes were stronger on outcomes of evaluating satisfaction or metacomprehension, compared with jury verdicts or assessments of convincingness. In conclusion, there is more than one type of neuroscience explanations effect. Irrelevant neuroscience does have a seductive allure, especially on self-appraised satisfaction and understanding, and when presented as text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is a book review of "Disorder in the Court: Morality, Myth, and the Insanity Defense" by Andrea L. Alden. The book explores the historical and rhetorical shifts in the insanity defense, using mass shootings as a starting point. Alden examines the desire to understand mental illness and the role of language in fields like law and medicine. The book analyzes specific cases that have shaped the insanity defense and discusses the current state of the defense in the United States. Alden argues for a nuanced understanding of mental illness in the intersection of law and medicine. [Extracted from the article]

Empowerment not only benefits patients but also provides support and assistance to their family members, especially in cases when patients are subject to custodial protection sentences. The positive effects of empowerment on patients' family members may be summarized into three main aspects, including: enhancing their engagement in healthcare, alleviating their anxiety, and enhancing their caregiving skills. With regard to enhancing engagement in healthcare, family members receive health education that provides an overview of the illness, treatment options, prognosis, and key nursing points and allows them to better understand the patient's condition and actively participate in decision-making. With regard to alleviating anxiety, patients under custodial protection sentences are involved in legal problems, which results in higher levels of stress for family members compared to their peers caring for general patients. Through emotional support and active listening, nurses provide opportunities for family members to express their concerns and offer comfort and encouragement, helping them cope with difficulties and pressures. With regard to enhancing caregiving skills, the purpose of custodial protection sentences is to prevent recidivism, and family members bear significant responsibility for caregiving after discharge. Nurses can share similar caregiving experiences from their ward, educate family members about observing symptoms, and provide guidance, thereby strengthening their caregiving capabilities. In addition, with regard to the disposition of patients, nurses assist family members to understand the medical process and provide necessary guidance, ensuring family members have a clear understanding and are respected during the preparations for discharge. Based on related theoretical frameworks and practical experiences, this research highlights the positive role of empowerment in enhancing the caregiving abilities and satisfaction of the family members of patients, particularly those subject to custodial protection sentences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A person suffering from legal insanity cannot be held responsible for his criminal act. English criminal law recognizes the doctrine of the insanity defense against the criminal responsibility of an accused. The objective of this paper is to study the English law on insanity defense using the doctrinal legal analysis approach. The findings show that English law deals with legal insanity differently than medical insanity. However, the opinion of the medical professionals is mandatory to determine legal insanity of a person. Furthermore, the standard of evidence to determine the legal insanity is the balance of probabilities. English law treats the insanity defense as distinct from the defense of automatism and diminished capacity and the incompetency to stand trial is also dealt with differently than the defense of insanity in English law. English law on the defense of insanity must be interpreted comprehensively by adopting multidisciplinary approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Persons with neuropsychiatric disorders present specific and unique challenges for forensic experts and defense attorneys in the criminal justice system. This article reviews two potential criminal defenses: legal insanity and the various legal standards or tests of criminal responsibility that are used in jurisdictions throughout the United States (i.e., the M'Naghten standard and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code), and the partial legal defense of diminished capacity (lacking the mental state necessary to be found guilty of a specific intent crime). The process of evaluating criminal responsibility or diminished capacity is also presented with a specific emphasis on common issues that arise in evaluating defendants with Intellectual Developmental Disorder (Intellectual Disability), Parasomnias, Seizure Disorders, and Neurocognitive Disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the association between cannabis and criminal responsibility and the case of a 25-year-old man who was arrested after breaking into a convenience store in the middle of the night and assaulting the clerk with a knife. Topics include findings from studies on an increased use of cannabis in the U.S., definition of criminal responsibility, and implication of the differences in the laws regarding voluntary intoxication and mental health defenses among jurisdictions.

The insanity defense is a defense against the criminal responsibility of an accused suffering from mental disorder(s). The law in the United States recognizes the doctrine of the defense of insanity. The objective of this study is to analyze the law on insanity defense in the US using the doctrinal legal analysis approach. The findings of this study suggest that the law on the insanity defense is not uniform across the United States. Moreover, forensic mental health evaluation by mental health professionals is critical in determining the plea of insanity. The forensic mental health assessment of an accused taking the plea of insanity must be detailed and comprehensive to assist the trier of the facts as it is the trier of the facts who would decide about the legal insanity of the accused. There is a need to adopt multidisciplinary approaches to further develop the law on insanity defense in the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Background: Some murders are committed under the influence of a psychotic state resulting from a mental disorder, mainly schizophrenia. According to the law in many countries, people with mental disorders do not have criminal responsibility. They are defined as not guilty due to insanity (insanity defense) and therefore cannot be punished. In Israel, in recent years, more lawyers are requesting psychiatric opinions for the murder defendants they represent. This study aims to explore the differences between two groups of murderers: individuals who committed murder and were found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and individuals who committed murder and were found responsible and guilty. The comparison is made from a broad perspective by examining sociodemographic factors and psychiatric factors as well as criminological and forensic factors. Methods: This study, conducted in Israel, analyzes the sociodemographic and forensic differences between 72 individuals who committed murder and were found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and 56 individuals who committed murder and were found responsible for their actions and fit to stand trial (guilty). Results: The findings show that NGRI participants were more likely to be from central areas, to be Jewish (rather than Arab), to be diagnosed with schizophrenia and have a background of hospitalizations before committing the murder, to have remained at the murder scene and/or called for help, and to be less likely to have committed the murder with a partner. Conclusions: The study's findings are explained and the limitations discussed. The findings add to the existing knowledge base about murder by reason of insanity and the differences between NGRI and criminal murderers. The characteristics of the NGRI group found here can help to identify risk groups and to develop and implement prevention programs for people with mental disorders who are at risk of violent behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insanity evaluations are often criticized for their—alleged—lack of objectivity, reliability and transparency. Structured tools to guide and support forensic evaluators during these evaluations have been developed—but they are rarely employed in forensic practice. In the present article, we consider the value of these tools for forensic practice in terms of opportunities and limitations. First, we briefly describe different insanity criteria used in Western countries. Next, we will review five structured instruments to guide insanity assessment together with their performance measures. Finally, we draw conclusions on the value of such instruments for forensic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Los Angeles Countys Office of Diversion and Reentry (ODR) has removed over 3800 people from the largest jail system in the country. Across various diversion programs, ODRs fundamental goal is to provide permanent, lifetime care for each diverted person. This article describes ODRs various diversion programs, and elucidates the types of elaborate clinical and court-related interventions that are necessary to remove persons with serious mental disorders from jail custody. As Los Angeles continues to build the necessary community-based continuum of mental health care, ODRs model proves that thoughtfully removing persons with serious mental disorders from jail is possible and necessary for the health of both patients and community.

Background: Homicidal offenders with schizophrenia who went through psychiatric evaluations are a small but significant group during a criminal appeal. Aim: Our aims are to explore whether the types of crime, such as homicide or not, would be related to the verdicts for the alleged offenders with schizophrenia in Taiwan. Our hypothesis was that homicide cases, rather than other alleged offenses, would be more likely to be regarded as no responsibility (legal insanity) or diminished responsibility for those defendants in the forensic psychiatric evaluation opinions or the court verdicts. Methods: A retrospective comparison of the homicide offenders with the nonhomicide offenders with schizophrenia, registered between December 2000 and November 2009, was conducted in the web-based, national, open-access court verdict databank. Results: There were 33 (3.4%) in 9691 criminal homicide offenders that had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. There were 33 in the homicide group and 22 in the nonhomicide group. Among these defendants in the homicide group, 3 (9.1%) were regarded as legal insanity, and 21 (63.6%) were regarded as diminished responsibility in comparison to the zero (0%) as legal insanity and nine (40.9%) as diminished responsibility in the nonhomicide group (P = 0.029). In addition, the group with multiple evaluations tended to receive forensic psychiatric opinions as legal insanity (N = 3; 33.3%), and the group with single evaluation tended to receive forensic psychiatric opinions as diminished responsibility (N = 16; 66.67%) (P = 0.017). The group with multiple evaluations tended to be ruled as legal insanity in the court (P = 0.001). Conclusion: Homicide cases would be more likely to be regarded as legal insanity or diminished responsibility for the defendants with schizophrenia in the forensic psychiatric evaluation opinions or the court verdicts.

Criminal responsibility refers to a person’s ability to understand his action, behavior at the time a crime is committed, what a person is thinking when he commits a crime or the expected result when a crime is committed. Crime is defined in terms of an act or omission (actus reus) and a mental state (mens rea). In this paper, is presented the general concept of irresponsibility and essentially reduced responsibility as a reason to be exempted from the punishment provided by the Criminal Code. Any perpetrator of a criminal offense who is capable of undertaking any action can be an active subject of a criminal offense, with the fact that regarding their sanctioning by the criminal system is concerned there are some restrictions related to age as well as dividing the perpetrators into responsible and non-responsible ones. For a person to be convicted of a crime, there must be evidence that proves his guilt, and that proves whether the perpetrator was in a regular state of mind or committed the criminal offense due to his irresponsibility.

This Article analyzes the 2021 judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mst. Safia Bano v. Home Department, Government of Punjab. The case has garnered significant local and international attention due to the Court's ruling that a death sentence may not be carried out on a defendant who has a mental illness. Setting the case against the backdrop of Pakistan's Islamic and colonial contexts, this article argues that the Supreme Court has reshaped the insanity defense in Pakistani law by placing the determination of a defendant's mental state mainly in the hands of medical professionals. However, the Court's reliance on medical professionals and the subsequent downplaying of the "moral capacity" element of the insanity defense—a determination of law made by courts—has created an obstacle for courts to punish offenders more stringently in future cases due to the popular belief that mental health professionals are ill-equipped to answer broader questions of justice for victims and society. The article recommends that this issue can be remedied by establishing an objective legal test for insanity that considers Islamic law, Pakistani precedent, and advances in medical science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insanity, insanity defense, and the elements of crimes are closely related to each other. An insane person cannot be punished for the crimes committed by him. However, insanity is a concept that has different connotations across academic disciplines. The law is interested in the legal insanity of an accused. Actus reus and mens rea, in most cases, are the essential components of a crime. The defense of insanity, which is an excuse defense against criminal liability is more relevant to the mens rea. Whereas the defense of automatism is more concerned with the actus reus. This paper analyzes the concepts of insanity and insanity defense in the context of elements of crime employing doctrinal legal analysis. The findings of this paper suggest that there is a need to interpret the concepts of insanity, insanity defense, and the elements of crimes, and the relationship among them when the accused is suffering from mental disorders by adopting multidisciplinary approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the first successful plea of insanity defense in history, specifically the case of James Hadfield. Topics include the impact of social influences on psychiatry, the historical significance of the trial, and the arguments made by Thomas Erskine regarding insanity and criminal responsibility.

The article explores the role of literary thought in the development of psychiatry in the U.S., focusing on psychiatrist Isaac Ray's acknowledgment of literary influences in psychiatric method. It discusses the narrative basis of psychiatric expansion, tracing the evolution of diagnoses like moral insanity and their reliance on behavioral narratives. It highlights Ray's advocacy for the doctrine of moral insanity as a pivotal moment in the professionalization of psychiatry.

This article shows how representations of women labeled as mentally ill in photography in Italy have been framed and marked by forms of violence, and how they continue to shape perceptions of women. It argues that the Italian case is a particularly interesting and revealing one, and that such images need to be viewed in the context of the shared status of photography and psychiatry as contemporarily "modern" inventions that have played important roles in reinforcing or contesting violent and institutionalized systems of surveillance and oppression of women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insanity as a defence against criminal conduct has been known since antiquity. Going through significant reformulations across centuries, different jurisdictions across the globe, including Nigeria, have come to adopt various strains of the insanity defence, with the presence of mental disorder being the causative mechanism of the crime as their central theme. A critical ingredient in the Nigerian insanity plea is the presence of 'mental disease' or 'natural mental infirmity' as the basis for the lack of capacity in certain cognitive and behavioural domains resulting in the offence. Mental disorders, which are the biomedical formulations of this critical legal constituent are primarily subjective experiences with variable objective features. Using illustrative cases based on psycho-legal formulation as well as reform-oriented and fundamental legal research, it is shown that Nigerian courts have held that claims of insanity based on the accused person's evidence alone should be regarded as "suspect" and not to be "taken seriously." Thus, Nigerian judicial opinions rely on non-expert accounts of defendants' apparent behavioural abnormalities and reported familial vulnerability to mental illness, amongst other facts while conventionally discountenancing the defendants' plausible phenomenological experiences validated by expert psychiatric opinion in reaching a conclusion of legal insanity. While legal positivism would be supportive of the prevailing judicial attitude in entrenching the validity of the disposition in its tenuous precedential utility, legal realism invites the proponents of justice and fairness to interrogate the merit of such preferential views which are not supported by scientific evidence or philosophical reasoning. This paper argues that disregarding the subjective experience of the defendant, particularly in the presence of sustainable expert opinion when it stands unrebutted is not in the interest of justice. This judicial posturing towards mentally abnormal offenders should be reformed on the basis of current multidisciplinary knowledge. Learning from the South African legislation, formalising the involvement of mental health professionals in insanity plea cases, ensures that courts are guided by professional opinion and offers a model for reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]