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The ability to compare objects, scenes, or situations is crucial for effective decision-making and problem-solving in everyday life. For instance, comparing the freshness of apples enables better choices during grocery shopping, while comparing sofa designs helps optimize the aesthetics of our living space. Despite its significance, the comparative capability is largely unexplored in artificial general intelligence (AGI). In this paper, we introduce CompBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the comparative reasoning capability of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). CompBench mines and pairs images through visually oriented questions covering eight dimensions of relative comparison: visual attribute, existence, state, emotion, temporality, spatiality, quantity, and quality. We curate a collection of around 40K image pairs using metadata from diverse vision datasets and CLIP similarity scores. These image pairs span a broad array of visual domains, including animals, fashion, sports, and both outdoor and indoor scenes. The questions are carefully crafted to discern relative characteristics between two images and are labeled by human annotators for accuracy and relevance. We use CompBench to evaluate recent MLLMs, including GPT-4V(ision), Gemini-Pro, and LLaVA-1.6. Our results reveal notable shortcomings in their comparative abilities. We believe CompBench not only sheds light on these limitations but also establishes a solid foundation for future enhancements in the comparative capability of MLLMs.

In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have the same capacity, and the number of agents is equal to the total capacity of all facilities. In the second framework, we aim to place two facilities, each with a capacity of at least half of the total agents. For both of these frameworks, we propose truthful mechanisms with bounded approximation ratios with respect to the Social Cost (SC) and the Maximum Cost (MC). When $m>2$, the result sharply contrasts with the impossibility results known for the classic $m$-Facility Location Problem \cite{fotakis2014power}, where capacity constraints are not considered. Furthermore, all our mechanisms are (i) optimal with respect to the MC (ii) optimal or nearly optimal with respect to the SC among anonymous mechanisms. For both frameworks, we provide a lower bound on the approximation ratio that any truthful and deterministic mechanism can achieve with respect to the SC and MC., Comment: 14 pages

Geometric graph is a special kind of graph with geometric features, which is vital to model many scientific problems. Unlike generic graphs, geometric graphs often exhibit physical symmetries of translations, rotations, and reflections, making them ineffectively processed by current Graph Neural Networks (GNNs). To tackle this issue, researchers proposed a variety of Geometric Graph Neural Networks equipped with invariant/equivariant properties to better characterize the geometry and topology of geometric graphs. Given the current progress in this field, it is imperative to conduct a comprehensive survey of data structures, models, and applications related to geometric GNNs. In this paper, based on the necessary but concise mathematical preliminaries, we provide a unified view of existing models from the geometric message passing perspective. Additionally, we summarize the applications as well as the related datasets to facilitate later research for methodology development and experimental evaluation. We also discuss the challenges and future potential directions of Geometric GNNs at the end of this survey.

In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the collector acquires the items and is the only one who knows the items' factual quality. The appraiser performs her duties with impartiality, but her assessment may be subject to random noises, so it may not accurately reflect the factual quality of the items. The main challenge lies in devising mechanisms that prompt the owner to reveal accurate information, thereby optimizing the collector's expected reward. We consider the menu size of mechanisms as a measure of their practicability and study its impact on the attainable expected reward. For the single-item setting, we design optimal mechanisms with a monotone increasing menu size. Although the reward gap between the simplest and optimal mechanisms is bounded, we show that simple mechanisms with a small menu size cannot ensure any positive fraction of the optimal reward of mechanisms with a larger menu size. For the multi-item setting, we show that an ordinal mechanism that only takes the owner's ordering of the items as input is not incentive-compatible. We then propose a set of Union mechanisms that combine single-item mechanisms. Moreover, we run experiments to examine these mechanisms' robustness against the independent appraiser's assessment accuracy and the items' acquiring rate.

In this paper, we explore the multiplayer General Lotto Blotto game over a single battlefield, a notable variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employs a probability distribution for resource allocation, ensuring that the expected expenditure does not surpass their budget. We first establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a modified version of this game, in which there is a common threshold that no player's bid can exceed. We next extend our findings to demonstrate the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the original game, which does not incorporate this threshold. Moreover, we provide detailed characterizations of the Nash equilibrium for both the original game and its modified version. In the Nash equilibrium of the unmodified game, we observe that the upper endpoints of the supports of players' equilibrium strategies coincide, and the minimum value of a player's support above zero inversely correlates with their budget. Specifically, we present closed-form solutions for the Nash equilibrium with threshold for two players.

In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required to facilitate this equilibrium transition. The game involves a single row player who possesses $m$ strategies and $k$ column players, each endowed with $n$ strategies. Our findings reveal that determining whether the minimum reward is zero is NP-complete, and computing the minimum reward becomes APX-hard. Nonetheless, we bring some positive news, as this problem can be efficiently handled if either $k$ or $n$ is a fixed constant. Furthermore, we have devised an approximation algorithm with an additive error that runs in polynomial time. Lastly, we explore a specific case wherein the utility functions exhibit single-peaked characteristics, and we successfully demonstrate that the optimal reward can be computed in polynomial time., Comment: To appear in the proceeding of AAAI2024

One primary topic of multimodal learning is to jointly incorporate heterogeneous information from different modalities. However most models often suffer from unsatisfactory multimodal cooperation which cannot jointly utilize all modalities well. Some methods are proposed to identify and enhance the worse learnt modality but they are often hard to provide the fine-grained observation of multimodal cooperation at sample-level with theoretical support. Hence it is essential to reasonably observe and improve the fine-grained cooperation between modalities especially when facing realistic scenarios where the modality discrepancy could vary across different samples. To this end we introduce a sample-level modality valuation metric to evaluate the contribution of each modality for each sample. Via modality valuation we observe that modality discrepancy indeed could be different at sample-level beyond the global contribution discrepancy at dataset-level. We further analyze this issue and improve cooperation between modalities at sample-level by enhancing the discriminative ability of low-contributing modalities in a targeted manner. Overall our methods reasonably observe the fine-grained uni-modal contribution and achieve considerable improvement. The source code and dataset are available at https://github.com/GeWu-Lab/Valuate-and-Enhance-Multimodal-Cooperation., Comment: Accepted by CVPR 2024

Time or money? That is a question! In this paper, we consider this dilemma in the pricing regime, in which we try to find the optimal pricing scheme for identical items with heterogenous time-sensitive buyers. We characterize the revenue-optimal solution and propose an efficient algorithm to find it in a Bayesian setting. Our results also demonstrate the tight ratio between the value of wasted time and the seller's revenue, as well as that of two common-used pricing schemes, the k-step function and the fixed pricing. To explore the nature of the optimal scheme in the general setting, we present the closed forms over the product distribution and show by examples that positive correlation between the valuation of the item and the cost per unit time could help increase revenue. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first step towards understanding the impact of the time factor as a part of the buyer cost in pricing problems, in the computational view., Comment: 11pages, 2 figures

We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several settings. Specifically, in the case where only the buyer distribution is known, we prove that there exists a distribution over different fixed-price mechanisms, such that the approximation ratio lies within the interval of [0.71, 0.7381]. Furthermore, we show that the same approximation ratio holds for the optimal fixed-price mechanism, when both buyer and seller distributions are known. As a result, the previously best-known (1 - 1/e+0.0001)-approximation can be improved to $0.71$. Additionally, we examine randomized fixed-price mechanisms when we receive just one single sample from the seller distribution, for both symmetric and asymmetric settings. Our findings reveal that posting the single sample as the price remains optimal among all randomized fixed-price mechanisms.

We investigate two-winner election problem seeking to minimize the social cost. We are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms where each voter only reports a single candidate. In our model, candidates and voters are located in Euclidean space and candidates' locations are known to the mechanism. The quality of a mechanism is measured by its distortion, defined as the worst-case ratio between the social cost achieved by the mechanism and the optimal one. We find that the ratio between the maximum and minimum distances among every two candidates plays a vital role in the distortion of mechanisms. When there are three candidates, the problem is solved mainly by previous work. We mainly focus on the problem with at least four candidates. When voters and candidates are embedded in 1-dimensional space, we establish several lower bounds of the distortion. When voters and candidates are embedded in at least 3-dimensional space, we give a tight bound of the distortion.

We consider designing reward schemes that incentivize agents to create high-quality content (e.g., videos, images, text, ideas). The problem is at the center of a real-world application where the goal is to optimize the overall quality of generated content on user-generated content platforms. We focus on anonymous independent reward schemes (AIRS) that only take the quality of an agent's content as input. We prove the general problem is NP-hard. If the cost function is convex, we show the optimal AIRS can be formulated as a convex optimization problem and propose an efficient algorithm to solve it. Next, we explore the optimal linear reward scheme and prove it has a 1/2-approximation ratio, and the ratio is tight. Lastly, we show the proportional scheme can be arbitrarily bad compared to AIRS., Comment: 20 pages, 2 figures

Due to the pseudo-anonymity of the Bitcoin network, users can hide behind their bitcoin addresses that can be generated in unlimited quantity, on the fly, without any formal links between them. Thus, it is being used for payment transfer by the actors involved in ransomware and other illegal activities. The other activity we consider is related to gambling since gambling is often used for transferring illegal funds. The question addressed here is that given temporally limited graphs of Bitcoin transactions, to what extent can one identify common patterns associated with these fraudulent activities and apply them to find other ransomware actors. The problem is rather complex, given that thousands of addresses can belong to the same actor without any obvious links between them and any common pattern of behavior. The main contribution of this paper is to introduce and apply new algorithms for local clustering and supervised graph machine learning for identifying malicious actors. We show that very local subgraphs of the known such actors are sufficient to differentiate between ransomware, random and gambling actors with 85% prediction accuracy on the test data set.

We report magnetic and electrical properties for single crystals of NdMn$_6$Sn$_6$ and SmMn$_6$Sn$_6$. They crystallize into a structure which has distorted, Mn-based kagome lattices, compared to the pristine kagome lattices in heavy-rare-earth-bearing RMn$_6$Sn$_6$ compounds. They are hightemperature ferromagnets of which the R moment is parallel with the Mn moment. We observed a large intrinsic anomalous Hall effect (AHE) that is comparable to the ferrimagnetic, heavy-R siblings in a wide range of temperature. We conclude that their intrinsic AHE is stemming from the Mn-based kagome lattice, just as in the heavy RMn$_6$Sn$_6$., Comment: 7 pages, 6 figures, 1 table

Distributed quantum information processing is essential for building quantum networks and enabling more extensive quantum computations. In this regime, several spatially separated parties share a multipartite quantum system, and the most natural set of operations is Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC). As a pivotal part in quantum information theory and practice, LOCC has led to many vital protocols such as quantum teleportation. However, designing practical LOCC protocols is challenging due to LOCC's intractable structure and limitations set by near-term quantum devices. Here we introduce LOCCNet, a machine learning framework facilitating protocol design and optimization for distributed quantum information processing tasks. As applications, we explore various quantum information tasks such as entanglement distillation, quantum state discrimination, and quantum channel simulation. We discover protocols with evident improvements, in particular, for entanglement distillation with quantum states of interest in quantum information. Our approach opens up new opportunities for exploring entanglement and its applications with machine learning, which will potentially sharpen our understanding of the power and limitations of LOCC. An implementation of LOCCNet is available in Paddle Quantum, a quantum machine learning Python package based on PaddlePaddle deep learning platform., Comment: 19 pages

Quantum entanglement is a key resource in quantum technology, and its quantification is a vital task in the current Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) era. This paper combines hybrid quantum-classical computation and quasi-probability decomposition to propose two variational quantum algorithms, called Variational Entanglement Detection (VED) and Variational Logarithmic Negativity Estimation (VLNE), for detecting and quantifying entanglement on near-term quantum devices, respectively. VED makes use of the positive map criterion and works as follows. Firstly, it decomposes a positive map into a combination of quantum operations implementable on near-term quantum devices. It then variationally estimates the minimal eigenvalue of the final state, obtained by executing these implementable operations on the target state and averaging the output states. Deterministic and probabilistic methods are proposed to compute the average. At last, it asserts that the target state is entangled if the optimized minimal eigenvalue is negative. VLNE builds upon a linear decomposition of the transpose map into Pauli terms and the recently proposed trace distance estimation algorithm. It variationally estimates the well-known logarithmic negativity entanglement measure and could be applied to quantify entanglement on near-term quantum devices. Experimental and numerical results on the Bell state, isotropic states, and Breuer states show the validity of the proposed entanglement detection and quantification methods., Comment: 12 pages

The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is well-known for its desirable fairness and efficiency properties. It is one of the most prominent protocols for the random assignment problem. However, Probabilistic Serial is not incentive-compatible, thereby these desirable properties only hold for the agents' declared preferences, rather than their genuine preferences. A substantial utility gain through strategic behaviors would trigger self-interested agents to manipulate the mechanism and would subvert the very foundation of adopting the mechanism in practice. In this paper, we characterize the extent to which an individual agent can increase its utility by strategic manipulation. We show that the incentive ratio of the mechanism is $\frac{3}{2}$. That is, no agent can misreport its preferences such that its utility becomes more than 1.5 times of what it is when reports truthfully. This ratio is a worst-case guarantee by allowing an agent to have complete information about other agents' reports and to figure out the best response strategy even if it is computationally intractable in general. To complement this worst-case study, we further evaluate an agent's utility gain on average by experiments. The experiments show that an agent' incentive in manipulating the rule is very limited. These results shed some light on the robustness of Probabilistic Serial against strategic manipulation, which is one step further than knowing that it is not incentive-compatible., Comment: To appear in AAAI 2020

We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many circumstances, these contracts need to be identical for the sake of fairness. We investigate the optimal common contract problem. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to consider this natural and important generalization. We first show this problem is NP-complete. Then we provide a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the optimal contract in $O(n^2m)$ time, where $n,m$ are the number of agents and actions, under the assumption that the agents' cost functions obey increasing difference property. At last, we generalize the setting such that each agent can choose to directly produce a reward in $[0,1]$. We provide an $O(\log n)$-approximate algorithm for this generalization.

Film release dates play an important part in box office revenues because of the facts of obvious seasonality demand in the film industry and severe competition among films shown at the same time. In this paper, we study how film studios choose release time for movies they produce to maximize their box offices. We first formalize this problem as an attraction competition game where players (film studios) consider both potential profits and competitors' choices when deciding the release time. Then we prove that there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium and give the sufficient condition of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Our model can be generalized to an extensive game and we compute the subgame-perfect equilibrium for homogeneous players. For the case that one film studio could have multiple movies to release, we prove that finding a player's best response is NP-hard and it does not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Experiments are provided to support the soundness of our model. In the final state, most of film studios, accounting for 84 percent of the market, would not change their release time. The behaviors of film studios imply they are following some strategies to reach a Nash equilibrium., Comment: 11 pages

In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in practice, can perform arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The problem can be formulated using a linear program with bounded and increasing variables. We then present an $O(n\log n)$ algorithm to find the optimal mechanism, where n is the number of players.

First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with discrete value distributions. We study the characterization of the BNE in the first price auction and provide an algorithm to compute the BNE at the same time. Moreover, we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the BNE. Some of the previous results in the case of continuous value distributions do not apply to the case of discrete value distributions. In the meanwhile, the uniqueness result in discrete case cannot be implied by the uniqueness property in the continuous case. Unlike in the continuous case, we do not need to solve ordinary differential equations and thus do not suffer from the solution errors therein. Compared to the method of using continuous distributions to approximate discrete ones, our experiments show that our algorithm is both faster and more accurate. The results in this paper are derived in the asymmetric independent private values model, which assumes that the buyers' value distributions are common knowledge.

Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper gives an algorithm to solve the problem of inferring the values of agents in a dominant-strategy mechanism from the social choice function implemented by the mechanism and the per-unit prices paid by the agents (the agent bids are not observed). For single-dimensional agents, this inference problem is a multi-dimensional inversion of the payment identity and is feasible only if the payment identity is uniquely invertible. The inversion is unique for single-unit proportional weights social choice functions (common, for example, in bandwidth allocation); and its inverse can be found efficiently. This inversion is not unique for social choice functions that exhibit complementarities. Of independent interest, we extend a result of Rosen (1965), that the Nash equilbria of "concave games" are unique and pure, to an alternative notion of concavity based on Gale and Nikaido (1965).

Following Chaudhuri, Sankaranarayanan, and Vardi, we say that a function $f:[0,1] \to [0,1]$ is $r$-regular if there is a B\"{u}chi automaton that accepts precisely the set of base $r \in \mathbb{N}$ representations of elements of the graph of $f$. We show that a continuous $r$-regular function $f$ is locally affine away from a nowhere dense, Lebesgue null, subset of $[0,1]$. As a corollary we establish that every differentiable $r$-regular function is affine. It follows that checking whether an $r$-regular function is differentiable is in $\operatorname{PSPACE}$. Our proofs rely crucially on connections between automata theory and metric geometry developed by Charlier, Leroy, and Rigo.

This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a $.743$-fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' values are independently distributed. The previous best bound was $1-1/e \approx .63$, derived in Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) using smoothness, the standard technique for reasoning about welfare of games in equilibrium. In the worst known example (from Hartline et al. (2014)), the first price auction achieves a $\approx .869$-fraction of the optimal welfare, far better than the theoretical guarantee. Despite this large gap, it was unclear whether the $1-1/e \approx .63$ bound was tight. We prove that it is not. Our analysis eschews smoothness, and instead uses the independence assumption on agents' value distributions to give a more careful accounting of the welfare contribution of agents who win despite not having the highest value., Comment: To appear in STOC 2018