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On stage, and in real life, timing is critical for success. Theranostic cancer care epitomizes the central role of timing in the evolution of efficacious molecular targeted radioligand therapy and its incorporation into routine clinical practice of oncology. Nuclear medicine has returned to its therapeutic roots, having been founded as a medical specialty, over three-quarters of a century ago, with radioiodine therapy of thyroid cancer. The very recent oncologist acceptance of 68Ga/177Lu/225Ac-PSMA effectiveness in treating prostate cancer has re-established the role of the physician in nuclear medicine. This article addresses various important issues in respect of timing related to this resurgence. Training of the required new workforce in technical -omics expertise and physicianly virtues is an urgent priority. Precision in radioligand therapy requires definition of individual radiation absorbed dose (Gy) to tumor and to critical normal organs, preferably prospectively. It is time to abandon one-size-fits-all administration of fixed activities (GBq) in arbitrary cycle intervals and duration. The time has also come to design combination sequenced theranostic-immuno-chemotherapeutic approaches to metastatic cancer to address unmet needs, particularly in pancreatic carcinoma; exploiting the potential of new fibroblast activation protein inhibitor radioligands targeting the tumor microenvironment. Public perception of all things "nuclear," including nuclear medicine, has recently recovered from the general opprobrium and radiophobia of the last half-century. Nuclear is the new green. At last, there have arisen propitious circumstances for the future development of theranostics: The timing is right, now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The philosophy of the discipline of physical education among school, further and higher education curriculums remains misunderstood, understudied and underdeveloped. With growing levels of uncertainty concerning its philosophical nature, general future (e.g. eradication, more of the same, radical change), and the role the profession plays within modern educational institutions, there is an urgent need to acknowledge, problematize, interpret and to study the unavoidably philosophical nature of the subject. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to strengthen the justification for movement-oriented character education in schools by articulating a neo-Aristotelian interpretation of physical education. Key Concepts: Aligned with this goal, I begin by clarifying my guiding philosophical framework of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics by synthesizing the concepts of virtue, character, phronesis and eudaemonia. Subsequently, I deconstruct contemporary practices associating character education to physical education circles with the goal of illuminating the potential of a philosophically informed approach compared to the dominant practice-driven and anecdotal view of character. In summary, I address the field's; overreliance on caught character; overemphasis on performance virtue; disproportionate focus on résumé virtues over eulogy virtues; the use of character as a peripheral curriculum activity; and lack of emphasis on wisdom and eudaemonia. Thereafter, I articulate one Aristotelian interpretation of physical education as if (neo) Aristotle was the teacher himself. From this position, I describe an education fixated on the affective domain, primarily concerned with helping youth to comprehend their moral potential in life through movement and inspired by the view that the cultivation of virtuous skills, agency, and reasoning are foundational to a flourishing society. Conclusion: By taking this approach, I philosophize the concept of the 'Virtuous Mover' and the potential ways in which school-based physical educators might begin to help future generations of youth to flourish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on a 2017 paper in TEXTILE which reports on a project on live coding and ancient weaving, entitled Weaving Codes/Coding Weaves (WC/CW). The 2017 paper introduces the concept of Kairos, which has widespread cultural and social applications. Kairos as articulated in WC/CW can illuminate practitioner knowledge and understanding in any creative practice. The article first discusses the research project and draws implications for other practices. The next section moves into the relevance of WC/CW to education, in its fundamental cultural role, and to teaching in particular. This leads to a discussion of the nature of practice. The last section draws out themes and implications, particularly on how Kairos might yield insights into the discussion of practice-based knowledge and understanding made by such thinkers as Dewey, Schön and Eraut. Kairos is a concept which together with Phronesis is particularly pertinent in the analysis of the epistemology of practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "Phronesis: Retrieving Practical Wisdom in Psychology, Philosophy, and Education" by Krisján Krisjánsson and Blaine J. Fowers explores the concept of phronesis, which is practical wisdom for making moral decisions and promoting human flourishing. The authors provide an overview of the field, discussing their neo-Aristotelian phronesis model and its applications in various contexts. They emphasize the importance of a person-centered and morally grounded approach to wisdom, while acknowledging the complexities of decision-making. The text also discusses the gappiness problem, the development of phronesis, civic virtues, collective phronesis, and the influence of cultural narratives on moral identity. [Extracted from the article]

Nicomachean Ethics 6.8 has been interpreted in a variety of ways. One dispute involves Aristotle's remarks about the relationship of phronēsis to politics: does Aristotle claim that phronēsis is foremost applicable to an individual's private life, to the political realm, or to some combination of the two? Two features of this dispute make it worthy of closer attention. First, the conflict of interpretations has not been documented as such. Second, I argue this contemporary conflict is a repetition of an ancient conflict about phronēsis that was being waged in 5th/4th century Athens. Phronēsis was a contested term alongside two related terms, apragmosynē (quietism) and polypragmosynē (meddlesomeness), and the construction of lines 1141b23–1142a12 enters into this historical debate to create a productive tension between two rival views. Aristotle heightens the tension between views represented by quietists and busybodies for his own purposes. In section 1, I surface the neglected historical frame of Nicomachean Ethics 6.8. In section 2, I turn to the contemporary conflict of interpretations, showing how it repeats the historical frame in many ways, and I provide a basic taxonomy of the views typically offered. In section 3, I bring the two debates – historical and contemporary – together and offer my own view of what Aristotle is up to in the passage. I argue that centering the historical frame in this passage highlights Aristotle's use of Isocratean-style phronēsis , while also transforming the concept by connecting it to a series of questions that go beyond Isocrates' view, thus preparing for a later exploration of the best forms of human living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Modern interpretations of Aristotelian concepts of knowing, episteme, techne and phronesis, have lately been adopted to study expertise and professions. The article argues that a combination of the three types of knowledge would be useful in development cooperation and that especially phronesis, or practical wisdom, should take the central stage as it combines practice with values. Although values are central in development work, they are currently undermined by technical understandings. The article explored the different forms of knowledge that are used and appreciated within the Finnish development cooperation. The data was drawn from a process of providing topical and rapid scientific inputs to Finnish ministry officials and it was complemented with key-informant interviews. The findings showed that although scientific knowledge was appreciated by the ministry officials, the internal incentive structures of the development administration favoured technical forms of knowledge. Especially results information as well as picking up travelling ideas from the major trendsetters within the field were important in everyday work. The main structural constraints for phronesis to flourish within the department seemed to be a lack of time for learning and reflection. Development is a messy process involving stakeholders with various interests and wicked problems that do not have simple solutions and are inflicted with power struggles. With declining funding and diminishing appreciation from the side of the power holders, the value of knowledge available to improve the quality and effectiveness of development policy and cooperation becomes important to all stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, I present the Chan Buddhist alternative to phronesis or 'practical wisdom'. Instead of involving the skill or 'know-how' in applying moral principles to particular situations, the Chan Buddhist virtuously responds to situations because they understand how each situation is a 'part' of a larger whole or a 'function' (用) of the 'body' (體). Ultimately, this sensitivity to how each situation is meaningfully situated within a context of relationships is what motivates the Chan Buddhist's spontaneous compassion towards the suffering of existence in its entirety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mulla Sadra considers the speaking soul to have perceptive and executive functions. The human soul can make the right choice in the path of thought to action with the presence of practical reason during conflicts that may arise between the speaking power and other powers of the soul. This research intends to explain the choice in Sadra's works with a descriptive and analytical method; a choice that is only sometimes rational. To explain the truth of rational choice, Sadra pays attention to the roles that practical reason can play in the process of optional action. According to him, practical reason overcomes illusion and reflects on imaginary perceptions, sometimes it does not confirm them as useful. By standing against some animal passions (lust and anger), it prevents their aggravation. He carries out the minor matters that he himself has decreed to be permissible, good and beautiful, with resolute determination. Through an optional verb, the ego is continuously choosing. By fully fulfilling these roles, practical reason realizes a rational and good choice, and on the contrary, with the absence of practical reason, a bad and inhuman practical choice will definitely be formed. Human action is human only when the scientific part of the soul reaches a scientific and rational understanding and combines this understanding with a decisive determination that is achieved in the area of the practical part in the light of practical rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines different philosophical theories of well-being, with a focus on perfectionism. It explores criticisms of perfectionism, such as its difficulty in accounting for subjective experiences and its lack of an adequate account of what is bad for us. The author proposes an alternative account of perfectionist badness, including moral and epistemic vice and impoverishment, drawing on elements of Aristotle's theory. The text also discusses virtues and vices in relation to rational and epistemic capacities, and explores the concept of robust prudential disvalue, which refers to the harm caused by the loss or waste of one's capacities. Overall, the article provides insights into the philosophical understanding of well-being and the factors that can diminish it. [Extracted from the article]

This text explores the concept of σωφροσύνη, or temperance, in classical Greece. It delves into the various meanings and interpretations of σωφροσύνη, going beyond self-control to include self-mastery, self-knowledge, and inner harmony. The author examines ancient texts and debates to understand the complexities of σωφροσύνη and its relationship to other virtues. The text also considers the challenges of interpreting σωφροσύνη and its relevance in contemporary society. It provides valuable insights into this Greek virtue and its significance in ancient Greek philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

The view of happiness that I propose in this article and derive on the basis of Aristotle’s and Henri Bergson’s ideas recommends that we must first understand life as an activity – not as a sum of accumulated experiences and things; nor a set of projects; nor fateful or haphazard events that befall us, but as a formative activity in which we play a key role. Ἐνέργεια or de l’action are at the core of life and it is by getting a hold of this creative core that we stand to live happily (Aristotle) or joyously (Bergson). For both thinkers, the possibility of happiness and joy comes to the fore, to no small extent, as a certain orientation in our thinking, i.e., as φρόνησις and θεωρία, for Aristotle, and as philosophy for Bergson. Our thoughts inform our choices and actions as well as our view of the world, grounding our sense of meaning, purpose, and value of action. It is by reckoning with the ever-unfolding act of life and with our own actions in it (actions which can be vicious, senseless, and unexamined or creative and constitutive of a life well-lived) that we also take hold of the possibility of happiness and joy.

Mankind has always relied on "practical wisdom" in the sense of Aristotle to change people and society. However, practical wisdom is difficult to accumulate and pass on from generation to generation. Therefore, although "natural engineering" that is consistent with "natural technology" can be used effectively to transform the natural world, using "practical wisdom" to change people and society remains difficult. Solving this dilemma requires an effective means to separate "social science", "social technology", and "social engineering" to accumulate and inherit "knowledge of changing people and society" similar to other types of scientific knowledge. Today, the prevailing evidence-based social science is the opposition and unity of laws of nature and free will, truth-seeking and goodness-pursuing, individual wisdom and collective wisdom, autonomy and supervision, the universal and the special in practice. The emergence of this concept allows for the possibility to enhance the effectiveness of social science practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to elaborate multiple dimensions of ethical perception in professionalism and introduces novel didactic viewpoints on educational routes through which professionals learn and develop the moral competencies essential to praxis. Results are discussed from recent innovative research projects on professional didactics, education and work practice. The article explores new research pathways through which to learn and develop professional ethics for teachers and social educators in collaboration between several agents in the field: students, teachers and educational leaders, as well as public institutions. Through lifelong learning trajectories, professionals are enabled to skilfully confront ethical challenges in reality, to develop concrete ethical perception and discernment based on practical wisdom, here defined as pedagogical phronesis. Based on a synthesis of empirical findings and theoretical perspectives, we argue that an interchanging dynamic between subjective experiences and dialogical learning constitutes several dimensions of tacit practical wisdom, which is accentuated in the perception of practice. These are: 1) the existential-phenomenological dimension, 2) the life-historical dimension, 3) the dimension of inter-relational competence, and 4) the social dimension of learning. Our findings have significance and applicability for policymaking, professional training, and educational development, as well as wider research projects on professional learning and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the recent resurgence of interest in character and virtues within philosophy, psychology, and educational studies. This renewed interest has been inspired by a retrieval of character-and-virtue research in psychology and the advent of positive psychology. The article explores the concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, and its role in moral decision-making. It also examines the relationship between virtues, wisdom, skills, and expertise. The aim of the article is to bring together scholars from various disciplines to address the methodological and substantive challenges in the study of virtue cultivation, practical wisdom, and expertise. [Extracted from the article]

Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theory. Scholars have predominantly understood educating character as a process that entails the formation of certain distinct character traits or functions through practice and habituation. However, these approaches present some problems. This paper explores the educational implications of various accounts focusing on the relationship between phronesis and other virtues. In particular, our focus will be on those that Miller (2023) has classified as Standard Model and Eliminativist Model of practical wisdom. Starting from these accounts, we will outline three specific problems that the latter models appear to generate at a theoretical level in character education. Finally, we will address the task of demonstrating why the monist account of moral virtue recently proposed by the Aretai group—which conceives being virtuous in possessing phronesis understood as ethical expertise—might offer a refined response to these challenges. In addition, we will illustrate three educational pathways that can emerge from the same model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the "Aretai model", that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021; Vaccarezza et al. 2023; De Caro et al. forthcoming). According to this model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness tout court, i.e., as the ratio essendi of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to be a good thinker? Which virtues work together in someone who possesses good intellectual character? Although recent research on virtues has highlighted the benefits of individual intellectual virtues, being an excellent thinker is likely a function of possessing multiple intellectual virtues. Specifically, a good thinker would both recognize one's intellectual shortcomings and possess an eagerness to learn driven by virtues such as love of knowledge, curiosity, and open-mindedness. Good intellectual character may only successfully manifest when individuals possess not just one or a few intellectual virtues, but a larger set of such virtues to different degrees. However, little is currently known about what combination of virtues are necessary for good thinking. We argue that it is important to identify and clarify the nature of the good thinker and outline a profile methodology for achieving this goal. This approach characterizes the good thinker in terms of a profile of multiple intellectual virtues. Understanding this profile can allow greater insight into the extent to which people possess such a profile, and the potential for societal benefits of educating for these qualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We aim to map out the points of confluence between phronesis and emotion, as well as the nature of this confluence. We do so based on philosophical and psychological explanations of emotions and phronesis. Making sound decisions, which requires phronesis, is an important matter, but its relationship with emotions has only just begun to be studied. We propose that the interplay between phronesis and emotion is possible (rather than inevitable) because both have a cognitive-behavioural structure and because emotions are hierarchical. In the case of emotion, there are no gaps between the cognitive and behavioural dimensions, while phronetic acts can only manifest if cognitive and behavioural aspects are activated simultaneously. The confluence we identify is bidirectional and involves mutual enrichment in this dual dimension. On the one hand, phronesis enriches emotion because it involves extra subjective knowledge and allows emotion to be directed towards higher goals. On the other hand, emotions enrich phronesis because phronesis makes decisions based on sensitive preferences and because emotions confirm correctness in the context of moral decision making. Methodologically, this study is theoretical and interdisciplinary, as our approach is both philosophical and psychological. Philosophy helps us to improve the conceptual foundation of the construct, while psychology provides an analysis of the emotional process, allowing philosophy to understand how emotional evaluation-assessment and motivation lead to decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empathizing with others is thought to be a useful, if not necessary, skill for a wise person to possess. Beyond this general conceptual assonance, however, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize this relationship. This paper aims to address this issue by investigating what role empathy is said to play in phronesis and whether there is a legitimate place for it in Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) accounts of practical wisdom. First, after a brief overview of Aristotle's account of phronesis, I will try to define three different ways in which empathy is thought to contribute to it according to the existing literature, based on a conceptual distinction between affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and sympathy. Second, I will ask whether empathy is the best conceptual candidate for Aristotle's account of phronesis and, more generally, whether the wise person should always rely on empathy in order to deliberate and act well. My tentative answer will be that empathy does not seem to be perfectly compatible with the concept of phronesis, nor is it its best ally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing virtues requires attending to the affective and cognitive components of virtue. The former component implies cultivating apt emotional responses to specific situations. The cognitive part requires the (meta) virtue of phronesis. In dealing with "Phronesis in educating emotions," this article attends to the nature of emotions and phronesis as its role in cultivating good action habits and virtuous emotional habits. It understands emotion regulation as one of the functions of phronesis. In the broader sense, phronesis includes elements other than deliberation, such as dialectics and rhetoric, which can be helpful to induce a certain suspicion or to persuade somewhat since our affectivity is susceptible to persuasion (i.e. Aristotle's political dominion of emotions). As a topic in the intersection of moral psychology and moral philosophy, we get valuable insights into a psychologist's work, Magda Arnold's (1903–2002) emotion theory. Her understanding of emotion elicitation elucidates the relation between phronesis and emotions. The article focuses on one of the central elements of emotion elicitation, the appraisal. This piece can make the education of emotions for virtue development more understandable. At first glance, our initial appraisal may be hasty and inaccurate, leading to emotional reactions. However, with careful reflection, we can correct and improve upon our initial appraisal and subsequent emotions. If our initial assessment was flawed, this second, more thoughtful evaluation can be enhanced through phronesis. Due to the appraisal's spontaneity, cultivating educated emotions requires values' teaching, learning, and thus, appraising good things. With the development of virtues, intuitive estimates become adequate, so emotional responses are more attuned to diverse situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practical wisdom is the sine qua non of good conduct for Aristotelian virtue ethicists. Aristotelians conceive it as the virtue responsible for the intellectual side of good conduct, which involves having the right goal and deliberating well about what fulfils that goal, among other tasks. But is there any such trait as practical wisdom? Given the diversity of jobs practical wisdom is asked to do (seven goals are often enumerated), there may be a cluster of traits corresponding to what Aristotelians are talking about, so there really isn't one trait. In this paper, I defend a traditional Aristotelian position on practical wisdom, arguing that it is one thing despite having different functions. Following Thomas Aquinas, we can see practical wisdom as having parts. Those parts may be psychological components (integral parts) of the trait, or they may be derivative functions (virtual parts), things that someone with practical wisdom is also able to do because they have practical wisdom. Still, practical wisdom is one because it is a trait that functions to enable us to pursue the good as good; it possesses what I will call here 'practical unity' as the master virtue of praxis or acting well full stop. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to study the interrelatedness of rationality, virtue, and practical wisdom in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by offering a critical interpretation of the bipartition of the soul presented in Chap. 13 of the first book. Aristotle relies on the partition of the soul into a rational and a non-rational part when he distinguishes between ethical and intellectual virtues. The paper will question the adequacy of these divisions and show that Aristotle himself casts doubt on them while leaving open the possibility of understanding the soul in an alternative way which will prove to fit better with his own exposition of deliberate choice and the integration of virtuous action and practical wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about a virtue ethical approach to the professional ethics of teaching, centred around the ideal of phronesis (practical wisdom) in an Aristotelian sense. It is grounded empirically in extensive research conducted at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues into teachers and other UK professionals, and it is grounded theoretically in recent efforts to revive an Aristotelian concept of phronesis as excellence in ethical decision-making. The article argues for the need for a virtue-based approach to professional practice, based on time-honoured Aristotelian assumptions and culminating in a conceptually viable construct of phronesis as a psycho-moral integrator and adjudicator. After setting some of the historical background in Sect. 1, Sect. 2 charts the most relevant empirical findings. Section 3 introduces a call for phronesis as a guide to virtue-based professional ethics: its role, nature, and methods of instruction. Section 4 adds some caveats and concerns about if and how phronesis can be cultivated as part of teacher training. Finally, Sect. 5 offers some concluding remarks about the novelty and radicality of the approach on offer in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the course of life, it is common to make some decisions that prove to be correct. Some of these choices are made without a specific reason, but only out of habit or intuitively, while others are based on judgments and motivations. However, when we claim that a decision is "right", what kind of judgment are we referring to? On the one hand, the term "right" (or "wrong") often refers to abstract norms. Usually, truth and falsehood serve as criteria in these cases. In such situations, judgments about what is "right" or "wrong" depend strictly on an accurate rational evaluation, which is instrumental in guiding individuals to undertake or avoid certain actions. On the other hand, there is a sense of justice that concerns ethics and values. In these circumstances, a decision is generally considered "right" if it is based on a criterion of judgment that allows individuals to make a decision freely, without being bound by an abstract norm, but rather by elaborating the choice as the realization of what they consider good and just. In this paper will examine and redefine the concept of "right choice", acknowledging the above mentioned dual nature of its meaning. It will be argued there is a link between what abstract norms dictate to do, in order to reach a formally correct decision, and what, instead, depends on merely reasons and attitudes. This connection is indeed ensured by wise decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, "it is time for an 'emotional revolution' in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom as are cognitive and reflective factors" (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück's appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite increased philosophical and psychological work on practical wisdom, contemporary interdisciplinary wisdom research provides few specifics about how to develop wisdom (Kristjánsson 2022). This lack of practically useful guidance is due in part to the difficulty of determining how to combine the tools of philosophy and psychology to develop a plausible account of wisdom as a prescriptive ideal. Modeling wisdom on more ordinary forms of expertise is promising, but skill models of wisdom (Annas 2011; De Caro et al. 2018; Swartwood 2013b; Tsai 2023) have been challenged on the grounds that there are important differences between wisdom and expert skills (Hacker-Wright 2015, p. 986; Kristjánsson 2015, pp. 98, 101; Stichter 2015, 2016, 2018). I'll argue that we can both vindicate the promise of skill models of wisdom and begin to specify practically useful strategies for wisdom development by attending to a reflective process that I call Case-Based Critical Reflection. I begin by demonstrating the process as it arose in a notable example from everyday life, illustrating how the process can be usefully applied to a case study of interest to wisdom scientists, and explaining its philosophical pedigree. After isolating the key features that make it relevant to wisdom development, I argue that attending to the importance of Critical Reflection can defuse prominent objections to skill models of wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examined whether evidence from the neuroscience of morality supports the standard models of phronesis, i.e., Jubilee and Aretai Centre Models. The standard models explain phronesis as a multifaceted construct based on interaction and coordination among functional components. I reviewed recent neuroscience studies focusing on brain networks associated with morality and their connectivity to examine the validity of the models. Simultaneously, I discussed whether the evidence helps the models address challenges, particularly those from the phronesis eliminativism. Neuroscientific evidence supported the importance of brain networks, i.e., the default mode, salience, and central executive functioning networks, in moral functioning in general. The findings favorably supported the multifaceted and integrative nature of phronesis proposed by the standard models. Finally, I considered how the two models could explain the mechanisms of phronesis more integratively based on neuroscientific findings. At the end of this paper, with the evidence, I proposed several practical ideas to promote the cultivation of phronesis, e.g., the consideration of coordination among components for moral functioning and the use of moral exemplars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical leadership is of growing interest and concern in public administration research and practice. Although both scholarship and practical wisdom suggest that the outcomes of leadership are contingent on followers' characteristics, knowledge about what individual preferences matter for the leadership–outcome relationship and how they moderate it is still scant. This study expands on extant scholarship by focusing on the moderating role of followers' need for autonomy in the association between perceived ethical leadership and two important follower outcomes, i.e., job satisfaction and affective organizational commitment. Building on self-determination theory, we test rivaling hypotheses on the moderating effect of follower's need for autonomy in a sample of public sector employees in Germany (n = 462). The results support the enhancement hypothesis, according to which the association between ethical leadership and follower outcomes increases at higher levels of need for autonomy. However, we find this effect only for job satisfaction, while no such moderation occurs in the case of affective organizational commitment. Future research is challenged to further explore the multiple contingencies of ethical leadership in the public sector by examining other configurations of outcomes and moderators at various levels of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the high incidence of corporate scandals, we are faced with reconsidering management theory, principles and education. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we seek to show that it is necessary and possible to analyse current managerial and directive action in the light of Aristotle's ethical thought, specifically concerning phronesis (practical wisdom). The second aim is to highlight that the Platonic interpretation of phronesis as a matter of contemplative life contributes to an inadequate leadership style and ethical apathy. Furthermore, we claim that the Machiavellian interpretation of phronesis contributes to leadership based on manipulation and exclusion of morality in management. The third and final objective is to respond to these two interpretations by reviewing Aristotle's exceptional teachings on the relevance of phronesis as a special kind of wisdom in which good judgment, discernment and an adequate understanding of events for decision‐making converge. An essential claim of this paper is that Aristotle and his notion of phronesis, rather than Plato's or Machiavelli's, ought to inform contemporary debates in management scholarship and education. Aristotle's philosophical insights into practice, wisdom and more comprehensive ethics are highly relevant for public discourse in our contemporary societal context, especially for management education. Integrating phronesis into management and leadership education involves using case studies and experiential learning to teach practical wisdom and sound judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her historical novel, The Beginning of Spring, Penelope Fitzgerald explores English identity in pre-revolutionary Russia by putting her expatriate hero Frank Reid to the test in ethical situations. Engaging with critical attention to the novel’s moral meaning, this article offers an ethical reading alongside Paul Ricoeur’s study on ethical intention and Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of the face of the other. Frank’s ethical self can be imputed from his aim of becoming a just man in the Moscow business community. To achieve that aim, he must make ethical deliberations based on his practical wisdom and the moral injunction that regulates the intersubjective relationship between the self and the other. He ultimately fails his ethical aim because of the unjust institution – he is othered in/by Russia. I conclude with a gesture that the novel is Fitzgerald’s ethical intention of giving a voice to the other Russian culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For this writing I have proposed to connect the concepts of analogy, phronesis and eudemonia in and from the work of Mauricio Beuchot, founder of the proposal called Analogical Hermeneutics. Analogy, as it is understood, in principle does not refer to the analog, as opposed to the digital. Analogy, along with univocality and equivocality, is a way of preaching that teaches that not everything has a single meaning nor is everything dispersed in multiple senses. Prudence is the virtue par excellence. It is the door to the other virtues. It is, according to Mauricio Beuchot, the incarnate analogy. It consists of the willingness to choose the appropriate means for the purposes pursued. The goal of the human being is happiness. It is distinguished by wealth, pleasure and honor. It is well that it corresponds to the human being for the fact of being human. Thus, structuring the analogy in life, as prudence, encourages, individually and socially, to seek happiness through the best means, that is, those that contribute to the plenitude of oneself and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the role of philosophical practice in the development of Aristotelian phronesis to enable younger generation to cope with human vulnerabilities. We study two sessions of philosophical practice involving eleven- and twelve-years old pupils of an educational priority area middle school in Grenoble, France. These activities are inspired by the Lipman's approach of Community of Philosophical Inquiry and the Tozzi's one of democratic and philosophical discussion. Extending our previous research, we investigate more specifically phenomena we refer to as "bimodal metaphorical philosophemes". We define them as sequences of recurring verbal and gestural metaphors that facilitate the co-construction of definitions during philosophical discussions. We show that bimodal metaphorical philosophemes foster the development of phronesis in pre-teens involved in the philosophical discussions we study. In this way, philosophical practices may help future generations cope with human vulnerabilities in the sense described by Cynthia Fleury. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A contemporary movement promotes the introduction of children and adolescents to philosophy. By considering that philosophy should be introduced from primary school, in order to contribute to the intellectual education of the younger generation, this movement re-examines the role and place of philosophy in education. This article explores this project through the notion of intellectual prudence. It suggests a return to the Aristotelian concept of prudence, phronesis, to clarify the project of the pioneers of philosophy for children (Lipman and Sharp), but defends an updating of the notion in order to understand the contemporary educational stakes of early philosophy teaching. To do so, it combines a textual analysis, questioning this project from a reading of the works that gave rise to it, and a field philosophy approach, questioning their realization from the experience of an actual field of practices developed in this line in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronēsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self‐controlled and akratic agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study focuses on family owner–nonfamily CEO relational practices and what these relational practices constrain and potentiate in family firm CEO succession. Our main contribution is developing a constructionist relational practice perspective and approach as an alternative to the entitative view that dominates the family business literature. We illustrate the relational practice perspective through our dialogically structured inquiries with family owners and nonfamily CEOs. We co-develop practical wisdom on how family owner–nonfamily CEO relational practices can construct stuckness in organizing or, conversely, open up new possibilities to go on depending on (i) the way the family owner and nonfamily CEO "handle" equivocality and tension they continuously (re)produce through their relational practices and (ii) the way they enact "relational balancing" to equilibrate their relation in the making in terms of value/self-worth maintenance by involving other actors, such as board members, management team members, or a coach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central problem for phronetic case‐based approaches to the ethics of teaching lies in the proper determination of normative ethical problems. Judgments about the character of normative ethical problems depend in part on background beliefs about what is (or is not) of ethical value. Thus, to distinguish genuinely normative ethical problems, teachers seem to first require knowledge of what is of ethical value, which practical problems themselves cannot generate. To resolve this practical and theoretical problem, Nicolas Tanchuk and Alyssa Emery argue for a Deweyan approach to teacher ethics that asserts two central theses: First, negatively, that inductive evidence warrants skepticism about any normative theory grounded in external reasons — (purported) reasons that are actually or possibly disconnected from an agent's motivational set of beliefs, desires, and dispositions. Second, that a cognitive and affective orientation toward solving problems through learning survives skepticism about external ethical reasons, grounding the commitments of many anti‐oppressive teacher educators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients with relapsed or refractory metastatic cancer unresponsive to standard therapies have motivated nuclear physicians to develop innovative radioligands, precisely targeted to tumor molecular receptors, for effective treatment of specific advanced malignancies. Individual practitioners in departments of nuclear medicine across the world have performed first-in-human studies on compassionate patient usage N-of-One protocols. These physician-sponsored studies then evolved into early-phase clinical trials and obtained real-world data to demonstrate real-world evidence of effectiveness in prolonging survival and enhancing quality of life of many so-called "End-Stage" cancer patients. Virtually all the therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals in current clinical oncology have been discovered and developed into effective specific treatments of targetable cancers by individual doctors in the course of their hospital practice. Pharma industry was not involved until many years later when performance of mandated Phase 3 randomized controlled trials became necessary to achieve regulatory agency approval. This article traces the history of several novel theranostic agents developed from compassionate N-of-One studies by hospital physicians over the past 36 years. It acknowledges the collegiality and collaboration of individual nuclear medicine specialists, worldwide, in pioneering effective humane therapy of particular advanced cancers unresponsive to conventional treatments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored how a non-linear coaching model can be used to develop headteachers in South Africa on their learning journey. The case study explores through qualitative data how senior leaders in schools were able to reflect on their learning through the use of a non-linear coaching model to deepen their understanding of senior leadership, and how they strategically needed to consider the needs of their school, as well as the learners and teams within their schools. A qualitative research approach was used, with data from semi-structured interviews thematically coded through the use of Braun and Clarke's (2006) six phase model. Key learning from the project is that a collaborative professional approach, facilitating effective learning conversations through a non-linear model, ensured that leaders were able to develop a deep understanding of their contexts and were able to engage with key strategic decisions making processes in a safe, trusting learning environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practical wisdom enables moral decision making and action by aligning one's apprehension of proximate goods with a distal, socially embedded interpretation of a more ultimate Good. A focus on purpose within the overall process mutually informs human moral psychology and moral AI development in their examinations of practical wisdom. AI practical wisdom could ground an AI system's apprehension of reality in a sociotechnical moral process committed to orienting AI development and action in light of a pluralistic, diverse interpretation of that Good. Defining AI purpose in terms of the human struggle to determine the moral "ought" (versus the way reality is) can overcome practical and normative limitations of principle-based approaches to AI ethics without requiring idiosyncratic moral reasoning or a premature commitment to a single ethical theory, which could hinder navigating the moral implications of future unknowns. Dividing practical wisdom into proximate, mediating, and distal processes enables each division to incorporate the moral dimensions of the situation, individual AI system, and sociotechnical community, respectively. Drawing upon externalist (4E) and ecological cognitive psychology theories to extend Xavier Zubiri's sentient intelligence, proximate apprehension of what an object affords the perceiver includes affordances for practical and moral purposes. Those apprehensions are structured by moral and other social-cognitive schemas that mediate moral constructs, the apprehended situation, and individual commitments and other motivating identifications in a process Ignacio Ellacuria calls historical reality. Distally, Josiah Royce's community of interpretation characterizes one way of organizing a sociotechnical process to synthesize diverse interpretations of the Good, orient AI moral practice, and align AI development with human and AI moral purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is an editorial introduction to a special issue of the journal Religions, which explores Søren Kierkegaard's views on virtues and vices. The editorial highlights the divided opinions among scholars regarding Kierkegaard's relationship to the virtues tradition. Some argue that he is firmly rooted in this tradition, while others are skeptical of labeling him as a virtue ethicist. The editorial also discusses Kierkegaard's exploration of virtues such as courage, forgiveness, gratitude, hope, humility, honesty, and patience, as well as his views on faith, hope, and love. The contributors to this special issue cover various aspects of Kierkegaard's relation to virtues and vices, including articles on patience, faith, hope, love, meekness, and thoughtlessness. The aim of this special issue is to provide insights into Kierkegaard's understanding of virtues and vices from different perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

Phronesis is often described as a 'practical wisdom' adapted to the matters of everyday human life. Phronesis enables one to judge what is at stake in a situation and what means are required to bring about a good outcome. In medicine, phronesis tends to be called upon to deal with ethical issues and to offer a critique of clinical practice as a straightforward instrumental application of scientific knowledge. There is, however, a paucity of empirical studies of phronesis, including in medicine. Using a hermeneutic and phenomenological approach, this inquiry explores how phronesis is manifest in the stories of clinical practice of eleven exemplary physicians. The findings highlight five overarching themes: ethos (or character) of the physician, clinical habitus revealed in physician know-how, encountering the patient with attentiveness, modes of reasoning amidst complexity, and embodied perceptions (such as intuitions or gut feeling). The findings open a discussion about the contingent nature of clinical situations, a hermeneutic mode of clinical thinking, tacit dimensions of being and doing in clinical practice, the centrality of caring relations with patients, and the elusive quality of some aspects of practice. This study deepens understandings of the nature of phronesis within clinical settings and proposes 'Clinical phronesis' as a descriptor for its appearance and role in the daily practice of (exemplary) physicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss Data, Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom, which is commonly referred to as DIKW. The DIKW Pyramid Model is a hierarchical model that is often referenced in both academic and practitioner circles. This model will be discussed and shown to be faulty on several levels, including a lack of definitional agreement. A new DIKW framework with systems orientation will be proposed that focuses on what the DIKW elements do in the way humans think, not what they are by definition. Information as a replacement for wasted physical resources in goal-oriented tasks will be a central organizing point. The paper will move the DIKW discussion to the computer-based concept of Digital Twins (DTs) and its augmentation of how we can use DIKW to be more effective and efficient. This will especially be the case as we move toward Intelligent Digital Twins (IDTs) with Artificial Intelligence (AI). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine the ancient wisdom on how to make good leadership decisions that Antigone offers. Creon, Antigone's ruler, preconizes the traditionally masculine leadership conduct, with hubristic tyrannical tendencies, that deliver tragic consequences. Antigone schools Creon and the audience, firstly, by identifying the behaviors and circumstances that favor bad and untimely leadership decisions. Then Antigone presents the wisdom of phronesis as the way forward for good and timely leadership decisions. Phronesis is a pragmatic, measured rationality that comprises prudence, and a sensibility to the context, openness to dialogue, and to the other. Phronesis also calls for an open and flexible relation to error, to changing one's mind. The focus is not merely on the leader but on the relations, their differences, and opportunities, and what everyone involved in the specific circumstances of the decision can offer when listening and learning from one another. Phronesis becomes part of a modus operandi that prefigures collaborative leadership. Collaborative leadership is predicated on the collective and individual flourishing central to the dawn of democratic rule and the dilemmas Antigone examines. This essay shows how today we still need Antigone in deepening our democracy and making better leadership decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]