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In this study, we focus on Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS) to explore the associations between executive function deficits and repetitive behaviors. Thirty individuals with RTS completed direct assessments of inhibition, working memory and set-shifting. Informants completed repetitive behavior and executive function questionnaires. Repetitive questions were associated with poorer inhibition and working memory. Stereotypy was associated with poorer inhibition. Adherence to routines was associated with poorer set-shifting, but only on the parental report measure. No other associations were evident. There is evidence of an association between specific repetitive behaviors and executive functioning in RTS, suggesting executive dysfunction may underpin behavioral difference in RTS. The findings point towards specific associations that are of interest for further research across populations in which repetitive behaviors are present.

Despite being implicated in a wide range of psychological and behavioral phenomena, relief remains poorly understood from the perspective of psychological science. What complicates the study of relief is that people seem to use the term to describe an emotion that occurs in two distinct situations: when an unpleasant episode is over, or upon realizing that an outcome could have been worse. This study constitutes a detailed empirical investigation of people’s reports of everyday episodes of relief. A set of four studies collected a large corpus ( N = 1,835) of first-person reports of real-life episodes of relief and examined people’s judgments about the antecedents of relief, its relation to counterfactual thoughts, and its subsequent effects on decision making. Some participants described relief experiences that had either purely temporal or purely counterfactual precursors. Nevertheless, the findings indicated that the prototypical instance of relief appears to be one in which both these elements are present. The results also suggest that, although relief is frequently experienced in situations in which people are not responsible for the relief-inducing event, nevertheless they typically report that the experience had a positive impact on subsequent decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)

Evidence from developmental psychology on children's imagination is currently too limited to support Dubourg and Baumard's proposal and, in several respects, it is inconsistent with their proposal. Although children have impressive imaginative powers, we highlight the complexity of the developmental trajectory as well as the close connections between children's imagination and reality.

Recent claims contrast relief experienced because a period of unpleasant uncertainty has ended and an outcome has materialized (temporal relief)—regardless of whether it is one’s preferred outcome—with relief experienced because a particular outcome has occurred, when the alternative was unpalatable (counterfactual relief). Two studies ( N = 993), one run the day after the United Kingdom left the European Union and one the day after Joe Biden’s inauguration, confirmed these claims. “Leavers” and Biden voters experienced high levels of relief, and less regret and disappointment than “Remainers” and Trump voters. “Remainers” and Trump voters showed an effect of precursor, experiencing little relief about the outcome that had occurred but stronger relief that a decision had been implemented. Only Trump voters who believed the election was over showed this precursor effect. Results suggest at least two different triggering conditions for relief and indicate a role for anticipated relief in voting behavior.

International audience; Tool behavior might be based on two strategies associated with specific cognitive mechanisms: cued-learning and technical-reasoning strategies. We aimed to explore whether these strategies coexist in young children and whether they are manifest differently through development. We presented 216 3- to 9-year-olds with a vertical maze task consisting in moving a ball from the top to the bottom of a maze. Two tool-use/mechanical actions were possible: rotating action and sliding action. Three conditions were tested, each focused on a different strategy. In the Opaque–Cue condition (cued-learning strategy), children could not see the mechanical action of each tool. Nevertheless, a cue was provided according to the tool needed to solve the problem. In the Transparent–No Cue condition (technical-reasoning strategy), no cue was presented. However, children could see the mechanical actions associated with each tool. In the Transparent–Cue condition (cued-learning and/or technical-reasoning strategies) children saw both the mechanical actions and the cues. Results indicated that the Opaque–Cue and Transparent–Cue conditions were easier than the Transparent–No-Cue condition in all children. These findings stress that children can use either cued learning or technical reasoning to use tools, according to the available information. The behavioral pattern observed in the Transparent–Cue condition suggests that children might be inclined to use technical reasoning even when the task can be solved through cued learning.

Background\ud Individuals with genetic syndromes show unique profiles of repetitive behaviours and restricted interests (RRBs). The executive dysfunction account of RRBs suggests that in autistic (AUT) individuals executive function impairments underpin RRBs, but not communication and social interaction autistic characteristics.\ud \ud Aims\ud To 1) describe profiles of behavioural manifestations of executive function (EF behaviours) and 2) explore the relationship between EF behaviours and autistic traits across individuals with Cornelia de Lange (CdLS), fragile X (FXS) and Rubinstein-Taybi syndromes (RTS), and AUT individuals.\ud \ud Method\ud Carers completed the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function – Preschool Version and the Social Communication Questionnaire. Data reporting on 25 individuals with CdLS (Mage = 18.60, SD = 8.94), 25 with FXS (Mage = 18.48, SD = 8.80), 25 with RTS (Mage = 18.60, SD = 8.65) and 25 AUT individuals (Mage = 18.52, SD = 8.65) matched on chronological age and adaptive ability were included in analyses.\ud \ud Results\ud All groups showed impairments across EF behaviours compared to two-to-three-year-old typically developing normative samples with no differences between groups. Different EF behaviours predicted RRBs in the syndrome groups with no associations found in the AUT group.\ud \ud Conclusions\ud Syndrome related differences should be considered when developing targeted interventions that focus on EF behaviours and/or RRBs in these groups.

Regret is a common emotion that has important links with decision-making in adults. Recent research suggests that the ability to experience regret emerges relatively late in development. By around 6 years, most children will experience regret, but the likelihood of experiencing this emotion increases across childhood and into adolescence. The developmental emergence of regret seems to affect children’s decision-making: Children who experience regret about a choice are more likely to make a better choice next time, and regret also seems to help children learn to delay gratification and behave more prosocially.

Children (6- and 7-year-olds) decided whether to wait for a short delay to win a prize or for a longer period to win a different prize. Those who chose to take their prize after a short delay won two candies but were shown that they would have won four candies if they had waited longer. We measured whether children regretted their choice not to wait. The next day, children were faced with the same choice again. Children who regretted choosing the short delay on Day 1 were more likely to delay gratification on Day 2 than children who had not regretted their previous choice. In a second study, we replicated this finding while controlling for intellectual ability and children's preference for four candies over two candies. This suggests that experiencing regret about a choice not to wait assists children in delaying gratification when faced with the same choice again.

We discuss whether the two systems approach can advance understanding of children's developing counterfactual thinking. We argue that types of counterfactual thinking that are acquired early in development could be handled by the temporal updating system, whereas those that emerge in middle childhood require thinking about specific events in time.

Children easily learn about tools from others, but have difficulty innovating tools independently. The current studies combine these research areas and explore the social influences on children’s ability to innovate their own tools from already modified materials. In Experiment 1 (N = 104) 5- to- 8-year-olds were unaffected by statements of designer’s intentions. Children were drawn to using modified materials in all conditions, but did not alter them to make functional tools. Experiment 2 (N = 163) found that children were not drawn to modified materials simply because they look made. Results are discussed in relation to executive function, scale errors, and task pragmatics. Overall, we conclude that the presence of modified materials negatively affects children’s innovation of tools.

Working memory (WM) impairments might amplify behavioural difference in genetic syndromes. Murine models of Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS) evidence memory impairments but there is limited research on memory in RTS. Individuals with RTS and typically developing children completed WM tasks, with participants with RTS completing an IQ assessment and parents/carers completing the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales. A cross-sectional trajectory analysis was conducted. There were significant WM span deficits in RTS relative to mental age. Verbal WM span was positively associated with mental age; however, this was not observed for visuo-spatial span. There is a dissociation between WM domains in RTS. Individuals may have difficulties with tasks relying on WM span, above difficulties predicted by overall ability.

In two experiments, we investigated whether having prior experience of objects influenced young children's ability to solve a metacognitive search task, based on the objects' perceptual properties. In Experiment 1, 100 children (mean age 77 months) chose whether to look or feel to locate one of two hidden balls (identifiable by sight or touch). Before choosing, children were told about the balls' perceptual properties (i.e. their colour and ‘feel’), and/or saw and touched them, or had no pre-trial experience of them at all. Children who only had self-directed contact with the balls performed best, but children who heard the objects described by an adult performed relatively poorly. In Experiment 2, 116 children (mean age 72 months) either heard only relevant, relevant and irrelevant, or no information about the objects before completing the task. Verbal descriptions of the balls (whether or not they contained irrelevant information) caused children difficulties. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Regret over missed opportunities leads adults to take more risks. Given recent evidence that the ability to experience regret impacts decisions made by 6-year-olds, and pronounced interest in the antecedents to risk taking in adolescence, we investigated the age at which a relationship between missed opportunities and risky decision-making emerges, and whether that relationship changes at different points in development. Six- and 8-year-olds, adolescents and adults completed a sequential risky decision-making task on which information about missed opportunities was available. Children also completed a task designed to measure their ability to report regret when explicitly prompted to do so. The relationship between missed opportunities and risky decision-making did not emerge until 8 years, at which age it was associated with the ability to explicitly report regret, and was stronger in adults than in adolescents. These novel results highlight the potential importance of the ability to experience regret in children and adolescents' risky decision-making.

Recent research has changed how developmental psychologists understand counterfactual thinking or thoughts of what might have been. Evidence suggests that counterfactual thinking develops over an extended period into at least middle childhood, depends on domain-general processes including executive function and language, and dissociates from counterfactual emotions such as regret. In this article, we review the developmental evidence that forms a critical but often-overlooked complement to the cognitive, social, and neuroscience literatures. We also highlight topics for further research, including spontaneous counterfactual thinking and counterfactual thinking in clinical settings. © 2014 The Society for Research in Child Development.

Item does not contain fulltext OBJECTIVE: Patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) can perform poorly on tasks involving theory of mind (ToM): the ability to reason about mental states. We investigated whether patients' ToM deficits were independent of executive dysfunction. METHOD: Experiment 1 aimed to establish that ToM deficits were present, and 2 following experiments manipulated the working memory (WM) demands of the ToM task. RESULTS: In Experiment 1, 15 patients with PD performed significantly more poorly than controls on a false belief vignette task but not on a faux pas task. Errors were related to poor verbal fluency. In Experiment 2, 24 patients with PD made fewer errors on shorter false belief vignettes than the original FBT, and errors on the latter were related to WM impairment. In Experiment 3, the FBT was presented as a comic strip visible throughout questioning, reducing WM demands. Patients (n = 24) made memory errors but no false belief errors on the comic strip. They exhibited no verbal fluency or WM impairments, but did exhibit deficits on a black-and-white Stroop task. False belief errors were not correlated with executive performance. CONCLUSIONS: PD patients made very few ToM errors that were independent of errors on memory questions, so in this sample, ToM deficits per se appear unlikely. However, patients still made errors on ToM tasks when associated incidental WM demands were considerably reduced, highlighting the need for future investigations of ToM in PD to account for the role of more general cognitive restrictions exhibited by even some medicated, early stage patients.

Spontaneous tool innovation to solve physical problems is difficult for young children. In three studies, we explored the effect of prior experience with tools on tool innovation in children aged 4-7years (N=299). We also gave children an experience more consistent with that experienced by corvids in similar studies to enable fairer cross-species comparisons. Children who had the opportunity to use a premade target tool in the task context during a warm-up phase were significantly more likely to innovate a tool to solve the problem on the test trial compared with children who had no such warm-up experience. Older children benefited from either using or merely seeing a premade target tool prior to a test trial requiring innovation. Younger children were helped by using a premade target tool. Seeing the tool helped younger children in some conditions. We conclude that spontaneous innovation of tools to solve physical problems is difficult for children. However, children from 4years of age can innovate the means to solve the problem when they have had experience with the solution (visual or haptic exploration). Directions for future research are discussed.

Understanding (a) how responses become prepotent provides insights into when inhibition is needed in everyday life. Understanding (b) how response prepotency is overcome provides insights for helping children develop strategies for overcoming such tendencies. Concerning (a), on tasks such as the day-night Stroop-like task, is the difficulty with inhibiting saying the name of the stimulus due to the name being semantically related to the correct response or to its being a valid response on the task (i.e. a member of the response set) though incorrect for this stimulus? Experiment 1 (with 40 4-year-olds) suggests that prepotency is caused by membership in the response set and not semantic relation. Concerning (b), Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) found that 4-year-olds could succeed on the day-night task if the experimenter sang a ditty after showing the stimulus card, before the child was to respond. They concluded that it was because delaying children’s responses gave them time to compute the correct answer. However, Experiment 2 (with 90 3-year-olds) suggests that such a delay helps because it gives the incorrect, prepotent response time to passively dissipate, not because of active computation during the delay.

Adults and children have recently been shown to prefer guessing the outcome of a die roll after the die has been rolled (but remained out of sight) rather than before it has been rolled. This result is contrary to the predictions of the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991), which proposes that people are sensitive to the degree of their relative ignorance and therefore prefer to guess about an outcome it is impossible to know, rather than one that they could know, but do not. We investigated the potential role of agency in guessing preferences about a novel game of chance. When the experimenter controlled the outcome, we replicated the finding that adults and 5- to 6-year-old children preferred to make their guess after the outcome had been determined. For adults only, this preference reversed when they exerted control over the outcome about which they were guessing. The adult data appear best explained by a modified version of the competence hypothesis that highlights the notion of control or responsibility. It is proposed that potential attributions of blame are related to the guesser's role in determining the outcome. The child data were consistent with an imagination-based account of guessing preferences.

In two experiments, we investigated whether 4- to 5-year-old children's ability to demonstrate their understanding of aspectuality was influenced by how the test question was phrased. In Experiment 1, 60 children chose whether to look or feel to gain information about a hidden object (identifiable by sight or touch). Test questions referred either to the perceptual aspect of the hidden object (e.g., whether it was red or blue), the modality dimension (e.g., what colour it was), or the object's identity (e.g., which one it was). Children who heard the identity question performed worse than those who heard the aspect or dimension question. Further investigation in Experiment 2 (N= 23) established that children's difficulty with the identity question was not due to a problem recalling the objects. We discuss how the results of these methodological investigations impact on researchers' assessment of the development of aspectuality understanding.

Tool making evidences intelligent, flexible thinking. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that 4- to 7-year-olds chose a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a tube. In Experiment 2, 3- to 5-year-olds consistently failed to innovate a simple hook tool. Eight-year-olds performed at mature levels. In contrast, making a tool following demonstration was easy for even the youngest children. In Experiment 3, children’s performance did not improve given the opportunity to manipulate the objects in a warm-up phase. Children’s tool innovation lags substantially behind their ability to learn how to make tools by observing others.

Saying something “almost happened” indicates that one is considering a close counterfactual world. Previous evidence suggested that children start to consider these close counterfactuals at around 2 years of age (P. L. Harris, 1997), substantially earlier than they pass other tests of counterfactual thinking. However, this success appears to result from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N = 41), 3- and 4-year-olds could identify a character who almost completed an action when the comparison did not complete it. However, in Experiments 1 and 2 (N = 98), children performed poorly when the comparison character completed the action. In Experiment 3 (N = 28), 5- and 6-year-olds consistently passed the task, indicating that they made appropriate counterfactual interpretations of the “almost” statements. This understanding of close counterfactuals proved more difficult than standard counterfactuals.

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N=39), children's performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N=42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.

In three experiments we compared 5- and 6-year-old children's understanding of multiple interpretations arising from an ambiguous figure (e.g., the duck/rabbit) and other ambiguous partial input. Children found it equally easy to switch between alternative interpretations of ambiguous figures and partial views (Experiment 1, N = 19) and more difficult to accept two characters' conflicting interpretations of ambiguous figures, than partial views (Experiment 2, N = 29). Children found it more difficult to accept explicitly that one stimulus could simultaneously give rise to two interpretations, than to switch between them (Experiment 3, N = 40). Children's handling of multiple interpretations was not primarily affected by the type of input, but results suggest that there are two distinct stages in children's handling of multiple interpretations.

Objective: To investigate theory of mind and the understanding of nonliteral language in patients with Tourette syndrome (TS). Background: In TS, striatal dysfunction could affect the functioning of the frontal cortex. Changes in frontal functioning could lead to impairments in theory of mind: the understanding of mental states, such as beliefs, emotions, and intentions. Poor understanding of a speaker's mental state may also impair interpretation of their nonliteral remarks. Method: In this study, patients with TS and healthy controls completed tasks to assess their understanding of sarcasm, metaphor, indirect requests, and theory of mind. These tasks were the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task, the Hinting task, and a faux pas task. Inhibitory ability was also assessed through the use of the Hayling task and a black and white Stroop test. Results: Patients with TS exhibited significant impairment on the faux pas task and Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task despite limited evidence of inhibitory impairment. Conclusion: TS may be associated with changes in theory of mind.

The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.

Children's understanding of counterfactual emotions such as regret and relief develops relatively late compared to their ability to imagine counterfactual worlds. We tested whether a late development in counterfactual thinking: understanding counterfactuals as possibilities, underpinned children's understanding of regret. Thirty 5- and 6-year-olds completed tasks assessing counterfactual thinking and understanding regret. Performance on the counterfactual task was better than that on the regret task. We suggest that thinking about counterfactuals as possibilities is a necessary but not sufficient cognitive development in children's understanding of regret. We discuss how other developments in counterfactual thinking may underpin children's emotional understanding.

Recent studies of children's tool innovation have revealed that there is variation in children's success in middle-childhood. In two individual differences studies, we sought to identify personal characteristics that might predict success on an innovation task. In Study 1, we found that although measures of divergent thinking were related to each other they did not predict innovation success. In Study 2, we measured executive functioning including: inhibition, working memory, attentional flexibility and ill-structured problem-solving. None of these measures predicted innovation, but, innovation was predicted by children's performance on a receptive vocabulary scale that may function as a proxy for general intelligence. We did not find evidence that children's innovation was predicted by specific personal characteristics.

Children were more likely correctly to specify possibilities when uncertainty resided in the physical world, and more likely to guess the outcome when objectively identical uncertainty arose from their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1, 4-to 6-year-olds more frequently marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, than when the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiment 2 (5-to 6- year-olds) and 3 (5-to 8- yearolds), children more frequently placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to be placed in a box, than when it was hidden in one. Results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and ‘curse of knowledge’.

Two experiments explored whether children's correct answers to counterfactual and future hypothetical questions were based on an understanding of possibilities. Children played a game in which a toy mouse could run down either 1 of 2 slides. Children found it difficult to mark physically both possible outcomes, compared to reporting a single hypothetical future event, "What if next time he goes the other way ..." (Experiment 1: 3-4-year-olds and 4-5-year-olds), or a single counterfactual event, "What if he had gone the other way ...?" (Experiment 2: 3-4-year-olds and 5-6-year-olds). An open counterfactual question, "Could he have gone anywhere else?," which required thinking about the counterfactual as an alternative possibility, was also relatively difficult.

Recent work developing interventions designed to reduce intergroup bias has sometimes yielded disparate findings. We tested whether the varying effectiveness of such interventions may have a motivational basis. In two experiments we examined whether differential ingroup identification moderated the effectiveness of a differentiation-reducing intervention strategy. In Experiment 1, thinking of characteristics shared between the ingroup and outgroup reduced ingroup favoritism to a greater extent for lower identifiers than for higher identifiers. In Experiment 2 we replicated this finding with different target groups and evaluative measures while controlling for information load. We discuss the implications of this work for developing social psychological models of bias-reduction.

To fully understand teaching, we need to know how it develops ontogenetically. Developmental questions about the emergence of different types of teaching behaviour in young humans and the psychological capabilities that underpin them are currently overlooked. Incorporating the individual's development from learner to teacher would expand the scope and impact of Kline's useful framework.

Syndrome specific repetitive behavior profiles have been described previously. A detailed profile is absent for Rubinstein–Taybi syndrome (RTS). The Repetitive Behaviour Questionnaire and Social Communication Questionnaire were completed for children and adults with RTS (N = 87), Fragile-X (N = 196) and Down (N = 132) syndromes, and individuals reaching cut-off for autism spectrum disorder (N = 228). Total and matched group analyses were conducted. A phenotypic profile of repetitive behavior was found in RTS. The majority of behaviors in RTS were not associated with social-communication deficits or degree of disability. Repetitive behavior should be studied at a fine-grained level. A dissociation of the triad of impairments might be evident in RTS.

In line with the claim that regret plays a role in decision making, O’Connor, McCormack, and Feeney (Child Development, 85 (2014) 1995–2010) found that children who reported feeling sadder on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice were more likely to make a different choice the next time around. We examined two issues of interpretation regarding this finding: whether the emotion measured was indeed regret and whether it was the experience of this emotion, rather than the ability to anticipate it, that affected decision making. To address the first issue, we varied the degree to which children aged 6 or 7 years were responsible for an outcome, assuming that responsibility is a necessary condition for regret. The second issue was addressed by examining whether children could accurately anticipate that they would feel worse on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice. Children were more likely to feel sad if they were responsible for the outcome; however, even if they were not responsible, children were more likely than chance to report feeling sadder. Moreover, across all conditions, feeling sadder was associated with making a better subsequent choice. In a separate task, we demonstrated that children of this age cannot accurately anticipate feeling sadder on discovering that they had not made the best choice. These findings suggest that although children may feel regret following a non-optimal choice, even if they were not responsible for an outcome, they may experience another negative emotion such as frustration. Experiencing either of these emotions seems to be sufficient to support better decision making.

1. Introduction. PART 1 Overview and Theory. 2. Maggie E. Toplak, Richard F. West and Keith E. Stanovich, Assessing the Development of Rationality. 3. Rebecca B. Weldon, Jonathan C. Corbin, and Valerie F. Reyna, Gist Processing in Judgment and Decision Making: Developmental Reversals Predicted by Fuzzy-Trace Theory. 4. Caroline Gauffroy and Pierre Barrouillet, A developmental mental model theory of conditional reasoning. 5. Paul A. Klaczynski and Wejdan S. Felmban , Developmental Reversals in Heuristics and Biases during Adolescence: An Individual Difference Approach. PART 2 Development of specific competencies. 6. David Moshman, Epistemic Domains of Reasoning. 7. Wim De Neys, Heuristics, Biases, and the Development of Conflict Detection during Reasoning. 8. Henry Markovits, How to Develop a Logical Reasoner: A Hierarchical Model of the role of divergent thinking in the development of Conditional Reasoning. 9. Sarah R Beck and Kevin J Riggs, The development of counterfactual reasoning.

Tool innovation-designing and making novel tools to solve tasks-is extremely difficult for young children. To discover why this might be, we highlighted different aspects of tool making to children aged 4 to 6 years (N=110). Older children successfully innovated the means to make a hook after seeing the pre-made target tool only if they had a chance to manipulate the materials during a warm-up. Older children who had not manipulated the materials and all younger children performed at floor. We conclude that children's difficulty is likely to be due to the ill-structured nature of tool innovation problems, in which components of a solution must be retrieved and coordinated. Older children struggled to bring to mind components of the solution but could coordinate them, whereas younger children could not coordinate components even when explicitly provided.