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Kant scholarship often refers to transcendental idealism as a ‘theory.’ Kant’s project, however, is not easily reconciled with that term in its current use. This paper contends that his critique and idealism should be seen as a remedial response against our natural albeit confused prejudice of transcendental realism. Kant’s idealism articulates a ‘metametaphysical’ ethos that is supposed to provide a new grounding of metaphysics by proceeding ‘from the human standpoint:’ it aims to dispel the temptation of transcendental realism in favor of a resolute inhabitation of, and contentment with, our own humanity. This project comes under pressure in post-Kantianism: Fichte is among the first to voice the worry that Kant’s critique is well-intentioned, but not well-executed. His concern is that, while it ‘bring[s] man into harmony with himself,’ this mere contentment with our own humanity will not suffice to achieve the scientificity that, by Kant’s own lights, is the mark of any promising metaphysics. Fichte’s charge is that Kant’s idealism, in its very confinement to the brute facts of the human condition, surrenders itself to unacceptable contingency or ‘facticity.’ The paper explores Kant’s idealist project of grounding metaphysics, Fichte’s facticity charge against it, and whether Kantian idealism can withstand it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we suggest that personalized LLMs trained on information written by or otherwise pertaining to an individual could serve as artificial moral advisors (AMAs) that account for the dynamic nature of personal morality. These LLM-based AMAs would harness users’ past and present data to infer and make explicit their sometimes-shifting values and preferences, thereby fostering self-knowledge. Further, these systems may also assist in processes of self-creation, by helping users reflect on the kind of person they want to be and the actions and goals necessary for so becoming. The feasibility of LLMs providing such personalized moral insights remains uncertain pending further technical development. Nevertheless, we argue that this approach addresses limitations in existing AMA proposals reliant on either predetermined values or introspective self-knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In 'Must We Mean What We Say?', Stanley Cavell defends the method of ordinary language philosophy while arguing that the special status of philosophical claims about language arises from the fact that these statements are expressions of self-knowledge. Recently, Nat Hansen (2017) has explored Cavell's position in relation to empirical research on linguistic usage. This paper challenges Hansen's reading of Cavell, and presents an alternative interpretation that withstands some of Hansen's objections. For Cavell, claims about 'what we say' are claims about observable matters of fact, but nevertheless they are not, and cannot ever be, observation-based claims. The point of observing ordinary usage is to remind the philosopher of what is contained within the practical mastery that she already possesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a new kind of approach to conspiracy theories – a procedural approach. This approach promises to establish that belief in conspiracy theories is rationally criticisable in general. Unlike most philosophical approaches, a procedural approach does not purport to condemn conspiracy theorists directly on the basis of features of their theories. Instead, it focuses on the patterns of thought involved in forming and sustaining belief in such theories. Yet, unlike psychological approaches, a procedural approach provides a rational critique of conspiracist thought patterns. In particular, it criticises these thought patterns for failing to conform to procedures prescribed by reason. The specific procedural approach that I develop takes its cue from the Kantian notion that reason must be used self-critically. I tentatively suggest that conspiracy theorists fail to engage in the relevant sort of self-critique in at least three ways: they do not critically examine their own motivations, they avoid looking at matters from the point of view of others, and they fail to reflect on the limits of human knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital mental health interventions (DMHIs) have surged in popularity over the last few years. However, adherence to self-guided interventions remains a major hurdle to overcome. The current study utilized a phased implementation design, incorporating diverse samples and contexts to delve into the engagement challenges faced by a recently launched online mental health platform in Brazil with self-evaluation forms. Employing an iterative mixedmethods approach, including focus groups, online surveys, and think-aloud protocols, the research aims to evaluate user satisfaction, identify barriers to adherence, and explore potential hybrid solutions. Engagement in the platform was evaluated by descriptive statistics of the number of instruments completed, and qualitative interviews that were interpreted thematically. In the fully selfguided mode, 2,145 individuals registered, but a substantial majority (88.9%) engaged with the platform for only 1 day, and merely 3.3% completed all activities. In another sample of 50 participants were given a choice between online-only or a hybrid experience with face-to-face meetings. 40% of individuals from the hybrid group completed all activities, compared to 8% in the online-only format. Time constraints emerged as a significant barrier to engagement, with suggested improvements including app development, periodic reminders, and meetings with healthcare professionals. While the study identified weaknesses in the number and length of instruments, personalized results stood out as a major strength. Overall, the findings indicate high satisfaction with the mental health platform but underscore the need for improvements, emphasizing the promise of personalized mental health information and acknowledging persistent barriers in a digital-only setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs 'Self-understanding' — i.e. (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has been gaining ground in recent decades, fuelled by a wide range of empirical results which allegedly demonstrate that subjects confabulate items of self-understanding. The paper rejects this attack on the received view. After critically examining one extant response to the Neo-Rylean, which gratuitously accuses her of equivocation, the paper proceeds to offer its own response, casting doubt over the suggestion that the experimental results actually demonstrate widespread confabulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Colombiana de Educación is the property of Universidad Pedaggica Nacional and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

God the Father was considered so completely inexpressible and unembodied that his visual appearance in early modern masterpieces has long challenged the theological accuracy of such works. A recent discovery complicates that issue. Albrecht Dürer's 1500 Self-portrait as Christ is incorrectly considered an isolated example of divine self-representation. It was, in fact, as shown here, part of a long tradition throughout Europe between at least the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The praxis, potentially sacrilegious, raises questions about the truth of art at its highest level. To address this conundrum, this article analyzes works by three eminent, but very different, artists: Michelangelo, Raphael, and Dürer. Two current methodologies—visual exegesis and the poetics of making—support the argument. The analysis reveals that there is a fundamental unity to their work, which has not been recognized on account of three popular misconceptions about the nature of art, divinity, and the mind. This article concludes that depictions of God the Father and Christ by these artists are neither heretical nor false because, as the evidence shows, all three were part of a continuous spiritual tradition embedded within their craft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generally, we confidently ascribe valuing states to ourselves. We make statements such as “I value democracy” or “I value my best friend” - our sense of who we are depends on doing so. Yet what justifies that confidence? If you were asked “Do you value philosophy, or are you just doing it for the money?”, how might you go about generating such knowledge? I will operate with the notion that valuing involves, at a minimum, a set of distinctive emotional dispositions toward the valued object. Given this view of valuing, a plausible explanation stemming from Tooming and Miyazono is the following: to know whether we value, we need to predict our potential or future emotional reactions. That is, they suggest that affective forecasting is necessary to generate knowledge of valuing states. I argue that, despite its intuitive appeal, affective forecasting is not necessary. I then consider a more modest claim, namely that affective forecasting is still explanatorily powerful when it comes to self-knowledge of valuing states, as it explains the difficulty of generating such knowledge. I reject this further claim, arguing that there is a stronger available explanation: the use of theories about valuing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discovery of "Self", the essence of “Self’ and the relationship between man and "Self" have a special place in the philosophy of illumination. The main issue in this article is how Suhrawardi discovers "self" and what is his mechanism in self-analysis? In order to reach Suhrawardi's answer, we have distinguished between two types of ontological and epistemological encounters with "self". In the ontological confrontation, man achieves the existential truth through self-analysis and makes this existential matter the basis of his entire metaphysical system, as we see in Ibn Sina's philosophical system. But from Suhrawardi's point of view, the human encounter in the discovery of "self" is epistemological. In the epistemological encounter with "self", the first finding of man is something that constantly appears to him, and according to the identity of appearance and perception, man's discovered is consciousness, and as a result, "self" is consciousness. Consciousness that is the basis of the philosopher's entire knowledge system. Considering these kinds of encounter, in this article we have distinguished between three stages of self-analysis, i.e. illuminated self-awareness, illuminated self-knowledge and illuminated selfimprovement. In the stage of self-awareness, a reality beyond the material body is discovered in three ways. In the stage of self-knowledge, by distancing from the Peripatetics philosophers and relying on the phenomenological approach, we reach the fact that this non-material thing constantly appears to man, such a thing is pure light. In the stage of self-development, by establishing a dialectic between man and "self", the conclusion is reached that alienation is a contradictory thing. Therefore, suhrawardi’s illuminated selfanalysis establishes a foundation for illumination epistemology both in its own philosophy and in the philosophies after it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The aim of this study was to compare the effectiveness of positive therapy and dialectical behavior therapy on the self-knowledge of vulnerable teenagers under the welfare of Tehran. Materials and Methods: 60 samples were selected by using the available sampling method and by screening, and they were assigned equally and randomly in the intervention groups of positive psychology and dialectical behavior therapy and the control group. The score obtained from Kettle's SelfKnowledge Questionnaire (1998) was included in the initial screening as a pre-test. Then, the intervention of positive psychology and dialectical behavior therapy was presented to the experimental group for 10 sessions of 90 minutes each, and the control group did not receive any intervention. Then all three groups were measured in the post-test. Also, after one month, a follow-up period was conducted by implementing a self-awareness questionnaire. Results: Data analysis with mixed variance analysis showed that positive treatment and dialectical behavior therapy were effective on the selfawareness of vulnerable teenagers under the welfare of Tehran city (P<0.001). Also, the effect of positive treatment was greater than dialectical behavior therapy in improving self-knowledge (P<0.001). The results were maintained in the follow-up phase. Conclusion: The results of this research reveal the need to pay special attention to the issues of vulnerable teenagers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines Nietzsche's inversion of Terence's formula "I am the closest to myself" into "Everyone is furthest from himself [Jeder ist sich selbst der Fernste]" (GM, Preface 1). In a contextual reading, I am going to ask how Nietzsche relates this formula to the difficulty of acquiring self-knowledge, as emphasized at the beginning of On theGenealogy of Morality. First, I argue that Nietzsche does not prohibit self-knowledge, but instead invites us to think about it differently; and second, I will show that the formula according to which "everyone is furthest from himself" can also be understood as an injunction to keep the self always at a distance. I will link these two aspects by arguing that Nietzsche replaces self-knowledge in the classical sense by an interpretation of the self, and that this interpretation must never be thought of as an undertaking that seeks to reify their self. Nietzsche urges us to make ourselves into creative projects, even this will entail fiction and illusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that $\neg p$ ¬ p and yet is sincere in asserting that $p$ p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation is automatic that the tension between the self-deceived agent's actions and assertions can be explained in a core subset of cases of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis study aimed to relate self-knowledge to mental health (from Islamic perspective), and compare it among the female students. Using the Morgan table, we selected 379 students from four universities, namely alzahra University, a single-sex university, the University of Tehran, Shahid Beheshti University, and Kharazmi University. The samples were selected randomly by applying a stratified sampling method. We utilized two instruments: Islamic self-knowledge and general mental health questionnaires. The collected data were analyzed using Pearson Correlation Coefficient, independent samples t-test, and linear regression analysis using SPSS version 25. The results showed that there were significant association between self-knowledge and mental health. However, there were no significant differences between the female students of humanities and sciences, whether from the point of self-knowledge or mental health. The results also showed no significant differences between the students of alzahra University and the female students of the other three universities in self-knowledge and mental health. In each case, the results are compared to Islamic viewpoints (Quran, Hadith, and Quotations from various Islamic thinkers) as well as the psychological viewpoints of Maslow and Rogers. Our findings underline the importance of enhancing self-knowledge among female university students as a protective factor against mental health outcomes (substance abuse, depression, and anxiety) Moreover, Faith based strategies are known to be effective, more accessible than mental health professional services and will carry less stigma in the target community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Meat consumption has a host of serious negative consequences for nonhuman animals, underprivileged humans, and the natural environment. Several interventions have been developed to encourage meat reduction but to relatively limited effect. There is also a range of established predictors of meat consumption, but much less is known about the factors that predict intentions to reduce meat consumption. The goal of this study was to determine the roles of personality and self‐knowledge in meat reduction intentions. Method: In this set of three preregistered studies, we tested brief interventions to encourage meat reduction intentions and examined personality predictors of intentions to reduce meat consumption. Results: We found no evidence that brief interventions with or without a self‐knowledge component had a meaningful effect on changing meat reduction intentions. However, we found robust evidence for relatively small associations between intending to eat less meat and high Openness to Experience, high Emotionality, and perceiving meat reduction as moral behaviors. Conclusion: Individual differences may be a more influential predictor of meat reduction intentions than brief interventions. Implications for promoting meat reduction are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we look at installation art through the lens provided by the notion of "affective artifact" (Piredda 2019). We argue that affective character is central to some works of installation art and that some of those works can expand our knowledge of our affective lives, while others can contribute to the construction of our identities. Sections (2), (3), and (4) set the stage for our discussion of affective installation artworks by, respectively, situating it within the debate on affective artifacts, looking at some general issues concerning the affective character of artworks, and sketching out a view of the ontology of installation art. In section (5), we discuss the affective character of six works of installation art. In section (6), we show how those artworks can reveal aspects of who we are. Section (7) concludes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-knowledge is an important element of metacognition. It encompasses understanding one's own strengths and weaknesses and includes belief and self-assessment of one’s capacity to perform a task. Cognitive skills comprise a range of mental processes, such as attention, memory, problem solving, systems thinking, abstract thinking, and critical thinking, that are essential for acquiring and applying knowledge. The research described in this paper examined the ability for self-knowledge and cognitive skills of electronics students engaged in project-based learning. The study, which used quantitative and qualitative tools, involved 140 twelve-grade electronics students and explored the self-knowledge and cognitive skills they exhibited while executing their final projects. The correlation and paired-samples t-test between the students’ self-report questionnaire (indirect assessment of cognitive skills) and achievement test (direct assessment of cognitive skills) scores were examined to assess the students’ self-knowledge and cognitive skills. The findings revealed a significant difference between self-report questionnaire scores and achievement test scores, indicating that the students’ self-knowledge did not reflect their actual low level of cognitive skills. Measuring self-knowledge and cognitive skills in project-based learning is essential for assessing the effectiveness of the learning process, resulting in improved project outcomes and a firmer foundation for future academic and professional success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a prominent strand of thought in analytic philosophy of mind, certain judgments of the form “a is F” are such that, although one can be mistaken about what property it is that a has, one cannot be mistaken that it is a that has the relevant property. Judgments of this kind are said to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM). This article has two main aims. On the one hand, it responds to a need for a systematization of the debate about immunity to error through misidentification, which consists of multiple contributions in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics that have accumulated throughout the last 80 years – since the publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Blue Book – and which no one – to the best of our knowledge – has drawn together in an exhaustive and accessible way. On the other hand, the article will take a stand on matters concerning the nature, scope, explanation, and significance of immunity to error through misidentification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text examines the interconnection between tragedy, logic, and action in Hegel's works, notably in "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right." Hegel correlates tragedy with negativity and reconciliation, influenced by ancient tragedy and Christian consciousness. Tragedy serves as a means for self-knowledge, where negativity and death are pivotal in unveiling the spirit's truth. Hegel's philosophy is enriched by the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, depicting the ethical crisis in Athens and the ensuing reconciliation of opposing ethical forces. Hegel identifies tragic elements in Christianity, a religion that perceives death and contradiction not as endpoints but transitional phases in reality. Christian religious consciousness, marked by finitude and sin, seeks reconciliation between the mutable and immutable. Hegel's practical philosophy is grounded in a distinctive ontological logic, with dialectics as a core element, not a function of subjective thinking but the animating essence of matter. The focus of the article is Hegel's stance on the manifestation and reconciliation of freedom, assessing the relationship between individual will and universal practical law. He critiques the limited legal perspective of individual freedom, advocating for a deeper, ethical interpretation of freedom. This view is distanced from common sense and consensus and rooted in speculative understanding developed through scientific and philosophical methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In classical Arabic philosophy, the topic of consciousness is commonly associated with Avicenna's 'Flying Man' thought experiment. But Avicenna's explorations of the nature of consciousness are not confined to the Flying Man, and he is by no means the only classical Islamic thinker to deem consciousness an important feature of our experience. Consciousness also plays a important role in the epistemology and moral psychology of Avicenna's intellectual rivals, the theologians (mutakallumūn), who represent important sources for Avicenna's own theorizing about consciousness. And while Avicenna's philosophical successor and critic, Averroes, seems to banish consciousness from the core of his cognitive psychology, in doing so he seems to anticipate contemporary efforts to expand the scope of consciousness through the notion of the 'extended' mind. This paper examines the varieties of consciousness recognized by Avicenna and several other classical Islamic thinkers with a view to understanding the extent to which their accounts can be mapped on to some of the concepts of consciousness delineated by contemporary philosophers of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism's implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On's neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-knowledge and its functionality has always been the focus of the scholars of humanities, especially in the field of philosophy. The objective of this paper is to study Imam Khomeini's approach to the subject of self-knowledge and its functions. Grounded theory has been applied in this qualitative study. The statistical population included all sources such as books, lectures, texts and letters of Imam Khomeini. The statistical sample included a total of 62 texts collected through purposeful method from different sources produced by Imam Khomeini related to self-knowledge. From source 48 onwards, the content within the text was repetitive and the data reached theoretical saturation. The data were analyzed through textual analysis within the framework of a conceptual model including the Causal conditions (causes and opportunities); Pivotal factors; Strategies; Underlying factors; Interference factors, facilitators (backers) and inhibitors (barriers), and ultimately consequences (results of self-knowledge). The findings show that a lifestyle consistent with true knowledge of the message of revelation and the program of primordial nature, turn of attention from acquired knowledge to intuitive knowledge and self-purification lead to self-knowledge. As a result of establishing a connection between knowledge of the self and the knowledge of the Lord, the potential talents inherent in human primordial nature are actualized. Hence, the rational soul will be attained and all the powers of the soul, including imagination, anger and lust, will surrender to the sane reason and the prophets’ messages and will turn to merciful armies, and eventually, the position of vicegerency of Allah and eternal happiness (felicity) will be achieved.

The article is dedicated to studying and developing strategies for fostering creative thinking among students through the teachingof poetry writing in a foreign language. In professional activities, creative thinking is evident when one must act in situations of uncertainty, lack of standard problem-solving methods, and rapidly changing conditions. A set of exercises for preparing students to create poetic texts has been proposed and tested. Both standard methods and new ones, based on the theoretical principles of D. Hanauer, are applied, ensuring a high-quality preparatory stage that motivates students to self-discovery and self-expression. The experiment showed that 100 % of the participants not only demonstrated their ability to independently complete the final task using literary techniques but also displayed deep involvement in the process of writing poetry. They were able to merge the content of the novel with their own memories and emotions, creating unique and emotionally rich poetic works. The obtained results have practical applications in the field of developing students’ creative thinking when studying a foreign language.

Abstract “Know thyself” may be indicated by a balanced high pairing of two emotional self-knowledge indicators: attention to emotions and emotional clarity. Closely associated but often evaluated separately, emotional clarity is consistently, inversely associated with psychopathology, while evidence regarding attention to emotions is less consistent. Variables of high/low emotional clarity and attention to emotions yielded four emotional self-knowledge profiles which were analyzed for associations with mental health indicators (depression and anxiety symptoms, self-esteem, self-schema, resiliency, transcendence) in n = 264 adolescents. Here we report regression models which show that compared with neither, both high (attention + clarity) show higher positive self-schema (B = 2.83, p = 0.004), more resiliency (B = 2.76, p = 0.015) and higher transcendence (B = 82.4, p

This study demonstrates that videodance has the potential to create a paradigm shift in curriculum analysis and the implementation of hybrid activities in pre-service teachers at both the individual and group levels. Students’ critical perceptions, which had previously been trained in the domains of videodance, intermedial approaches, and cooperative learning, confirm the dimensions of video dance: videodance as an expression of language synergies, self-knowledge development through the use of technology, intermediality as a didactic resource, and the social contextualization of videodance. Pre-service students demonstrate their ability to create intermedial items. The outcomes of an individual creative education based on the requirements of each individual, as well as a collective artistic education based on varied interpretations of society, are demonstrated. Videodance generates an integrative look of the individual towards oneself, that is, awareness of the media (physical and visual) shapes the individual’s social observation and influences the reproduction of oneself towards the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the special issue 'The point of view of shared agency', a collection of papers that develops, and critically assesses, a striking development in recent philosophy of mind, epistemology, and developmental psychology, that is, the fundamental reappraisal of the time-honoured distinction between a 'first-person' and a 'third-person perspective' on our mental lives. In recent years, the nature of the 'second-person standpoint' has become a major focus of work across a range of disciplines. More recently, the idea of 'first-person plural knowledge', has received some attention, for example in considering knowledge of what 'we are doing' when we are doing things together. This collection explores collective agency, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other minds, from this plural and relational point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Anscombe a solitary activity is intentional if the agent has self-knowledge of what she is doing. Analogously one might think that to partake in shared intentional activities is for the agents involved to have plural or collective self-knowledge of what they are doing together. I call this 'the Plural Practical Knowledge Thesis' (PPK). While some authors have advanced related theses about the nature of the knowledge involved in shared practical activities (see Laurence, B. [2011]. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UP; Schmid, H.-B. [2016]. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP; Rödl, S. [2015]. "Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness." Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 14: 769–779. doi:; Rödl, S. [2018a]. "Joint Action and Pure Self-Consciousness." Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1): 124–136; Rödl, S. [2018b]. Self-Consciousness and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard UP) this alternative remains relatively underexplored in the current literature. The paper offers an account of plural practical knowledge based on the idea that shared activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means-end structures and proposes a paradigmatic methodology that generalizes this account to understand what different cases of collective intentional action have in common. It then discusses the differences between the proposed approach and those due to Schmid 2016. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP and Laurence 2011. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UPand the reasons why it should be preferred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework. I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge. Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations. I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework that can explain these desiderata. I argue that a group has self-knowledge of its own attitude A if and only if (i) the operative members jointly accept that the group has attitude A; and (ii) that joint acceptance is non-deviantly caused by the operative group members’ belief that the members jointly accepted attitude A; and (iii) the group has attitude A. Together (i) to (iii) give us conditions for a group having a justified, non-lucky, true belief about its own attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mathematical beliefs and metacognitive knowledge play significant roles in solving mathematical problems; thus, this study aims to investigate the influence of middle school students' beliefs on their metacognitive knowledge when solving geometry problems. This study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative research methods. A linear regression test was used to determine the effect of middle school students' beliefs on their metacognitive knowledge. The results of the quantitative research analysis were followed up with a qualitative research approach to describe the metacognitive knowledge of students who have high and low confidence in solving geometric problems. This research involved 352 middle school students in the Tarakan area. Based on the results of linear regression, it is known that the beliefs of middle school students have a positive effect on their metacognitive knowledge when solving geometric problems. In addition, it was found that students with different beliefs could solve a given geometry problem, but the approach to solving it varied among subjects. Middle school students have diverse beliefs, but these variations do not affect their capacity to apply their metacognitive knowledge at every stage of solving mathematical problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we can and do have some self‐knowledge, how do we acquire it? By examining the ways in which we acquire self‐knowledge—by introspection—we can try shedding some light onto the nature and the breadth of self‐knowledge, as others have tried to do with other forms of knowledge. My aim is to show that introspection involves multiple (that is, at least two) distinct processes, a view I call "pluralism about introspection". One of the virtues of pluralism is that it explains how we can have such a wide variety of self‐knowledge despite our cognitive limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning to take care of oneself in order to be able to take care of others is key to the future of Social Work practice. This article analyzes how self-care is taught to and learned by Social Work students. We approach it through the experiences and discourses of students and professors from the Social Work degree course at the Rovira i Virgili University (URV), in Tarragona, Spain. The methodology used was mixed. Data was collected during 2019 through 143 Social Work student online questionnaires, two student focus groups, two in-depth interviews with students, and 13 social work faculty online questionnaires. The results highlight the lack of specific training in self-care and the demands of both groups to have better access to this training. Some proposals to introduce content related to self-care programmatically into Social Work university studies are also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham's own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham's account of interim memory with his account of human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Perspectives on Culture / Perspektywy Kultury is the property of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Digital mental health interventions (DMHIs) have surged in popularity over the last few years. However, adherence to self-guided interventions remains a major hurdle to overcome. The current study utilized a phased implementation design, incorporating diverse samples and contexts to delve into the engagement challenges faced by a recently launched online mental health platform in Brazil with self-evaluation forms. Employing an iterative mixed-methods approach, including focus groups, online surveys, and think-aloud protocols, the research aims to evaluate user satisfaction, identify barriers to adherence, and explore potential hybrid solutions. Engagement in the platform was evaluated by descriptive statistics of the number of instruments completed, and qualitative interviews that were interpreted thematically. In the fully self-guided mode, 2,145 individuals registered, but a substantial majority (88.9%) engaged with the platform for only 1 day, and merely 3.3% completed all activities. In another sample of 50 participants were given a choice between online-only or a hybrid experience with face-to-face meetings. 40% of individuals from the hybrid group completed all activities, compared to 8% in the online-only format. Time constraints emerged as a significant barrier to engagement, with suggested improvements including app development, periodic reminders, and meetings with healthcare professionals. While the study identified weaknesses in the number and length of instruments, personalized results stood out as a major strength. Overall, the findings indicate high satisfaction with the mental health platform but underscore the need for improvements, emphasizing the promise of personalized mental health information and acknowledging persistent barriers in a digital-only setting.

This entry provides a comprehensive overview of the major themes, questions, and developments concerning the concept of the self in Islamic thought. Beginning with the Qur’an and then following the various streams of Islamic thought, such as theology (kalām), philosophy (falsafa), and Sufism, this study shows how Muslim thinkers reveal themselves to be fundamentally concerned with the problem of the human condition. Their manner of addressing this central issue from their differing perspectives devolves on the cultivation of what can be called both an anthropocentric and anthropocosmic understanding of the self that emphasizes self-knowledge, self-cultivation, and self-transformation on the one hand and a relational view of the self and the cosmos on the other. A rapid survey of Islamic philosophical, theological, and mystical texts gives the impression that the question of selfhood occupies a central place, as evidenced by numerous treatises/book chapters bearing its title. In his al-Mabdaʾ wa-al-maʿād (The Origin and the Return), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1050/1640), perhaps the most influential Islamic philosopher after Avicenna (d. 428/1037), goes as far as to claim that ‘knowledge of the self is the mother of philosophy (umm al-ḥikma) and the root of happiness (aṣl al-saʿāda), and that if one fails to attain assured certainty of the immateriality (tajarrud) and subsistence (baqāʾ) of the self, one then fails to attain the rank of a philosopher’. ‘And how is it possible’, he asks rhetorically, ‘to have any certainty concerning anything, if one did not have knowledge of one’s self in the first place’ (Mullā Ṣadrā 2002–2005: I.6)? He then goes on to aver that ‘whoever knows himself becomes deified (man ʿarafa dhātahu taʾallaha)’, a saying that he attributes to ancient philosophers (Mullā Ṣadrā 2002–2005: I.7). In his Nuzhat al-arwāḥ (The Delight of the Spirits), Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. c. 1288), one of the most important commentators of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī’s (d. 587/1191) Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Philosophy of Illumination), similarly claims that ‘understanding his [Suhrawardī’s] words and unravelling his writings and their mysteries are contingent upon knowing one’s self (bi-al-jumla, maʿrifat kalāmihi wa-ḥall kutubihi wa-rumūzatihi mutawaqqif ʿalā maʿrifat al-nafs)’ (Shahrazūrī 1976–1977: 14). Similarly, Dimitri Gutas has recently argued that the lynchpin of Avicenna’s philosophy is the ‘metaphysics of the rational soul’ (Gutas 2012: 417–425). Likewise, the Qur’an also contains hundreds of references to the word nafs (lit. self or soul) and its modalities, such as the blaming self (al-nafs al-lawwāma) or the tranquil self (al-nafs al-muṭmaʿinna).

God the Father was considered so completely inexpressible and unembodied that his visual appearance in early modern masterpieces has long challenged the theological accuracy of such works. A recent discovery complicates that issue. Albrecht Dürer’s 1500 Self-portrait as Christ is incorrectly considered an isolated example of divine self-representation. It was, in fact, as shown here, part of a long tradition throughout Europe between at least the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The praxis, potentially sacrilegious, raises questions about the truth of art at its highest level. To address this conundrum, this article analyzes works by three eminent, but very different, artists: Michelangelo, Raphael, and Dürer. Two current methodologies—visual exegesis and the poetics of making—support the argument. The analysis reveals that there is a fundamental unity to their work, which has not been recognized on account of three popular misconceptions about the nature of art, divinity, and the mind. This article concludes that depictions of God the Father and Christ by these artists are neither heretical nor false because, as the evidence shows, all three were part of a continuous spiritual tradition embedded within their craft.

Introspection can be defined as taking time to think deeply both about yourself and the outside world. Through introspection, library managers can obtain a more objective knowledge of their skills and weaknesses to better judge what they can do well, where they can improve, and when they should seek outside expertise. Introspection also leads to improved decision making since the reflective manager examines evidence from all sides, looks for hidden agendas, discovers how the world really works, and thinks before acting. The chief negative is that introspection takes time. The successful introspective manager learns to discover the optimal amount of reflection based upon the complexity and importance of the decision and also understands when to seek closure. The current frenetic pace of life with information overload and never-ending tasks requires the successful manager to find quiet time for the reflection that will increase performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Novel technological devices, applications, and algorithms can provide us with a vast amount of personal information about ourselves. Given that we have ethical and practical reasons to pursue self-knowledge, should we use technology to increase our self-knowledge? And which ethical issues arise from the pursuit of technologically sourced self-knowledge? In this paper, I explore these questions in relation to bioinformation technologies (health and activity trackers, DTC genetic testing, and DTC neurotechnologies) and algorithmic profiling used for recommender systems, targeted advertising, and technologically supported decision-making. First, I distinguish between impersonal, critical, and relational self-knowledge. Relational self-knowledge is a so far neglected dimension of self-knowledge which is introduced in this paper. Next, I investigate the contribution of these technologies to the three types of self-knowledge and uncover the connected ethical concerns. Technology can provide a lot of impersonal self-knowledge, but we should focus on the quality of the information which tends to be particularly insufficient for marginalized groups. In terms of critical self-knowledge, the nature of technologically sourced personal information typically impedes critical engagement. The value of relational self-knowledge speaks in favour of transparency of information technology, notably for algorithms that are involved in decision-making about individuals. Moreover, bioinformation technologies and digital profiling shape the concepts and norms that define us. We should ensure they not only serve commercial interests but our identity and self-knowledge interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The panel discussion presented at the New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute's 1066th Scientific Meeting held on June 8, 2023, takes up aging and dying of an analyst and their impact on patients and on the nature of analytic process. Participants reflect on conflicts and challenges arising with more analysts and patients living to an advanced age, on the unregulated nature of analysts' retirement, and on multilayered meanings of analysts' ethical commitment to their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Edward St. Aubyn shows a persistent metaphysical interest in consciousness, personal identity and psychoanalysis. Reading seven of his novels, this article investigates the relationship between what appears to be a style topic, that of metaphor, and an ontological truth, that of self-knowledge. This article contends that St. Aubyn uses metaphor’s ambiguity to structure his narrative explorations of subjectivity and metaphor’s power to create new meanings to offer absolution for his agonising characters. In the Patrick Melrose novels, metaphor is structured as a thought experiment to conduct a philosophical discussion of consciousness and personal identity. The ambiguous structure of metaphor provides a model for rival views on personal identity for Patrick to achieve self-knowledge through narrative identity. In Dunbar, the exploration of self-knowledge turns to the body. St. Aubyn situates Dunbar in the Lake District’s ambiguous environment, allowing him to regenerate an embodied subject to restore his sanity. Double Blind revisits one of St. Aubyn’s favourite subjects, psychoanalysis, and offers a concluding remark on the relationship between metaphor and subjectivity. St. Aubyn presents schizophrenia as a hermeneutic problem of making bad metaphors. He analogises the interpretive ability of psychoanalysis to gaining metaphoric competence, which promises recovery from schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]