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Deepfakes raise various concerns: risks of political destabilization, depictions of persons without consent and causing them harms, erosion of trust in video and audio as reliable sources of evidence, and more. These concerns have been the focus of recent work in the philosophical literature on deepfakes. However, there has been almost no sustained philosophical analysis of deepfakes from the perspective of concerns about honesty and dishonesty. That deepfakes are potentially deceptive is unsurprising and has been noted. But under what conditions does the use of deepfakes fail to be honest? And which human agents, involved in one way or another in a deepfake, fail to be honest, and in what ways? If we are to understand better the morality of deepfakes, these questions need answering. Our first goal in this paper, therefore, is to offer an analysis of paradigmatic cases of deepfakes in light of the philosophy of honesty. While it is clear that many deepfakes are morally problematic, there has been a rising counter-chorus claiming that deepfakes are not essentially morally bad, since there might be uses of deepfakes that are not morally wrong, or even that are morally salutary, for instance, in education, entertainment, activism, and other areas. However, while there are reasons to think that deepfakes can supply or support moral goods, it is nevertheless possible that even these uses of deepfakes are dishonest. Our second goal in this paper, therefore, is to apply our analysis of deepfakes and honesty to the sorts of deepfakes hoped to be morally good or at least neutral. We conclude that, perhaps surprisingly, in many of these cases the use of deepfakes will be dishonest in some respects. Of course, there will be cases of deepfakes for which verdicts about honesty and moral permissibility do not line up. While we will sometimes suggest reasons why moral permissibility verdicts might diverge from honesty verdicts, we will not aim to settle matters of moral permissibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, are increasingly common, but often come with significant tradeoffs and effects which may elude initial observations. Among these, the term "soft impacts" has come to signify the qualitative implications of a technological device or intervention. How can these sorts of effects be addressed, and what role do they have in the development phases of emerging technologies? In this paper, we outline our interdisciplinary Responsible Robotics project, which harnesses and builds upon an embedded ethics framework. We describe the embedded ethics approach, summarize some of its challenges, and highlight a key benefit. In short, by addressing the so-called "soft impacts" of technology, embedded ethics may stand to benefit not only the users of emerging systems, but also the developers. Although confirming this with a great degree of confidence will call for substantive longitudinal studies, we believe the aims and current roll-out of the embedded ethics approach provide grounds for optimism concerning the intended benefits described here. Accordingly, the mere prospect of increasing social and ethical sensitivity in development settings can serve to encourage a wider adoption of embedded ethics programs worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is artificial intelligence (AD virtuous? Can AI become as virtuous as hunmns? This article is intended to explore these questions with a focus on artificial moral advisor (AMA). AMA is a proposal for thefuture application of AI to human moral life. Hence, this article will be dedicated to the theoretical anal ysis of the issues surrounding AMA. Socratic AMA will be the spec#ic object Of study. To this end, this article will examine whether or not the Socratic AMA con enhance hummi virtuous lije through exploration of Thomas Aquinas's theology of virtue. It will argue thnt the Socratic AMA is not as virtuous as humans insofar ns it lacks both the subject ami ultimate end of virtue anti is diaracterized as measurable. Nevertheless, the Socratic AMA can be considered to be embedded with delegated virtues and is expected to assist humans in their cultivation of virtue in certain contexts by reason of both its capacity to gather voluminous informntion and its tremendous processing power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary ethics is currently ramifying into different sub-ethics specific to each type of technology. Although this trend has been very timely and rightly called into question by Sætra and Danaher, both these authors and their critics Llorca Albareda and Rueda leave the matter unsolved from a discipline point of view. In this commentary, we clarify the statute of the ethics of technology, which corresponds to that of a subsidiary applied ethics, and show how it is precisely that, what renders the creation of an ethics for each technology inappropriate. We thus provide a disciplinary reason to support Sætra and Danaher’s concern on tech ethics proliferation and to refute Llorca Albareda and Rueda’s relativization of it. In turn, we conclude by drawing some guidelines for tech ethics in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Workers can be fired from jobs, citizens sent to jail, and adolescents more likely to experience depression, all because of algorithms. Algorithms have considerable impacts on our lives. To increase user satisfaction and trust, the most common proposal from academics and developers is to increase the transparency of algorithmic design. While there is a large body of literature on algorithmic transparency, the impact of unethical data collection practices is less well understood. Currently, there is limited research on the factors that affect users' trust in data collection practices and algorithmic transparency. In this research, we explore the relative impact of both factors as they relate to important outcome measures such as user's trust, comfort level, and moral acceptability. We conducted two pilot studies to learn what real users consider to be ethical and unethical data collection practices, as well as high and low transparency for algorithms. We then used these findings in a 2 × 2 design to examine how transparency and the acceptability of data collection practices impact users' acceptance, comfort, and trust in algorithms. Our results suggest that the singular emphasis on algorithmic transparency may be misplaced. Given the difference in their impact to increase acceptance, trust, and user satisfaction, a more effective strategy would be to also understand and abide by users' views of ethical data collection practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The operationalisation of Responsible Research and Innovation is increasingly associated with ethical toolkits. However, scholars remain critical of those toolkits, often referring to them as theoretically problematic, toothless, or too instrumental. Moreover, toolkits imply ideological commitments that are not necessarily made explicit. In this scoping review, we analyse 127 tools designed for technology ethics as part of the RRI Project. We find that (1) these tools tend to frame responsibility as general training or aimed at the development phase of technologies, while monitoring is underrepresented. (2) These toolkits often lack substantive conceptualisations of ethics ignoring contested paradigms. (3) Emerging digital and biotechnologies are over-represented in relation to other socio-technical infrastructures, and (4) there is a risk of a PDF-ization of ethics, as most toolkits are materially constructed as reading material and checklists. We conclude by presenting prompt questions to reflectively reconsider how we design ethical toolkits for technology.

The discipline of business ethics has been slow to include Big Tech as a worthwhile object of examination. My goal in this presidential address is to make the case that the discipline of business ethics is overlooking novel harms and marginalized stakeholders in emerging and impactful technology industries. Furthermore, although the discipline is improving, the persistent narrowness of our field inhibits our ability to identify and examine novel issues in these important industries. I use standpoint theory to suggest one reason why we remain narrow in what we think counts in business ethics as valid objects of concern: because we are similarly narrow in who counts as a business ethicist. As scholars, we are a lens that we train on the world to identify who counts as a scholar, what we study, and who matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Although gamified sustainable consumption apps (SCAs) have been on the rise, only a few have survived longer than two years. While most existing research focuses on how gamification contributes to engagement and the formation of more sustainable consumption habits, there is little about how their survival is secured. Intervention's Purpose: Twenty-one SCA creators shared their considerations and experiences managing SCAs, providing valuable insights into the field of gamified sustainable consumption and practical insights for their stakeholders. Methods: Ideal-type and narrative analyses of the interviews unraveled some relevant survival strategies and lessons learned. Results: The creators' motivation and background play a role in the app's survival. Their experiences exposed several aspects affecting their gamification strategies and their relevance for the apps, highlighting traps to avoid and opportunities to improve their standing in an increasingly competitive market. Discussion: Most creators shared stories of "learn as you go," presenting how the flexibility to adjust the apps' business models rather than the creators' professional background is a critical success factor. Since their apps represent their understanding of sustainability, SCA creators should find practical and emotional ways to engage their users while considering the objectives of their apps. Conclusion: Awareness of the risks and pitfalls when creating an SCA may not be enough for successfully undertaking this enterprise. The creators should be capable of strategically plan for all the activities that creating and managing an SCA convey even before the app is conceptualized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The integration of AI technologies in all domains of life raises ethical debates. Children and young people are not exempt from these discussions since AI is also an increasing part of their lives. This study explores teenagers’ (aged 13 to 16 years) views on AI with a focus on ethical thinking. This is a retrospective empirical study in which data from three cases involving young people in technology learning activities have been analysed to answer the following research questions: (i) What ethical challenges around AI do young people reflect upon and (ii) what ethical dimensions do these reflections connect to? We have adapted an existing framework outlining dimensions of ethical thinking to identify young people’s ethical reflections on AI in various learning activities. Our findings show how young people reflect on AI ethics, even without dedicated teaching on it and are able to consider various dimensions and make connections to everyday uses of AI raising ethical issues. Based on our findings, we advocate for an integrated approach of AI and ethics in learning activities about technology. We believe the framework presented in this study can be a valuable tool to inform further research and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Distance Education (1672-0008) is the property of Zhejiang Open University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of EDU REVIEW: International Education & Learning Review / Revista Internacional de Educación & Aprendizaje is the property of Eagora Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tsinghua Journal of Education is the property of Tsinghua University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The unique capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have forced theologians to develop analytical categories beyond the instrumentalist model of technology. Recent work examines AI in terms of whether it has the qualities of a person, its effects on character, and its embedding in structures of sin. Constructive responses have focused on principles, communities, and virtues. None of these responses fully addresses concerns raised by critical analyses, suggesting that moral theology is still searching for a replacement for the instrumentalist model of technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethics play a crucial role in the work of engineers, and therefore in everyone’s life, from the field of artificial intelligence ethics to the fields of environmental ethics and biomedical ethics. Analyzing critical technology case studies from the perspective of engineering ethics affords us the opportunity to understand if engineers acted ethically or not in a given situation, what they could have done otherwise, and what they should bear in mind for future case studies regarding ethics. In this article, at first, we draw upon primary and secondary sources in order to analyze two case studies that are of critical importance because, according to the engineers involved in them, it was likely they could have led to fatal accidents. Then, we offer engineering ethics perspectives into the studies. Studying engineering cases from an engineering ethics perspective is crucial for two reasons. First, engineers could have a more completed point of view regarding engineering ethics in order to understand how to act ethically during their work. Second, engineers and others (philosophers of technology, historians of technology, etc.), who analyze these cases in retrospect, could present a more adequate story that would be more useful for the engineers who are taught from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My focus is on the contemporary astrobiological activity of Messaging ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (METI). This intentional astrobiological signaling typically involves embedding digital communications in powerful radio signals and transmitting those signals out into the cosmos in an explicit effort to make contact with extraterrestrial others. Some who criticize METI express concern that contact with technologically advanced extraterrestrial life could be seriously harmful to Earth or humanity. One popular response to this critique of messaging is an appeal to causal impotence sometimes referred to as the ‘Barn Door’ Argument—we are already engaged in many other detectable activities not intended for cosmic communication. If the Barn Door Argument is correct, then those who engage in messaging arguably have a moral excuse. They are permitted to continue messaging because there is no point in abstaining. I develop three ways in which the claim of causal impotence in the Barn Door Argument could be understood. I evaluate each of these in turn and demonstrate that only one is appropriate to contemporary messaging. However, this interpretation does not generate the moral excuse on which the proponents of the Barn Door Argument rely; thus, the argument fails. Finally, I entertain and respond to candidate objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Distance Education (1672-0008) is the property of Zhejiang Open University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the practice of using predictive systems to lengthen the prison sentences of convicted persons when the systems forecast a higher likelihood of re-offense or re-arrest. There has been much critical discussion of technologies used for sentencing, including questions of bias and opacity. However, there hasn’t been a discussion of whether this use of predictive systems makes sense in the first place. We argue that it does not by showing that there is no plausible theory of punishment that supports it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synthetic biology is designing and creating biological tools and systems for useful purposes. It uses knowledge from biology, such as biotechnology, molecular biology, biophysics, biochemistry, bioinformatics, and other disciplines, such as engineering, mathematics, computer science, and electrical engineering. It is recognized as both a branch of science and technology. The scope of synthetic biology ranges from modifying existing organisms to gain new properties to creating a living organism from non-living components. Synthetic biology has many applications in important fields such as energy, chemistry, medicine, environment, agriculture, national security, and nanotechnology. The development of synthetic biology also raises ethical and social debates. This article aims to identify the place of ethics in synthetic biology. In this context, the theoretical ethical debates on synthetic biology from the 2000s to 2020, when the development of synthetic biology was relatively faster, were analyzed using the systematic review method. Based on the results of the analysis, the main ethical problems related to the field, problems that are likely to arise, and suggestions for solutions to these problems are included. The data collection phase of the study included a literature review conducted according to protocols, including planning, screening, selection and evaluation. The analysis and synthesis process was carried out in the next stage, and the main themes related to synthetic biology and ethics were identified. Searches were conducted in Web of Science, Scopus, PhilPapers and MEDLINE databases. Theoretical research articles and reviews published in peer-reviewed journals until the end of 2020 were included in the study. The language of publications was English. According to preliminary data, 1,453 publications were retrieved from the four databases. Considering the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 58 publications were analyzed in the study. Ethical debates on synthetic biology have been conducted on various issues. In this context, the ethical debates in this article were examined under five themes: the moral status of synthetic biology products, synthetic biology and the meaning of life, synthetic biology and metaphors, synthetic biology and knowledge, and expectations, concerns, and problem solving: risk versus caution.

A Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) is a promising technology that has received increased attention in recent years. BCIs create a direct link from your brain to a computer. This technology has applications to many industries and sectors of our life. BCIs redefine how we approach medical treatment and communication for individuals with various conditions or injuries. BCIs also have applications in entertainment, specifically video games and VR. From being able to control a prosthetic limb with your mind, to being able to play a video game with your mind—the potential of BCIs are endless. However, as with any new innovative technology, ethical concerns are raised.Keywords: Brain-Computer Interfaces; BCI; Brain-Computer Interaction; Technology Ethics; Cognitive Enhancement; Prosthetics

Current approaches to dealing with the climate and environmental crisis aim to motivate action by teaching skills for sustainability. This study asks whether the associated programmatic approach meets the ethical requirement for religious education to be a place for reflection on the understanding of reality. In particular it describes the relationship between the self-design of young people, the normative implications of the climate discourse, including a possible orientation towards external norms of behaviour and the reference to nature in religion. If sustainability is seen as an interpretation of our technically determined way of life and the shaping of the nature-culture process, then possibilities of self-positioning beyond heteronomous orientations open up for young people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Food & Fermentation Industries is the property of Food & Fermentation Industries and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Methaodos: Social Science Journal / Methaodos: Revista de Ciencias Sociales is the property of Departamento de Ciencias de la Comunicacion y Sociologia, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Social media companies commonly design their platforms in a way that renders them addictive. Some governments have declared internet addiction a major public health concern, and the World Health Organization has characterized excessive internet use as a growing problem. Our article shows why scholars, policy makers, and the managers of social media companies should treat social media addiction as a serious moral problem. While the benefits of social media are not negligible, we argue that social media addiction raises unique ethical concerns not raised by other, more familiar addictive products, such as alcohol and cigarettes. In particular, we argue that addicting users to social media is impermissible because it unjustifiably harms users in a way that is both demeaning and objectionably exploitative. Importantly, the attention-economy business model of social media companies strongly incentivizes them to perpetrate this wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the announcement of the purchase of Twitter by Elon Musk, the risks for the future of the social network suggest the advent of a "Frankenstein 2.0" – a notion that refers to large technology companies whose control escapes their creators. Behind this event, the question of technological drifts and their impact on society arises. This is an opportunity for governments, and in particular the Canadian government, which promotes open data and technology policies, to redefine the game rules. In this sense, some recommendations are proposed, especially to consolidate the normative framework of technologies in Canada. The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA), currently in discussion at the Parliament, should go further in terms of the automated systems transparency and strengthen its requirements for the "algorithmic" data governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recognizing the prevalence of initiatives to align technology with social values through design and “by design” (such as privacy by design, security by design, and governance by design), this dissertation explores the current and potential role of design techniques in attending to values, and analyzes user experience (UX) professionals’ “values work” practices—practices used to surface, advocate for, and attend to values—within large technology companies.            The first part of the dissertation interrogates the relationship between values and design practices, looking at privacy as a case study. A review of human computer interaction literature about privacy and design suggests the importance of thinking about the purpose of design, who does the work of design, and on whose behalf is design work done. In order to better understand how design in the service of “values work” could be used towards purposes of exploration, critique and speculation, I create a set of speculative design fictions depicting a range of fictional products that suggest different sets of privacy harms. These designs serve as way to surface and foster reflection on values. The success of this design intervention in a laboratory setting sparked interest in understanding whether and how design approaches were used in values work within the technology industry.            The second part of the dissertation seeks to understand the practices and strategies of UX professionals who already see addressing values as a part of their practice. I conducted interviews with UX professionals working at large technology companies, and field observations at meetups in the San Francisco Bay Area about technology design and values. These UX professionals report doing values work as a part of everyday configurations of UX work, such as when designing interfaces or conducting user research. More strikingly, UX professionals also report on engaging in a range of other activities aimed at shaping the organization, rather than a technical product or system. These practices are used by UX professionals to re-configure how values work is conducted at their organizations in several ways: by making more space for UX professionals’ values work; by getting others in the organization to adopt human-centered perspectives on values; and by changing the politics and strategies of the organization regarding values. Moreover, UX professionals’ values work practices occur within relations and systems of power. UX professionals often engage in tactics of soft resistance, seeking to subtly subvert existing practices towards more values-conscious ends while maintaining legibility as conducting business-as-usual within the organization. Together, these values work practices create social and organizational infrastructures to promote an alternative sociotechnical imaginary of large technology companies in a way that views these companies and their workers as more cognizant, proactive, and responsible for identifying and addressing social values, in particular reducing harms to users and other stakeholders.The last part of the dissertation reflects on the politics of using speculative design techniques in the service of values work. Experiences sharing speculative designs with others who interpreted the designs in ways that do not recognize their speculative, critical, and reflective nature, raises questions about how speculative design can be re-appropriated by or co-opted towards the very ends that are being critiqued and reflected upon. One approach to this dilemma might be to conduct speculative design work with and for specific groups of stakeholders, instead of for broad public discussion. Another approach might be to create organizational fictions that focus a designer’s and viewer’s attention more on practices and social relationships, compared to traditional speculative designs that focus attention on fictional products. Informed by the practices of UX professionals involved in values advocacy, the dissertation concludes by suggesting a new purpose for design, design for infrastructuring imaginaries, to complement the social practices of values advocacy. I reflect on the politics of choosing design as a mode of action when conducting values work, and reflect on implications that this work has for values in design researchers, practitioners, and stakeholders.

The humanitarian sector continually faces organizational and operational challenges to respond to the needs of populations affected by war, disaster, displacement, and health emergencies. With the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of response efforts, humanitarian innovation initiatives seek to develop, test, and scale a variety of novel and adapted practices, products, and systems. The innovation process raises important ethical considerations, such as appropriately engaging crisis-affected populations in defining problems and identifying potential solutions, mitigating risks, ensuring accountability, sharing benefits fairly, and managing expectations. This paper aims to contribute to knowledge and practice regarding humanitarian innovation ethics and presents two components related to a value-sensitive approach to humanitarian innovation. First is a mapping of how ethical concepts are mobilized in values statements that have been produced by a diverse set of organizations involved in humanitarian innovation. Analyzing these documents, we identified six primary values (do-no-harm, autonomy, justice, accountability, sustainability, and inclusivity) around which we grouped 12 secondary values and 10 associated concepts. Second are two proposed activities that teams engaged in humanitarian innovation can employ to foreground values as they develop and refine their project's design, and to anticipate and plan for challenges in enacting these values across the phases of their project. A deliberate and tangible approach to engaging with values within humanitarian innovation design can help to ground humanitarian innovation in ethical commitments by increasing shared understanding amongst team members, promoting attentiveness to values across the stages of innovation, and fostering capacities to anticipate and respond to ethically challenging situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms use algorithms to make important business decisions. To date, the algorithmic accountability literature has elided a fundamentally empirical question important to business ethics and management: Under what circumstances, if any, are algorithmic decision-making systems considered legitimate? The present study begins to answer this question. Using factorial vignette survey methodology, we explore the impact of decision importance, governance, outcomes, and data inputs on perceptions of the legitimacy of algorithmic decisions made by firms. We find that many of the procedural governance mechanisms in practice today, such as notices and impact statements, do not lead to algorithmic decisions being perceived as more legitimate in general, and, consistent with legitimacy theory, that algorithmic decisions with good outcomes are perceived as more legitimate than bad outcomes. Yet, robust governance, such as offering an appeal process, can create a legitimacy dividend for decisions with bad outcomes. However, when arbitrary or morally dubious factors are used to make decisions, most legitimacy dividends are erased. In other words, companies cannot overcome the legitimacy penalty of using arbitrary or morally dubious factors, such as race or the day of the week, with a good outcome or an appeal process for individuals. These findings add new perspectives to both the literature on legitimacy and policy discussions on algorithmic decision-making in firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the map of technology ethics is expanding, the growing subdomains within it may raise misgivings. In a recent and very interesting article, Sætra and Danaher have argued that the current dynamic of sub-specialization is harmful to the ethics of technology. In this commentary, we offer three reasons to diminish their concern about ethical proliferation. We argue first that the problem of demarcation is weakened if we attend to other sub-disciplines of technology ethics not mentioned by these authors. We claim secondly that the logic of sub-specializations is less problematic if one does adopt mixed models (combining internalist and externalist approaches) in applied ethics. We finally reject that clarity and distinction are necessary conditions for defining sub-fields within ethics of technology, defending the porosity and constructive nature of ethical disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In terms of technological progress, students of public administration confront a challenging dilemma where normative reflection in the realm of technology ethics has not kept pace with the rapidity and magnitude of technological advancement. Consequently, this necessitates further reflection on how to best apply aspects of ethical behavior to the development and usage of technology in the public sector. The significant role of the technology ethics in public service has received meager consideration in the literature, lacking a theoretical foundation that can help guide practitioners (as techno-ethicists) through rapid transitions in technological progress. Using the philosophy of technology literature, this article seeks to address this gap in public administration theory by considering first, how technological advancements affect the nature of didactic power relationships between the public and government; and second how the concept of technological nonneutrality is framed as a basis for structuring what obligations public administrators have when adopting and using technology in public service. This includes reflection upon the expanding role of newer technologies such as Artificial Intelligence in reshaping the nature of government-society relationships. Framing techno-ethical principles in theoretical dialogue prompts greater awareness for how practitioners may effectively respond as moral agents to rapidly changing technological advancements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statistical criteria of fairness are formal measures of how an algorithm performs that aim to help us determine whether an algorithm would be fair to use in decision-making. In this paper, I introduce a new version of the criterion known as “Equalized Odds,” argue that it is a requirement of procedural fairness, and show that it is immune to a number of objections to the standard version. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using fiction is a popular way to communicate sometimes-complex administrative practices. This paper uses Disney Pixar's WALL-E to examine the movie's ethical dilemmas and how to communicate those in the public management classroom. Through a content analysis of the movie, several overall ethical themes emerged: ethical use of technology, environmental ethics, and consumerism as administrative dilemma. Each is explained using exemplar stories from the film. The research builds on the growing realization that popular culture is relevant to understand governance practices and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Technological change is impacting the work of health professionals, especially with recent developments in artificial intelligence. Research has raised many ethical considerations respecting clinical applications of artificial intelligence, and it has identified a role for professional regulation in helping to guide practitioners in the ethical use of technology; however, regulation in this area has been slow to develop. This study seeks to identify the challenges that health professionals face in the context of technological change, and whether regulators' codes of ethics and guidance are sufficient to help workers navigate these changes., Methods: We conducted mixed methods research in Ontario, Canada, using qualitative content analysis of regulators' codes of ethics and practice guidance (26 regulators, 63 documents analysed), interviews with 7 representatives from 5 health profession regulatory bodies, and focus groups with 17 healthcare practitioners across 5 professions in the province. We used thematic analysis to analyse the data and answer our core research questions., Results: We find that codes of ethics focus more on general principles and managing practitioners' relationships with clients/patients; hence, it is not clear that these documents can successfully guide professional practice in a context of rapid technological change. Practitioners and regulatory body staff express ambivalence and uncertainty about regulators' roles in regulating technology use. In some instances, health professionals experience conflict between the expectations of their regulator and their employer. These gaps and conflicts leave some professionals uncertain about how to practice ethically in a digital age., Conclusions: There is a need for more guidance and regulation in this area, not only for practitioners, but with respect to the application of technology within the environments in which health professionals work., Competing Interests: Declarations. Ethics approval and consent to participate: Approval from the Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (file #123730) was obtained prior to beginning the study. All focus group and interview participants provided informed consent to participate. Consent for publication: Not applicable. Competing interests: The authors declare no competing interests., (© 2024. The Author(s).)